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Abstract
Elliott, Dominic Paul
Organisational Learning From Crisis: An examination of the UK Football
Industry 1946 - 97
This thesis examines organisational learning within the UK Football Industry
during and after a series of crisis incidents. In particular, Turner's (1976, 1978) model
of Cultural Readjustment is critically examined. In the thesis, it is argued that
Turner's model is deficient in its treatment of organisational learning following public
inquiries. In the case of the UK Football Industry, it is argued that there was little
change to operating norms and procedures following each of the Bolton (1946), Ibrox
(1971) and the Bradford and Heysel Disasters (1985). The thesis, drawing upon the
relevant management literature, examines the roles played by organisational culture,
structure and communication as barriers to effective learning. Effective organisational
learning, it is argued, depends not only upon the development of explicit knowledge
but also upon the organisational elements that influence the transfer of knowledge into
changed behaviour.
In the period since 1989, the research indicates that some cultural change has
occurred. However, it is argued that those elements that thwarted learning in the
earlier period have impeded cultural readjustment. Further, the thesis provides an
analysis of the regulatory regime pertaining throughout the period, drawing in
particular upon Gouldner's (1954) 'Patterns in Industrial Bureaucracy'. It is argued
that the limited cultural change can, in part, be explained by the nature of the
regulatory system operated by different local authorities. In the analysis of the post
1989 period extensive use is made of Pauchant & Mitroff's Onion Model of Crisis
Management; an evaluation of which forms a part of this section.
The thesis concludes by making a number of recommendations for the various
bodies involved in the process for ensuring and promoting the safety of crowds inside
sports stadia.
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Chapter 1
Crisis Management, Cultural Readjustment and
Perspectives on the Stadia Crises of the UK Football
Industry
1.0 Stimulus for Research and Objectives of Study
UK football stadia have been the scene of at least forty-five incidents
involving multiple casualties or fatalities since 1945 (see table 1.1). Four of these
incidents, Bolton 1946, Ibrox 1971, Bradford 1985 and Hillsborough 1989 involved
more than fifty fatalities each. The scale and occurrence of these incidents suggest
a particular problem for the safe management of crowds in UK football stadia.
The initial stimulus for this study arose from a personal observation that a
number of measures recommended by Popplewell in 1985 were only implemented
in the aftermath of the 1989 Taylor Report. Further investigation revealed that
many of the recommendations put forward by Popplewell and Taylor had been
advocated in previous reports. This raised questions about the translation of
knowledge into action. Can organisations learn from disasters? If so, how does
such learning occur? Why did the football clubs not act sooner? How can we be
sure that the redevelopment of stadia following the Hillsborough Disaster
incorporates the lessons identified by the various public inquiries? This study
represents an attempt to examine, scientifically, these broad questions. A review of
the relevant literature suggested that effective learning can be impeded by a number
of organisational factors including culture and structure which forms the basis of
Chapter 2 (see for example, Garvin, 1993; Smith, 1995).
Implicit in previous studies of learning from disasters, (see for example,
Turner 1976, 1978, Toft & Reynolds 1992), is the hypothesis that crisis incidents
will provoke a cultural readjustment in the form of a challenge to accepted beliefs
about the world and its hazards. Hypothetically, this readjustment manifests itself
in changes to operating norms and procedures (i.e. changes to behaviour).
Although Turner (1978) alludes to the potential limitations of a full cultural
readjustment, given the focus of his analysis upon the incubation of disasters, this is
an issue that remains underdeveloped. 1 The first objective of this study was to
"this cultural readjustment is limited by the amount of disagreement which prevails among groups about the effectiveness of
any new precautions adopted" (Turner, 1978, p92) The discussion contained within Chapters 1 and 2 puts forward a
framework by which this can be assessed.
15
assess the extent to which a full cultural readjustment occurred within the football
industry. As it is argued that no full readjustment took place, the second objective
was to explore and examine why there was little learning from the various crisis
incidents.
The remainder of Chapter 1 deals with a number of issues. First, it
deals with the social or organisational dimension of crisis incidents and suggests
that human activity may influence the potential for a systems failure. The Chapter
proceeds to the identification of a series of stadium incidents providing the basis for
cross national and sport comparisons. Three perspectives regarding causality of the
UK's stadia accidents are examined. The Chapter concludes with a consideration
of three stages of crisis and assesses the potential contribution of learning at each
stage.
1.1 Definition of Terms
The study of organisationally based crises and disasters, many authors use the
terms interchangeably, has received increasing attention in recent years (Pauchant &
Douville 1993). Although used interchangeably, each term may imply a particular
view of the nature of crises or disasters. Broadly two general approaches exist
which we have termed here the 'Disaster' and 'Crisis' Management Schools. A
limitation of any review of such a diverse literature is that it will fail to do justice to
the complexity of writing within a particular field. Of course individual researchers
rarely fit neatly into one view or another and of course, writers may change their
views over time. With these limitations in mind attention is drawn to the main
differences between these two Schools.
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1.2 Crisis and Disaster Management Theory
This section introduces and defines the key terms that are used throughout this
thesis. A thorough review of this literature is beyond the scope of this thesis and a
number of such reviews have been undertaken (See for example, Lagadec 1993;
Quarantelli 1988; Pauchant & Douville 1993 ). Some authors have suggested that
overuse has stripped the term 'crisis' of scholarly meaning (see for example,
Robinson 1971, Morin 1976, Eberwein 1978 and Pauchant 1993). A brief review of
the evolution of research in the field of disaster and crisis management sets the
context for the use of the terms crisis and disaster within this thesis.
The Disaster Management School has since the 1960s focused primarily on the
response of organisations, particularly the emergency services, to natural disasters.
The term 'crisis management' in this context has been equated with 'emergency
managing' only (see for example, Quarantelli 1988). That is, particular attention is
given to understanding the processes by which post disaster communications and
co-ordination are achieved. The underlying causality of crises has not been
considered in detail by the 'Disaster School', reflecting its primary concern with
'naturally occurring disasters'. No human intervention could prevent an earthquake
or tornado, for example. Although it would be unfair to suggest that researchers
from this field hold a simplistic view of the underlying causes of crises, it is
evident that its emphasis upon the post incident phase has been to the detriment of
the study of the pre incident phase (See for example, Dynes & Aguirre 1971,
Quarantelli 1988). As Horlick-Jones (1990), Toft & Reynolds (1992) have argued,
the cause of such crisis incidents are often explained as 'acts of God,' highlighting a
potential danger of this approach; that organisations and/or communities are treated
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as separate from their environment. In Figure 1.1 the relationship between the
environmental trigger (disaster) and organisational response (crisis management) is
shown, as seen from a 'disaster management' perspective.
Environmental
	
Organisational
Trigger	 Response
(Disaster)	 (Crisis)
Figure 1.1 Disaster & Organisational Response
A key limitation of focusing upon the post crisis incident phase was identified
by Hardin (1971) who examined the deaths of some 500,000 people following a
cyclone in East Bengal. Hardin (1971) criticised the view that the cyclone was the
cause of death as too simplistic, instead suggesting that the underlying cause was
systemic, including a combination of inadequate infrastructure, overpopulation and
the decision to locate people in a hazardous area. Although Hardin (1971) made no
use of the term 'trigger' it is clear from his analysis that human activity can create
the potential for disaster of which the cyclone was merely the trigger.
Alternatively, the Crisis Management School, uses the term 'crisis
management' to refer to organisational activity before, during and after a specific
crisis incident as shown in figure 1.2. As Shrivastava (1987a), Pauchant & Mitroff
(1988) and Smith (1990a) have argued, the activities and inactivities of managers
may, and often do, play a key role in the promulgation of crisis incidents, as well as
influence the immediate organisational response and subsequent recovery.
Although figure 1.2 is shown as a linear model it should be seen as circular with
the post crisis stage feeding back into the pre crisis stage of a subsequent crisis
18
incident. Learning from crisis is an important means by which this 'vicious circle'
can be broken (see for example, Smith, 1995). The research interests of the 'crisis
management' school, therefore, are not only with the crisis incident and immediate
Pre Crisis Incident
Crisis of Management
Crisis Incident
Operational Crisis
Post Crisis Incident
Crisis of Legitimation
4	
Trigger
Figure 1.2: Three Stages of Crisis
Source: Smith (1990a)
response but also focuses attention on the organisational causes of crises. The
crisis management approach, which underpins this thesis, rests on the assumption
that organisations themselves influence their propensity to crisis, a point which is
discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. However, despite the distinction
drawn between a crisis and disaster management approach, identified above, these
two terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis except where specified.
The next section draws further distinctions between the term crisis, accident and
incident. Additionally, the next section examines the concept of cultural
readjustment, which refers to the process by which organisational learning from
crisis is translated into new precautionary norms and operating procedures that
break the 'vicious circle' of crisis. However, where the term 'crisis incident' is
used in this thesis it refers to the second stage of the model shown in figure 1.2.
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1.3 Distinguishing between Crises and Accidents: Cultural Significance
Learning from crisis has received relatively scant attention within a literature
that has focused upon understanding both the causes of socio-teclmical crises and
the immediate recovery from crisis incidents (see for example, Quarantelli 1988, for
a review of the Disaster Management literature). However, some recent studies
(most notably loft & Reynolds 1992, Smith & Sipika 1993, Smith 1995, Fortune &
Peters 1995) have dealt with the issues associated with organisational learning from
crisis incidents.
Central to the learning process is the role of culture, defmed for the present as
a set of assumptions and practices, which permits beliefs about issues such as risk
and safety to be constructed. Toft & Reynolds (1992) argued that:
"A culture is created and recreated as members of it repeatedly behave in ways
which seem to them to be the natural, obvious and unquestionable way of
acting."Q3).
The link between beliefs and behaviour is central to this defmition of culture and is
discussed more fully in Chapter 2. Turner's (1976, 1978) analysis suggested that
following a 'major man-made disaster' full cultural readjustment may take place:
"when the immediate effects [of a disaster] have subsided, it becomes possible to
move toward something like a full cultural readjustment.... of beliefs, norms and
precautions, making them compatible with the newly gained understanding of
the world."(Turner, 1976, p382).
Turner's analysis was primarily concerned with the incubation of crises and
identif'ing "organizational patterns that precede ... disasters"(Turner 1976, p380).
This thesis challenges the hypothesis, implicit within Turner's (1976, 1978)
analysis, arguing that in the case of the football industry, which was subject to
incidents investigated by four public inquiries in the period 1946-89, no such full
cultural readjustment occurred. The commissioning of a public inquiry is used by
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Turner (1976, 1978) and Toft & Reynolds (1992) as a proxy measure for the
cultural significance of a particular incident. As Turner (1976) argues:
"there is little need for a re-evaluation of culturally accepted devices when
accidents, even on a large scale, occur in situations recognized as hazardous.
When a trawler is lost in Arctic fishing grounds, or when a wall collapses onto a
firefighting team, there is much less comment than when an accident kills
passengers on a suburban commuter train." (p380).
For a number of authors it is the cultural significance of an event that
distinguishes a crisis from a simple accident. Turner (1978) refuting arguments that
defined disasters by scale (see for a recent example, Keller et a! 1990) suggested
that for an accident to be described as a disaster:
"it will probably need to be an unusually large-scale accident, an unusually
costly accident, an unusually public accident, an unusually unexpected accident
or have some combination of these properties." (Turner, 1978, p26).
Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a) suggested a typology of crisis, based on the work of
Perrow (1984) and Habermas (1973), that restricted use of the term 'crisis' to those
Systems Area
Subsystem	 Whole System
Physical
	
Incident	 Accident
Systems
Level
	
Symboli
	
Conflict	 Crisis
Figure 1.3: Definition of Terms in Crisis Management
Source: Pauchant & Mitroff(1992a) p13
'happenings' that physically affect an entire system and challenge basic
assumptions of members of that system to the point at which they are forced to
acknowledge the faulty basis of these assumptions or develop defence mechanisms
to protect these assumptions. The term 'accident' is used to describe a disruption
that affects a whole system physically but not symbolically. This typology is shown
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in figure 1.3. Turner's (1976) Arctic trawler might thus be described as an accident
because it does not trigger a cultural re-evaluation.
Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a) used the example of Bhopal which they modelled
both as an accident and as a crisis (see appendices 1.1 and 1.2 respectively). The
accident model focused upon the detail of what went wrong (technically and
organisationally) whilst the crisis model, encompassing all this detail, also
emphasised the symbolic importance of the disaster with reference to operating
norms and procedures within Union Carbide, the World Wide Chemical Industry,
and the operations of Multi National Companies in developing countries. This view
is linked closely with l'urner's (1976) view of cultural readjustment. A crisis
incident, as defined by Pauchant & Mitroff(1992a), has a symbolic importance that
leads managers and other personnel to question critically existing methods of
operation and thus leads to the development of new operating norms:
"To some extent this is what distinguishes crisis management, where both the
physical and symbolic dimensions of a crisis are addressed before and after a
crisis, from security management which is limited to the technical side of safety,
and crash management which is limited to reactive actions." (Pauchant &
Mitroff 1992a, p18).
These qualities of a crisis share much with Turner's (1978) defmition of disaster:
"an event, concentrated in time and space, which threatens society or a relatively
self-sufficient subdivision of a society with major unwanted consequences as a
result of the collapse of precautions which had hitherto been culturally
acceptable as adequate." (pp83-4).
Turner's (1976) notion of full cultural readjustment is clearly referring to the
symbolic dimension identified by Pauchant & Mitroff(1992a). Previous studies
have also drawn a distinction between the structural and psychological aspects of
crisis. For example, Billings et al (1980) critiqued Hermann's (1971) 'classical'
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model that had identified three dimensions to crisis, 'degree of threat, surprise
and limited time for decision making':
"Two actors may be in precisely the same situation, yet one may feel uncertainty,
time pressure etc. and defme the situation as crisis, while the other may see it as
a routine decision-making situation. Crisis resides in the person as well as in the
situation." (Billings et al. 1980, p.306).
Eberwein (1978) distinguished between structural and psychological approaches to
crisis:
"structural concepts of crisis stress the objective aspect of the phenomenon that
is a specific state of affairs independent from the fact of being perceived or not
while psychological concepts are those defming the subjective or perceptual
aspect of a specific state of affairs ... irrespective of the fact whether such a state
of affairs exists or not outside... perception." (p126).
It follows from this discussion that two identical events may be perceived of in
different ways, one as a crisis, the other as an accident, to use Pauchant & Mitroff's
(1992a) terminology. That is, one possesses a symbolic importance and leads to a
challenge of the core organisational assumptions which acts as the first step towards
full cultural readjustment; alternatively, the other (an accident) is treated as a
'structural' failure only; hence Smith's (1995) observation that the biggest hurdle to
learning from disasters concerns the focus of managers upon the technical elements
only of a system's failure.
The perceived importance by individual decision makers of a particular
incident sets an important dimension to the context in which organisational learning
occurs. Only the physical or technical elements of an incident will be examined
where it is perceived to be an 'accident'. Smith (1995) argued that the greatest
barrier to learning is that managers search for technocratic solutions to socio-
technical problems reflecting their inability to see the importance of cultural, human
and social factors.
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"The dilemma is that if we focus only on the technocratic group of elements then
we will, by definition, leave the dangerous human elements free and active
within the system." (Smith, 1995, p20).
This reflects the importance of symbolism to Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a)
definition of crisis; it suggests that examination goes beyond the technical issues to
include a questioning of the social and organisational dimension of crisis.
In summary, the terms crisis and disaster are used interchangeably throughout
this thesis.	 They refer to 'culturally significant' events, indicated by the
commissioning of a public inquiry. Cultural readjustment combines the re-evaluation
of 'beliefs and precautionary norms' and their translation into new operating
procedures. That is, the challenge to previously held assumptions leads to changed
behaviour, based on the newly acquired understanding through the public inquiry
process. The commissioning of four public inquiries, in addition to other official
reports, indicates the symbolic importance of the major football stadia disasters.
Thus, each might have been expected to trigger a full cultural readjustment. The
principal hypothesis to be examined is that:
"a full cultural readjustment did not occur following each of the stadium
disasters."
A full explanation of how this hypothesis was examined is provided in Chapter 3.
1.4	 Learning from Disaster: Full Cultural Readjustment?
In their study of learning from disasters, loft & Reynolds (1992) concluded
that single loop learning is the most common response to disasters leading to what
they defmed as a failure of hindsight. Single loop learning (Argyris 1994), which
may be defmed as 'within paradigm learning,' focuses upon the structural elements
only. Turner (1976, 1978) had earlier referred to failures of foresight in which the
warning signals of disaster potential were misunderstood or ignored. Tofi &
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Reynold's (1992) analysis went a step further by suggesting that following a
disaster, failures of hindsight occurred because an inability to learn from major
system failures leads to the recurrence of 'like incidents'. Single loop learning
forms the explicit basis for two of the three 'pure' types of learning identified by
Toft & Reynolds (1992); organisation specfIc learning (where each organisation
involved in a disaster draws its own lessons from the incident); iconic learning
(where organisations are informed of an event). Within the third type double loop
learning is implicit; isomorphic learning (where 'universally applicable lessons"
from an incident are learned). Toft & Reynolds (1992) were particularly concerned
with isomorphic learning and the transfer of knowledge between superficially
different systems. For example, understanding the behaviour of people when
threatened by a fire can be of value regardless of whether the potential fire location
is a theatre, hotel, football ground or underground station.
As discussed in section 1.2, crises differ from accidents in the symbolic
significance attributed to them. Figure 1.4, developed in part from Turner's (1976)
6 stage model, identifies the process by which cultural readjustment and
organisational learning may take place. Turner's (1976, 1978) model is shown at
the right hand of figure 1.4, alongside the relevant stage in the organisational
learning from crisis process model. The concern of Turner with the pre crisis
incident stages can be seen clearly. The pivotal role of the public inquiry is
identified, although, it is suggested in this thesis that actual learning is more
complex than simply receiving the results of such inquiries. This is the key
omission in the works of Turner (1976, 1978) and Toft & Reynolds (1992),
25
Turner's (1976) 6 Stage model
Figure 1.4.• The Organisational Learning From Crisis Process
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although it should be noted that their concerns were with distinct incidents rather
than the series of disasters within one industry that are the focus of this study. As
figure 1.4 highlights, information from the public inquiry process will be examined
and interpreted through a number of organisational and individual filters. This is
the key contribution to the models suggested by Turner (1976, 1978) and Toft &
Reynolds (1992) who failed to develop any critical examination of how
organisations might learn and how they might filter information. The nature of these
filters forms the basis for much of the discussion in Chapter 2 and it is hypothesised
that these filters have a powerful influence on the quality of learning that occurs.
Figure 1.4 also identifies Toft & Reynolds' (1992) three types of learning
(shown in italics) and places them within the context of an overall learning process.
It differs from the models put forward by Turner (1976) and Toft & Reynolds
(1992) by the inclusion of a stage of interpretation which, it is argued in this thesis,
is the key to understanding how the knowledge acquired is translated into active
learning. Turner (1976) fails to explore how the defmition of new, well-structured
problems and appropriate precautions through the inquiry process, is translated into
new norms and operating procedures. This process, it is argued, is more complex
than either Turner (1976, 1978) or Toft & Reynolds (1992) suggested. A main
objective of this thesis is to develop insights into this process with reference to the
UK football industry..
The next section presents a brief background to the series of crises experienced
by the UK Football Industry. Comparisons are made with other countries and other
sports suggesting that the UK football industry had a particular problem over a
period of forty years. As discussed earlier, despite recent interest in organisational
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learning from system failures there has been no attempt to systematically examine
an industry which has experienced a series of disasters. The experiences of the
Football Industry up to and including early 1997 offer an opportunity for such an
examination.
1.5 The UK Football Industry: A Series of System Failures
On April 15th 1989 ninety-five people died in the Hillsborough Stadium, a
ninety sixth victim died some three years later, never having recovered
consciousness.
"Afler eight previous reports and three editions of the Green Guide2 it seemed
astounding that 95 people could die from overcrowding before the very eyes of
those controlling the event."(Taylor ,1989 p4)
As Taylor's statement indicates, the Hillsborough tragedy was not seen as a freak
accident, technical failure or simple Act of God, a usual explanation for such
catastrophes (Horlick-Jones 1990, Toft & Reynolds 1992), but as a failure of those
responsible for ensuring crowd safety inside sports stadia.
Before Hilisborough, eight Government sponsored reports had led to a myriad
of recommendations, the introduction of a legislative and advisory framework, and
the development of a stadium licensing system. Between 1945 and the 1989
Hillsborough tragedy, over two hundred and fifiy spectators died inside British
Football Stadia, and, many more had been injured (see Table 1.1). Taylor (1989)
noted 'that many of the deficiencies .. had been envisaged' suggesting that the
problem of managing crowds inside stadia had been treated with some
complacency.
2 Green Guide to Safety in Sports Grounds, first published in 1973 and subsequently revised in 1986,
1990, 1997. The Green Guide is the main source of guidance for football clubs and regulatory
agencies regarding the technical requirements for stadia and more recently, advice on safety
management.
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There are two key arguments of this thesis. The first is that the tragedies, of
which Hilisborough was only the most recent (others include Ibrox 1971, Bradford
1985), were the result not simply of the technical and organisational failures on the
day of the disasters, but of a longer process influenced by the norms and values of
individuals and organisations associated with the football industry. That is, failure
to learn by the various agencies within the industry contributed to each disaster.
The second main argument is that despite the major redevelopment of football
grounds since 1989, these norms and values have changed only superficially.
1.5.1	 Stadium Disasters in the UK and World-wide
Stadium disasters are not a problem restricted to the UK. For comparative
purposes a summary of world wide stadia disasters is shown in Table 1.2. A number
of observations can be made about the data included within the two tables.
(i) Fatal accidents have occurred inside football stadia since the creation of the
Football League (1888).
(ii) There has been an apparent increase in the number of incidents in the period
since 1960. Although table 1.1 suggests that the incidence of 'stadium accidents'
may have increased since 1960 the lack of detailed evidence for the preceding
period prevents a proper analysis from being undertaken.
(iii) Accidents are not restricted to larger football stadia but have also occurred in
those owned by clubs with smaller stadium capacities.
(iv) Although extensive efforts were made to collect data from developed
countries, particularly from the UK's immediate European neighbours where
football is similarly popular, most of the examples included in Table 1.2 would be
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Venue	 Year	 Fatalities	 Injuries	 Disaster Type
Valley Parade (Bradford)
	
1888	 1	 3	 Railings collapse
Blackburn	 1896 ___________	 5	 Stand Collapse
Ibrox (Glasgow)	 1902	 26	 500	 Collapsed temporary stand
Brentford	 1907 ______________	 25	 Fence Collapse
Leicester	 1907 ______________	 25	 Barrier Collapse
Hillsborough (Sheffield)
	 1914 ______________	 80	 Wall collapse
Chariton	 1923 _____________	 24	 Crowd Crush
Wembley	 1923 _____________	 1000	 Crowd Crush
Burnley	 1924	 1	 50	 Crowd Crush
Manchester (City) 	 1926 ______________ 25
	
Crowd Crush
Huddersfield	 1932 _____________	 100	 Crowd Crush
Huddersfield	 1937 ____________	 4	 Crowd Crush
Watford	 1937 _____________	 <10	 Crowd Crush
Fulham	 1938 ____________ <25	 Crowd Crush
Rochdale Athletic Ground
	 1939	 1	 17	 Roof Collapse
Burnden Park (Bolton) 	 1946	 33	 400	 Crowd Crush
Shawfield (Clyde)	 1957	 1	 50	 Barrier Collapsed
Ibrox (Glasgow)	 1961	 2	 ____________	 Crowd Crush on Stairway 13
Oldham	 1962 _____________	 15	 Barriers Collapse
Arsenal	 1963 ____________	 100	 Crushing
Port Vale (Stoke on Trent) 	 1964 _____________	 2	 FalllCrushing
Roker Park (Sunderland) 	 1964 _____________	 80	 Crowd Crush
Anfield (Liverpool)	 1966 _____________	 31	 Crowd Crush
Leeds	 1967 ____________	 32	 Crowd Crush
Ibrox (Glasgow)	 1967 _____________	 8	 Crowd Crush on Stairway 13
Dunfermline	 1968	 1	 49	 Crowd Crush
Ibrox (Glasgow)	 1969 ______________	 24	 Crowd Crush on Stairway 13
Ibrox (Glasgow)	 1971	 66	 <100	 Crowd Crush on Stairway 13
Carlisle	 1971 ______________ 	 5	 Barrier Collapse
Oxford	 1971 _____________	 25	 Wall Collapse
Stoke	 1971 _____________ 46	 Crowd Crush
Wolverhampton	 1972 _____________	 80	 Barrier Collapse
Arsenal	 1972 ____________	 42	 Crowd Crush
Lincoln	 1975 ______________	 5	 Wall Collapse
Leyton Orient	 1978 _____________	 30	 Barrier/Wall Collapse
Hillsborough (Sheffield) 	 1981 _____________	 38	 Crowd Crush
Middlesborough	 1981	 2	 <20	 Gate collapses,
Walsall	 1984 _____________	 20	 Wall Collapsed
Bradford	 1985	 56	 ____________	 Fire
Birmingham	 1985	 1	 200	 Wall Collapsed/Hooliganism
Heysel (Brussels)	 1985	 39	 Wall	 Collapsed.
______________________________ ________ _____________ ______________ Hooliganism
Easter Road Edinburgh	 1987 ____________	 150	 Crushing
Hillsborough (Sheffield) 	 1989	 95	 400	 Crowd Crush
Middlesborough	 1989 _____________	 19	 Crowd Crush
Stockport	 1991 _____________	 3	 Crowd Crush
Table 1.1: Stadium Disasters in the UK:
Sources: Elliott, D (1996), Inglis, S (1996), McGibbon, E (1996) FSDAC Bibliography (1993)
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Venue	 Year	 Fatalities	 Fatalities	 Disaster Type
Lima (Peru)	 1964	 300	 ___________	 Crowd Riot
Turkey	 1967	 41	 __________ Crush
Buenos Aires (Argentina)	 1977	 71	 ___________	 Crush
Cairo (Egypt)	 1974	 48	 ___________	 Crush
Piraeus (Greece)	 1981	 24	 ___________	 Crush/Stampede
Ibagne (Colombia) 	 1981	 18	 ___________	 Crush
Cali (Colombia)	 1982	 24	 250	 Crushing/Stampede
Algiers (Algeria)	 1982	 10	 ___________	 Roof Collapse
Moscow Spartak (Soviet 	 1982	 340	 Crowd Crush
Union)	 ___________ ____________ ____________ _____________________
Mexico City (Mexico)	 1985	 10	 29	 Crushing
Tripoli (Libya)	 1987	 20	 ___________	 Crush
Katmandu (Nepal)	 1988	 70	 Stampede	 during
_____________ ______________ ______________ 	
Hailstorm
Lagos (Nigeria)	 1989	 12	 ___________	 Crush
Orkney (South Africa)	 1991	 40	 50	 RiotJStampede
Bastia (Corsica)	 1992	 17	 ____________	 Crush
Lusaka (Zambia) 	 1996	 9	 52	 Crowd Crush,, exit
__________________ _______ _______ _______ from ground
Guatemala	 1996	 80	 150	 Crowd Crush
Table 1.2:	 Stadium Disasters World-wide
Sources: Elliott 1996, Inglis 1996, McGibbon 1996, Daily Telegraph 1996
considered as developing nations. For example, the United Kingdom is the only G7
nation to have been the scene of more than one stadium disaster. Few of the
incidents reported in table 1.2 received the media coverage given to the UK
tragedies, making it highly probable that this list is incomplete. For example, the
recent Zambian disaster was reported in only one British Newspaper and received
coverage of less than one colunm inch (Daily Telegraph, 25/06/96).
(v) A number of the disasters listed in table 1.2 were triggered either by adverse
weather conditions or by political violence, neither of which has been identified as
triggers for UK Stadia Disasters.
(vi) The absence of examples of stadia accidents in Italy, Germany and The
Netherlands is surprising given the popularity of football in these countries and the
large attendances that matches attract. A table of some 80 European stadia that
have been used as 'big match venues' is included at appendix 1.2 to demonstrate
that stadia are of equal size to those in the UK. The regular concentration of large
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crowds into stadia is not peculiar to Great Britain. The average age of stadia (in
1994) ranged from 41 years (Germany), 45 years (Italy, Holland), 53 Years (Spain),
54 years (France) and 91 years (Great Britain). It should be noted that the age has
been calculated on the basis of when a stadium was first established on a particular
site. Difficulties in assessing the extent of any subsequent refurbishment prohibited
the use of rebuild as a measure of age. The significance of age, apart from the
implications for the design of stadia and its possible condition, concerns the
geographical location of stadia given that transport to and from such constructions
was very different in the early twentieth century from that now (Bale 1993).
Another observation is that in the cases of Italy and Germany, and to some extent
Spain and France, municipal authorities have been frequently involved in the
development of new stadia with a multi purpose use anticipated (e.g. with running
tracks surrounding the pitch). In the cases of Germany and Italy, new build appears
to have occurred in two main phases with government investment. The first during
the post First World War period in which grand stadia may be linked to the rise of
nationalism. The second phase when preparations for hosting major international
events were made; the Olympics (Germany 1972) and Football World Cup (Italy
1990). A fmal observation is that the reduction in stadia capacities has not been
restricted to Great Britain (see appendices 1.2 and 1.4) and as the figures for
Germany, Italy and Spain illustrate, official capacities have been exceeded in the
past and current capacities are much lower than some twenty years ago. This
evidence supports the view that the concentration of large numbers inside sports
stadia is not unique to Great Britain, neither is the reduction in capacities. Key
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differences lie however, in the forms of ownership of stadia and in the time elapsed
since the decision to first build a stadium on a particular site was made.
(vii) A comparison with Rugby League, the second most popular spectator sport in
the UK, if measured by the average attendances at first division matches (see
Appendix 1.3), indicates a large difference in attendances. In the ten year period
1986 to 1995 some seventy two instances of crowds in excess of twenty thousand
are recorded (excluding cup finals). Of these exactly half took place at either
Wembley or a League football club's ground. Notably, the first recorded death in a
crowd related incident at a British stadium took place at a Rugby League match in
1888 (Inglis 1996). For comparison, on an average Saturday in 1997 there are some
fifteen football crowds in excess of twenty thousand.
(viii) Although Hillsborough was the last 'tragedy' to date, other 'incidents' have
occurred in and around sports stadia since 1989. Two are identified in table 1.1.
Another, that cannot be identified because of assurances from the author regarding
anonymity, concerned a crushing incident as crowds sought to re-enter a ground.
The UK appears to have a particular problem concerning crowd safety inside
sports stadia. It is clear that the concentration of large crowds inside stadia is not
peculiar to the UK but the use of stadia appears to be a riskier activity for British
football spectators than for their Rugby League or Continental European peers.
Within the relevant literature three basic explanations of the Stadia disasters can be
identified.
1.6	 Explanation One: The Hooligan Trigger
The first view, and one that has received some popular currency (See
Giulianotti et a! 1994 for a discussion of media coverage), suggests that the
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tragedies were caused largely by one factor, hooliganism, either directly by the
hooligans themselves or indirectly by the ways in which measures were introduced
to deal with this problem. Reflecting the former view, Sir Bernard Ingham (1996),
Chief Press Officer (1980-90) for Prime Minister Thatcher, stated:
"that the Hilisborough soccer disaster was caused by tanked up yobs who arrived
late, determined to force their way into the ground. (Daily Mail 20/06/96, p1 1).
Ian Taylor (1989) putting forward a similar view, albeit from an alternative
political perspective, discussed the 'over-determination' of the issue of crowd safety
during the 1980s, setting it against a national context of poor investment in
infrastructure and the desire of Government to deal with the problems of
hooliganism by increasing police powers rather than to search for its underlying
causes:
"The determining cause, if this is the appropriate word, of the Hillsborough
tragedy was, indeed, the way in which the Leppings Lane terrace, like so many of
the 'popular ends' at English soccer grounds had been reconstructed over the
years as a caged in 'pen' from which there was no means of escape at a
predictable moment of crisis of mass spectator excitement and anxiety. It is vital
to understand that this process of caging in a section of the soccer audience,
identifiable with that portion of the underclass seen to be generally and
universally capable of violent behaviour, is a social process - prioritising 'secure
containment' - and a product or expression of a particular historical and political
moment deriving from the late 1960s and 1970s."(Ian Taylor, 1989, p95).
The coincidence of the Bradford fire in 1985 with incidents of football
hooliganism in Britain and the Heysel stadium tragedy in Brussels meant that the
upsurge in political interest in Britain, including the involvement of Prime Minister
Thatcher, was concerned primarily with the issue of hooliganism. Hogwood (1987),
Taylor (1989), and Giulianotti (1994) argued that such a view suited the dominant
view of the "state" and allowed for the development of technocratic solutions in the
form of more rigid police control of spectators and the building of more fences to
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contain football supporters. At Heysel, thirty-nine spectators were crushed to death
following a charge of English supporters. Although subsequent inquiries
highlighted that the Heysel Stadium contained structural flaws and that inadequate
conimunications had existed between the various police agencies overseeing the
event (t'Hart & Pinjenburg, 1989), hooligans clearly played a key role in triggering
the incident. Popplewell's Interim Report (1985) dealt largely with the Bradford
Fire and the events at Birmingham, on the same day, that saw the death of one
spectator following a confrontation between rival fans inside the stadium. The
Final Popplewell Report (1986) focused upon the Heysel Tragedy, devoting the
majority of its content to the issues of crowd control and hooliganism. Concluding
the Final Report Popplewell (1986) stated:
"I do not pretend that my Report can be all embracing or provide a simple
solution to a complex problem. There is no panacea. There is no one solution
to violence." (ç61).
thus illustrating that the issue of football violence was perceived to be at the core of
the problem - despite his own fmdings that violence played no part in the events of
the Bradford Fire and that there were a number of organisational and technical
failures3 associated with the Heysel Stadium disaster. The Government of the day
did not wait for Popplewell to complete his report, but announced several measures
within a week of the Heysel tragedy (Giulianotti 1994). This indicated a desire to
be seen to act quickly, even without possession of the full facts. The influence of
this particular view will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. However, it is
argued that the focus upon hooliganism as the football industry's primary problem
was an important factor that helped to limit the effectiveness of learning.
A discussion and analysis of the various football disasters, including Bradford and Heysel is included
in Chapter 5
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1.7 Explanation Two: Simple Causes
A second explanation (a non-systemic approach) suggests that every disaster
or crisis is unique, a view which Tofi & Reynolds (1992) criticise for constraining
learning to incident specific issues. For advocates of this perspective, that four
major tragedies occurred within a thirty year time frame represented an unfortunate
coincidence; but each should be treated on its own merits and not linked into any
search for a common pattern.
Such an explanation rejects a systemic view, focusing solely upon the incident
in question. Criticising such views Tofi & Reynolds (1992) cite von Bertalanify
"It did not matter whether a particular system was biological, sociological or
mechanical in origin, it would display the same (or essentially similar)
properties, if it was in fact the same basic kind of system."Q3).
From this Tofi & Reynolds (1992) deduct two further inferences, for which they
provide extensive supporting evidence.
"First, that any failure that occurs in one system will have a propensity to recur
in another like system for similar reasons. Second, although two particular
systems may appear to be completely different, if they possess the same or
similar underlying component parts or processes, then they will both be open to
common modes of failure."(pp4-5).
Recent comprehensive reviews of research in the fields of Man-made Disasters
(Horlick-Jones 1990) and Crisis Management (Pauchant & Douville 1993) reported
the growing agreement amongst researchers that crises (disasters) are system
failures, resulting from complex interrelationships among many factors. Toft &
Reynolds (1992) argued that the limited focus of learning from disaster incidents
(i.e. incident specific rather than isomorphic or systemic) had been an important
contributory factor to the recurrence of such incidents. Public Inquiries (the
principal tool used to examine the various football stadia disasters), reported Toft &
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Reynolds (1992), describe the events leading up to an incident, an analysis of these
events and a series of recommendations that deal with tecimical issues aimed at
preventing the recurrence of similar incidents. They fail to examine the systemic
causes of crisis incidents, that is, the social and technical aspects together, thereby
losing an opportunity to transfer learning to other socio-technical systems that
share similar properties.
An example from the Football Industry concerns the Public Inquiry into the
causes of the Ibrox tragedy, undertaken by Lord Wheatley. Following Wheatley's
Report (1972) the Safety in Sports Grounds Act (1975) was introduced with
supporting guidance in the form of the so called 'Green Guide'. The aim of the
Green Guide was to provide guidelines for the design and management of sports
stadia. Canter et al (1989) have argued that the Safety at Sports Ground Act (1975)
and Green Guide put forward untested, technical solutions to the problems of
managing crowds within stadia. The engineering simplicity of these technical fixes
did not bear up to psychological examination; for example, people moving along a
corridor or through an exit do not flow like liquid through a tube (Canter et al,
1989). Indeed technical advice contained within the Green Guide was in at least
one case based upon incomplete and preliminary research. This guidance, reported
Canter et al (1989), was treated as established fact. The ways in which technical
approaches have been implemented suggests a widely held view that problems of
crowd control and safety can be dealt with once and for all through the
implementation of design standards that are created in response to specific
incidents. Prior to the Hilisborough tragedy 'safety inspections' of grounds focused
exclusively upon testing the strength of crush barriers. A further example, the
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"Football Stadia Design Advisory Council" (FSDAC), set up following Taylor's
Reports, put forward guidelines based on people of average height. This average
made no allowances for differences between men, women and children (John,
1993). No justification for this approach was made despite objections at the
conference made by both the author and by a representative of the Royal Society for
the Prevention of Accidents4.
A further problem is that despite the availability of guidance a number of
football clubs failed to act upon advice. This failure was encouraged by Wheatley's
(1972) decision not to press for the introduction of a statutory Code of Regulations,
but to opt for "a more flexible system under which the requirements of each
stadium might be considered". This "flexibility" was in spite of one of his
concluding remarks concerning the failure of some clubs to implement the
recommendations of the earlier Lang (1969) Report. As will be shown in Chapter
4, there is extensive evidence that many clubs failed to follow the guidance set
down in the Green Guide and that an ineffective regulatory system ensured that
these failures were rarely identified.
Whilst an overemphasis upon the failure of technical elements is most notable
within the history of the football industry other examples do exist. Lord Justice
Stuart-Smith, appointed by the Labour Government to determine whether there are
grounds for re-opening the Hillsborough public inquiry, 'joked' when first meeting the
Hillsborough Families Support Group, asking if "other families were going to turn up
late like Liverpool fans" thus suggesting a simplistic interpretation of the causes of
the Hillsborough disaster (Guardian, October 3rd) 1997.
"The Conference was held at the Home Office Training College at Easingwold, Yorkshire. It sought to
bring together a number of experts in the field of crowd and sporting venue management.
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The similarities between the first and second explanations of the various
tragedies concern their focus on simple causes. In the first case, the hooligan
problem is identified as the key trigger, in the second, teclmical failures or bad luck
conspired to cause accidents. As de Quidt (1997a) 5 noted, the immediate response
to the Hillsborough tragedy has been the redevelopment of football stadia (i.e. an
emphasis upon technical solutions). The role of the Football Licensing Authority,
de Quidt identifies, is to build upon these improvements and to facilitate the
development of a real 'safety culture'. de Quidt's (1997a) view, and the evidence
of recent near misses, lead to a research question that flows from the first
hypothesis. Why didn't effective or active organisational learning occur? The
focus upon technical issues appears to have formed a powerful mindset. This raises
questions about the nature of the learning process and the organisational filters
through which knowledge is processed and translated into actions. The underlying
theoretical basis for the third explanation provides an alternative way of looking at
the stadium disasters and an approach for exploring the issues of organisational
learning from crisis.
1.8 Explanation Three: A Systemic View of Football Stadia Crises
A third explanation, based upon a systemic view of crises, emphasises a
common pattern of inadequate management practices, behaviour and attitudes
within the industry that lies behind each of the crisis incidents (see for example
t'Hart & Pinjenburg 1989, Elliott & Smith 1993a). Extensive supporting evidence
for this view is included in Chapters 5 and 6 which contain a detailed analysis of
each of the main crisis incidents.
Chairman of the Football Licensing Authority
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An underlying assumption of this thesis (following for example, Turner 1976,
1978; Perrow 1984; Shrivastava 1987a; Smith 1990a; Pauchant & Mitroff 1992a;
Toft & Reynolds 1992) is that the stadium disasters were socio-technical system
failures. In a review of the crisis management literature, Pauchant & Douville
(1993) criticised the approach of many researchers who focused upon only a few
variables arguing that:
"Crises do not happen in a vacuum; they are the results of complex systemic
interrelationships among many different variables."QD5 1).
A systems approach seeks to avoid the flaw of over emphasising a particular causal
factor by seeking to deal with the interplay between various system elements. As
Checkland (1981) has identified, the central concept of systems thinking may be
described as:
"the idea of a set of elements connected together which form a whole, this
showing properties which are properties of the whole, rather than properties of
its component parts." (Checkland 1981, p3).
Using Checkland's (1981) classification, a football stadium may be described as
sharing the properties of a 'designed physical system' (the technical infrastructure)
and a 'human activity system' (comprised of the people using a stadium, its
management and the various agencies associated with crowd safety). The label
'socio-technical system' recognises this combination of physical and human
components throughout this thesis. Checkland (1981) argued that each system type
possesses its own idiosyncrasies. This view, it will be argued, has been ignored by
many of the public inquiries regarding the stadia disasters, the results of which
make the assumption that human behaviour can be regulated in the same way as
liquids and gases in test tubes and pipes (see for example Sime 1985, Canter et al
1989). It can be hypothesised that 'the response to the football stadia tragedies has
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concentrated upon the technical system elements to the detriment of social
components'.
It is argued that the stadium incidents were not the consequence of technical
factors alone, instead they represented failures of complex systems, triggered by the
individuals working within them.. Within this tradition this thesis argues that the
various stadia tragedies 1971-89 were not unique but that they represented
manifestations of a wider 'crisis of management' (Smith 1990a, Elliott & Smith
1993 a) within the UK Football Industry. The remainder of this Chapter provides an
overview of a crisis management approach. Figure 1.5 highlights the influence of
each of these explanations upon the learning process. The high profile given to
hooliganism and emphasis upon tecimical solutions operated throughout the
learning process through the public inquiry to the implementation of
recommendations. For individual clubs, it is argued, culture, structure and
communications acted as filters through which learning was translated into new
norms and operating procedures.
Organisational Learning From	 Barriers to Learning
Crisis Process (see Figure 1.4)
Public Inquiry
Challenge To Existing NormsI	 HooliganismTechnical Mindset
Dissemination Of Public Inqu Findings 7ICuInire,
Interpretation Through Organisational Filters 	 &
Communications
Figure 1.5: Barriers to Learning from Crisis
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1.9 Stages of Crisis and The Organisational Incubation of Crises
The study of industrial and commercial crises is a relatively new and evolving
discipline. It is important to recognise the distinction between those who are
concerned with a largely reactive model of crisis management and those who
advocate a more strategic approach. The contingency based approach to disaster
management of the former group is exemplified by studies of media response
(Scanlon 1992), organisational dynamics (Dynes & Aguirre, 1979, Quarantelli
1988) and medical response (Wallace et al., 1994). The latter group (see for
example, Turner 1976, 1978, Shrivastava 1987a, Smith 1990a, Pauchant & Mitroff
1 992a) are concerned with issues of prevention, change and learning rather than
simply with response. A number of the key studies reflecting this latter view are
summarised in table 1.3 which indicate the key developments. A common
characteristic is the identification of a number of stages through which a crisis
proceeds. As table 1.3 indicates researchers have identified a different number of
stages. However, there is agreement upon three basic stages, pre crisis, crisis
incident and post crisis recovery and turnaround.
From a theoretical perspective the opportunity to intervene early in system
failures was lost to early researchers because the models did not include a pre-crisis
stage. That is, they advocated reactive rather than proactive strategies (see for
example, Fink et al. 1971).
Turner's (1976, 1978) seminal work was amongst the first to identify the role
played by organisational culture and faulty assumptions in creating the
preconditions for crisis:
"Common causal features are rigidities in institutional beliefs, distracting decoy
phenomena, neglect of outside complaints, multiple information handling
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Incubation
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Hidden Crisis
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difficulties, exacerbation of the hazards by strangers, failure to comply with
regulations and a tendency to minimise emergent danger." (Turner 1976, p3 78).
Turner (1976, 1978) argues that this combination of factors leads to a 'failure of
foresight' as organisational personnel and systems are unable to identify potential
risks. Toft & Reynolds (1992) developed this argument into the notion of
Fink et al	 Turner (1976)	 Slatter (1984)
(1971)
Stage 2
Defensive
Retreat_______________ _____________
Stage 3
Acknowled
gement_____________ ___________
Stage 4	 Stage 6	 Stage 5
Adaptation Full cultural	 Recovery or
& Change	 Readjustment Failure
Fink	 Smith (1990a) Shrivastava et al 	 Pauchant &
(1986b)	 (1995)	 1991	 Mitroff
(1 992a)
Stage I
	 Stage 1	 Stage I
	 Stage 1
Prodromal	 Crisis of	 Environmental	 Signal
Crisis	 Management	 Munificence	 Detection
Firm: Optimism
& expansion	 __________
Stage 2
	
Stage 2
Crunch	 Preparation
Economic	 and
slowdown	 Prevention
Firm: Cutbacks	 __________
Stage 3
Uncertainty	 _______
Stage 2	 Stage 2
	
Stage 4	 Focal
Acute Crisis Operational
	
Triggering Event Crisis
Crisis	 Incident
Stage 3
Chronic
Crisis
Stage 3
Containment
/Damage
limitation
Stage 3
Crisis of
Legitimation
(i) Defensive
phase
Stage 4
	 (ii)	 Stage 4
Crisis	 Consolidation	 Recovery
phase
(iii) Offensive	 Stage 5
Phase	 Learning
Learning
Learning
Feedback
Table 1.3 : Models of Crisis
'failures of hindsight' where organisations failed to learn effectively from crisis
events leading to the recurrence of similar crisis incidents. Even with the benefit of
hindsight, these rigidities of belief, information handling difficulties etc. act to
prevent effective learning.
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Turner (1976) also introduced the concept of a trigger event, the effect of
which is dependent upon an organisation's 'susceptibility' to crisis. This argument
is central to the contribution of later authors including Shrivastava (1987a)
Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992a), and Smith (1990a) who, whilst not dismissing
the relevance of environmental factors, argued that crises can often be better
explained in tenns of internal (i.e. organisational) factors than external ones.
is, the propensity to crisis resides within organisations. The external factors may
influence the internal ones and external elements may provide a trigger, but the
inherent vulnerability is internal. This is not to say that the crisis resilient
organisation will be able to deal with every 'external trigger' but that it will be
better placed to do so. For example, a study of the effects of the bombing of the
City of London upon resident banks found that:
"The particular organisational crises triggered by the City of London bombings
were largely determined by internal factors- the degree of centralisation,
hardware and software backup routines and out of hours staff communications.
A gas explosion or earthquake might have had similar effects. Following the
City's Bishopsgate bombing, the Nat West's data transfer routines were cited as
a key factor in its ability to maintain operations. Conversely, the routines of the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation did not facilitate a quick return to
normality." (Swartz et al 1995, p19).
Increasingly the focus of research in the field of crisis management has shifted
towards developing a greater understanding of how the preconditions for crisis
arise as indicated in table 1.3. The notion that organisations possess crisis prone
and crisis resistant properties has received much attention from a number of
authors (See for example Slatter 1984; Schwartz 1987; Pauchant & Mitroff 1988,
1992a; D'aveni 1990b; Miller 1990). Others including Roberts (1990a & b, 1993a
& b), Weick (1988,1993), La Porte 1996, deal with similar issues from the
alternative perspective of 'high reliability organisations.' The basic philosophy
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underlying this extensive research is that organisations influence their exposure to
crisis and that greater effectiveness requires co-ordinated changes to plans and
structures through fundamental changes in organisational beliefs and individual
assumptions. For High Reliability Organisations (HRO), these authors focus on
those organisations that have largely avoided crisis incidents despite operating in
hazardous industries. However, HRO's are very narrowly defmed against a set of
specific criteria and there is thus a problem in using their arguments in other
organisational settings. Despite this shift in emphasis within the academic
literature, the 'professional' literature is still largely concerned with crisis response
(see for example Regester 1987). Smith (1990a) has argued that this is indicative of
'the threat that such changes bring with them.'QD12). In other words, it is easier to
justify resources for developing and resourcing contingency plans than it is to
secure backing for the fundamental changes that a full crisis prevention process
might require. Thus management inactivity may contribute to the incubation of
crises.
'Incubation' is the term used by Turner (1976), Smith (1990a) and Toft &
Reynolds (1992) to refer to the organisational process(es) by which the potential for
crisis is created or enhanced. For example Smith (1990a) stated:
"the actions or inactions of management can promulgate the development of an
organisational climate and culture within which a relatively minor triggering
event can rapidly escalate up through the system and result in catastrophic
failure." (p271).
Tofi & Reynolds (1992), recognising that crises frequently concern many
organisations argued that:
"The socio-technical system operates, possibly suffering from inherent latent
system failures which build up until some event occurs that precipitates or
triggers an incident, accident or disaster." (p9)
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Within the Football Industry, the many 'incidents' or 'accidents' (to use Pauchant &
Mitroff's typology) suggest many warnings of latent system faults which were
generally ignored. This thesis now moves on to a consideration of those factors that
have been identified as influencing the propensity of organisations to crisis.
1.10	 Factors that Influence the Propensity to Crisis
Recent studies have identified the importance of "human" factors such as
culture, structure, communications and history and "technical" factors such as
systems' coupling and complexity, control, contingency planning and cost that
cause some organisations to be more prone to crisis than others (see for example,
Smith 1990a, 1993 Pauchant & Mitroff 1992a,). Smith (1990a, 1992, 1995) for
example, identified a number of critical elements within crisis causation, described
as the 7 C's of crisis management. Two groups were identified in Smith's 7
element model, shown in figure 1.6, which may be seen as a critique of the search
for excellence 7 S framework. Smith (1995) argued that the excellence
characteristics embedded within the 7 S framework (Waterman et al 1980, Pascale
& Athos 1981) represent one end of a continuum and that the 7 Cs represent the
move into crisis incubation. Using the typology of Waterman et al (1980) and
Athos & Pascale (1981), Smith (1995) grouped the 7Cs into technical (cold) and
socio-politico (warm) categories. The 'cold square' elements of 'contingency
planning', 'control', 'coupling and complexity' and 'cost' represent the technocratic
aspects of crisis management, whereas the 'warm triangle' elements of 'culture',
'communications' and 'configuration' represent the organic aspects of the process.
Smith (1990a) argued that the 7C's can be seen to operate in each of the different
phases of crisis management (see figure 1.6).
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Identifying causal factors is however, extremely difficult and the search for
single or simple causes may be misleading, as Turner (1976, 1978) and more
recently, Smith (1990a, 1992) noted. The interdependence of multiple factors is
generally accepted within the literature (for example, Perrow 1984, Thain &
Goldthorpe 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Smith 1990a; Pauchant & Mitroff 1992a;
Shrivastava et al. 1991). No hierarchy is implied as it is the relationships between
the various factors that are important. That is, a systems approach is used. Other
research has sought to identify common patterns to identify organisational types.
Smith (1995) drawing on D'aveni's (1990b) work on organisations and
fmancial crises, suggested that this incubation phase may be up to ten years. From
on
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a previous analysis of the football industry (see Elliott & Smith 1993a; 1997), and
drawing on Turner's (1976) analysis this may be extended to encompass far longer
periods.
The importance of core assumptions and beliefs about the world and potential
hazards (identified by Turner (1976) Shrivastava (1987a) and Mitroff & Pauchant
(1988)) indicate the influence of years rather than days or months. The influence of
these core beliefs and assumptions is that events at variance with them are ignored
or their importance is devalued (Turner 1976). Fink (1986b) described these as
prodromes or warnings that are either not seen, or disregarded or the organisation
fails to respond effectively to them. Fink (1986b) suggested that the prodromal
stage began at least "13 months prior" to the Three Mile Island leak. With
reference to the Football Industry, Stairway 13 in the Ibrox Stadium was the scene
of three serious crowd incidents in the 10 years preceding the 1971 tragedy.
In summary the image of organisation formed by these writers is of a system in
precarious balance, constantly adjusting and readjusting.
"It is clear, then, that what is important for the concept of crisis is not so much
the external disruption which in certain cases effectively triggers a crisis process.
Rather it is the internal disruption from processes apparently not disruptive....
and the internal disruption, triggered by overloading or double bind, will
manifest itself as failure in the regulation or the decay of an homeostasis."(Morin
1976, p14).
In general terms the "trigger event" had become synonymous with the crisis itself.
It is now seen by many authors as one phase ,or part of a phase, of the crisis
process, which includes pre-trigger crisis conditions as well as a post trigger crisis
incident.
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1.11 Crisis Management Approach: The Operational Crisis
At this stage the potential for crisis is translated into a system wide incident.
This stage has received significant attention from researchers. As previously
identified the Disaster Planning School starts from the assumption that a
"catastrophe" has occurred. Typical subject matter includes studies of crisis
communications and the examination of organisation structure and crisis response
(see for example Dynes 1970, Dynes & Aguirre 1971, Hage et al. 1971, Quarantelli
1988). For Dynes (1970) crisis situations provided "a natural laboratory for testing
hypotheses about organisational and group behaviour under realistic conditions of
severe strain and stress"Q)4). The interests of this group have usually concerned
community based disasters reflecting the sociological origins of this approach.
Quarantelli's (1988) summary of this school's research findings argues that the
greatest improvement to "disaster crisis management" will be achieved from
improving the behaviour of emergency organisations. 	 This focus upon the
emergency service distinguishes this literature from that of the management science
field, although both schools of thought share an interest in the problems of
information, communications and decision making (see Smart & Vertinsky 1977
for example).
Other researchers have examined the reactions of victims and rescuers alike
(see for example James 1988, Hodgkinson & Stewart 1989, Elliott & Smith
1993b). The aim of research has been focused upon understanding how groups,
individuals and organisations deal with the effects of the pressures generated by a
crisis situation.
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1.12 Crisis Management Approach: Crisis of Legitimation
Smith & Sipika (1993) have identified three distinct phases of crisis response
shown in figure 1.7. The third phase shares some features of Turner's (1976, 1978)
model. Smith & Sipika (1993), suggest that the removal of 'scapegoats' provides a
basis for a restructuring and the 'cultural change process that is the embodiment of
this final phase'. Smith & Sipika (1993) drawing upon the case of Union Carbide
following the Bhopal disaster, argued that the removal of senior decision makers
Crisis Incident
Post Crisis
Defensive Phase	 Immediate crisis response, attempt to limit the impact of crisis incident upon
____________________	 the organisation.
Consolidation	 Organisation seeks to provide a firm base on which to develop a strategy for
Phase	 repair and recovery.
Offensive Phase	 Scapegoating and removal of a number of senior decision makers -
Oranisation adaDts its culture and confi guration to facilitate growth
Figure 1.7. Three Phases of Post Crisis Stage:
Source Adaptedfrom Smith & Sipika 1993
(scapegoats) provided a platform for cultural adjustment and reconfiguration. This
may occur in some cases but not in all. A review of safety systems at the Bradford
Football Stadium some eight years following the fire indicated the continuance of
the lax safety culture that predated the disaster (Laybrun 1995), despite the removal
of those held to be at fault.
Smith (1995), developing this model further, suggested that the issue of
organisational learning from such events is often overlooked. The extent and type
of such learning may prove to be a key factor in determining the future proneness of
an organisation to crisis. That is, the crisis of legitimation feeds back directly into
the crisis of management. Where one ends and the other starts is difficult if not
impossible to determine. Understanding organisational learning and those factors
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which influence the process, is key to understanding whether or not core individual
beliefs and assumptions have changed. This process is discussed in greater detail in
the next chapter.
1.13 Summary
This thesis is concerned with two distinct but related issues. The first is to
examine the hypothesis that "no full cultural readjustment followed the various
stadium disasters". Chapters 5 and 6 provide a detailed analysis of the football
industry in the 1946-97 period which provides extensive evidence in support of the
principal hypothesis.
The second issue concerns the reasons why no full cultural readjustment
occurred. A hypothetical model of the 'Organisational Learning from Crisis
Process' was identified in figure 1.4 and contrasted with that put forward by Turner
(1976, 1978). This new model emphasises the role played by organisational filters
as determinants of the extent of learning from crisis. That is, the public inquiry
process through to the dissemination of its fmdings represents only one part of the
cultural readjustment process. This raises a number of research questions which
flow from the preceding discussion. First, what are these organisational filters and
what are their characteristics? Chapter 2 identifies the theoretical justification for
selecting culture, structure and communications as filters and provides frameworks
by which these factors can be examined with reference to the UK football industry.
Second, how did these organisational filters influence learning within the UK
football industry? In particular how did these filters influence the interpretation of
public inquiry fmdings and their translation into new operating norms and
procedures? Cultural readjustment, as Chapter 1 has argued, refers to a process in
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which knowledge is translated into changed behaviour. It is hypothesised that
culture, structure and communications acted together to restrict organisational
learning and cultural readjustment. With regard to culture, which is examined in
detail in Chapter 2, it is argued that beliefs and assumptions about the role of
hooliganism (directly and indirectly) and technical failures acted as powerful
influences not only upon organisational learning but upon the entire public inquiry
process. These arguments flow directly from the crisis management approach,
discussed above, that suggests that organisations and managers themselves
promulgate the conditions for crisis incidents. Each public inquiry represented an
opportunity for the UK football industry to break the 'vicious circle' of crisis.
Finally, although the period since 1989 has witnessed the extensive
redevelopment of stadia, the core beliefs and assumptions of managers within the
industry have, it is argued, largely remained unchanged and that such superficial
changes are unlikely to prevent future incidents. In other words, the football clubs
and related agencies have not learned effectively from past incidents and the
potential for future tragedy is high. The purpose of this thesis may be summarised
as the testing of the first hypothesis concerning the extent of cultural adjustment
and a supplementary exploration of organisational learning from crisis with
reference to the football industry.
Chapter 2 introduces the analytical framework on which this thesis is based.
It explores the key dimensions that influence organisational behaviour and argues
that effective change to behaviour requires challenging deep-seated beliefs and
assumptions. An analytical framework, based upon the crisis management literature
is put forward as a model for examining the football industry. Chapter 3
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describes the principal methods used during the research with an analysis of their
advantages and disadvantages. The methodology made use of a mixed methods
approach, one suited to the complexity of the subject under investigation. Chapter 4
provides background information to the industry; considers the contribution of the
hooliganism debate to an understanding of stadia disasters; and outlines the
organisational characteristics of the key agencies involved within the football
industry Chapter 5 examines the various stadium tragedies and analyses the
response of football clubs to regulations in the period since 1946. In particular, this
thesis is concerned with exploring the nature of organisational learning in the period
between the Bolton (1946) and Hillsborough (1989) tragedies. Chapter 6 deals with
the football industry in the post Hilisborough period and examines the extent of the
cultural readjustment that has occurred within the football clubs and regulatory
agencies. Chapter 7 includes the conclusions and recommendations for ftirther
research.
The main contribution of this research is that it represents the first attempt,
from the literature reviewed, to examine organisational learning within an industry
that has experienced a series of system failures. The fmal Chapter concludes with a
series of recommendations regarding both directions for future research and
practical measures for developing learning within the industry.
53
Chapter 2
Crisis Management Theory and Organisational Learning
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the scale and occurrence of stadia disasters
indicated a particular problem for the UK football industry. The commissioning of
four public inquiries in a forty year period indicated the high symbolic importance
attributed to these crisis events. Despite their high profile the recurrence of a series
of accidents and crises suggests that no full cultural readjustment occurred raising
questions of the ability of organisations and individuals working within the football
industry to learn.
This Chapter concentrates upon organisational learning and identifies and
examines those factors which may influence the learning process. It begins with an
evaluation of the public inquiry process, given its prominence as a mechanism for
learning, based upon previous studies. The Chapter introduces the guiding
analytical framework which pulls together the key organisational characteristics that
influence learning with the three stage crisis model (shown in figure 2.1).
Culture, configuration and communications have emerged from the literature
as key factors. Each of these is critically examined in the subsequent parts of this
Chapter. In particular, Pauchant & Mitroffis (1988, 1992a) Onion Model of Crisis
Management is used to provide a framework for the identification of individual and
social barriers to organisational learning (i.e. defence mechanisms, fatalism, inner
orientation). Organisational structure and communications are examined with
reference to Mintzberg's (1983) model of configuration which argues that there is a
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close relationship between an organisation's size, age and environment.
In figure 2.1 the three filters, culture, structure and communciations are shown
interlinked with the fourth system element of tecimology. Together, these form the
context in which a strategy emerges, leading ultimately, to organisational
behaviour. The analysis in this chapter examines each of these four elements and
introduces frameworks to be used in the examination of the football industry.
Although each may have an influence upon learning this is shown as closely linked
to behaviour with both single and double loop learning identified. This is significant
given the focus of this study upon learning from crises and the public inquiry
process.
2.2 The Public Inquiry Process
The public inquiry is the mechanism by which events of a special significance
are investigated. The purpose of the public inquiry, it has been argued, is frequently
to apportion blame (see for example Tofi & Reynolds 1992, Fortune & Peters
1993). The collection and analysis of evidence usually takes place within a
particular paradigm, the basis of which is rarely examined. Often the public inquiry
concentrates upon one focal incident, thereby discouraging learning which may
arise from the consideration of similar failures. Reference to other incidents may be
made, but these are rarely re-evaluated in the light of new evidence.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the major incidents that have occurred since 1946. The
occurrence of a number of large scale accidents that were subsequently investigated
through the public inquiry process offers an opportunity to examine organisational
learning over a period of nearly half a century. Within Figure 2.2 each circle
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represents the three stages of crisis for each incident, with the fmal stage feeding
directly into the pre crisis stage of the successive incident.
Following each incident the Government of the day instigated a public inquiry
into the causes of the tragedies. A number of criticisms have been made of the
public inquiry process:
i) Political considerations and context. A view expressed that issues other than
evidence are taken into consideration for political reasons (Toft & Reynolds 1992).
For example, the UK Government acted before Popplewell (1985, 1986) had
published his fmdings regarding the causes of the Bradford Fire and Heysel
Stadium Tragedy.
ii) Limited or biased terms of reference. Setting the scope and scale of the
inquiry from the outset can have a major impact upon its fmdings (Toft & Reynolds
1992). The terms of reference reflect the dominant paradigms re. causality and a
non-systemic view as identified by Canter et a! (1989) with regard to the public
inquiry into the Throx Disaster. From this study it emerged that the public inquiry
focuses upon explicit knowledge and frequently deals with technical issues. That
is, recommendations are made that seek to prevent the exact re-occurrence of a
particular set of conditions by the imposition of specific, technical,
recommendations. Little attention is given to the social system elements that are, as
identified in Chapter 1, key to understanding the behaviour of modern
organisations. Organisational learning is restricted in such cases to the pursuit of
technical excellence through the implementation of specific recommendations.
iii) Quasi-legal structure. It has been suggested that rather than seekmg the truth,
inquiries have an implicit goal of apportioning blame (Toft & Reynolds 1992).
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Smith (1992) identified the tendency for post crisis reviews to apportion blame.
Perrow (1984) and Senge (1990) argue that systems may cause their own behaviour
making the search for individual scapegoats nonsensical.
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Figure 2.2: Stadium Crises in the Football Industry 1946 - 96
59
iv) Time consuming (Fortune & Peters 1995). The length of time between the
commissioning of an inquiry and publication of its final recommendations may
encourage government or others to act prematurely as may have been the case with
the government response to the Bradford and Heysel disasters.
v) There is no requirement to act on their findings. (Fortune & Peters 1995). The
public inquiry process does not necessarily have the full force of law. Identification
is only the first step in the process of changing behaviour. As already indicated the
public inquiries concerning stadia accidents had made a number of
recommendations that, if implemented could have averted the Hillsborough tragedy.
(For example, Moelwyn-Hughes' (1946) recommendation regarding the counting
and control of spectators into stadium enclosures). A second, and equally important
step, is translating knowledge into action via changes to operating norms and
procedures. This raises questions about the communication of the fmdings of
public inquiries and the mechanisms by which organisations implement them.
vi) Perrow (1984) argued that many investigations into accidents are 'left
censored' in that they examine only failures and not systems with the same
characteristics that have not failed.
In summary, the commissioning of a public inquiry may act as an indicator of
the perceived symbolic importance of an incident. However, its adversarial nature,
limiting terms of reference and political context may combine to limit, rather than
enhance, their usefulness as a tool for learning. Further, those that most need to
learn are the subjects rather than participants in the inquiry process. This
distinction raises questions of how involvement in the public inquiry process may
influence the acquisition and interpretation of knowledge.
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2.3 Knowledge, Organisational Learning and Cultural Readjustment
Recent debate in organisational theory has focused much attention upon
learning, yet as Garvin (1993) notes, "a clear definition of learning has proved to be
elusive"{p79]. It is clearly an important construct as Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995)
have argued:
"In an economy where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one source of
competitive advantage is knowledge." (p99).
Knowledge, whether gained from mental models, experience, mistakes or shared
insights, is the consistent element of many defmitions of learning (see for example,;
Levitt & March 1988; Argyris, 1991, 1994; loft & Reynolds, 1992; Garvin 1993;).
Implicit in all these definitions is the translation of knowledge into changed
behaviour. Nonaka (1991) distinguished between tacit and explicit forms of
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is personal and difficult to formalise while explicit
knowledge is formal and available in a form that is easily communicated. Nonaka
(1991) used the example of a craftsman to highlight the nature of tacit knowledge.
Knowledge and skill develop during a long apprenticeship served working
alongside a master craftsman. Such knowledge can not be made explicit easily.
That is, it can not be readily transferred to others in the way that the logic of a
computer programme might be demonstrated. Senge (1990) made a similar
distinction when he argued that the term learning had lost its central meaning
stating that it had become synonymous with absorbing facts. Learning, argues
Senge, should also involve 'a fundamental shift or movement of mind'. Nonaka
(1991) stated that tacit knowledge lies in the mental models, beliefs and
perspectives that influence the way in which people perceive their world and act in
it. Tacit learning, it follows, may incorporate a questioning of these mental models,
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a form of learning which has been described as double loop. (see for example,
Argyris 1991, Stacey 1993).
Within organisations, Stacey (1993) argued that learning may take place
within a cultural framework or it may seek to question existing norms and practices.
In the case of the former, learning takes the form of single, negative, feedback
loops in which organisations review and learn from actions that they or others have
taken. Such learning takes place within a given paradigm. Double ioop learning
takes further steps in that it questions not only the objective facts, but asks
questions about those facts, their context, the reasons and motives that surround
them and their presentation. Argyris (1994) defmed the two approaches with
reference to the simple example of the thermostat:
"Single loop learning asks one dimensional questions to elicit a one dimensional
answer. For example, a thermostat which measures ambient temperature against
a standard setting and turns the heat source on or off accordingly. Double loop
learning takes an additional step, or more often than not, several additional steps.
It turns the question back on the questioner.... In the case of the thermostat for
example, double loop learning would wonder whether the current setting was
actually the most effective temperature at which to keep the room and, if so,
whether the present heat source was the most effective means of achieving it. A
double loop process might also ask why the current setting was chosen in the
first place." (Argyris 1994 pp78-79).
Double loop and tacit learning question underlying assumptions, and in their most
extreme forms take nothing for granted. In explaining the development of science,
Kuhn (1970) argued that a paradigm was more than just a set of rules or procedures
but that it constituted, at a sub-conscious level, a whole way of thinldng that
conditioned how science was carried out. A scientific revolution occurred when
more and more anomalies came to light, challenging the basis of the existing
dominant paradigm. Kuhn's (1970) theory of the development of science mirrors
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the 'cultural readjustment' hypothesised by Turner (1976). Cultural readjustment
occurred, argued Turner (1976) when:
"disaster provoking events tend to accumulate because they have been
overlooked or misinterpreted as a result of false assumptions, poor
communications, cultural lag, and misplaced optimism."Q395).
Major incidents, argued Turner (1976, 1978), challenge these false assumptions
leading to new mental models and beliefs. The importance of symbolism to
Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) definition of crisis reiterates this point. Toft &
Reynolds (1992) suggested that major incidents provoke active, as distinct from
passive, learning, which results in 'fundamental' remedial action to correct errors.
The emphasis of Toft & Reynolds analysis, as illustrated by the three types of
learning described in Chapter 1, is upon a sophisticated form of single ioop
learning, improving techniques for analysing incidents and accidents with a view to
improving organisational learning. Such an approach is akin to TQM with its
emphasis upon continuous improvement - the question of replacement is never
considered. Toft & Reynolds (1992) failed to examine the organisational factors
that influence the type, scope and scale of learning, nor did they make reference to
single and double loop learning.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that learning may occur in a variety of
ways and at different levels. The cultural readjustment identified by Turner (1976)
and later by Tofi & Reynolds (1992) is clearly concerned with the development of
tacit knowledge, based upon double ioop learning. Given that learning implies the
translation of knowledge into action, the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 examines the
extent to which stadium and crowd management changed in the period 1946-97.
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As identified in Chapter 1, a number of authors have identified a pre-crisis
incident stage in which occur a series of incidents which are at odds with accepted
beliefs about hazards and the means of avoiding them (see for example, Turner
1976, Fink 1986a, Smith 1990a, Tofi & Reynolds 1992). Such incidents mirror the
build up of anomalies described by Kuhn (1970) in the development of a science.
A crisis, to use Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) defmition, occurs when these
anomalies can no longer be ignored and a particular incident acts as a watershed in
the development of a new paradigm. However, Kuhn's (1970) notion of scientific
revolution suggests too clear cut a development or transition from one paradigm to
another. In the case of organisations, some may undergo a cultural transformation
whilst others remain wedded to existing norms and practices. A key area of interest
therefore, concerns the question, what factors influence the nature and extent of
organisational learning?
2.4 Factors That Influence Organisational Learning
Pedler et al (1991), Rochlin (1993), Garvin (1993), and Argyris (1994),
amongst others, have observed that learning processes reflect the culture,
communications, structures and reward systems of organisations. Smith (1995)
identified culture, communications and configuration as the three main drivers of
the learning process. An alternative way of expressing this view is to describe these
factors as filters through which information is collected, examined and translated
into behaviour, procedures and mental models. These three factors (i.e. culture,
communications and configuration) correspond to the "warm triangle" or 'human'
elements of a system that has failed (Smith 1995). Citing Reason (1987), Smith
(1995) has argued that these human-centred elements may act as Reason's 'resident
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pathogens', which can lie dormant for periods of time before triggering crisis
events. For most of the time such pathogens are:
"either tolerated or kept in check by protective measures. But every now and
again a set of circumstances occurs which permits these 'resident pathogens' to
thwart the defences, thus making the system vulnerable to threats that could have
otherwise been withstood."(Reason, 1987, p465).
A danger is that by focusing solely upon technical elements, the human elements
are ignored and left free and active within a system. Smith (1990a) has previously
argued that these three 'human' factors together with the technical system elements
(control, cost, contingency planning, and coupling and complexity) interact as the
drivers of an incubating crisis and that the organisational climate of human factors
may act as barriers to learning. A remedy, argued Smith (1995), is for organisations
to 'generate turbulence' by a constant challenging of the underlying paradigm of
core beliefs, assumptions and shared values. Such controlled turbulence provides
an environment in which double loop learning is both encouraged and supported
(Smith's 1995 model is shown at appendix 2.1). Organisational learning is divided
between single loop with fixed standards and double loop with reassessed
standards. The relationship between the cold square and warm triangle is key.
Smith (1995) describes this process as:
"turning the overall learning process on its head and, rather than immediately
focus on the technocratic elements of the supposed solution, we begin to
question the basis of technocratic rationality in organisations."Q21).
Smith's (1995) ideal learning organisation is one in which reassessed standards of
decision making are in a state of constant flux and open to criticism from those
outside of the decision body. Ideal learning may be conceived of as active in the
sense that the learner is not simply the passive recipient of explicit knowledge.
Instead active learning involves the ongoing questioning of new knowledge and the
65
mindsets that created it. This is of particular relevance to the development of
technical specifications that are clearly forms of explicit knowledge. Fischer (1991)
has argued that the culture of technocracy is important in luring organisations into a
false sense of security concerning their decision making. Organisational learning in
this broad sense encompasses both explicit and tacit learning. It refers not simply to
the ongoing monitoring of the responses to one dimensional answers but seeks to
question the filters through which new knowledge is acquired.
In the analytical framework (see figure 2.1), organisational strategy and
behaviour are shown as the outcome of the interaction of the various socio-technical
elements of the system (culture, structure, communications and technology) which
are each shown as open to the environment. That is, open to influences outside the
focal system itself. Double loop learning feeds directly back into the organisational
system, alternatively single loop learning acts as positive or negative feedback into
organisational behaviour. There is clearly a need for both. Single ioop learning
enables operational control, double loop ensures the ongoing evaluation of
standards. They are complementary rather than contradictory.
Missing from the framework are two categories, no learning and passive
learning. No learning occurs where an organisation fails to collect any information
regarding possible systems failures. The failure to collect information may reflect a
culture of denial within an organisation, one of the defence mechanisms discussed
in the following section. Passive learning is where a threat is identified but ignored,
again suggesting the presence of cultural defence mechanisms. Just as active
learning is facilitated by organisational characteristics, so too are passive and no
learning.
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In addition to culture the other organisational characteristics are identified as
configuration, communications and technical elements. It is argued that these four
characteristics interact with one another to produce an organisations strategy and
ultimately organisational behaviour at each stage of the crisis cycle.
The defence mechanisms, degree of fatalism and inner/outer focus of decision
makers shown in figure 2.1 represent dimensions of culture or the individual and
collective mediators of learning. The addition of 'economic context' feeding into
both culture and technology systems recognises that decisions are rarely free of
commercial considerations. Configuration and communication are both linked to
the ways in which organisations co-ordinate work practices and information flows.
The lower end of figure 2.1 illustrates the three stage cycle of crisis, as described by
Smith (1990a), emphasising that the framework as a whole represents only a
snapshot and that it should be conceived of as a fluid system, with the
organisation's characteristics influencing its capabilities within each phase of the
crisis process. Implicit within the model is that organisational learning should also
be an ongoing process rather than a periodic review or response to crisis. This
Chapter now turns to consider each of these factors and their influence upon
organisational learning.
2.5 Defining Culture
Culture, stated Hofstede (1990), has acquired a status similar to strategy and
structure within the management literature, identif'ing the acceptance by both
theorists and practitioners of its importance. Defining culture however, is not
straightforward. Mitroff et a! (1989) offered a simple definition when they
suggested that culture is to the organisation as personality is to the individual. A
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more comprehensive defmition, also offered by Mitroff et a! (1989), drawing
extensively upon the work of Schein (1985) stated that:
"The culture of an organisation may be defmed as the set of rarely articulated,
largely unconscious beliefs, values, norms and fundamental assumptions that the
organisation makes about itself, the nature of people in general and its
environment. In effect, culture is the set of "unwritten rules" that govern
"acceptable behaviour" within and outside the organisation." (Mitroff et a! 1989,
p2'7l).
Schein's (1985) defmition concluded that culture represents:
"the accumulated shared learning of a given group covering behavioural,
emotional and cognitive elements of the group members' total psychological
functioning... a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned." (pp
10-12).
This view of culture as a stable phenomenon, consisting of shared values, norms
and fundamental assumptions has been widely accepted (see also Turner 1976,
Williams et al 1989, Hofstede 1990, Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 1994).
There is also much agreement that a useful framework for examining culture
incorporates a number of levels, the innermost of which are hidden or obscure (see
table 2.1). Turner (1976) in an analysis of three disasters (Aberfan, Hixon and
Summerland)' argued that all organisations develop a continuous culture closely
related to their tasks and environment which carried the risk of a 'collective
blindness' to important issues:
"This is the danger, that some vital factors have been left outside the framework
of bounded rationality. When a pervasive and long established set of beliefs
exists within an organisation, these beliefs influence the attitudes of men and
women inside the organisation. They affect decision making procedures and
mould organisational arrangements and provisions so that there is the possibility
of a vicious self reinforcing circle growing up."[p388].
'Aberfan (1966), A mudslide in a Welsh village slipped killing 144 people; Hixon (1968) in which a
slow moving lorry was hit by a train on a newly automated level crossing killing 11 people;
Summerland (1974), A fire in a leisure complex on the Isle of Man killing 50 people.
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Schein (1985) Mitroff&	 Williams et al Hofstede	 Trompenaars	 Hampden
Pauchant	 1989	 (1990)	 (1993)	 Turner (1994)
________________ _____________ (1988)
	 _____________ ____________ _____________ _____________
Description	 Multi layered	 Onion	 Lily Pond	 Onion	 Onion	 Circle/Spirals
cites Schein
_______________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ (1985)
Key level I	 Level I	 Level I	 Level I
	
Level I
	 Level I
Observable/Visible	 artefacts,	 Organisationa	 Behaviours	 Symbols	 Explicit
creations	 I plans	 Culture
Visible	 (observable
organisational	 reality in
structures and	 language etc.)
__________________ processes	 ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________
Level 2
	 Level 2
Organisationa	 Heroes
________________ _____________ I Structure
	 _____________ _____________ _____________ _____________
Level 3
____________ __________ __________ __________ Rituals 	 __________ __________
Key level 2	 Level 2	 Level 3
	
Level 2	 Level 4	 Level 2
Reportable, greater Espoused
	 Assumptions	 Attitudes and	 Values	 Norms and
level of awareness	 values	 and	 Values	 values
strategies,	 Beliefs	 (Reportable)
goals,
__________________ philosophies
	 ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ______________
Key level 3
	 Level 3
	
Level 4	 Level 3
	
Level 3
Unconscious,	 Basic	 Individual	 Beliefs	 Core
invisible	 underlying	 Beliefs	 (Unconscious	 assumptions
assumptions	 )	 about
___________________	 existence
Table 2.1: Alternative Models ofOrganisational Culture
Levitt & March (1988) argued that organisational learning OCCUrS within a
'structure of meaning' that is broadly shared. They suggested that such structures
are sufficiently flexible to permit some change in operational procedures but that:
"participants collude in support of interpretations that sustain the
[organisational] myths. As a result stories, paradigms and beliefs are conserved
in the face of considerable disconfirmation and what is learned appears to be
influenced less by history than by the frames applied to that history"[p324]
A similar phenomenon was observed by Starbuck et a! (1978) who observed that
organisations seek to 'routinise' the means by which they have been successful and
in so doing become internally focused and concerned with driving efficiency. From
this evidence it is clear that culture can and does act as a powerful force upon the
process of organisational learning.
Developing this view, Pauchant & Mitroff (1988) argued that all organisations
could be placed upon a continuum ranging from those with a crisis prone culture to
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those with a crisis resistant one. The characteristics of crisis prone organisations
included an 'inward orientation' and rigid, inflexible structures and belief systems.
Their resulting "Onion Model" (see figure 2.3) emphasised the inter-relatedness of
individual beliefs, shared organisational values, structure and processes and
ultimately organisational behaviour. In particular the Onion Model provided the
basis for the cultural element of the analytical framework shown in figure 2.1.
Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992a) argued that in crisis prone organisations,
managers may use a variety of defence mechanisms in relation to crisis. Drawing
from a psychoanalysis literature they argued that managers use these mechanisms to
avoid having to deal with complex, potentially threatening situations. For example,
managers might avoid a systems approach to a problem because of its complexity,
preferring in its place to deal with the system components individually, a defence
mechanism they label splitting. Support for this view comes from Argyris & Schon
(1996) who described a similar phenomenon within organisations, namely
'defensive routines'. Threats are dealt with by defensive reasoning which inhibits
an effective response to disturbing stimuli. Argyris (1994) defmed defensive
reasoning as consisting of:
"all policies, practices and actions that prevent human beings from having to
experience embarrassment or threat and, at the same time, prevent them from
examining the nature and causes of that embarrassment or threat."Q78).
People and groups within organisations employ a range of strategies to resist
change, even when events highlight inadequacies in systems, procedures and
beliefs. Organisational culture acts as a key influence upon the effectiveness of
learning. Mitroff et al (1989) suggested that there is:
"extreme overlap and interpenetration between the various factors that compose
the levels such that it is extremely difficult to say at times which circles are true
subsets of which."Q,273).
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At the surface layer are the most observable factors (described by Schein 1985, as
artefacts) such as plans and actual behaviour. These are the tangible elements that
reflect the beliefs, values and assumptions of the core. The analytical framework
(figure 2.1) draws out the intangible elements of culture, structure and
Level 4
Level 1	
_ Organisational Strategies
Core Individualj	 (Plans, mechanisms for crisis mgt.)
(individual defence
mechanisms)
Level 3
Organisational Structure
Level 2
Organisational
(Organisational beliefs
& assumptions)
Figure 2.3: The Onion Model of Crisis Management
Source: Pauchant & Mitroff 1988
communications and illustrates how they interact with the technical elements and
drive organisational behaviour. Single loop learning operates at a superficial level,
restricted to the outer layer of the onion model. Double loop learning, at its most
effective, penetrates to the core of the onion model. Effective learning requires
going beyond the outer layers to develop a firm understanding of the nature of the
core and its influence upon behaviour. This means developing an understanding of
the factors that make up the inner two layers. For example, the use of defence
mechanisms or a high degree of inner orientation will be reflected in rigid structures
and a lack of crisis preparedness.
2.6 Level 1 of the Onion Model : Individual Core Beliefs
At the core of the Onion Model three key factors were identified by Pauchant
& Mitroff (1988, 1992a) as providing a basis for measuring the extent of crisis
proneness for an organisation. Suggesting that each should be thought of as existing
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on a continuum, Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992a) identif' the degree of self
centredness, the nature of defence mechanisms and the degree of fatalism.
2.6.1	 Inner or Outer Orientation: Layer 1 of the Onion Model
Drawing on the work of Kohut (1977), Pauchant & Mitroff (1 992a) identified,
from an interview survey of 410 firms, that crisis-prepared organisations displayed
a positive self regard for key stakeholders such as employees and their
communities. Contrastingly, unhealthy or crisis prone organisations had a narrow
view of stakeholders. When a crisis occurred, it happened to them alone. For the
prepared organisation, crises occurred to customers, community and employees as
well as to the company.
The 'orientation' of organisations has been identified as being closely related
to their ability to consider a range of points of view. For example, Shrivastava's
(1987a) analysis of the Bhopal tragedy offers three models of the crisis based upon
three distinct stakeholder groups. Each model has validity, but Shrivastava (1987a)
argues that organisations need to look at themselves, their activities and even crises
through the eyes of different groups. Echoing Smith's (1995) 'self generated
turbulence', Shrivastava argued that in so doing they may see themselves from a
new perspective and gain fresh insight. At Bhopal:
'the stakeholders worked independently to achieve their own goals. While their
actions each made sense from an individual point of view, when they interacted
with each other they created a series of secondary effects that only served to
deepen the crisis." (p71).
A stakeholder perspective is akin to a system's perspective. It acknowledges the
importance of other groups and provides the basis for understanding how these
might impact upon organisations. A number of authors, including Pauchant &
Mitroff 1988, and Shrivastava 1987a, argue that those organisations with better
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crisis preparations are outer directed and take a broader stakeholder view. This
outer orientation may be expressed in terms of seeing beyond traditional
organisational boundaries and thereby facilitating a greater understanding of the
environment. Writing about organisational learning in general Garvin (1993)
recommends the removal of organisational boundaries as an essential step in
promoting the development of an effective learning climate within organisations.
As Allison (1971) has demonstrated, in an analysis of the Cuban missile crisis,
by looking at issues from different perspectives new insights may be gained. Not
only will potential or real problems be identified but "empathising" may encourage
reflection on the appropriateness of existing organisational frameworks.
"Multiple perspective analysis involves understanding and describing events
from the perspective of all key stakeholder groups. This is done by
acknowledging that social events are subject to multiple, conflicting and
disparate interests, assumptions, values, and interpretations, and then using those
interests, values, and interpretations as a basis for building an understanding of
events."Q72).
A high degree of inner orientation or narcissism would suggest that no
multiple perspective view had been developed. Smith (1995) identifies external
verification as one process for encouraging double ioop learning. Exposure to
contrary viewpoints is one source of such verification as it encourages reflection on
the assumptions that lie behind operating norms and practices.
An inner orientation acts as a major block to the infusion of new ideas and
perspectives. Other barriers to learning arise from the perceived control that
executives have over their organisations.
2.6.2	 The Degree Of FatalismfPassivity: Layer 1
Fatalism, observed Mitroff et al (1989), reduces guilt and responsibility and
acts as a justification for doing nothing. At its most basic, the view that the
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disasters are freak accidents, acts of God or caused by some other external agency
reduces the perceived control that any organisation or executive has over them.
Such a view will have a strong influence on the amount of time and resources that
are invested in crisis prevention and preparation.
Fatalism acts as a barrier to learning because it assumes that there is nothing to
be done. Pauchant & Mitroff(1992a) cite the President of Exxon who insisted that
the Valdez accident was an "act of God that could not have been prevented.(p97)".
Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a) point out that the president did not acknowledge
twenty nine previous oil spills that shared many similarities. Given the absence,
other than in theory, of no risk or total safety, fatalism is a question of degree. High
degrees of fatalism block learning because it assumes that nothing can be done by
organisations to prevent failures.
2.6.3	 The Nature Of Defensive Mechanisms: Layers 1
Defence mechanisms, argued Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a), are employed to
'distort external reality' to such an extent that individuals can avoid having to deal
with complicated, potentially threatening situations. Drawing upon a psycho-
analytic literature, eight basic devices were identified by Pauchant & Mitroff
(1992a). A brief explanation of each is included in table 2.2. These devices range
from simply denying the existence of a threat to isolating different elements so that
the whole does not have to be dealt with. That is, it creates the appearance of
reducing the threat by identifying fragments which are dealt with but leaving the
rest virtually untouched. Pauchant & Mitroff (1988) found that crisis prone
organisations were approximately seven times as likely to use these devices as crisis
prepared ones. Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a) argued that intellectualisation is the
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most commonly used in organisations and leads directly to the faulty
rationalisations and assumptions that they argue characterise the second layer of
their Onion Model.
Level	 1:	 Defence	 Explanation
Mechanisms________________________________________________
Denial	 Expressed refusal to acknowledge a threatening
	
__________________________________ 	 reality or realities
Disavowal	 Acknowledge a threatening reality but downplay its
_____________________________ importance
Fixation	 Rigid commitment to a particular course of action or
	
___________________________ 	 attitude_in_dealingwith_athreatening_situation
Grandiosity	 The feeling of omnipotence. "We're so big and
powerful that nothing bad can happen to us"[Mitroff
	
___________________________ 	 & Pauchant 1990]
Idealisation	 Ascribing omnipotence to another person
Intellectualisation The elaboration of an action or thought. Pauchant
& Mitroff (1992a) argue that intellectualisations
frequently involve distorted schemes of reasoning to
	
_____________________________	 justify a particular course of action.
Projection	 Attributing unacceptable actions or thoughts to
	
______________________________	 others.
Splitting	 The extreme isolation of different elements, extreme
	
______________________________	 dichotomisation or fragmentation.
Table 2.2: Defence Mechanisms
Source Adaptedfrom Pauchant & Mitroff (1 988)
Fixation, the unquestioning pursuit of a particular course of action represents an
almost complete absence of double ioop learning. The ubiquity of technical
solutions to socio-technical problems identified in the opening Chapter provides a
powerful example of fixation. Similarly denial and disavowal provide some
justification for executives doing nothing. Grandiosity and idealisation reflect a
view that some one (us or another agency) will be sufficiently powerful to deal with
all eventualities. Individually and together, the presence of these defence
mechanisms provides a strong indication of the effectiveness of organisational
learning.
Following a similar argument, Argyris & Schon (1996) suggested that when
individuals are threatened or potentially embarrassed they employ a defence
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mechanism that inhibits double ioop learning. Referring to internal communications
they cited, for example, the case of an organisation:
"For example, concern and caring come to mean : "Act diplomatically; say
things that people want to hear"-meanings that lead to action strategies such as
easing in, covering-up and telling white lies." (p96).
Information becomes distorted and manipulated as individuals acting in groups
make use of vagueness, ambiguity, inconsistency and withholding data to obscure
errors and make them uncorrectable. Hirokawa's (1988) analysis of the Challenger
disaster described how defence mechanisms acted as powerful blockers to the
collection, analysis, discussion and exchange of information between engineers
employed by the designers of the Space Shuttle and NASA representatives.
In summary, defence mechanisms act as powerful barriers to organisational
learning. At their most extreme (denial) they block out any attempt to collect
information. More subtly, they permit the distortion and misinterpretation of
information and reduce the effectiveness of learning. In developing their argument
Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a) suggested that these defence mechanisms play an
important role in determining corporate views and assumptions regarding the four
key issues, which form the second level of their Onion Model.
Although Chapter 3 deals with research issues, it is important to point out that
the choice of semi-structured interviews within a grounded theory methodology
represented a deliberate attempt to deal with the complex issues surrounding
individual beliefs. This data was subsequently complemented by a questionnaire
adapted from Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) culture measurement tool.
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2.7	 Organisational Assumptions and Rationalisations:
Where level one reflects individual beliefs, level two refers to collective or
group assumptions. Key words in defmitions of culture emphasise shared values,
stable beliefs and rigidity in thinking. Earlier the persistence of faulty assumptions
in the light of contradictory evidence was identified (see for example Turner 1976,
1978). From a crisis management perspective Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992a)
group such assumptions into four issues:
1. Assumptions about the properties of the organisation.
2. Assumptions about the properties of the environment.
3. Assumptions regarding the properties of crisis.
4. Assumptions regarding the properties of prior crisis management preparations.
These groups of assumptions are closely related to the three 'level 1' factors
discussed above. Indeed, argue Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a), these assumptions
represent the manifestations of particular defence mechanisms. Grandiosity, for
example may lead an organisation to assume that it has the properties to deal with
any crisis incident. The interaction or overlap between elements from levels one
and two raises questions about the validity of Pauchant & Mitroffs (1988, 1992a)
Onion Model. The delineation between the levels formed a part of the analysis in
Chapter 6.
Denial and disavowal may be employed by organisations to ignore potential
environmental threats. Pauchant & Mitroff (1992a) argue that inner oriented
organisations were more likely to ignore external threats. More significantly their
lack of environmental awareness was reflected structurally and procedurally in the
lack of any mechanisms for scanning the environment. This may raise the
probability that warning signals are not interpreted accurately and this inner
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orientation may also act as a barrier to learning from the experience of other
organisations. That is a failure of foresight. (Tofi & Reynolds 1992).
The third group concerns the properties of crises themselves. A deeply held
assumption, supported by the response of some of those agencies charged with
responsibility for stadia safety is that crises have technical solutions. However,
technology is not used in a vacuum but within a system designed and operated by
people. The introduction of all seater stadia may increase safety but the Bradford
Stand that caught fire was all seater, the Ibrox tragedy occurred as spectators were
leaving the ground. As was argued in Chapter 1 and is argued in Chapter 5 these
incidents were the result of the complex interaction between a variety of human,
organisational and technical elements. The technical components form an
important part of the system, but only a part (see for example Canter et al 1989,
Reason 1987, Toft & Reynolds 1992) and technical guidelines quickly take on the
attributes of 'sacred writing'. As Chapter 5 identifies, the 'Green Guide' was used
by many clubs and Local Authority Safety Conm1ittees in a rigid and technical way.
This assumption, 'that crises are technical in nature', means that only one group of
system components (as identified in figure 2.1) is dealt with.
A second assumption regarding crises is that they occur by chance or fate.
Fate can be employed as a device to justif' doing nothing. Such a view is contrary
to the evidence that suggests that organisations themselves create the pre-conditions
for crisis.
A third assumption relates closely to the defence mechanism of splitting. The
public inquiry approach that seeks to identif r a single point of failure (the pilot at
Kegworth or police at Hillsborough) encourages a very partial view of a socio-
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technical system failure. It lends credence to the view that crises are simple events
and that simple, technical solutions will suffice.
From a learning perspective, assumptions regarding these four issues will
create not only ideological barriers to learning, but will also influence the transfer
of knowledge into action by determining the allocation of resources in the form of
time and money devoted to a particular area. Thus, assumptions about the nature of
the organisation will play an important role in determining the importance given to
issues such as safety management. An organisation that believes itself 'omnipotent'
will not devote time or money to safety management. Learning may be blocked
through lack of time to consider the relevant issues and through the lowly status of
support service executives. Organisations may also focus upon a narrow range of
high profile activities to the detriment of support activities. Within the Finance
Sector, for example, the dealers who trade in stocks and shares attract large
remuneration packages. Support services such as Information Technology and
Business Continuity Planners receive less attention and fewer resources, although
without these services the dealers could not function either efficiently or effectively
(See for example, Elliott et a! 1997).
An inward looking organisation may become efficient at performing certain
tasks but it may also lose touch with its environment, a phenomenon described by
Miller (1990) in the 'Icarus Paradox'. An inner orientation offers few opportunities
for double ioop learning given that it is associated with an absence of external
verification. Alternative mindsets are not just rejected, they are simply never
considered.
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Assumptions regarding the properties of crises may act as barriers to learning
by setting constraints to the collection and analysis of data. For example, an
extreme fatalist view will lead to no consideration of crisis prevention strategies -
there is little point in seeking to prevent an Act of God. The focus upon technical
issues identified previously and in Chapter 1 will similarly constrain learning to a
single loop reconsideration of technological improvements.
There is a close link between assumptions regarding the properties of crises
and prior crisis management efforts. For the fatalist, to do nothing may appear a
reasonable strategy. Where there is a focus upon technical issues then basic
contingency plans may suffice. In this way the individual beliefs and core
organisational assumptions may be seen to interact and create a climate of decision
making which determines, in large part, the behaviour of an organisation. These
factors will influence the nature of organisational learning at each stage of crisis.
These rationalisations also manifest themselves in the forms of structure and
communications employed by organisations to co-ordinate their activities. It is to
these two components that this thesis now turns.
2.8 Structure and Communication
The discussion of configuration and communication builds upon the previous
sections that dealt with culture. Structure may be defined as the means by which an
organisation co-ordinates the activities of its staff. It is the most tangible form of
the operating norms and procedures. Communication is discussed with structure
because the two are inextricably linked. Organisations with formal hierarchies and
stable operating procedures place great emphasis upon formal communication,
including for example, written memos and job descriptions. In discussing the
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relationship between structure and strategy Mintzberg (1983) dismissed Chandler's
(1962) 'structure follows strategy' assertion by arguing that the one follows the
other no more than the left foot follows the right when walking. Widely accepted
models (see for example Waterman et al 1980, Gaibraith 1983, Pauchant & Mitroff
1992a) emphasise the importance of a consistency between a number of
organisational characteristics. Mintzberg (1983) identified distinct clusters of
organisational characteristics which he labelled configuration. Configuration
enabled an organisation:
"to achieve an internal consistency or harmony, as well as a basic consistency
with the organisation's situation - its size, age, the kind of environment in which
it functions, the technical systems it uses and so on." (Mintzberg 1983, p3).
Figure 2.4 identifies five of these configurational types and indicates the
characteristics of environment with which they are consistent. A description of
each is shown in table 2.3. These five configurations result from the interaction of
the key parts of the organisation (namely, the strategic apex, middle line, operating
core, technostructure and support staff) with the demands placed upon it from its
environment (these environmental characteristics are shows on the two axes in
figure 2.4).
Within the football industry a number of these configurations were evident.
The Football Association itself might be described as a small machine bureaucracy.
It is governed by a 93 member council representing professional, amateur, military,
regional and gender organisations. Its essential role is to oversee the regulation of
football in England. The Football Leagues of England and Wales and Scotland are
managed in similar ways. A weakness of these configurations is their emphasis
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upon formality. Mintzberg (1983) identified that their 'natural' environment is
stable and simple and the resulting structure reflects this. As a result they do not
Dynamic Environment
Entrepreneurial Context	 Innovative Context
Simple Form
	
Ad Hocracy
Simple	 I Divisio$alised I	 Complex
Mature Context	 Professional Context
Machine Bureaucracy Professional Bureaucracy
Stable Environment
Figure 2.4: Organisational Configuration
Source: Mintzberg 1983.
cope well with change. The earlier reference to Starbuck et al (1978) highlighted a
tendency for success to lead to programming, echoing Mintzberg's (1983) theory
that organisational success and growth tend to lead towards greater formalisation.
The formality and rigidity of the machine bureaucracy may act as a barrier to double
loop learning and hence, cultural change. Culture, structure and communications
reflect core values of stability, forrnalisation, adherence to rules and lengthy
decision making processes, frequently through formal communications and
committees. Table 2.3 highlights the key characteristics of the machine
bureaucracy.
Although the larger football clubs have recently invested more resources in
their administrative and commercial infrastructures, many are still run along the
lines of the Simple form. Exceptions might include those that have become public
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limited companies such as Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur; a
phenomenon that is increasing in 1997 as more clubs take advantage of the
Organisational	 Description and characteristics
Type
Simple Form	 Means of Co-Ordination: Direct Supervision
Environment: Simple & Dynamic
"few support staffers, loose division of labour, minimal differentiation among its
units, and a small managerial hierarchy. Little of its behaviour is formalised, and
it makes little use of planning, training and liaison devices, it is above all organic"
[p159]
__________________	 e.g. Small sales based firm
Machine	 Means of Co-Ordination : Standardisation of work processes
Bureaucracy	 Environment: Simple and Stable
"highly specialised, routine operating tasks; very formalised procedures in the
operating core; a proliferation of rules, regulations, and formalised communication
througiout the organisation.......relatively centralised power for decision making;
and an elaborate administrative structure with a sharp distinction between line and
staff'
__________________	 e.g. Royal Mail, Fire Service, Chemical Plant
Professional	 Means of Co-Ordination : Standardisation of skills (through lengthy vocational
Bureaucracy	 training)
Environment: Complex and Stable
"operating work is stable leading to predetermined or predictable, in effect,
standardised behaviour. But it is also complex and so must be controlled by the
operators who do it"
___________________	 e.g. University, Police, Hospital
Ad Hocracy	 Means of Co-Ordination: Mutual Adjustment
Environment : Complex and Dynamic
"highly organic structure, with little formalisation of behaviour, high horizontal
job specialisation based on formal training.., deploy specialists in small market
based project teams to do their work. Reliance on liaison devices to encourage
mutual adjustment"
________________	 e.g._Research_team,_professional_partnership_in_dynamic_industry
Divisionalised	 Means of Co-Ordination : Standardised outputs (e.g. via performance measures)
Form	 Environment : May incorporate other types and thus exist in different
environments.
_________________	 e.g. Conglomerate
Table 2.3:	 Characteristics of Configurational Types
Source: Adapted from Mintzberg (1983).
economic attractiveness of Premiership football. A common response amongst
League football club secretaries to questions concerning administration and
business practices was that their job amounted to being a 'jack of all trades'. The
results indicated some differences between respondents which will be examined in
Chapter 5. Mintzberg's (1983) identified possible weaknesses of the simple form:
"The chief executive can get so enmeshed in operating problems that he loses
sight of strategic considerations. Alternatively he may get so excited about
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strategic opportunities that the more routine operations wither for lack of
attention and eventually pull down the whole organisation." (p161).
The extreme centralisation of decision making acts as a barrier to spending money
on essential but non-glamorous activities, particularly when clubs are operating on a
financial shoestring. A barrier to organisational learning lies with the personality
and capabilities of the figure head or chief executive. It is argued that the growing
complexity of managing a professional football club requires a different form of
structure than the one that has evolved. The simple structure, with its lack of
formalisation and little use of training and liaison techniques, makes dealing with a
wide range of tasks, difficult. Organisational learning may be effectively blocked
by the resources of the Chief Executive.
2.8.1 Crisis of Management: Structure and Communication
Each of the structures identified by Mintzberg may be conceived of as
solutions to particular problems. The machine bureaucracy organisation, for
example, is the solution to the problem of how to carry out operations in the most
efficient manner. Starbuck et a! (1978) identified a tendency for organisations to
move towards a bureaucratic solution in their search for success:
"Programming often facilitates success and success always fosters
programming." (p786).
The inner orientation that follows from this standardisation (e.g. desire to maximise
efficiency of programmes and emphasis upon scientific management approaches
such as work study) causes the organisation to be less able to perceive what is
happening within its environment. Miller (1990), in 'The Icarus Paradox', argued
that this flaw was widespread in US industry:
"American firms have become complacent, careless and out of touch. They
pursue short term, bottom line targets and bury themselves in technical or
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fmancial intricacies, while they neglect the substance - the products and the
customers - of their business."QDl).
The insularity of the machine bureaucracy, reinforced by time consuming
procedures, the filtering and aggregation of information and reliance upon standard
programmes prevents it from effectively monitoring the harmony between the
various internal and external elements. This tendency has not been restricted to
twentieth century corporations as Toynbee's (1972) study of world civilisations
illustrates. The essence of Toynbee's argument is that the decline of many
civilisations came from a cultural and structural stagnation borne of internal
rigidity, complacency and oppression.
Mintzberg (1983) argued that each configuration possesses a unique set of
strengths and weaknesses. The machine bureaucracy has already been discussed.
The versatility of the simple structure is balanced by its reliance upon the whim,
skill and health of one individual. For the professional bureaucracy, the benefits of
the efficient provision of complex operations may be undennined by the length of
time required to change the practices of highly trained individual operators; a vital
problem for the police involved in the management of crowds inside football stadia.
The current problems facing the Health Service illustrate this point. Curing sick
people suits the skills and experience of many professional health care workers,
prevention of ill health is less tangible, and arguably commands less prestige
resulting in less attention from key operatives. This reflects a cultural bias and
provides an illustration of how the very presence of structures provides a powerful
barrier to change. Finally, the reliance of the ad hocracy upon much
communication means that it is well suited to dynamic and complex environments
that require innovation but less well suited to the stable, simple environment that
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requires mass production. In the ad hocracy the regular communication and
interaction between key staff provides fertile ground for double loop learning. The
development of the personal computer and software reflects the strength of these
structures. The Graphical User Interface (GUT) 2 was first developed by Xerox, a
large bureaucratic organisation who failed to see its potential. Microsoft, at the
time a good example of the ad hocracy was quick to refine and develop the GUI and
achieve dramatic success.
For the Football Industry the growing commercialisation evident in the
Premier League and development of a Safety Management infrastructure requires
greater specialist input as its places a strain on the 'jack of all trades' who can not
hope to become sufficiently expert in all task areas. Crisis prepared organisations
will recognise this and employ specialists whether internally or externally to ensure
that they have the right blend of skills required. Crisis prone organisations are more
likely to seek to 'plod along' just 'getting by' on their existing resource base. If the
football industry has only changed superficially it would be expected that structure
would have changed little since 1989 and the publication of Taylor's (1989)
Interim Report. Growing specialisation, with the employment of experts, would
suggest a more fundamental change.
The incubation of crises may, therefore, occur when the hannony of internal
and external elements is disrupted without any effective response, planned or
emergent, from the organisation. Additionally the characteristics of each
organisation may lend themselves to particular types of crisis. For example, the
reliance of the simple form upon an individual leaves it vulnerable to sudden
2 The so called GUI interface forms the basis of the popular Windows computer operating environment.
It was developed some twenty years before Microsoft recognised its potential and commercialised it.
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changes in that person's performance. The filtering of information through the
machine form will reduce its ability to monitor internal and external elements.
2.8.2 Operational Crisis (Incident): Structure and Communication
Just as the organisation provides a framework in which the potential for crisis
can be incubated, they also provide the arena in which crises unfold. Structure
provides the mechanisms for crisis response. (See for example, Dynes & Aguirre
1971, Smith 1990a).
In an examination of the Kegworth Air Crash, Smith (1992) utilised
Mintzberg's five configurational types as a framework for examining the response
of those organisations involved. Of particular relevance here, was the behaviour of
the Fire Service who use a drilled response to many of the routine incidents with
which they deal (see Elliott & Smith 1993b). Using Mintzberg's terminology the
Fire Service usually operates as a machine bureaucracy. This form is used for two
key reasons. First, because the uncoordinated actions of one fire fighter might put
the lives of others at risk. Second, because any delay can lead to the endangerment
of life, hence the importance of an immediate, drilled response. Such a form is
appropriate to the routine small fire and road traffic accidents attended by the fire
service but is less appropriate for dealing with a major incident where the
dynamism and complexity of a crisis incident may make contingency plans
inoperable. In such cases co-ordination is achieved through feedback to a central
co-ordinator. Any deviation from drill needs to be communicated to and agreed by
the central co-ordinator. Where an incident is complex and dynamic, the central co-
ordinator may be overloaded with requests from officers seeking to deviate from
their drilled response. At Kegworth communication problems between fire fighters
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and the central co-ordinator were compounded by radio failures, the presence of
three brigades, eighteen fire tenders and the sheer volume of information and
requests for decisions to the central co-ordinator (see Smith 1992). The machine
bureaucracy is less able to adapt to a complex and dynamic environment, (the
conditions frequently associated with crises), potentially resulting in a reduction in
its effectiveness and placing persoimel under pressure, thereby increasing the risk
of error (see Elliott and Smith 1993b). The method by which the machine
bureaucracy seeks to deal with such extraordinary events is through contingency
planning.
Criticisms of a contingency plan based approach to crisis management focus
largely upon the issue of structure. It is not enough (see for example, Smith 1990a,
1995, Elliott & Smith 1993b) to prepare a plan and expect it to be implemented.
Individual behaviour is influenced not only by formal instruction but by the culture,
shared value and structures with which they are familiar. Contingency plans are
only one element of any changed behaviour and any strategy for ensuring effective
crisis response must take account of these human issues. A further criticism is that
contingency plans are 'rigid' and if they are to be implemented as written requires
that the incident has to happen as expected.
2.8.3 Post Crisis Learning: Structure and Communication
Turner (1976, 1978) concluded that organisations often impede the flow and
utilisation of knowledge that could have been used preventively. Jasnoff (1994)
argues that organisational barriers stand in the way of communicating knowledge in
an appropriate form, to people who have the influence and will to take preventive
action. Toft & Reynolds (1992) identified the 'failure of hindsight' to describe the
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inability of organisations to learn from their own experience or that of others in
related industries. Tofi & Reynold's (1992) discussion of isomorphic learning may
be interpreted as a call for the development of techniques that will facilitate
learning from incidents that superficially have little obvious similarity. Toft &
Reynolds (1992) argued that the a role for managers and analysts is to develop a
systemic view that will enable them to uncover the lessons from seemingly
unrelated incidents, the key lying in the ability to generalise from the appropriate
level. (Thus emphasising the importance of challenging core individual beliefs).
The series of incidents within the football industry identified earlier (see table
1.1), indicates the poverty of learning within the industry. Toft & Reynolds (1992)
suggested that learning can be promoted by developing a:
"cumulative, reflecting and saturating process through which all personnel
within organisations learn to understand and continually reinterpret the world in
which they work by means of the organisational experiences to which they are
exposed." (p7).
Such an approach requires an appropriate corporate culture that encourages the free
flow of information and permits employees to challenge established practices and
assumptions. Culture is however, only one element. Structure may also play an
important role in facilitating or hindering the flow of communication and the
involvement of all staff. The failure of the police to learn from the previous years
experiences raises the important issue of post crisis incident learning.
It may be seen from Mintzberg's (1983) organisational forms that only one
configuration lends itself readily to the conditions identified by Toft & Reynolds
(1992) as necessary for effective learning to take place, that is the ad hocracy. The
machine bureaucracy is too inflexible and restrictive of communication. The
dominance of the chief executive over the simple form requires that effective
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learning take place at the strategic apex or not at all. The emphasis of the
professional bureaucracy on pre-employment vocational training may make the
transfer of new knowledge a lengthy process, particularly given Weick's (1987)
observation, based upon a study of pilots, that professionals revert to their earliest
learnt processes at times of crisis.
2.9 Culture, Structure and Communications: A Summary
From the above discussion it is apparent that a number of studies have
identified these three elements as influential factors in determining the ability of
organisations to translate knowledge into realised behaviour. The application of the
concept of the trinity emphasises the close interrelationships between the three
elements. It is recognised that the variables being explored are extraordinarily
complex and that the use of a single measure to describe each variable adequately is
impossible. This recognition led to the decision to employ a mixed methods
approach with the aim of painting as rich a picture as possible of the system under
investigation. As Pauchant & Mitroff (1 992a) indicated, there is no clear dividing
line between these three elements making the analogy with the trinity more apt.
Indeed it is the interaction between these three elements that permits a multi-
dimensional analysis. Notwithstanding these difficulties the research methodology
sought to explore the influence of these elements upon organisational learning
within the football industry. Particular attention was placed upon the following
issues that emerged from the review of literature.
1. The extent to which respondent organisations indicated an inner or outer
orientation. Following on from the earlier discussion, an inner orientation, as
indicated by formal and informal links with other stakeholders, participation in
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forums or the stated attitudes of respondents will provide an indication of the inner
or outer directedness of individuals and organisations within the football industry.
2. The degree of fatalism expressed by respondents with regard to past and
potential future	 stadium incidents. 	 Semi-structured interviews permitted
interviewer and respondent to explore perceptions regarding the causes of past
disasters and the potential for future ones. This was complemented by inclusion of
questions related to fatalism incorporated within the questioimaire survey of
football safety officers. A high level of fatalism may be associated with decisions
to do nothing or to do the bare minimum.
3. The employment of defence mechanisms with regard to past incidents and
current practices. Again the use of semi-structured interviews permitted the
exploration of this area with further investigation undertaken through the survey of
football safety officers.
4. Given the close linkages between the layers of the Onion Model the analysis of
issues 1 - 3 proved a useful basis on which to examine organisational culture and
assumptions about the properties of crisis management. This study, as will be
outlined in later Chapters, represents an opportunity to examine the linkages
between the different levels and to determine whether distinct layers actually exist.
5. An examination of how respondents interpreted the various stadium accidents
within the historical context of the football industry.
6. An examination of respondent perceptions regarding the basis for and efficacy
of changes in management practices.
This Chapter now turns to a brief consideration of technology which builds upon
the earlier comments about a systems approach to crisis management research.
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2.10 Technology
A Football stadium does not have the appearance of the highly technical
system that is evident in the case of either a nuclear power or industrial chemical
plant. As Tofi & Reynolds (1992 have argued, despite these superficial
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Figure 2.5:	 Systems map of the stadium
dissimilarities, stadia and industrial plants share many features as socio-technical
systems and that concepts such as interactive complexity and tight coupling have
relevance to both. This line of argument is fully developed in Chapter 5 which
examines each of the stadia tragedies. Figure 2.5 illustrates a map of the stadium as
a system.
These technical system aspects consist of the physical attributes of the
stadium, its design and layout, materials such as crush barriers and state of repair of
fixtures and fittings. The fences, gates, tunnels, exits and turnstiles all form a part
of this physical system. This physical system is itself the result of compromise
between the advice of regulators, architects and other specialists and the resources
and priorities of the Club responsible for providing the investment to fund its
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ongoing development and upkeep. When an event is held the stadium is
transformed. It is the context for the gathering of large numbers of people. The
physical form of the stadium influences behaviour as do semi-physical elements
such as signposting (Popplewell 1985, Taylor 1989). However, the crowd itself
develops its own characteristics, introducing uncertainty, (McPhail 1991, Lewis
1982, 1989, Lewis & Veneman 1987) and is itself influenced by those with
responsibility for overseeing safety and control at football matches.
Despite this observation, Official Inquiries have focused on teclmical
improvements to stadia to the detriment of developing a safety culture. de Quidt
(1 997a) Chairman of the Football Licensing Authority (FLA) states that a key role
for the FLA in the future is to switch the emphasis from technical safety to culture
safety. The introduction of all seater safety, whilst reducing the risk from specific
types of crisis incidents has done little to prevent a recurrence of either the Bradford
Fire or an Ibrox style accident. This emphasis upon technical issues is one
important factor, it is argued, in the continuing crisis proneness of the football
industry. The following section illustrates this argument with reference to Perrow
(1984) and a study undertaken of two stadia tragedies.
Drawing extensively from the work of Perrow (1984), 't Hart and Pinjenburg
(1988, 1992a) offered an analysis of the Heysel and Hilisborough Stadia tragedies.
As such, their work is a part of the development of applying 'crisis management'
models to systems that are not 'technologically' complex. The interactive
complexity of such systems derives from the presence of large numbers of people
in a confmed space. As a consequence there is the potential for unexpected
interactions similar to those encountered in high tech environments. Tight coupling
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arises from the physical infrastructure that accommodates these people and the
difficulty in controlling movement. In the case of sports stadia, and theatres,
cinemas etc. the need to ensure that only paying customers are admitted and cannot
move to more expensive parts of the structure adds further problems. Jacobs &
t'Hart (1991) asserted that:
"In an almost purely social system, it is not realistic to reduce the causes of
major accidents to technological flaws (or flaws in handling technology) only.
Rather, one should look for the personal, organisational and inter-organisational
dynamics shaping the planning, preparations and interventions that affect the
operation of these systems." (p141).
Their argument is that various parts of the system at Heysel interacted in an
"elaborate and unintended way due to the fact that system components are
complex and tightly coupled; consequently chain reactions follow quite
easily."(p20 8).
The context in which the Heysel soccer match took place 'contained built in flaws
and errors which were conducive to disaster'. These flaws concern the variety of
agencies involved, tensions between them, their different preparations and
interpretations of what was required and the complexity of rules, regulations,
guidelines and advice which influenced their efforts (a thorough analysis is included
within Chapter 5). Given this context, the authors argue that when the 'error
inducing system' was placed under severe pressure a chain reaction occurred during
which these weaknesses emerged to contribute to the fmal disaster.
The political aftermath of Heysel, t'Hart & Pinjenburg (1989) argued,
highlighted the difficulties associated with learning from such incidents. They
reported the immediate search for culprits reflecting the simplistic assumptions of
cause and effect that Perrow's model sought to counter. They note that although the
tragedy shocked everyone as:
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"time passed local authorities under budgetary or commercial pressures became
more willing, once again, to take 'acceptable risk' with the lives and well being
of soccer fans."(p223).
In summary, t'Hart and colleagues offer a systems view of crises, that
examines the relationships between social and technical factors, placing greatest
emphasis upon inter-organisational breakdowns. They echo the argument of
Shrivastava (1987a) regarding the Bhopal Accident, who identified human,
organisational and technical failures.
2.11 Implications for this study
A deficiency in the treatment of crisis and organisational learning so far is that
previous studies have failed to explore frilly the relationship between organisation
characteristics and learning. Much of this deficiency may be explained by the
bibliographies of the two texts dealing with learning from disasters (Toft &
Reynolds 1992, Fortune & Peters 1993,) which make almost no reference to the
work of the Crisis Management School (see above), reflecting a tendency of
researchers to remain within discipline. Although Toft & Reynold's (1992) analysis
contains many valuable insights, the absence of a grounding in the management and
organisation literature prevents a full development of their ideas. From the above
discussion a number of factors have been identified that drive or hinder the
organisational learning process. Chapters 5 and 6 examine data collected from the
football industry with a view to determining the presence of these factors. It is
intended that some of the mechanisms that have blocked learning can be identified.
Given the series of crisis incidents identified it can be hypothesised that there
should be extensive evidence of factors that hinder organisational learning. For
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those concerned with the future safety of sports stadia, the presence of these factors
in the post 1989 period may be cause for some alarm.
2.12 Conclusions
This Chapter has dealt with the nature of organisational learning and its
relationship with the different stages of crisis. This thesis is based upon the premise
that the stadia disasters represented socio-technical failures. Figure 2.1 mapped the
key elements of this approach and illustrates the relationships between system
elements. Given that the focus of this study is upon learning from system failures
this map should be read as a fluid diagram, with ongoing interaction between the
various system components. Double ioop learning feeds directly back to the
organisation.
From the discussion above, a number of key issues have emerged related to the
nature of knowledge, forms of learning and barriers to effective learning. These
inter-related issues form the analytical basis for this thesis.
A distinction has been made between explicit and tacit knowledge. It is
argued that explicit knowledge is developed within a particular paradigm.
Paradigms are resilient to change and exert tremendous influence over the validity
of the information collected, analysed and translated into knowledge. For
organisations, these paradigms or mindsets are manifested in the cultural
assumptions that are made regarding themselves, the nature of crisis, their
environment and the nature of crisis management preparations. The resilience of a
particular mindset creates a powerfiul inertia to change.
	 From the crisis
management literature, a particularly persistent mindset focuses upon the technical
causes of crises to the detriment of human and organIsatIonal factors. Learning, it
is argued, has been largely constrained to explicit knowledge in the form of
technological modifications. Conversely little attention has been given to the social
elements of culture, structure and communications identified in figure 2.1.
The concepts of single and double ioop learning have been developed to
explain how organisations might develop tacit in addition to explicit learning. That
is, the learning questions core assumptions. It has been argued that although there
is a need for both forms of learning, that each fulfils a different task. Single loop
learning might be summarised as 'within paradigm' monitoring and evaluation. It
is vital for operation's management. Double loop learning questions the rules and
assumptions that underlie decisions. A parallel might be drawn between these two
terms and the differences between efficiency and effectiveness. The former
meaning doing something well, the latter doing the right thing.
Double loop learning is closely allied to the concept of 'cultural re-adjustment'
that Turner (1976) and Tofi & Reynolds (1992) hypothesised would occur to an
organisation following a disaster. They argued that the significance of a major
disaster would lead to a fundamental questioning and change to the organisational
mindset. Evidence has been offered that this is not always the case. Further, it is
argued that to wait for a major incident to challenge the cultural mindset may be
expensive in lives and money. A key question that arises is, why do organisations
fail to learn?
From previous studies within the field of Crisis Management and within the
broader field of organisational studies, a number of barriers to learning have been
identified. Culture, structure and communications have been identified in a number
of separate studies from two distinct fields, which lends some credence to the
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findings. From the foregoing discussion a number of research questions arise.
First, what evidence is there for a full cultural readjustment having taken place
within the football industry? Second, if no full cultural readjustment has occurred,
what factors have impeded the learning process? Specifically, do individuals and
organisations within the industry demonstrate an inner or outer orientation? Is there
evidence of defence mechanisms in the forms outlined above? What are the views
of those operating within the industry regarding the causes of the previous stadia
disasters? What is the economic context for the industry now and in the preceding
fifty year period? What is the nature of the involvement of other agencies with
responsibility for promoting safe stadia? Analysis of these issues forms the main
part of the remainder of this thesis.
The analysis of cultural barriers to learning within this thesis, has been
developed from Pauchant & Mitroff's (1988, 1992a) Onion Model of Crisis
Management. Specific factors including the use of defence mechanisms by
organisations, the degree of their inner orientation and a fatalistic view of the world
have been identified as factors that hinder effective learning. Indeed these factors,
it has been argued, frequently prevent double loop learning and thereby forestall
cultural readjustment. These factors are more fully explored with reference to the
football industry in chapters 5 and 6.
The two other social elements identified in figure 2.1, structure and
communication, have been discussed together. It has been argued that structures
may either impede or facilitate the free flow of information, determine the extent to
which knowledge is shared, and set the context in which decisions are made.
Structure provides the context in which learning takes place or does not take place.
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Certain structures have proved more amenable to double loop learning and
Mintzberg's (1983) framework is used to examine the football industry.
Finally, the Chapter introduced the concept of the stadium as a socio-technical
system. Emphasis was placed upon demonstrating the interaction between the hard
and soft system elements.
Chapter 3 provides a review of the available research methods and provides a
rationale for and explication of the approach adopted in this study. The analysis
then proceeds to an examination of the well documented football stadia tragedies
Ibrox (1971) Bradford (1985), Heysel (1985) and Hilisborough (1989). It is
emphasised that whilst these incidents provide a necessary entrance to the
discussion, the other crisis stages should be the focus. It is intended to provide
evidence that the incidents reflected a common pattern of causality that came from
the industry itself. It is argued that although the first three incidents provoked
considerable government and public response, the fourth (i.e. Hilisborough) and
the subsequent Taylor Report was a watershed for the industry. This Chapter
combines an examination of the regulation of the industry within this period. It
argues that the early periods were characterised by an indulgent regulatory regime
that failed to have the desired impact.
This thesis then proceeds to an examination of the post 1989 period, reporting
the evidence collected in the course of this study, as a means of examining the first
principal hypothesis which suggests that recent developments have done little to
change the underlying cultural and structural causes of these crisis incidents.
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Chapter 3
Research Methods
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter reviews the methods used to obtain information during this
research project. First, the problem area and the key research questions addressed
in this thesis are discussed. Second, it explains what was done, how it was done
and seeks to provide a justification for why the study was operationalised in a
particular way.
3.2 The Nature of the Problem
The purpose of this study was to explore the issues surrounding organisational
learning from crises. A key objective was to increase understanding of how
organisations learn or, conversely, why they fail to learn. The origins of the study
lay in the observation that the UK football industry had experienced a series of fatal
accidents, the most serious of which have been investigated by the public inquiry
process. Chapter 1 indicated that the rate of accidents has been much higher in the
UK than in other, comparable countries suggesting a particular problem. A key
argument is that the various stadia disasters represented socio-technical failures and
that they are linked together despite the superficial differences between them. This
assumption, discussed in Chapter 1 underpins this thesis. Previous studies have
suggested that a full cultural readjustment will follow a 'disaster incident' leading
to new operating norms, beliefs and procedures (see Turner 1976, 1978; Toft &
Reynolds 1992). The principal hypothesis contends that following the various
stadia disasters no full cultural readjustment occurred. The emphasis upon the
word 'full' is important, although a reading of Turner (1976, 1978) and Toft &
Reynolds (1992) indicates that the notion of full cultural readjustment is an ideal
one. However, the means by which cultural readjustment occurs were not discussed
at length. The focus of these studies lies primarily upon learning from the public
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inquizy process, rather than upon the broader process of organisational learning
which is the focus of this study. Central to this thesis is the notion of active
learning which, it is argued, corresponds with Turner's notion of cultural
readjustment (i.e. the translation of knowledge into operating norms and practices).
While it is difficult to quantify organisational learning, and more particularly to
specify when 'full cultural readjustment has occurred,' it is possible to qualitatively
assess changed behaviour and identify the range of factors that influence it. This is
an important consideration that justifies the need for qualitative methods to provide
a rich picture combined with quantitative methods to provide the population
validity. A focus upon the inquiry documents alone would not give sufficiently rich
insights into the responses made by the organisations to the output from those
public inquiries.	 That is, the study of cultural change requires not only an
assessment of beliefs, assumptions and values but of how such changes manifest
themselves in altered behaviour.
Learning at an appropriate level, therefore, appears central to the notion of
cultural readjustment. The review of the organisational learning literature identifies
two broad forms that relate to 'factual' and 'cultural learning respectively. Argyris
(see 1993 for example) distinguishes between single and double loop learning while
Nonaka (1991) identified explicit and tacit knowledge. Whilst the two ideal forms
of learning are quite distinct, in practice the distinction between them is more
difficult to specify as KoIb's (1986) Learning Cycle portrays. Also as Nonaka's
(1991) illustration of the baker (see chapter 2) suggests, the output reflects the skills
of the craftsman as well as the ingredients used.
Any understanding of cultural readjustment it is argued, depends upon the
nature of learning and those factors that influence it. The second stage of the
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research project (which is discussed in greater detail below) combined a review of
the relevant literature with the use of a grounded approach. A grounded approach
was used primarily to avoid simply exploring the issues believed to be key at the
outset of the project. In line with Strauss & Corbin's (1991) approach to grounded
theory, it was employed to prevent the study simply reflecting the reading
undertaken at that point and the inevitable researcher bias. In practice the whole
research process is, of course, an iterative one with multiple feedback loops
between the different stages, not always in keeping with what Bryman (1988) has
described as the 'post constructed logic of many theses'. From this exploratory,
grounded stage a number of themes emerged that could be linked to the beliefs and
assumptions of those associated with the football industry and to the structures of
their organisations. The role of regulators was identified as a central issue in the
post 1989 period but appeared less relevant in the preceding years. Other themes
that emerged included relations between clubs and external stakeholders; the roles
of police and stewards; assumptions regarding the causes of preceding incidents; the
different types of club structures; varying perceptions of the importance of safety
management and steward training. (a full list of the key issues covered is included
at appendix 3.1). In short a number of specific propositions were identified during
the grounded approach that were linked, ultimately to key issues that emerged from
the review of the relevant literature. It appeared that the way in which regulations
were enforced influenced the type of response of each club; the structure of many
clubs appeared to impede the effective consideration of safety management; the
lack of effective strategic planning also appeared connected to the failure of clubs to
deal with safety management issues effectively; the relations between club and
regulatory agencies appeared to be influenced by a narrow perception of the purpose
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of the club and a desire to reduce expenditure on match policing. Although these
themes emerged from the data, it was inevitable that prior knowledge would inform
the categorisation process. It is emphasised again that the grounded approach was
used deliberately to foster an open minded approach to the data, so far as that was
possible. The identification of Gouldner's (1955) framework of 'patterns of
industrial bureaucracy' was introduced at this stage as it appeared, from a study
conducted by the author fifteen years previously, to achieve a close fit with the data
from the first two stages of this project. It is possible that without the open minded
approach encouraged by the use of grounded theory that this important contribution
would have been overlooked.
3.3 Stadium Disaster Case Studies
The first stage consisted of collection and analysis of data concerning five high
profile disasters (Bolton 1946, Ibrox 1971, Bradford 1985, Heysel 1985,
Hillsborough 1989). The scale of these incidents, in terms of fatalities, was such
that each might have been expected to trigger a fundamental reconsidering of the
paradigm for managing crowds inside stadia. Data were collected from a variety of
sources including the Reports of the relevant public inquiries, media coverage of
the incidents and semi structured interviews of those involved in an official capacity
at the Hiflsborough Disaster. This latter group of interviews was conducted with
members of the Police Forces of South Yorkshire, Merseyside and West Midlands;
the latter had been charged with the task of collecting evidence for Taylor's
Committee. One problem that arose, concerned the different accounts given by
different sources. The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 is largely based upon the factual
evidence provided in the Official Inquiry Reports. Owing to the brief coverage of
the Ibrox Stadium disaster in the Wheatley Report, other sources including Burrows
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(1982) were used to reconstruct the events that day. In the case of Hillsborough,
interviews with the South Yorkshire Police elicited some information that had not
been presented at Taylor's Inquiry. Wherever possible, data from different sources
were compared as a means of ensuring reliability.
Although some forty five incidents were identified in table 1.1 there was scant
data available regarding the majority of them. There is no body charged with the
central collection of data concerning such incidents. To facilitate analysis the post
1946 period was divided into periods that used the major incidents as break points,
based on the hypothesis that changes in behaviour would follow a disaster (see table
3.1). The historical analysis that resulted from this first stage proved useful in two
key ways. First, the detailed analysis of each major incident provided a means of
assessing 'actual learning' from preceding disasters and inquiries and thus
permitted the testing of the hypothesis. Second, analysis of the periods between
Time	 Data Collection & Analysis
Bolton 1946	 Systemic analysis of crisis incident
intervening period, 1946 - 71 Search for evidence of Cultural Readjustment
Ibrox 1971	 Systemic analysis of crisis incident
Intervening period 1971 - 85
	
Search for evidence of Cultural Readjustment
Bradford, Heysel 1985
	 Systemic analysis of crisis incident
intervening period 1985 - 89
	
Search for evidence of Cultural Readjustment
Hillsborough 1989
	 Systemic analysis of crisis incident
intervening period? 1989 -? Search for evidence of Cultural Readjustment	 I
Table 3.1:
	 Crisis events and intervening periods.
crisis incidents provided valuable insights regarding the relations between
regulatory agencies and the clubs.
The final analysis, (see Chapters 5 & 6 ) was arranged in chronological order.
Gouldner's (1955) classification of patterns of industrial bureaucracy was used as
one framework to explore changes in patterns of behaviour with regard to active
regulation from the enforcement agencies (police, fire, local authorities) and to
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positive action on the part of the stadium owners. Additionally, the analysis
concentrated upon the three 'barriers' to learning, (namely culture, structure and
communciations) identified in Chapter 2. It should be emphasised that culture and
structure had also emerged as key themes from the grounded data collection,
although the categories that emerged were frequently at a more specific level. A
key aim of the analysis was to explore the extent to which these variables
influenced organisational learning during each historical period.
3.4 From Desk to Field Research
The second stage of data collection was focused upon the clubs themselves
with the purpose of identifying evidence of organisational learning and cultural
readjustment. Semi-structured interviews were used to ensure that key areas
already identified, were covered whilst providing the flexibility to identify those
areas held to be important by respondents.
To ensure access to clubs, the support of the various football authorities was
requested and granted. The purpose of the research project was explained to these
authorities (respective national football associations and leagues) who agreed to
dispatch a letter of introduction to the Chief Executive of each club in the selected
sample. A subsequent telephone call was made to arrange an appointment with the
senior administrative and commercial manager (either the club secretary or chief
executive).
A sample of four clubs from each division in England and Wales, and two
each from the two senior Scottish divisions was selected. This disparity reflected the
different sizes of the English and Scottish divisions. Football clubs were selected on
the basis of three criteria (see table 3.2) which have been identified as key in previous
106
studies, most notably in the first and second Chester Reports (1968 and 1983
respectively).
Criteria
1.Division	 Recommendations from the Taylor report had been targeted at different divisions,
of Club in	 particularly in the timing by which clubs had to comply. League position also reflects
1992/3 different commercial opportunities and clubs in the various divisions receive differing
contributions from the various leagues. Much of the moneys received by football clubs
for items such as competition sponsorships and fees paid for TV rights are collected by
the leagues and redistributed to all clubs on a fixed payment to each club dependent on
their division. This payment amounts to a significantly higher proportion of total income
for lower division clubs than for those in higher ones.
2. Average	 A club was selected from each quartile. Although there is a link between the division in
Attendance	 which a team plays and its average attendance this is not fixed. For example teams that
in the	 are relegated may see persistently high average attendance's when compared to other
1992/3	 teams in their division. Consistently high attendances would also be reflected in grounds
season with larger capacities. Thus a team playing in the second division may have average
crowds than a team playing in the premier division. The premier team however would be
able to expect higher levels of income from sources other than gate money (e.g.
___________	 sponsorship and television moneys).
3. Region Clubs from various parts of the country were visited: Wales, South, North East, North
West, Midlands and Scotland. Wheatley's (1971) Report had identified that centres of
population such as London differed in regulation by virtue of the fact that expertise could
be developed where local authorities had responsibility for a number of venues.
Historically the football league developed largely in the north and midlands of England.
Although many of these teams were no longer as successful as they had once been, if
success is measured in league and cup performance, they possessed large stadia which
might pose different problems to safety than clubs in the south that had risen from semi-
professional status more recently and would therefore have less traditional support and
smaller, more modern stadia.
Table 3.2 Criteria for sample of UK football clubs selection.
All interviews were conducted in the offices of respondents. To ensure
anonymity respondents are identified in the analysis by a case reference (P1 for the
first Premiership respondent, P2 for the second Premiership respondent, Fl for the
first First division respondent, Si for the first Second division respondent, Ti for
the first Third division respondent and SC1 for the first Scottish respondent etc.).
At the start of each interview it was explained that the project was not primarily
concerned with the issue of hooliganism, a frequent misunderstanding.
A copy of the questionnaire outline is included in appendix 3.1. Great care was
taken to ensure that the respondents were allowed to do most of the talking and the
questionnaire was used as a checklist rather than as a rigid framework for the
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interview. All interviews were recorded on tape and transcribed as soon as possible
following each visit. Hand-written notes were also taken during all interviews,
partly as a back up to the tape and partly to record interruptions and to record other
non-vocal forms of communication. In some cases the Club's safety officer was
invited for the latter part of the interview and in three cases was interviewed
separately.
Initially the taped interviews were typed up as short summaries. However, it
became clear that these incomplete transcripts failed to capture the full richness of
the interviews and these early interviews were subsequently typed up in full, with
notes to indicate pauses, respondent mood in terms of excitement, annoyance and
perceived willingness to answer questions frankly. Interviews lasted an average of
two and a quarter hours for Welsh and English clubs and forty five minutes for
Scottish clubs.
The purpose of the interviews was to determine the extent of cultural
readjustment and to identify factors that influenced organisational learning. The
interview typically began by asking respondents to describe how their club had
responded to the Bradford and Hillsborough tragedies, providing evidence of how
each incident had been perceived. Other key issues discussed included the role of
the board of directors and owners, the management processes used within each club
(including safety management processes), the views, beliefs and assumptions of the
various club executives regarding safety management post-Taylor, as well as the
causes of the Hillsborough and Bradford Stadium tragedies.
When all the interviews with club executives had been completed, the
procedure shown in table 3.3 was followed to sort and analyse the data (see
Easterby Smith et al 1993, Strauss & Corbin 1990). Throughout this process a
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number of techniques were used to make sense of the voluminous amounts of
data generated in the course of the interviews, including the use of matrix sheets
to facilitate analysis between clubs (Miles & Huberman 1994).
	 Such
reductionism is inevitable as analysis develops. The purpose of using a
grounded theory approach, in the first instance, was to ensure that such
summarising or focus emerged from the interviewees and the data itself rather
than from the researcher's preconceptions
Rigour was achieved by closely following established methods of analysis.
The decision to use grounded theory in the initial stages was taken as a means of
avoiding simply placing frameworks drawn from the literature to the data. The
intention thus was to avoid simply fitting the data into predetermined 'holes' and to
seek instead to be creative in interpreting it. That is not to say that the initial stages
of this process were not informed by a good knowledge of the relevant literature,
given the length of time in which this had been critically reviewed over the
preceding years, but that efforts were made to prevent premature disclosure on
conclusions already reached. Also experience of organisations provided some
insights into aspects of the data. As Strauss & Corbin (1990) suggested, the
researcher should, periodically stand back and ask 'what is going on here'? What is
being communicated through these interviews? What of importance is being
omitted? Why is the interviewee focusing on this particular aspect? What might
this focus reveal about the organisation, its culture, its processes in addition to the
perceptions of the individual? Given that the context was a discussion of safety and
management following a series of disasters, it was expected that interviewees would
seek to emphasise positive aspects rather than negative ones. The label
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i) Familiarisation with the data, re-reading and re-listening to the interviews.
Re-listening to the interviews, although time consuming proved extremely useful
as voice intonation or hesitations provided further clues to the meaning of
interviewees.
ii) Reflection on the data and emerging themes. In practice it was difficult to
distinguish absolutely between these first stages and as the study progresses this
difficulty became more pronounced. Familiarisation and reflection inevitably go
hand in hand. Some 45 key themes emerged at this stage.
iii) Conceptualisation. Again the distinction between this stage and the first
two was blurred. A conscious attempt was made to avoid premature
conceptualisation using existing frameworks. However, as this stage emerged in
its own right a reflection upon the wider literature and frameworks was used to
link the themes together.
iv) Cataloguing concepts. This process was begun before stages i)-iii) were
concluded. Transcripts were stored in tables on a 'Word' file. A master copy of
each transcript was kept separate. Use of the cut and paste facility was made to
group data under themes, sorted by club reference. Where data could be
included under two or more themes it was placed in two or more tables.
v) Recoding of concepts. As the analysis progressed and concepts were
linked together the number of themes was reduced to eleven. Despite the
temptation to hurry this process, this stage proved extremely useful in
reconsidering the analysis that had already been undertaken. The use of a
grounded theory approach had been made to facilitate creativity and ensure that
structure emerged from the data.
vi) Linking concepts. A model of the concepts was drawn up and refmed
many times in an attempt to highlight important relationships (See figure ?).
These are discussed in greater detail below.
vii) Re-evaluation of themes. Given the independent nature of the PhD this
stage was used as yet another opportunity to reflect upon the process and re-read
the transcripts once more. This fmal re-reading sought to treat each transcript
holistically with a view to identifying the underlying meaning.
Table 3.3: Stages of Grounded Theory methodology
Source Easterby-Smith el a! (1993)
'displacement' was applied to those instances where the interviewee indicated that a
certain task or area of responsibility belonged to another agency. This was added to
Pauchant & Mitroff's (1988, 1992a) seven types of defence mechanism.
Correspondingly a label of non-displacement was identified to facilitate collection
of instances where interviewees reported that tasks were their own responsibility.
Strauss & Corbin (1990) refer to this as the 'flip-flop' technique whereby a
particular concept is turned upside down and looked at from a contradictory or
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opposite perspective. Extensive use of the 'flip-flop' technique was made as a
means of finding conflicting examples to avoid merely fitting the data to
preconceived models. Comparisons with other industries were made to develop
new perspectives. For example, comparisons with data collected from other sports
business organisations as well as finance sector firms were made as a means of
developing as rich a picture as possible of what was being communicated from the
interview data.
In addition to the interviews, arrangements were made to visit a number of
clubs to observe matchday operations. These included 3 Premier clubs, four First
division clubs, and two each from the Second, Third and Scottish Divisions.
3.4.1	 Consolidation
The third stage of the research project built upon the second two stages in that
it sought to take the grounded data and themes and place them within the context of
existing knowledge. The relationship between the two ideal forms of learning
identified above and cultural readjustment has already been discussed. At this stage
the contribution of those researching in the field of organisational learning and
crisis was considered alongside the data and an attempt to integrate them made.
The system's map shown in figure 2.1 highlights a number of variables
identified in the literature as key influences on active learning or organisational
behaviour. Learning or cultural readjustment is equated with a shift in beliefs,
norms and assumptions. Drawing upon Pauchant & Mitroffs (1988, 1992) Onion
Model these elements can be seen to lie hidden at the core whilst behaviour remains
on the outer layer. The richest picture of organisational culture will emerge from an
analysis that seeks to explore and understand the relationship between behaviour
and the assumptions that underpin it. Data from the grounded research provided
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some insights regarding the assumptions of key decision makers regarding safety
management, the causes of disasters, organisational objectives and structural
arrangements. The work of Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992) provided an
opportunity, through the use of an adapted form of their questioimaire, to analyse
the football industry utilising an existing research instrument. This is fully
discussed in section 3.6.
In the principal hypothesis it was argued that there was no fundamental
cultural change following the disasters at Bolton, Ibrox, Bradford and Hilisborough.
Cultural readjustment suggests complex learning of the double loop variety as
shown in figure 3.1. Such learning strongly infers the absorption or transfer of
knowledge into changed operating norms and procedures. Most importantly, the
double loop learning associated with cultural readjustment requires a questioning of
the mental models, heuristics, etc. that provide the frameworks in which decision
makers and operators decide. The motivation for changed behaviour can be
expected to come from within as new insights and understandings are translated
into action
The first proposition is that full cultural readjustment did not occur. Figure 3.1
summarises the groups of key factors by which the extent of cultural readjustment
will be assessed. Reference should be made to figure 2.1 which provides a systems
map identifying the relationships between the key variables of communication,
structure and culture which underpin figure 3.1. The second proposition is that
learning from the public inquiry process tended towards the translation of explicit
knowledge within a paradigm of single ioop learning. That is, the learning did not
lead to a change in operating norms and assumptions as hypothesised by Turner
(1976, 1978). The third proposition relates to the second group of elements shown
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7
Yes
Continua
Readjustment
Double loop learning 	 Single loop learning
Tacit Knowledge	 i	 Explicit knowledge
Internal motivation	 External Motivation
OuterOrientation	 __________________________ Inner Orientation
Mechanisms for	 Coercive enforcement
ongoing learning	 measures
Modified norms and 4	 No fundamental change
operating procedures
Figure 3.1: Factors that indicate degree of cultural readjustment
in figure 3.1 and concerns the primary motivators for change within the industry. In
essence it is argued that football clubs have not been open to external influence and
that many of the visible improvements observed since 1989 are the result of
coercive enforcement measures with a focus upon minimal compliance. Gouldner
(1954) and Mintzberg (1983) have argued that organisational characteristics,
particularli in the form of deep seated assumptions, will play an important part in
translating regulatory changes into patterns of behaviour. A range of patterns of
behaviour are identified by these authors suggesting that there is no simple
dichotomy between non-compliance and full compliance. From the grounded data
it emerged that: a punitive oriented regulatory approach appeared to be linked to a
compliance only response; the focus of football club Chairmen upon playing
success appeared to contribute to a low priority given to safety management;
perceptions and assumptions regarding the underlying causes of the stadium
tragedies were also identified as key factors influencing the implementation of
crowd management activities.
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Data collected from the semi-structured interviews (for example related
specifically to perceptions of various guidelines) and direct observations were used
to identify examples of single and double ioop learning. Previous studies (see for
example, Gouldner 1954, Mintzberg 1983, Shrivastava 1987, Smith 1990, 1995,
Smith & Tombs 1995) have indicated that regulation, and its enforcement, is
insufficient to fully change behaviour as groups and individuals may actively resist
imposed measures unless their deep lying assumptions and beliefs are successfully
challenged. In the light of this observation Turner's (1976, 1978) notion of full
cultural readjustment appears too clear cut. The frameworks suggested by Gouldner
(1954) and Mintzberg (1983) imply a range of alternative scenarios of changed
values and behaviour as opposed to Turner's seeming dichotomy of either no or full
cultural readjustment. The range of instruments employed (i.e. the combination of
qualitative and quantitative methods) sought to create the rich picture required to
understand the role of legislation in changing behaviour. In addition to the data
already collected from semi structured interviews with football club executives,
data were collected from those agencies tasked with formulating and implementing
the regulatory framework. In the questionnaire to football safety officers, numbers
39 - 42 dealt with perceptions of safety and the extent to which clubs complied with
regulation.
With regard to assessing the extent of learning, figure 3.1 identifies the key
indicators that were identified in Chapter 2. The data collected sought to identify
the type of learning within the industry. In particular, data, collected in the course
of interviews, direct observation and questionnaire survey, sought to identify the
cultural and organisational framework in which learning took place, in addition to
searching for evidence of both single and double loop learning. A related factor
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concerned the motivation for action and the research design sought to elicit the
reasons for changes to behaviour.
The primary instruments employed in using the model to examine cultural
readjustment included data collected from the semi-structured interviews, direct
observations of events and the questionnaires despatched to football club safety
officers.
In the case of double and single loop learning, respondent views regarding the
causes of previous incidents, their clubs tangible responses to these, and their
questioning of technical guidance provided indicators. In particular responses (see
appendix 3.1) concerning perceptions of the causes of the Hilisborough and
Bradford tragedies in addition to the club's responses to these provided insights
regarding the type of learning that occurred. A further measure included the
responses of local authority officers responsible for overseeing implementation of
the 'green guide' (the introductory letter sent to local authorities is shown in
appendix 3.4 and provided the basis for semi structured interviews).
For tacit and explicit knowledge, closely related to single and double ioop
learning, the semi structured interviews provided evidence of the extent to which
knowledge was transferred to those with administrative responsibilities and more
specifically those tasked with safety management, for example in the training of
stewards. A theme that emerged from the semi-structured interviews concerned the
type of formal and informal training that stewards received. For example, the use
of female stewards by some clubs reflected the view that stewards were not there to
deal with crowd control but safety - the underlying assumption being that women
could not deal with rowdy males. Direct Observation provided an opportunity to
witness how such knowledge was translated into behaviour. In the course of the
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direct observation attention was focused upon identifying the organisation and co-
ordination of the stewards, in particular the extent to which a regimented approach
was pursued. In the questionnaire administered to football club safety officers,
respondents were requested to indicate the primary factor in improved safety
(question 41).
With regard to internal or external motivations the interviews provided access
to views concerning the Chief Executive's motives to change, the role of significant
events, regulators or pressure from supporters. In the course of the direct
observation the interaction between club and regulatory agencies including the
police, FLA and local authorities was observed. The questionnaire also sought to
identify the key stimuli and barriers to change. Closely linked to the previous factor,
the degree of inner-outer orientation was assessed firstly by eliciting the views of
Chief Executives re. various stakeholder groups; second, by talking with safety
officers, police and stewards during the direct observations; third through the safety
officer questionnaire. Fourth, through the interviews with local authority officers.
An assessment of the strength of mechanisms for ongoing learning concerned not
just appropriate forums but an attempt to measure commitment. For example,
Safety Advisory Groups exist for each club in the FA Premier and Football
Leagues. However, more important was the reported commitment of clubs to use
these as mechanisms for learning. From the semi structured interviews and
questionnaire items focused upon assessing whether these were in place to
implement guidelines or to monitor and review. From the direct observation it was
clear that some clubs had in place a system of regular debriefs to feedback
operational problems to either the club or the safety advisory groups. These
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operated informally at some clubs where in some cases the knowledge thus
acquired was not passed to those with authority to respond.
The final category concerned actual behaviour and as such the direct
observation was the key instrument used. In summary, the direct observation
provided insight regarding many of the elements shown in figures 2.1 and 3.1. First
and foremost, it provided evidence of actual practice. Second, it provided the
opportunity for 'a look behind the scenes' of behaviour that would have been
extremely difficult to orchestrate. Third, it provided an opportunity to observe the
interaction between the various agencies which revealed evidence of the nature of
relations between clubs and regulatory agencies. Fourth, it provided what might be
called the acid test of commitment to safety. For example, in the course of the
exercise I attempted to gain employment as a steward in order to assess the
effectiveness of steward training from inside the organisation. The results of this
experience is included in Chapter 6.
The principal research question focused upon those factors which influenced
organisational learning, examining in particular those changes that have occurred
within the football industry, including the extensive redevelopment of stadia, since
the 1989 Hillsborough Disaster. Such changes may represent largely tecimical
modifications which do not challenge the previously held mindsets and operating
norms. Further, the decision to require extensive redevelopment was taken by
government and not by the owners of the stadia themselves. Physical
redevelopment may reflect the view that the safe management of crowds is a
technical problem. In Chapters 1 and 2 it was argued that that the stadium disasters
represented socio-technical failures. Technical modifications oniy deal with one
element of the total system. As Chapter 5 argues, this emphasis on technical
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solutions to solve one problem has been a key factor in subsequent disasters. A
widely cited analogy concerns the introduction of legislation making it compulsory
that all car passengers wear a seat belt. Evidence indicated that the introduction of
this legislation was followed by an increase in the accident rate. An explanation put
forward was that as car drivers felt safer by wearing a seat belt the standards of their
driving fell to maintain the same level of perceived risk.
3.4.2	 Can Organisations Learn?
A difficulty in assessing learning concerns the question, who or what learns?
Argyris & Schon (1996) suggested that acceptance of the notion of the learning
organisation has been gained only recently, reflecting a growing agreement that the
development of corporate strategy frequently follows an active, iterative process
involving whole organisations. Levitt & March (1988) defmed organisational
learning as the "encoding of inferences from history into routines that guide
behavior"Q3 19). They concluded their review of the literature on organisational
learning by stating that:
"There is adequate evidence that the lessons of history as encoded in routines are
an important basis for the intelligence of organisations. Despite the problems,
organizations learn"Q336)
Chapter 2 discussed the organisational impediments to effective learning.
These factors included structure, communication and organisational culture. An
additional dimension, however, concerns the beliefs and assumptions of individuals
working within an organisation. There is some agreement, as shown in Chapter 2,
that an important element of corporate culture concerns the beliefs and values of
individuals.
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3.5 Direct Observation
Following each interview, arrangements were made to observe the
management of specific events. Observations of events invariably followed the
format:
1. Arrive three hours before the game and meet with Contact.
2. Attend police and stewards briefing.
3. Talk to stewards and police.
4. Remain with Safety Officer or Deputy for the duration of the event.
5. Short post event debrief.
As Buchanan et a! (1988) report:
"The practice of field research is the art of the possible. It is necessary to exploit
the opportunities offered in the circumstances" (p55).
Freedom was given to roam with a security pass for all areas and in many cases the
opportunity to wander around stadia during events was used to advantage. This
provided an opportunity to talk to stewards, police, local authority officers and to
observe what was done, how it was done and what was not done (especially that
which should have been). A pocket tape recorder was used to collect notes and a
transcript was typed up after the event. This direct observation performed a key
element of the triangulation approach. It permitted some cross checking of evidence
collected during interviews by observing actual practice, providing a less formal
scenario for discussions with the original interviewee and the freedom to interview
significant others (e.g. stewards, visiting local authority officers). It also provided
an opportunity to discuss safety issues with operational staff and identify the quality
of training and communications.
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The data collected from direct observation provided a valuable means of
double checking data collected from semi-structured interviews. Interviews with
executives provided a view of how things should be, whilst direct observation
permitted the identification of how things were. Thus direct observation permitted
an investigation of actual behaviour. The results are discussed in Chapter 6.
3.6 Questionnaire Survey
Given the focus of this study upon the Professional Football Population within
the UK the total population amounted to some ninety two clubs in England and
Wales, zero in Northern freland and twenty in Scotland (the remaining twenty
Scottish League clubs are considered semi-professional). The questionnaire was
issued to all clubs that had membership of the Football Safety Officers Association
(FSOA), which included all 92 clubs in England and Wales and only two in
Scotland. The questionnaire was distributed by the FSOA with a covering letter
outlining the aims of the research. A questionnaire (identical) was also sent to the
eighteen Scottish Premier and First Division clubs who did not have a member of
the FSOA on their staff
Responses were received from some 60 clubs (see table 3.4), giving an overall
response rate of 65%. There was some variation in the response rate when it was
examined by division. Fourteen responses were received from Scottish clubs, a
response rate of 70%. The lower response rate of second and third division clubs
may be explained by the fact that their safety officers are often part time, many
working on matchdays only. The poor response is itself indicative of the resource
problems facing these lower division clubs. As the Bradford Fire illustrates
however, these clubs are not immune from stadium disasters.
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No.	 %of
____________________ 	
Respondents	 Division
Premier Division	 17	 85
First Division	 19	 79
Second Division	 12	 50
Third Division	 12	 50
Scottish Premier &	 14	 70
Firstdivisions	 _________________ ________________
Total	 74	 100%
Table 3.4 Survey Respondents
3.6.1	 Questionnaire Data Analysis
The mailed questionnaire survey included an adapted form of Pauchant &
Mitroff's (1992a) attitudinal questionnaire tool, as well as a section used to provide
evidence of safety management practices which have been referred to in the
previous sections. The inclusion of an adapted version of Pauchant & Mitroff's
(l992a) questionnaire provided the basis for examining their Onion Model of
organisational culture (questions 45 to 66). This provided a basis for identifjing the
presence of defence mechanisms that would provide evidence of barriers to active
learning. A copy of this questionnaire is included at appendix 3.2 A key problem
that emerged concerned the methods to be used to examine the data. Standard
independent variables had been identified and included the division of respondent's
employers, as well as personal information concerning respondents including age,
previous employment, current role and time in post. A summary of these
characteristics is included at appendix 3.3. One aim of the questionnaire was to
collect data regarding perceived improvements with regard to safety within the
football industry. A second objective concerned an attempt to identi' the
perceptions of respondents regarding the four levels of the Onion model. SPSS was
used to generate cross tabulations of a wide range of variables and explored the data
for correlations. Additionally factor analysis was used to assess Pauchant &
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Mitrofrs (1992a) findings and to search for the presence of underlying factors. A
full description of the procedures followed are included in Chapter 6. Although
widely used, few authors identif' the full limitations of these techniques nor do they
allude to their origins. Gould (1988) noted that both Pearson and Spearman,
responsible for two widely used correlation techniques, were both eminent
psychologists and Gould (1988), commenting on the origins of the technique,
asserted that:
"Factor analysis, despite its status as pure deductive mathematics, was invented
in a social context and for definite reasons. And though, its mathematical basis
is unassailable, its persistent use as advice for learning about the physical
structure of intellect has been mired in deep conceptual errors from the start.... in
this case, the notion that such a nebulous, socially defmed concept as intelligence
might be identified as a thing.... and that it might be measured as a single
number, thus permitting a unilinear ranking of people according to the amount of
it they possess."Qp238-239).
Gould's criticism of reducing intelligence to a number may be extended to any
attempt to summarise individual personality and corporate culture. However, factor
analysis was used as only one component of this study and was examined alongside
data collected from other sources. In this way triangulation was used to facilitate
flexibility in the collection and analysis of data (essential given the complexity of
the subject under investigation), whilst ensuring that the various data collected were
integrated and cross checked. As Jick (1979), amongst others, notes, there can be
greater confidence in the results of a study that has used various means of data
collection.
Given the central role of culture in the process of organisational learning, there
was a danger that Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) 'attitude scales' be used in a
simplistic way (i.e. to rank organisations). It should be made clear that they also
adopted a triangulated approach combining survey data with extensive interview
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data. Pauchant & Mitroffs (1992a) questionnaire tool, although supported by
rigorous statistical analysis, provided no more than pointers towards potential
weaknesses. For this study of the football industry it did provide evidence of core
assumptions, but, as Chapter 6 demonstrates, the validity of this study's findings is
based upon the use of a mixed methods approach.
Factor analysis and grounded theory share a number of characteristics despite
their obvious dis-similarities. Both are tools for exploring a mass of data to identify
a small number of themes, categories or factors. Both lead to conclusions for which
it can be claimed that they are 'grounded in the data'. Similarly both depend upon
the data that is input, 'garbage in, garbage out'. The value of using the two
techniques together, was that it permitted a mixed method's cross check, leading to
increased confidence in the validity of this study's findings.
Gould (1988) was keen to counteract the assumption that 'abstract measures
sunimarising large tables of data must express something more real and
fundamental than the data themselves' @239), citing correlation as the most
misused technique. As the data analysed on SPSS was ordinal, this cross checking
was vital. The necessity to combine quantitative with qualitative data became
evident throughout this study. Although particular problems encountered in the
analysis of the questionnaire data are discussed in Chapter 6, conscious efforts were
made to ensure that all data were treated in an open, if critical, way, particularly
with regard to the 'hard' data produced from the questionnaire.
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3.7 Local Authority Interviews
In late 1996 and early 1997 a series of interviews were conducted with the lead
officer for each Safety Advisory Group (SAG) 'of the Clubs that had been visited.
Respondents' views are identified within the text by the prefixes LA1, LA2 etc.
The first step of this process consisted of a letter despatched to each officer
outlining the purpose and background of this study (see appendix 3.4). The support
of the football authorities was also highlighted to encourage participation. A very
positive response was received with many respondents making contact directly
rather than waiting for a telephone call. Although it was intended for these
interviews to last for no more than 15 minutes, in practice the average interview
length was in excess of 40 minutes and in one case 90 minutes. Respondents also
passed on further information including minutes of SAG, inspection reports and
other items of correspondence. Although the interviews were semi-formal in nature
they were sharply focused to elicit data regarding the development of safety
management practices at football clubs. Such an approach was necessary, given the
difficulties of designing a questionnaire to examine the evolution and current state
of safety practice.
3.8 Final Interviews
In addition to preliminary interviews with the various football authorities, the
findings of the research were discussed at length with the Chief Executive of the
FLA. This provided an opportunity to test the findings with an individual closely
involved within the industry, and to collect data regarding the work of the FLA.
The Safety Advisory Group was set up, following Taylor's recommendations, to act as a forum for the
various agencies and interested parties to meet and discuss crowd safety.
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3.9 Methodological Perspective: Reliability and Validity
There is a growing literature that argues against the application of quantitative
terms, such as validity and reliability, to qualitative research. Marshall & Rossman
(1995) for example, citing Lincoln & Guba (1985) argued that all research must
meet certain 'criteria of soundness,' the term which they used in place of validity
and reliability. Soundness, Marshall & Rossman (1995) defined as the credibility
of fmdirigs, their transferability to other settings, the confidence with which the
replicability of a study can be achieved in the same context and with the same
participants and finally the confidence that the fmdings are reflective of the
subjects' views rather than the researcher. There is a strong logic to Marshall &
Rossman's (1995) argument that, given the different logic of quantitative and
qualitative methods, different criteria should be used to demonstrate the soundness
of both. This is not to state that anything will do in qualitative research but that any
attempt to demonstrate soundness should reflect the particular approach. However,
although this study makes use of quantitative methods in what is essentially a
qualitative study, this section aims to establish the soundness of this study with
reference to reliability and validity.
The methods selected for the collection and analysis of data for this thesis
included semi-structured interviews with key executives, surveys of safety officers,
analysis of documents and direct observations of events. In so doing an attempt
was made to assess safety policy, assumptions, beliefs and safety practice by
developing theory grounded in observation. Glaser & Strauss (1967) argued that
theory that develops out of empirical research (i.e. grounded theory) is 'more likely
to fit the data and to be useful, plausible and accessible' (p9). Theory or experience,
which comes first is like the chicken and egg debate. Grounded theory method was
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used to avoid the potential pitfall of applying a completely preconceived framework
to the data and simply selecting that data which fitted. This aided the creative
process and led to the use of Gouldner's (1955) study of 'Patterns in Industrial
Bureaucracy' which had not been considered relevant prior to the study.
This section deals with the methodological issues that arise from the foregoing
description of what was done. The social sciences present a sometimes confusing
array of appropriate alternative research methods. As Bryman (1988a) has noted,
there is a good deal of confusion over what constitutes qualitative and quantitative
research. Part of this confusion arises from a narrow association of quantitative
methods with 'experimental', hypothetico-deductive' or 'positivist' positions and
qualitative methods with 'contextual' or 'interpretative' positions. In this study a
number of methods or techniques were employed. The rationale for the chosen
blend lies with a number of factors including the nature of the research problem; a
desire to match the complexity of the subject with the tools employed to examine it;
and a deliberate intention to employ triangulation to improve the reader's
confidence in the results and conclusions. Silverman (1993) argued that:
"It is an increasingly accepted view that work becomes scientific by adopting
methods of study appropriate to its subject matter. Sociology is thus scientific
to the extent that it uses appropriate methods and is rigorous, critical and
objective in its handling ofdata."(p144, no added emphasis).
3.9.1	 Reliability
Validity and reliability, therefore, may be defmed as the core concepts of
rigour in scientific research. As has been shown, these terms are value laden
leading some qualitative researchers to avoid using these terms. For example,
positivist notions of reliability assume an unchanging universe where research can
quite logically be replicated. This contrasts sharply with the interpretivist or
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qualitative tradition which asserts that change is ever present and always possible.
Kirk & Miller (1986) described the search for such replicability in a social context
as 'quixotic reliability'. For example, the notion of test-retest reliability may be of
value for a thermometer but less appropriate for the measurement of the experience
of human stress, which may be expected to change over time.
For an essentially qualitative study such as this one reliability may be aligned
to confidence in the consistency of categorisation. The rigorous procedure used for
the analysis of the interview data represented an attempt to ensure this consistency
table 3.3). A continual re-reading and reflection upon the interview data were the
means used to ensure that the subject's responses were properly reflected in the
categorisation and subsequent analysis. Additionally, the questiounaire was piloted
on four safety officers.
3.9.2	 Validity: Respondent Validation
The validity of the findings of this study can be asserted on a number of
grounds. First, throughout the research process preliminary findings and analysis
have been circulated to a number of football club officials, local authority
representatives, the Football Licensing Authority and the various football
associations for comment, discussion and feedback. 'Where the subjects verify one's
findings it is argued that there can be greater confidence in their validity or
credibility (see for example, Lincoln & Guba 1985, Bryman 1988a, 1988b,
Silverman 1993, Marshall & Rossrnan 1995). Of course the strength of analysis
that is grounded in observation is that it can not help but be valid as Marshall &
Rossman (1995) assert.
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3.9.3	 Validity: Triangulation
The second basis for asserting the validity of this study concerns the use of a
triangulated multirnethods approach. Data were collected from a variety of
documentary sources and from all agencies involved in the management and
regulation of football stadia. Additionally, a number of methods were used to
collect data including document analysis, interviews, questionnaires and direct
observation. The overall research design permitted data collected in different ways
and from different sources to be evaluated as a whole reducing, but not necessarily
eliminating, the risks associated with researcher bias. Although each source of
information has its own limitations, taken together they provide a foundation of
hard evidence against which the limitations of each can be assessed.
A distinct tradition exists within the social sciences, that advocates the use of
multiple methods commonly know as 'triangulation' (see for example, Denzin
1970, Jick 1979, Silverman 1993). 'Where there is agreement between two or more
methods greater confidence in validity
	 follow. As Jick (1979) notes however,
'simpler' triangulation methods consisting of five variations of a particular method
will not necessarily generate five distinct varieties of triangulated data, and whilst it
might aid reliability it says little of validity. To deal with this potential weakness
triangulation was employed in two ways. First, all agencies with a formal
responsibility for safety management were interviewed (i.e. Football club
executives, safety officers and other safety personnel, local authority enforcement
officers, members of the Football Licensing authority, representatives of the various
football authorities and members of the police service). Differences in perceptions
provided fresh insights into the subject. Second, data collected via interviews was
complemented by other methods. For example, direct observation provided an
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opportunity to examine safety practice in action rather than in theory. The use of an
adapted form of Pauchant & Mitroffs (1992a) questionnaire in the survey of
football safety officers provided an opportunity to compare the data collected from
interviews with data collected using an instrument that has been widely used in
other crisis management studies. The analysis of data included in Chapters 5 and 6
draws upon evidence collected from the variety of methods employed, thereby
promoting greater confidence in the validity of that analysis and the conclusions
drawn from it.
3.9.4	 Validity: Representativeness
With regard to the Representativeness of the study a number of observations
can be made. Of a total population of 112, in-depth interviews were conducted with
representatives of twenty clubs (18%) and nearly 68% completed the questionnaire.
The stratified sampling ensured that those subjects interviewed were representative
of the whole population according to the criteria held to be appropriate. A strong
case can therefore be made for confidence in the Representativeness of the sample
and hence for the validity of the fmdings to the population as a whole.
A further problem associated with qualitative studies is that necessarily the
fmal report can only contain a small fraction of the data collected. There is a
danger that only those fragments that support an argument are cited. To combat this
danger 'deviant cases' are cited and explained where appropriate. The summary
tables in Chapter 5 and 6 include data from cases that suggest differences..
3.9.5	 Validity : Grounded Data
As Marshall & Rossman (1995) report, a qualitative study that aims to explore
a problem through describing a pattern of interaction cannot help but be valid. An
in depth study and description of the complexity of interaction between variables
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will be thoroughly grounded in the data. In this study of organisational learning in
the football industry, the participation of two thirds of the total population provides
a strong indication of its validity.
3.10 Summary
As Bryman (l988a) has observed:
"Anyone who has ever conducted social research knows that the content of the
textbooks on methods bears only a partial relationship with research itself
(R)esearch involves much more than and is very different in texture than that
implied by the text books"@l)
Bryman's further observations, that researchers commonly make mistakes,
gradually recognise the fragility of their methods and redefme their research
towards less ambitious aims, all apply to this thesis. The whole process was of
learning and it was not always pleasant. Whilst the above description of the process
is true it does not tell the full story. Unfortunately there is insufficient space. None
of this detracts from its ultimate value, but the process was more about learning a
craft than following a systematic process. Working with organisations, forging
links with gate keepers, overcoming missed appointments, diary clashes, illness and
an initial grand view of the PhD were all barriers that had to be overcome. The
purpose of this brief digression is to highlight that the actual process was much
messier than the necessarily brief description given above.
The links between the various stages were important. The collection of data
using semi structured interviews and the subsequent analysis, using grounded
theory, during the second stage was intended to ensure that premature conclusions
were not reached. In this sense this stage may be seen as a 'devil's advocate' stage
in which the assumptions from stage 1 and the frameworks from crisis management
were put aside and the data were considered afresh. For this reason, this stage may
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be represented as at the cross over between an inductive and a deductive approach.
In the first stage the purpose was to develop a plausible explanation of the
phenomena under investigation without allowing preconceptions to determine the
outcomes; although it was difficult to put aside powerful assumptions and early
conclusions. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) highlight the every day use of heuristics
such as first impressions which remain as very powerful influences. However, this
stage permitted the researcher to be immersed in the data, to re-read transcripts, to
re-listen to the interview tapes whilst reading the transcripts, so that subtle
intonations could be recorded to ensure that the data were interpreted as closely to
the interviewees' meaning, as possible. The researcher resorted to pen and paper
and recorded a total of forty nine themes. These were subsequently modified to
twenty five and again down to eleven. At this stage, consciously, the researcher
compared the results from this grounded analysis with the crisis management
frameworks and conclusions of stage one. This stage was particularly painstaking.
As Marshall & Rossman (1995) have indicated, certain dangers confront the
qualitative researcher. These include personal bias and a potential tendency to
make value judgements during data collection. Certainly at the start of this study
there was a clear expectation of what the conclusions would be. In the course of the
research for this study, however, there was less certainty regarding the eventual
conclusions. With regard to the second potential weakness, the use of tape recorded
interviews and word for word transcripts helped ensure that value judgernents were
not made during the data collection stage. Early transcripts were summarised to
facilitate analysis but these were soon found to be inadequate, and complete
transcripts were completed for all interviews. A further strategy employed to
prevent premature closure on ideas, was to search for negative instances of themes
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raised. For example, the notion of displacement, held to refer to the expressed
belief that safety was someone else's responsibility, was twinned with a category of
non-displacement where a club executive suggested that they were responsible for
safety.
This second stage also included participant observation at a number of
sporting events. For logistical reasons this was undertaken, whenever possible,
when a visit was made to a particular club or when the researcher was next in that
area, supporting Buchanan et al's (1988) contention that the researcher has to be
opportunistic. On a number of occasions this also permitted observation of the
interaction between club officials, police and members of the regulatory authorities
such as representatives of the FLA and Local Authority Safety Committees. This
enabled the researcher to verify the recorded views of club officials and provided an
opportunity for the collection of data from other sources. Ostensibly, however, the
purpose of participation was to see the safety management procedures in practice
and thus provide a means of verifying what had been communicated in the course
of the interviews.
The hybrid methodology incorporated elements of what Harrigan (1983) has
described as 'fme' and 'coarse grained' approaches to research to cope with the
complexities of the study area. 	 Fine grained or qualitative methodologies
permitted the researcher to understand the nuances of the football industries
environment and the peculiarities of each club and gave access to a wide range of
viewpoints within the industry. The supplementary use of 'coarse grained' or more
quantitative approaches facilitated the collection of data from across the industry
and promoted the validity of the study findings by ensuring that the phenomena
were looked at from multiple perspectives in such a way, that deeper dimensions,
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that might have been missed, were permitted to emerge. The use of a grounded
theory approach in particular avoided premature closure regarding the key variables
to be studied. The use of a revised version of Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a)
questionnaire and the subsequent statistical analysis, allowed the integration of
established tools and techniques within the overall study. Given the complexity of
the industry and the historical nature of much of this inquiry, this mixed methods
approach offered the best means of data capture, and appears wholly suitable to
achieve the research objectives relating to the industry currently and in the period
prior to 1989.
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Chapter 4
Structure, Finance and Culture and the UK Football
Industry
4.1 Introduction.
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce and examine the various agencies
and organisations which constitute the football stadium system. Particular attention is
placed upon the environmental context and the structural and communication patterns
evident within the industry. The Chapter is largely based upon documentary sources,
supplemented where appropriate with data collected in the course of this study. It
provides essential background to our examination of organisational learning. A
commonly used framework for examining the environment of organisations is the
Political-legal, Economic, Social and Technological (PEST).
4.2 Political-legal context
As Chapter 5 deals with the response of the football industry to legislation and
regulation in the post-war period, this Chapter will confine itself to a number of
observations. First, the political framework that has evolved owed much to concerns
with hooliganism culminating in the Football Spectators Act 1989.	 Second,
following the public inquiry process outlined in Chapter 2, the legislative framework
has developed in a piecemeal way in response to specific incidents or perceived
problems. Third, the analysis demonstrates the reluctance of Government to
introduce and effectively enforce regulation regarding safety management. Indeed the
1989 Football Spectator Act, which recommended the introduction of an identity card
scheme, remains on the statute book, although large parts of it have never been
introduced. Fourth, the 1989 Act covers England and Wales but not Scotland where
a self-regulatory system still exists. Only two Scottish clubs employed safety officers
in 1994; this figure had risen to twenty in 1997.
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4. 3 Economic Context
The period 1946 to 1997 witnessed a number of changes in the economic
prosperity of the football industry. From 1946 to 1958 attendances rose
continuously at a time when costs were restricted by the presence of the players'
maximum wage. From 1958 until the early l990s attendances fell continuously.
During this period Chester was commissioned (1967, 1983) to investigate the
economic viability of the industry reflecting Government concerns. It should be
noted that despite the fall in attendances in the period 1958-90, gate receipts
actually increased at a rate higher than inflation (see table 4.1).
	
Division	 Division	 Division	 Division	 All	 General Index
1	 2	 3	 4	 Divisions	 of Retail
	_________________ ____________ ____________ ___________ ___________ ___________
	Prices
	
1958/9-1963/4	 + 3.1	 + 4.2	 +4.1	 - 1.7	 + 3.1	 +2.3
	
1963/4-1968/9	 +12.3	 + 5.9	 +3.0	 + 8.0	 + 8.9	 +4.2
	
1968/9-1974/5	 + 9.8	 +11.4	 +9.2	 + 1.7	 + 9.6	 +10.0
	
1974/5-1978/9	 +17.8	 +15.8	 +15.6	 +27.5	 +17.6	 +14.7
	
1978/9-1983/4	 + 6.7	 +11.4	 +7.9	 + 2.5	 + 7.8	 +10.7
	
1983/4-1988/9	 + 9.0	 +10.8	 +12.8	 +13.7	 +10.3	 + 5.0
Table 4.1: Annual Averaged Percentage changes in Football League Gate Receipts
(after VAT deducted) 1958/9-1988/9
Source:	 Based upon Football Trust Annual Digest of Statistics (1993).
Arnold & Benveniste (1987), in an extensive examination of the English
Football League, provided an explanation for this seeming anomaly reporting that this
had been achieved through:
"successful pricing policies, whereby price increases have exceeded inflation and
taken advantage of inelastic demand.....[P]roduct extension has taken place into
new competitions." (p202)
Other factors reported by clubs include the increased income sharing arrangements
through the Football League (from a central pooi collected from sponsorship and a
levy on televised football).
Despite these successes, however, rising costs, including the abolition of the
players' maximum wage in 1961, contributed to a decline in the industry's
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prosperity. An Economist survey (22/04/89) claimed that all league clubs would be
considered bankrupt if they were to be judged by criteria in the Insolvency Act (see
also Arnold 1991, Bird 1982, Gratton & Lisewiski, 1981). As the majority of clubs
were privately owned there was little detailed data concerning their individual
financial status. However, it is evident from a number of studies (see for example
Arnold & Benveniste, 1988, Gratton & Lisewiski 1981) that there has been, and
remains, a wide gap between the richest and poorest clubs. For example, in early
1997 Manchester United were estimated to have a stock market value of £460m.
Other clubs, e.g. Brighton FC however, were facing bankruptcy. Indeed a feature of
the 1990s has been a reduction in income sharing arrangements, partly due to the
creation of a separate Premier League fri England and Wales and a 'go it alone' deal
with BSkyB. Despite this reduction a number of respondents in the English Second
and Third division identified this income as vital. For a Third division club the
Football League distributed approximately £160,000 in the 1994/5 season (Whalley,
1994).
The effects of new commercial opportunities and TV income created by the FA
Premier League, enabled its member clubs to switch an average annual loss of £1 .86m
to an average profit of £2.24m between 1993 -5 (Deloitte & Touche 1996). Deloitte &
Touche (1996) identified that in the 1993-4 season only 36% of all clubs were
profitable at an operating level, a figure that falls to 20% for divisions 1,2 and 3.
Coopers & Lybrand (1997) reported that the flotation of football clubs has led to
dramatic increases in value, in addition to providing further financial resources.
Charlton's 1997 flotation, despite seeing the price of shares marked down from 8Op to
66p at the end of the first day of trading, raised some £5.5m the club desired to pay for
ground improvements. The Guardian provided details concerning ten clubs that have
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been transformed into public companies (see table 4.2). Although Coopers &
Lybrand (1997) claimed that these valuations vastly exceed the real value of certain of
these football clubs they concluded that on the basis of these figures, the professional
football industry in the UK is currently worth between £2-2.5 billion. They suggested
that a valuation of approximately £1.5 billion would more accurately reflect the real
value of the industry. Nevertheless, this valuation provides an indication of the
changed economic prospects for the more successful clubs. The threatened demise of
a number of lower league clubs indicates that this 'prosperity' is not evenly shared.
Club	 Flotation Date	 Initial Value	 Value as at 01/04/97
Manchester United	 June 1991	 £47.4m	 £41 Om
Glasgow Rangers	 October 1995	 £20.7m	 £230m
Arsenal	 October 1995	 £39.3m	 £210m
Chelsea	 March 1996	 £56.7m	 £150m
Tottenham Hotspur
	
October 1983	 £ 9.lm	 £1 12m
Leeds	 June 1996
	 £20.2m	 £1 lOm
Celtic	 October 1995	 £14.5m	 LilOm
Sunderland	 December 1996
	 £47.5m	 £53m
Queens Park Rangers	 October 1996	 £26.Om	 £31m
r Manchester City
	 October 1995
	 £ 7.85m	 £15m
Table 4.2:	 Stock Market Value of Clubs, April 1997
Source:	 Guardian (1997)
In summary, the period since the initiation of the FAs Premier League has seen a
growth in the profitability of Clubs playing in the top divisions in England, Wales and
Scotland. However, in the preceding period (i.e. the period covering the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s) few football clubs were profitable. The ability of so many clubs to keep
operating despite their financial position may explain why so many football club
executives expressed the view that the second and third divisions could continue
indefinitely. S2, S4, Ti and T4 all reported that they would 'muddle through' as they
always had done (the prefixes were explained in Chapter 3). No respondent indicated
the view that the lower divisions would go part time as a means of reducing costs.
With regard to the stadia disasters, it seems clear that lack of financial resources, in
part explains the reluctance of football clubs to spend money on stadium
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redevelopment or upon any activity (e.g. stewardirig) other than their core activity of
playing football.
4.4 Social Context : Hooliganism Permeates the Debate
Close links exist between the social and political-legal context. It has been
argued that the identification of hooliganism as soccer's main problem acted as a
key barrier to effective learning from stadia disasters. The problems associated
with soccer hooliganism defmed the context in which Government sought to
intervene within the industry.
"The media have - over an historical period of thirty or forty years - created a
condition of football as a signification of violence. It has become almost
impossible to research into the regulation of football without being seen to be an
integral part of discourses about football hooliganism" (Redhead, 1991, pp48 1-
2).
The prominence given to hooliganism affected the debate concerning crowd
safety and control. Williams (1995) suggested that for many
"Hooliganism has become dangerously close to being the national sport's key
defining characteristic for the past 25 years"Q 160).
Bale (1990) reported that the scale of the hooliganism problem has been grossly
over-rated, citing Trivizaz (1980) who suggested that people committing offences at
football grounds were treated more severely than those committing similar offences
elsewhere. This context, Redhead continued, has set the scene for 'football
legislation' even where the official purpose of legislation was to improve safety.
The Government's 'rapid' reaction to the Bradford Fire supports this view. New
regulations were decided in early June, some months before Popplewell's interim
report.
The dominance of sociology in football research is highlighted by the
establishment of The Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research within the
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Department of Sociology at Leicester University. Canter et al (1989) argued that
these sociological studies have 'delighted' football clubs as it has allowed them to
blame the hooligans for all their problems. Support for this view emerged from
this study.
Following the Heysel tragedy (1985) English football clubs were barred from
participating in European competitions. Giulianotti et al (1994) suggested that in
this period the Government pursued a paradoxical approach to dealing with the
issue of hooliganism:
"Giving rise to deamplification (to confirm the efficacy of existing measures)
and amplification (to legitimise further legislation)" (p21).
Giulianotti (1994) identified seven distinct phases of the treatment of the issue of
hooliganism by researchers, media and government (summarised in table 4.3).
Most pronounced from Giulianotti's (1994) analysis is that football hooliganism
appears to have been 'discovered and rediscovered' politically on several occasions;
alternating between 'amplification and deamplification' of the issue as politically
required. Cohen (1973) observed that football hooliganism bore all the signs of
moral panic that had been associated with the public's response to 'mods' and
'rockers'. The football hooligans were labelled as social deviants in order to
reinforce middle class perceptions of the correctness of their own way of life. This
moral panic provided some justification for the increasingly punitive sanctions
developed during the 1980's. Contradicting such views Bale (1990) reported that
local residents consider traffic and parking as greater nuisances than hooliganism.
Whannel (1979) argued that the press had generally treated hooliganism as a new
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I_Time Period	 Focus
Post-war- 1968 Irregular disturbances, concern with maximisirig working hours. Little
government concern apart from Moelwyn-Hughes (1946) report on Bolton
Disaster. Media deamplification of phenomenon.
1968-70 Perceived escalation in fan violence and 'hooliganism' defined as a definitive
social policy area with Harrington (1968) and Lang (1969) reports in
hooliganism and crowd behaviour. Corporatist framework for problem solving
applied to problem with setting up of committees between state, police and
__________________	 football authorities. Media amplification of phenomenon.
1971-78 In academic circles a Mandst perspective developed (Hall & Jefferson 1976,
Taylor, 1971- Hooliganism reflects deterioration in social relations centred on
local football club). Response to Ibrox disaster with technical solutions put
forward and Safety in Sports Ground Act, 1975. Safety and Control perceived
of as separate concerns. Introduction of segregation in English grounds.
Perception that technical solutions being effective. Hooliganism viewed as a
temporaly phenomenon as mods and rockers had been in the 1960's. By 1974,
___________________	 political efforts to deamplify phenomenon.
1979-84 Identifies transition of government from Corporatist framework to a 'New
Right' administration. Greater sensitisation of executive towards hooliganism
and switch towards punitive judicial policies. The Leicester School dominates
debate in search for understanding of phenomenon. Hooliganism, it is argued,
has always been there, it is simply that public expectations have become less
tolerant of such behaviour. Soccer violence perceived as an international
embarrassment. Political and media amplification of issue.
1985 Deaths at Birmingham and Heysel linked to hooliganism, death of further 57
fans in Bradford fire. Giulianotti describes shift from 'New Right' approach to
Prime Ministerial crusade against the enemy within. Government announces
measures before Popplewell Inquiry reports back. Indefinite ban on English
football clubs playing in European competitions. Rethinking of earlier
conclusions on part of some researchers (e.g. Taylor). Growing interest in
subject from a range of international researchers from Western and Southern
_________________	 Europe._SouthAmerica,_andAfrica._High_amplification.
I 986-Hillsborough	 Giulianotti identifies a paradoxical executive approach towards football
1989	 hooliganism, 'giving rise to deamplification (to confirm the efficacy of existing
measures) and amplification (to legitimise further legislation). 	 CCTV
introduced into football grounds, compulsory membership scheme planned.
__________________	 Emphasis upon containment and extension of technical fixes of 1970's.
Post Hillsborough	 Scale of Hillsborough tragedy led to Taylor Report and far reaching changes in
1989:-	 the industry. Emphasis on presence of hooliganism elsewhere. Problems of
football industry recognised as not being simply concerned with hooliganism.
__________________	
To_early_1996_deamplification_of hooliganism_as_a_phenomenon.
Table 4.3: The seven phases in analysis of hooliganism
Source:	 Adapted from Giulianotti (1994)
phenomenon despite evidence of its much longer history. Dunning (1994) offered
evidence that the extent of hooliganism has remained relatively stable and that it is
media reporting or perception has changed. He wrote:
"Media sensationalism contributed to the pattern of football hooliganism that
emerged in the mid 1960's and lasted until the 1980's, namely the pattern
whereby football matches came to be used by more or less organised groups of
young, primarily working class males as a focus and context for fighting."
(p137).
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Contradicting Dunning, Williams (1995) argued that hooliganism has declined
since Hilisborough. Dunthng (1994) writes of its continuance, despite the failure of
the media to report hooliganism. There is evidence to support both arguments.
Hooliganism inside stadia has certainly dwindled, as indicated by Middleham's
(1993) survey of police forces, and may have declined in surrounding areas.
Incidents in Dublin (1996) and at Queens Park Rangers' Ground in 1997 illustrate
that it has not gone away. Tombs (1997) suggests that hooliganism may have been
subject to media blackouts, a tendency that has coincided with the repackaging and
commodification of football as a middle class leisure industiy. A difficulty which
emerges is the absence of a precise, commonly held defmition of hooliganism. This
makes measurement of the phenomena extremely difficult.
In late 1988 and early 1989 the Government was developing plans to introduce
a compulsory "National Membership Scheme" for football spectators. At a national
level the Government desired to introduce an identity card scheme . Before the
scheme could be implemented a further tragedy occurred. In April, 1989 ninety
five spectators were crushed to death at the Hillsborough Stadium. As Ian Taylor
(1991) has argued this latter disaster was an:
"End point.....of those forms of political and journalistic discussion of football
which had developed throughout the late 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s,
articulated almost entirely around a 'law and order' theme and the identification
of soccer's problems almost exclusively with the issue of hooliganism. "QD3)
The close identification of hooliganism with the football industry effectively
determined the context in which solutions were prepared and discussed. Prior to
the Hillsborough tragedy Government intervention focused upon controlling
spectators, culminating in the attempt to introduce a national identity card scheme
for football spectators. The efforts of clubs, as Arnold & Benveniste's (1988)
142
survey suggested, were focused upon lobbying government to change its mind on
the identity card scheme. The issue of hooliganism and the alternative means of its
control dominated the debate. This attempt to control football spectators supports
the view that policy makers and media perceived of the stadia disasters as being
caused largely by unruly spectator behaviour. Lord Justice Taylor himself, was
reported (by a senior RFU Official) to have commented upon a visit to Twickenham
that his recommendations had not been intended to impact upon Rugby Football
Stadia (anon, 1994). The implication of this view being that the problems of
management of stadia were unique to the football industry.
The perceived close links crowd safety and control are illustrated by the terms
of reference of Lord Justice Taylor's Report (1989):
"To inquire into the events at the Sheffield Wednesday football ground on 15
April 1989 and to make recommendations about the needs of crowd control and
safety at sports events" (p1)
The main recommendations of the Taylor Report included the requirement for all
football stadia to become all-seater. Although this may be interpreted as a high
level technical fix, Taylor's criticisms of the football industry marked a significant
development from previous reports in that a more thorough critique of the industry
and other grounds was developed, than had been the case in earlier inquiries.
Although there was debate about the particular role of hooliganism in triggering the
events at the Hillsborough stadium, it was accepted by Taylor (1989) that the
potential for disaster had been created by those agencies with responsibility for
preparing for and overseeing the event. Taylor was critical of the complacency
shown by football club directors and the tendency for ground development to occur
in a piecemeal manner with, little consideration of how small changes might impact
upon the overall stadium system. Taylor argued that his report should not be seen
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as a one off solution to the problem but that safety could only be improved with
ongoing reviews of arrangements.
Ian Taylor (1989) argued that the stadia disasters must be socially and
politically contextualised. Citing the examples of a range of different disasters,
unprecedented in scale and frequency within the UK, Taylor identifies a number of
themes common to each:
"Rampant disregard for safety in private and public services; poor
communications once disasters occur; inadequately trained and overworked staff
and, especially, dilapidated public facilities" (pp 108-9).
In a later article Taylor (1991) makes more explicit reference to the football
industry:
"The Hillsborough disaster was the product of a quite consistent and ongoing
lack of interest on the part of owners and directors of English League clubs in the
comfort, well being and safety of their paying spectators: this particular failure
within football that I am condemning is a generalised problem in English culture
- the lack of regard by authority (and thereby what we now call service
providers) for the provision of well being and security of others" (p12).
Here, neatly, this thesis returns to one of its first points, that is, that the search for
lessons requires looking at the appropriate level of generality. Examination of the
stadia tragedies has too often focused upon either specific 'technical' problems or
upon hooliganism. From the analysis above, the debate surrounding the issue of
hooliganism can be seen to have hindered effective organisational learning by
dominating the discussion of the problems facing the football industry.
Using the football industry as a vehicle, this dissertation examines the
development of crises paying particular attention to the nature of organisational
learning prior to and following crisis incidents. As our earlier discussion has
indicated, hooliganism has been seen by many to be a defming characteristic of
football in England and may, thus, have distorted any examination of the industry's
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problems. The high prominence given to 'soccer violence' research has contributed
to a mindset in which the issues of crowd safety and crowd control have become
inseparable in the minds of official agencies. This mindset has arguably dominated
football stadia design and crowd management. Such a mindset permitted the
conclusion that if crowd disorder could be contained, then crowd safety could be
ensured, as depicted in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Fortress Football
Source: Bale, J (1990) citedfrom When Saturday Comes, No. 25pplO-ll
Figure 4.1 illustrates a fans' perspective. 'When Saturday Comes' is a popular
national football fans' magazine that seeks to represent the views of supporters. It
summarises the views of a number of football supporters who felt themselves to be
treated, increasingly, as trouble makers. The cartoon sought to demonstrate how the
experience of attending a football match had become dominated by security and
control. The guard tower, closed turnstile for 'normal decent supporters' and the ID
card for normal supporters portray a very strong image of how many supporters were,
or believed themselves to be, treated.
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4.5 Organisational Context: Power and Influence within the UK Football
Industry
Governance of the football industry within Great Britain is through a number of
Government
Public
Football	 Football
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Figure 4.2: The 'Football Stadium 'System Organisational System
related, but independent bodies. A systems map of the various agencies involved in
football stadia is shown in figure 4.2. This illustrates the range of agencies
involved within the industry, the potential complexity of relationships and the
likelihood that some organisations are likely to exert political influence whilst other
groups may be easily overlooked. The stadium and the football club are shown at
the centre of the map as these represent the hub of the system. Although obviously
complex, even this system's map fails to capture the full richness of this particular
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system. The right hand side of the model depicts those with a regulatory interest
within the industry. The left hand side identifies those 'agencies' with a close, if
unstructured relationship with the industry (supporters and media).
4.5.1 The Football Association
Founded in 1863, the FAs amateur roots are reflected in the current composition
of its ruling council. The FAs Council consists of a majority of representatives from
non-professional County Associations, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the
three armed forces and the Amateur Football Alliance ( who represent business
houses, banks, Old Boys' clubs and similar organisations).
The professional football leagues share some fourteen seats. The FAs view of its
own primacy is clearly stated in its 'Blueprint for the Future of Football' (1991):
"The future of Association Football depends, fundamentally, on confirming and
strengthening the position of The Football Association as the Government of the
game in England. All other Associations, Leagues and Clubs should be
subordinate to The Football Association" (p29).
The influence of its amateur roots has extended to the current day, as is shown by the
make up of the FA Ruling Council and it has certainly contributed to past failures to
seize commercial opportunities (Tnglis 1988). Dougan (1981) described the battle that
he had with the FA over shirt sponsorship. As manager of the semi-professional
Kettering Town, Dougan was called to face a committee of the most senior FA Board
members. In summing up his views of that meeting he stated:
"I have also gone on record as saying that if the FA or Football League could
horsewhip a player in public or, possibly get away with hanging one of us, they
would do so, because some of them are convinced that the ills of the world today
and certainly of the UK, stem from professional footballers. That attitude is still
prevalent today."(pp49-50)
Recent developments however, have seen the FA embrace commercialism in a
hitherto unseen manner. 'The Blueprint for Football' (1991), much of which was
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subsequently discarded, identified the enhanced commercial opportunities of a
smaller, but better, First Division. The establishment of the FA Premier League in
1992 caused the transfer of twenty of the most commercially viable clubs from the
Football League. The commercialisation of football iii the form of sales of TV rights
and sponsorship has developed rapidly since then. A part of the justification for
setting up the FA Premiership was that the historical hostility between FA and
Football League had been to the detriment of football as a whole. The FA also argued
that a smaller First Division, resulting in fewer fixtures, would support the national
team.
Apart from its new role within the professional game the FAs main tasks have
been to represent and govern the game within England. The Scottish and the Welsh
FAs perform similar roles within their respective countries, although the senior Welsh
teams play in the English League. The national FAs work alongside UEFA and FIFA
(the European and World-wide ruling bodies). The popular view of the various
Football Association is that they are staid, bureaucratic organisations with little vision.
This view was held by many respondents from all divisions; a view not helped by the
average age of their council members, where one was younger than sixty years old
and the eldest were in their late eighties (Guardian 1996).
Further evidence of outdated systems comes from the FAs Director of Public
Affairs, David Davies. Davies (1997) reported that on his appointment in 1993:
"After the royals and the government this organisation, arguably, gets more
column inches than any other. But there was no structure for dealing with that at
all... There were only two phones and you would get hundreds of calls in a day.
The first might be from a 15-year old in Sevenoaks who wanted to know who
played centre-forward for England in 1897. Meanwhile, on the other line, would
be Brian Woolnough from The Sun" (Davies, 1997 p4)
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Davies reported that when he applied for the post he advised the FA that the role they
had identified was simply not broad enough for the task in hand. The fact that Davies
was appointed indicates, however, some willingness to change.
The FA employ their own 'security' advisers, whose role combines planning and
managing the security and stewarding arrangements for international matches with
advising individual clubs. At the time of this study the security adviser devoted the
majority of his time to planning for the 1996 European Championship, held in
England (Titcombe 1994). The task of advising clubs on safety and security matters
therefore, fell to the various leagues.
4.5.2 The Football League, Scottish Football League and FA Premier League,
The Football Leagues (FL) are the main co-ordinating bodies of professional
football in the UK. The Football League, as distinct from its Scottish counterpart,
was founded in 1888 by twelve Northern and Midland clubs who were believed to
have the largest potential support. The role of the FL may be summarised as looking
after the collective interests of its members, collecting monies from the sale of TV
rights and Pools, enforcing FL regulations and overseeing the fixtures process.
Despite the egalitarian values of its founding members, from the start clubs were
more interested in self rather than collective interests as shown by the 1888 decision
not to share gate receipts, agreeing instead on a fee of £15 to be paid to the visiting
team (Inglis 1988). In the sharing of monies raised from other sources however, (e.g.
poois, sale of TV rights etc.) it was not until 1986 that the equal share per club
regardless of division, was amended to a fifty per cent of monies granted to First
Division clubs, twenty five percent to Second division clubs and the remainder shared
between the two lowest divisions. Amendments to the voting structure for the FL's
Committee also saw further concentration of power in the hands of the First division.
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From a cultural perspective, the FL may be described as an inner oriented and
conservative organisation. Prior to the 1980s and 1990s little attempt was made by
the FL to communicate directly with spectators or to canvas their views. Rules were
used to exclude up and coming semi-professional clubs from entering the League.
Conservatism hindered many attempts of the FL to exploit new commercial
opportunities. The non-confonnist, anti-gambling views of a number of its influential
committee members allowed thirty years to pass before an agreement was reached
with the Pool's companies. When agreement was reached in 1959, the FL's
commercial income jumped from £1,256 to £275,000. The sales of TV rights and
development of Sunday football were hindered by a distaste for change on the part of
the FL's Committee (Inglis 1988 pp2 10-213).
A number of key changes occurred during the 1 980s, a period that saw internal
amendments combine with increasing environmental pressure created by a
combination of the high profile of hooliganism, the financial problems of clubs, the
various stadium disasters and arguably, the persistent perception of the England
team's failures. The 1 980s saw the development of a number of innovations such as
the development of live football on TV, permission for the appointment of paid club
directors, the creation of end of season play offs and "automatic" promotion from the
semi-professional conference league to the old Division four. The reality of this latter
change demonstrates how structural changes can be subverted as the requirements for
potential entrants (in terms of ground, facilities and finances) appeared to be increased
and applied more rigorously than for those already within the FL
Historically, this inconsistency has not been restricted to relations between
league and non-league clubs. Inglis (1988) reported that during the late 1960s
Manchester United received a £7,000 fine for a misdemeanour that saw Port Vale and
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Peterborough punished by demotion. This inconsistency highlights a weakness of the
FL, that without the support of its clubs it is like a 'toothless tiger'.
From a structural perspective the FL is best described by Mintzberg's (1983)
Divisionalised form. It differs from the pure type in the extent of power held by the
clubs, power expressed in electing the conimittee and in their observance of the rules.
Our earlier reference to the inconsistency in the enforcement of these rules suggests a
lack of power within the FL. Much power resides therefore with the clubs. However,
this power is not evenly spread. Wealthier, and frequently more successful, clubs
have worked to amend the rules in their favour as the 1980s reforms to the FL and the
creation of the FAs Premier League demonstrate. Certain charismatic individuals
have also played key roles throughout the history of the FL either blocking or
engineering change. Mintzberg (1983) described this process as 'balkariisation' as the
middle managers (club chairmen in this case) have sought to increase their own
power. In the case of the FL, as has been shown, this has led to the increased
concentration of power and resources into the hands of the larger and increasingly
wealthy clubs iii the upper divisions.
The involvement of so many in decision making has proved a powerful barrier to
change, which combined with the innate conservatism of many of its members saw
the FL struggle to cope with the changes of the 1970s and l980s. Inglis' (1988) and
Walvin's (1994) histories of the football industry depict the various football
authorities over much of the twentieth century in a Canute like pose seeking to
prevent the tide of change. As Mintzberg (1983) argued the structural type is best
suited to a simple and stable environment, a label that could not be applied to the FL's
context in this period. The changing economic context outlined earlier is one factor in
this. Since the formation of the FAs Premier League in 1992 the FL has been left
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with a rump of seventy two of the smaller professional clubs. Talk of extending the
FAs Premier League threatens to weaken further the FL with the transfer of a further
twenty of its largest members. The fmancial position of many members of the FL
remains precarious at a time when the FA Premier League is exploiting many of the
commercial opportunities available to the industry.
In 1994 the commercial earnings collected and distributed by the FL proved the
largest source of income for a number of clubs in the lowest two divisions.
Requirements to develop their grounds and improve the quality of stewarding have
led the FL to develop programmes to assist clubs (Whalley 1994).
In summary, the football leagues do devote resources to the development of
guidelines for issues such as stewarding. These are produced in booklet format and
distributed to clubs. This provides a useful means of disseminating explicit
knowledge but the implementation of guidelines is very much dependent upon
individual clubs.
4.5.3 Football Clubs
If the FL shows some similarity with Mintzberg's (1983) Divisionalised form
the clubs tend towards the simple structure. That is, towards little formality with
minimal specialisation. Despite their superficial differences there are many
similarities between the various football clubs. One common feature is the
centralisation of power in the hands of one or a very small number of directors as the
following quotes from three premier league clubs indicate. Respondents were asked
to describe the role of their Board and Chairman in decision making; first the
responses of the FAs Premier League executives:
"Very hands on, Chairman appointed old business staff to sort the club out, he
restructured the club, he sees it as part ofajigsaw" (P1)
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"At the end of the day the Chairman is the Chairman, and he is the major
shareholder he's the person that's put most of the money into the club and would, if
he felt it necessary, impose himself on everyone else." (P3)
"If there is any expense the Chairman is involved, there is no delegation there.
The chairman is the Board, the other Board members just nod and say yes." (P4)
No common style emerged from interviewees from the lower three divisions.
Fl, Si and T4 identified Boards in name only, with the Chairman taking all decisions
whilst for the others a more democratic system was reported:
"6 directors, all with a responsibility, instead of going to the Board every three
weeks with a great list of issues, each individual has a specific priority such as
the shop, or catering or commercial or ground or medics." (S2)
"Normally decisions go up to the Board and then it's left to the chair and Ito sort
out." (S4)
"I haven't got a demagogue running the club, we've got 6 directors who are
equally placed." (T2)
However, despite this appearance of democracy it emerged in the majority of cases
that some directors were more equal than others and held key responsibilities that
gave them more influence. For example, in the case of S2, one director was a medical
doctor and liaised with St Joim's Ambulance, whilst another director authorised stock
purchases for the shop that was open on matchdays only. For a number of clubs,
particularly those in the Third Division, the Chairman and other Board members were
largely distant, keeping in touch with a daily phone call to the Club Secretary (Ti,
13, T4).
As Mintzberg (1983) identified, the success of such a structure depends upon the
'whim and health' of an individual as the difficulties Everton F.C. and Raith Rovers
P.C. experienced illustrates. In the former case the long illness of Sir John Moores
made it difficult for long term decisions to be made (Swift, 1994,); for Raith Rovers
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the Chairman returned to Canada and was not heard from for ten months, virtually
paralysing the club's administration.
A further danger identified by Mintzberg is that the Chief Executive may
become so focused upon strategic issues that the more routine operations 'wither for
lack of attention'. In the case of football clubs, this trait manifests itself in a focus
Objective:	 Arnold &	 Safety Officers	 Safety Officers
Benveniste (1988)
	 (Elliott 1997)	 (Elliott 1997)
% of Respondents 	 % of Respondents 	 % of Respondents
________________________ __________________ England & Wales
	
Scotland*
Playing Success	 93	 83	 83
Financial Success
	 55	 28	 58
Financial Stability	 24	 67	 42
Entertainment	 19	 7	 8
Marketing of Club
	 8	 nla	 0
Crowd Safety	 nla	 73	 75
Ground Improvement	 7	 35	 8
Success for Locality 	 5	 3	 0
Table 4.4.	 Football club objectives
Source Arnold & Benveniste (1988, p6), Elliott 1997, survey data.
* of the 12 respondents, I did not complete the section on club objectives
upon achieving playing success, as identified by Arnold & Benveniste (1988) and
subsequently confirmed in our survey (see tables 4.4 and 4.5). Respondents were, in
both surveys, asked to indicate their clubs top three priorities. It should be noted that
Arnold & Benveniste's survey was aimed at club executives whilst this survey was
targeted at Football Safety officers. The breakdown by division also offers further
insights. That lower divisions identify crowd safety as a lower priority objective
than the higher divisions may reflect a view that small crowds do not pose a
problem. It should be noted that the Bradford Club were in the old third division at
the time of the fire. The data included in table 1.1 illustrated that lower division
clubs are also susceptible to problems of crowd safety.
These data support Sloane's (1971) argument that football clubs do not seek to
maximise profits but are utility maximisers subject to basic financial constraints
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Routine matters such as ground improvements (in the aftermath of the Bradford Fire)
were reported by a paltry 7% of respondents as one of their top three objectives.
Premier	 Division	 Division	 Division	 Scottish
______________________	 Division	 1	 2	 3	 Respondents
Playing Success
	 71%	 84%	 92%	 92%	 83%
Financial Success	 24%	 32%	 33%	 25%	 58%
Financial Stability
	 59%	 58%	 83%	 75%	 42%
Entertainment	 6%	 5%	 0%	 17%	 8%
Crowd Safety	 88%	 74%	 67%	 58%	 75%
Ground Improvement	 47%	 37%	 17%	 33%	 8%
Local Area Success	 0%	 11%	 0%	 0%	 0%
Table 4.5: Objectives of football clubs by division 1997
This lack of interest in routine matters was also identified in our interviews when
respondents were asked to describe their own role, their business practices and to
describe their planning processes. There is always the possibility that respondents will
over emphasise their work burdens but careful analysis of the interview data showed a
high level of consistency, with many uses of the first person singular to describe the
various activities performed within this club. Data collected during the direct
observation also supported the pivotal role played by the club secretary or chief
executive in all but the Premier Division Clubs and one Scottish club. The pattern that
emerged suggested that for clubs in the Premiership, and for some in the First
Division, planning processes had been developed recently. P1 for example,
commented that the Club was:
"Better managed now, but before, I didn't have enough time to concentrate on
the issues that really mattered because you're bogged down with the day to day
issues."
P1's comments about recent change were supported by the evidence of new iT
equipment and the obviously recent investment in office accommodation. For some
clubs in the senior divisions a growing division of labour was observed, with the
appointment of specialist staff to deal with marketing, ticket sales, safety and legal
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issues - all tasks that had previously been undertaken by the Club Secretary, or as one
interviewee stated:
"Ashes to ashes, dust to dust, what the others won't do the secretary must."(S4)
F4 suggested that a lack of resources for administration combined with the
uncertainty of professional football prevented proper attention being given to
planning:
"Unfortunately football being what it is most people do two or three jobs....
everybody has more roles than they should have, you just do not have the time,
it's not an excuse, it's a fact, football clubs can't afford to pay that number of
people because the financial structure of clubs is wrong.... in football it is
impossible to do a cash flow for the next month, there are so many unforeseen
things that can happen and it is all down to kicking a football on the pitch or
drawing a number out of a bag."
For T3, planning was limited to the re-signing of their best player to ensure that he
could be sold for more at the end of the season. T4's prioritisation consisted of:
"You live by the seat of your pants, basically, you just do what you have to get
through, whoever shouts the loudest, you do that next. There is no other more
methodical way of doing it, you learn as you go on and if you're lucky you don't
learn too often by your mistakes."
A view echoed by S3 who observed:
"I've usually got 6 or 8 balls in the air, and I probably should do something
about these things and when people shout aloud, they do happen"
The reluctance of Directors to invest more resources in administration and support
was noted by two interviewees. S2 indicated a desire to appoint staff in preparation
for promotion, directors wanted to wait until they achieved it before committing any
resources. Of the twenty English, Welsh and Scottish respondents only three
provided evidence of any formal planning. These three were all in one of the
Premier divisions.
The evidence collected suggested that there was a growing gap between those
clubs who were secure in their Premiership status and the rest. This was supported by
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the fmancial evidence of a growing gap between Premiership clubs and others. In
Scotland the recognition of the dominance of two clubs meant that the others were
more realistic in their expectations (Sd). Each of the Scottish Clubs (SC) identified
the existence of some form of planning process (SC1, SC2 SC3, SC4). A growing
commitment to planning, in two cases reported as stemming directly from the arrival
of a new Chairman and investment in new technology and in customer services was
evident in the three clubs secure in the Premiership. Similar strategies were identified
in three other clubs, two of which had recently been acquired by a new management
team. As the quotes above indicate, the role of the Club Secretary in many clubs
covers many areas of responsibility. There was little evidence of significant
investment in IT in the majority of clubs visited. The low priority of administration
was indicated by a reluctance to provide cover for illness or to replace staff quickly.
(F4, S2, S3, Ti, T2, T3, T4).
Despite this seemingly poor treatment many staff appeared to genuinely enjoy
their work and involvement with a Football club and were willing to work a six day
week during the season. Mintzberg (1983) had previously identified this
characteristic of the simple form with the explanation that people frequently enjoyed
working for a small, intimate company that retained a sense of mission. A potential
problem when people are requested to master a variety of tasks is that none are
completed properly because of either inexpertness or lack of time. This problem
appeared most pronounced amongst the lower divisions. A number of secretaries (S3,
TI, T2, T4) retrieved a pile of correspondence that they had not been able to deal with
through lack of time. A number stated that they had been fined for not following FL
or FA procedures, mistakes made because of a lack of time or because they had not
had time to read fully the guidelines.
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It was argued in Chapter 2 that structure and communciations could act as
barriers to learning. The examples provided above illustrate how this may occur.
Lack of time, too many tasks, lack of training and a reactive rather than proactive
culture may combine to ensure that only the most obvious tasks are undertaken. The
physical distance between many clubs and key directors means that only the most
pressing matters are dealt with. The contribution of this type of structure and
organisational problems are examined in Chapters 5 and 6.	 For example, our
discussion of the causes of the Bradford Fire highlights the problems of inadequate
investment in what should be the routine tasks of administration and maintenance. T4
stated that the phasing out of the Youth Training Scheme would leave the club short
staffed and remove those who had the task of cleaning the stadium.
The simple structure does not provide the time needed for individuals to collect
and analyse data. The centralisation of control means persuading the owner, of the
value of new learning; otherwise passive learning takes place - learning without
action. Similarly, the culture of what was called 'crisis management' perpetuates a
myth that 'we' will survive whatever happens.
Historically, the majority of clubs trace their roots back into the late nineteenth
century and many have altered little with regard to administrative structures since
then. Walvin (1986) described the clubs as:
"Victorian and Edwardian institutions, often fiercely resistant to change,
determined to maintain their methods and traditions - most of which were forged
in an earlier and quite different epoch. Clubs have been 'old fashioned' in the
worst of senses; reluctant to change their outlook and their mode of operations.
But the clubs were also desperate to benefit from whatever lucrative deal could be
clinched with new commercial interests. The end result has been a particular
amalgam, of old and new; of clubs whose appearance has, in many cases changed
little since the early years of the century but who adopt a host of modem money
making tactics and often flamboyant methods of fund raising." (p17)
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The structures of the clubs lend themselves to their domination by powerful
individuals. Although some of the larger clubs (e.g. Manchester United, Tottenham
Hotspur) are publicly quoted companies, particular individuals still play an influential
role. Others are private companies with shares passed down through families whose
involvement with a particular club may stretch back almost to the turn of the century
(e.g. Shipman family at Leicester, Moores family at Liverpool and Everton). Other
clubs are controlled by businessmen who have made a fortune and have subsequently
become involved with the team they supported during their childhood (e.g. Jack
Walker at Blackburn, Steve Gibson at Middlesborough). A related group are those
who form a partnership of local businessmen supporting their club (e.g. Bumley and
Darlington). Yet other investors have been attracted by the high profile of the football
industry and have sought to develop their other interests alongside through football
(e.g. David Sullivan at Birmingham, Robert Maxwell at Oxford and Derby during the
1980s). Others have mixed motives combining as Sir John Hall at Newcastle does a
desire to promote the success of the football club as a piece of the jigsaw for
increasing the profile and prosperity of the North East. (Cushing 1994).
Regardless of their particular motive, a trait common to the vast majority of
these individuals and families is that they have created their own financial fortunes
outside the football industry, and their involvement with a club satisfies a need other
than that of making money. Although S3 spoke of stewardship of their club rather
than ownership, the majority suggested that the club was an executive toy or a means
of satisfying the ego of the chairman (P2, P3, P4, Fl, F2, F4, 51, S2, S4, T2, T4). The
importance of this is, that it reinforces the importance of playing success to the
detriment of the routine, unexciting back room activities which may act as a barrier to
effective learning. The status of the safety officer was not high in many clubs.
159
Following a match the chairman and directors would retire to the directors lounge.
On a number of occasions, when invited to join, I had to be escorted into the lounge.
In the meantime the Safety Officer was left to a private gathering of 'junior' staff
who often sat in an office with a bottle of Scotch. There was a real potential for
learning at these impromptu meetings, as few of those present had seen the match and
they inevitably discussed problems they had encountered during the day. There
appeared to be no mechanism for communicating this valuable information to the
senior executives. The 'protected' world of the football club director means that they
never have to use the crowded toilets, push their way through turnstiles or sit on a
broken seat drinking tepid tea. Generally their experience is far removed from that of
many spectators. Three clubs (P1, P3, S3) stated that occasionally directors would
deliberately join the spectators to gain a new perspective. Those respondents
interviewed after this data came to light expressed positive support for this activity,
although believed it unlikely that their Board would be so 'enlightened'.
From a cultural perspective the focus upon activities on the pitch may be seen as
a key influence on core assumptions, reflecting the beliefs and values of the main
shareholders. The enfrepreneurial background of many club chairmen mitigates
against their acquiescence to the many rules and regulations to which they are subject.
Scott et al (1989) have reported that small firms are particularly poor at complying
with regulations, especially where there is a good chance that this behaviour will
remain undetected. A survey of business compliance with environmental regulations
indicated that up to three quarters of small firms had been in breach of regulations
(see Elliott et al 1997). Inglis (1988) described how, despite the collaboration of
clubs in setting up the rules of the League, from the start, individual club directors
worked to test the rules and see how far the Management Committee would bend.
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There was early conflict between the larger, wealthier clubs and the FA when in 1901
the maximum wage was introduced. The maximum wage restricted the amount that
wealthier clubs could pay their best players. Inglis (1988) suggested that when the
opportunity to remove this restriction appeared, the wealthier clubs had already found
ways of circumventing the regulation and poorer clubs benefited from the restriction.
"What developed was a kind of silent conspiracy in which subterfuge became the
accepted norm; the public face nodded approval while the private hand slipped
cash into the players' pockets."(Inglis, 1988, Ps4).
Such behaviour was effectively endorsed by the FL's punishments, where Sunderland
in 1904 were fmed £50 in public records, the amount was reduced to £5 in the
confidential minutes. The age of these examples may suggest that they do not reflect
a fair picture of the industry in the present day. However, a key theme of Inglis'
(1985, 1988) analysis is that persistent rule breaking and scandal have been rife
within the industry throughout the twentieth century. Collecting evidence of 'illegal'
payments, fraud and other scandals is difficult for obvious reasons and has often come
from disgruntled employees (Inglis, 1988). The closure of parts of twenty seven FL
grounds in 1985, following the Bradford Fire, indicates that clubs had not been
complying fully with the Safety at Sports Ground Act (1975). In the course of
interviews with club executives not one indicated that they had been personally
involved in any fraudulent activity, although the majority claimed to be aware of
'dubious practices'.
"Within the Industry, back handers and corruption exist to a greater or lesser extent
in many clubs which is why I'm not an advocate of footballing people being
involved in football clubs. There is always the temptation to do it and always the
difficulty of proof ... I will not compromise my principles.., we may not attract
some players because we do not offer the same incentives." (S3)
A fmal characteristic of clubs identified from the interviews was their inner
orientation. This insularity has been described as narcissistic by Pauchant & Mitroff
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(1992) who identify this as a key factor in determining the propensity of an
organisation to crisis. S3 was particularly critical of standards across the industry
suggesting that it was too insular, linking this insularity with poor business practice:
"They wouldn't know best practice if it got up and bit them, they don't know
planning, they don't know best practice, procedures, they don't know because too
many people have been in it for too long, working for a football club is very
isolating, it is a very unique type of job, it is like nothing else...They don't have
standards, they don't have vision, they lose track of an insight into business and a
keenness and sharpness."
With regard to customers although each club reported excellent relations with
supporters this was not supported by their evidence. Few clubs held regular meetings
with supporters, although five had carried out some market research. For example, P2
and F3 had convened supporter groups to assist in drawing up plans for future
redevelopment A number of interviewees commented that the closest the Board ever
got to the supporters was 'by driving their cars through the crowds on their way to the
ground'. At Rangers' Ibrox Stadium, in addition to Market Survey and Customer
Comment cards littered around the ground, a number of senior administrators walked
around the stadium prior to each match to meet with supporters. Leicester City
organised a series of six forums offering an opportunity for" straight talking debates
between supporters and Club representatives on issues with regard to the Club's
operations" (Leicester City Programme, 1997, p33). These proved to be the exception
rather than the rule. Contact between clubs and supporters was often restricted to
responding to letters, a task that was taken seriously, reportedly, by many chairmen.
For example:
"We don't have spectator involvement at board level, we do have forums twice a
year with the chairman and manager but we have none at board level, the
chairman isn't very interested but he answers every letter, but his attitude is why
should you run the club when I've put in all my money" (P4)
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Where contact was reported, it often appeared halfhearted or contained a low opinion
of what supporters could offer:
"We listen, we are probably the worlds worst, I wouldn't like to be disrespectful to
them but going back to the safety forum and the Taylor Report where we were
talking about liaising with supporters, we don't invite them to come in and say give
us your views, but like a lot of clubs actually do, because I don't think they can
really be constructive, because I think that you would get some daft ideas out of
them, you really do, plus who can actually generate good ideas that can work
within the framework? What if you reject some ideas? Fanzines will have great
fun, giving them self importance, raising expectations (S2)
"That is the thing that fans have to understand, they think that they can have
everything their own way, and we get it here, you get a lot of criticism and I'm sure
that all clubs do. Why are you doing that? Why is it this way? Why can't we do
that? ... Football must be the only industry where everyone thinks they have a right
to tell you how to run your business." (S3)
The responses reflected a failure on the part of clubs to communicate with
spectators. S2 contradicted his opening statement "We listen" with a clear
indication that he does not. However, these three statements reflect the view that
supporters have a very strong interest in all aspects of a club's operations and are
not reticent in coming forward. Bale (1990) highlights the key role played by
supporters in keeping Charlton Athletic from bankruptcy, illustrating a positive
aspect of supporters. Decisions concerning the use of turnstiles for season ticket
holders (T3) or a prohibition on tickertape (S3) or over the allocation of cup tickets
(T4) were implemented and not communicated in advance to supporters. The
result in each case was to cause much dis-satisfaction amongst spectators, which
timely communication could have avoided. One explanation for this failure to
communicate may concern the perception of many supporters as daft, uninformed
or hooligans.
Football supporters occupy a particular place within the industry. The direct
financial contribution of spectators will decrease as a proportion of total income for
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the industry as clubs rely upon fees and sponsorship linked to televised matches.
However, fans are also a part of the product which football clubs sell, they provide
the atmosphere which is integral to the product.
The attitudes of many football clubs towards spectators were indicative of an
inner orientation or self centredness, identified as a key element of the innermost
circle of the Onion Model. In Chapter 2 it was argued that an inner orientation
could act as a barrier to double ioop learning as it prevented the consideration of
multi-perspectives.
These characteristics of football clubs directly influence safety management
inside stadia. The lack of specialisation, somewhat altered with the appointment of
safety officers, acts as one barrier to learning. For many clubs the safety officer's
is a part time job, ensuring that much of the time is spent on supervising stewards
and maintaining records. Inevitably the safety officer's job is reactive rather than
proactive. In Scotland only two clubs had a safety officer in 1994. In many
instances (see appendix 4.1) the safety officer is employed in a part time capacity,
often on matchdays only, in a chief steward capacity. In other instances the post is
full time with responsibility for training stewards and overseeing maintenance of
the stadium. Safety officers have day to day responsibility, with executive
decisions being taken by the Club Secretary and Chairman. The lack of time on the
part of the safety officer and his lowly status prevents him from dealing with the
board directly. Typically, the safety officer reports to the Secretary or Chief
Executive. The 'jacks of all trade' roles of many secretaries illustrates the
difficulties these individuals have in dealing with the many issues for which they
have responsibility. The tendency for chairmen to focus their efforts upon a club's
playing activities may prevent them from dealing properly with safety issues as our
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earlier evidence indicates. Culturally, the focus of clubs upon playing success and
the 'soccer star syndrome' acts as a further barrier to communication and active
learning, preventing the free flow of important information. However, decisions
regarding crowd safety are not taken in a vacuum but within a framework that has
evolved over the past two decades, including other agencies such as the police,
football licensing authority and local authority.
4.5.4 Local Regulation: FLA, Local Authority, Emergency Services
The stadia of all teams competing in the English and Scottish senior leagues
are designated. In England and Wales the relevant local authority is required to
produce a Safety Certificate specifying the terms and conditions for using a
particular stadium. A safe capacity figure is calculated on the basis of a stadium's
infrastructure and the safety management practices implemented by the owning
club. A local authority has responsibility for determining the contents of the safety
certificate but, is required to consult the police, fire authority and ambulance
service, through a forum called the Safety Advisory Group (SAG). It is also
expected to consult other agencies with 'relevant skills or experience.' (FLA 1991).
The Football Club is also expected to participate in discussions and 'wherever
possible representatives of supporters should be consulted' (FLA 1991). In practice
few supporter's groups are represented at SAG. In some cases (e.g. LA4) although
no supporters attend, copies of SAG minutes are sent to the Club's official
supporters association. In the case of LA5 the decision not to invite supporters was
taken because it was feared that their attendance might prevent the relevant club
from being open.
From telephone interviews it emerged that the Building Control function had a
major input to the work of the SAG, advising on structural and electrical
165
engineering issues. This reflected the early enforcement of legislation regarding
safety inside stadia, with its focus upon the improvement of the physical
infrastructure of football grounds. However, this focus upon the tangible or
technical elements of stadium safety appeared to have been to the detriment of other
safety management areas, such as the quality of stewardiiig and the development of
an 'appropriate safety culture'. This issue is covered in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Frosdick's (1995) analysis of the post-Hillsborough response of the football
industry is particularly concerned with the interaction between these groups,
arguing that their different cultures, possibly conflicting priorities and risk
assessments may lead to very different 'safety cultures' between stadia. The role of
the FLA is to promote consistency but not uniformity. de Quidt (1997a, 1997b)
argues that uniformity would prevent proper consideration of the tangible
differences between stadia and the clubs which own them. Middleham (1993) in a
survey of all Police Authorities with responsibility for football stadia reported
'wild' inconsistencies in policing arrangements and costs. Persistent concerns with
the quality of stewarding was identified by nearly 25% of Police Authorities who
reported that stewarding at their club was either 'not good' or 'poor.' (Middleham
1993, p122)
A system of self regulation still exists in Scotland, so no role is played by the
Football Licensing Authority. Some Scottish Clubs complained that the Strathclyde
Regional Council attempted to force them to do too much (Sd, SF1). A notable
difference between Scotland and the rest of Great Britain was the prominent role
played by the police. Three out of four interviews were conducted with the Police
Commander present. Visits to the Rangers ground were also conducted with the
police. Stadia management therefore, is considered to be a Law and Order matter.
166
Whilst Rangers might be considered a model of good practice, assisted by a
charismatic Safety Officer who was obviously held in high regard (by Chairman,
Club Secretary, Spectators) and the fact that the majority of seats are sold to season
ticket holders, the presence of the police at other interviews at Scottish clubs
appeared to be linked to a heavy handed approach to maintaining order. 'Cuff's
around the ear', a 'sharp shock' etc. were all comments repeated off tape as means
of dealing with spectators.
4.5.5 Football Supporters
Although the FLA recommend consultation with football supporters in
developing the terms and conditions for a particular stadium, the problem is how is
this achieved and who is to be consulted. The views of some club executives have
been reported above, suggesting that ongoing consultation is unlikely to be
embraced enthusiastically by the clubs. LA5's deliberate decision to exclude
supporters from SAGs, despite an expressed awareness of Taylor's
recommendation, illustrates one difficulty regarding the involvement of spectators.
LA5 however, reported that clubs had been directed to make improvements based
upon complaints and observations from spectators, indicating that such views are
collected, albeit informally. Bale (1990) reported the activities of football
spectators who have made an important fmancial contribution to clubs beyond
paying their entrance fee; he also suggested that they can be a good source of
knowledge as they use the facilities every week. Harnessing unlikely groups can
prove extremely profitable. A Business Week report (1997) reports on the use of
computer hackers to check IT security. However, a football crowd is not one
homogenous block but formed by many disparate elements with varying modes of
behaviour, interests and motivations. Many clubs have a supporters club which
167
may be held to represent the interests of one group. In parts of the country the
Football Supporters Association, a national pressure group, has many members. A
development of the 1 980s and 1 990s has been the growth of the football fanzine,
each reflecting a different view of a particular group. A difficult question concerns
the identification of a representative group. At Leicester City, attempts have been
made to form a representative group of supporters for Market Research purposes.
No such attempt appears to have been made to elicit views from supporters for
Safety Advisory Groups.
The inner orientation of football clubs appears to act as a barrier to their
learning from the experiences of supporters. This may mean that they lose an
important opportunity to learn from those who use the facilities each week and are
well placed to comment on problems, overcrowding, hazards etc. Indeed spectators
could play an important role in assisting the 'self generated turbulence' that Smith
(1995) identified as a valuable means of encouraging double ioop learning.
4.5.6	 Technology: The Stadium
Bale (1990) illustrates the development of stadia over the past century from an
open space with few rules through enclosure to a highly regulated 'complex space'
in which spectators are ordered and monitored (see figure 4.3). As Chapter 1
identified, British stadia have typically been in situ for a period of over ninety years,
more than twice as long as their counterparts in Germany, Spain, France and Italy.
For example, the Hilisborough Stadium developed within the tight constraints of a
residential area and a small river. This evolution of stadia has not, in the UK at any
rate, occurred in revolutionary steps with greenfield sites but as the result of
piecemeal changes. The nature of this development, it will be argued in Chapter 5,
was one of a number of factors underlying the Hilisborough Stadium disaster.
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As the preceding section has argued, spectators do not form one homogeneous
group but consist of many small groupings. Robins & Cohen (1978) identified that
a complicated socio-spatial pattern emerged on the terraces, in which distinct
groups took up relatively fixed positions. Bale (1990) suggested that the behaviour
STAGES
Ti- /%
ENVIRONMENT
PERMEABLE BOUNDARIES
WEAK RULES OF EXCLUSION
No spatial limits;
uneven terrain:
spatial Interaction between
'players' and 'spectators':
diversified land use.
ENCLOSURE
Limits of pitch defined;
players segregated from
spectators.
PARTITIONING
Embankments.
terraces,grandstands;
payment for entry:
segregation of spectators by
social class:
start of segregation within crowd:
specialized land use.
SURVEILLANCE
Enclosed ground;
synthetic pitch and concrete bowl:
TV replay screen;
total segregation within crowd;
panopticism;
diversified land use.
RULES OF EXCLUSION
STRONG
IMPERMEABLE BOUNDARIES
Figure 4.3 : A Four Stage Model of the Evolution of the Modern Stadium
Source: Bale, J (1990) p12
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of these different groups can be predicted. Yet there is no mention of this research,
subsequently supported by later studies (see Marsh 1977), in either the Popplewell
or Taylor Reports, nor in the Football Stadia Design Advisory Councils guidelines.
Marsh (1977) identified six main groups including convicted hooligans, confirmed
'aggro,' novices, and older mixed groups. The design of stadia has taken no
account of this evidence nor have clubs devised strategies to deal with the likely
types of behaviour.
4.5.7 The Football Industry: A Summary
A number of past studies of the Football Industry have used the word
'conservative' to describe its culture (See for example, Walvin 1986, Inglis 1988).
The histories of the FA and FL led both of these institutions to resist greater
commercialisation of the industry. As our description of the clubs themselves has
shown, whilst they have been quick to exploit certain commercial opportunities
themselves, they have done little, until recent years, to re-engineer themselves. The
role of a Club's commercial manager was frequently to oversee the running of a
lottery and a club shop that was only open on matchdays. Lack of development in
non-playing areas reflects the conservatism of the clubs as well as the realities of
the administrative resources that they created. As this Chapter has shown, new
tasks such as ground safety was often passed onto the already overstretched
administrative framework. A lack of planning and training frequently blocked the
development of new ideas. As our analysis has shown there is now evidence that
the larger clubs are switching from their internal focus and are seeking to exploit
commercial opportunities through customer satisfaction and a greater awareness of
the value of the product they provide. Amongst the smaller clubs there was little
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evidence of a sea change and it may be that the point of no return has been passed
and that lack of resources will prevent the re-emergence of such clubs.
Despite the financial problems that Chester (1968, 1983) highlighted, the focus
of media attention has been upon the issue of hooliganism. A plethora of books and
learned articles has been published, particularly during the last fifteen years. It is
our view that this focus has deflected attention away from the more fundamental
financial and organisational problems of clubs. Indeed hooliganism has provided
an opportunity for clubs to 'displace' their own responsibility for the poor ground
infrastructure of the 1980s onto the 'hooligans' who achieved the status of 'folk
devils' (Whannel 1979). Hooliganism, although included in our systems map of the
industry, differs from other components in that it refers to a concept rather than an
individual or agency. The discussion of Hooliganism however, is vital to an
understanding of the evolution of the industry and the effect it has had upon the
stadium. The first perimeter fences to be erected in a UK stadium were put up in
1963, at Everton, in response to missile throwing incidents.
4.6 Chapter conclusions
The various agencies and key influences upon the stadium have been identified
and key characteristics discussed with reference to the literature review of Chapter
2. Safety management for each club may be seen as a fluid process influenced
directly by the concerns of a number of agencies as well as indirectly, by the
broader political and media context. Figure 4.4 illustrates this process. Spectators
and the media are seen to exert pressure by demanding improved safety standards
whilst the various regulatory bodies seek to push football clubs towards better
practice. Many spectators are passive yet they possess the potential to exert
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significant power in moving clubs forward. This potential, however, may reduce as
the proportion of gate receipts to total income, declines.
Government	
FIFA
UEFA
PUSH
Football
Club
PULL
/	 Active
Learning
Media /N
Safety
Culture
Figure 4.4: Football Systems Map
This thesis now moves onto a detailed consideration of the stadia disasters
and an assessment of the regulatory frameworks that were in place. The key
research question to be examined is "What factors prevented a major cultural
readjustment and thus effective learning, from taking place?' Chapter 5 examines
the period from the Bolton Disaster in 1946 up to, and including, the Hillsborough
tragedy of 1989. Although a detailed analysis of each incident is included, the issue
of learning in the period between the crises is addressed. To assist in this analysis,
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a brief review of the literature concerned with regulation is provided, including
Gouldner's (1954) framework from his study of Industrial Pafterns of Bureaucracy.
Chapter 5 draws from official accounts of the stadium disasters as well as from
primary data collected from a variety of agencies in the course of this study.
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Chapter 5
Disasters, Regulation and the Football Industry 1946 - 89
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents an analysis of the football industry in the period between
1946 and 1989 (from the Bolton Stadium Disaster to the Hillsborough Tragedy
respectively). The first section deals with the tecimical emphasis of the industry's
response to the disasters. The Chapter then proceeds to a discussion of regulation and
introduces Gouldner's (1954) theory concerning Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy.
Gouldner's work did not form a part of the initial review of the literature, but,
following reflection upon the data, it seemed extremely relevant to this study. The
final part of the Chapter examines in detail, each of the main crisis incidents and the
intervening periods between them. This analysis makes use of Gouldner's framework
in addition to those identified in Chapter 2. The principal objective of this Chapter is
to determine the extent of cultural readjustment that followed the Bolton, Ibrox and
Bradford Disasters respectively. The analysis also provides an examination of those
factors that hindered organisational learning in this period.
A detailed account of each incident is provided alongside a critique that seeks to
examine the three factors identified in Chapter 2 as the filters through which
knowledge is processed and actual learning achieved (i.e. culture, structure and
communciations). Each critique deals with the period between the disaster incidents
and explores evidence of these and other drivers of the learning process.
5.2 Background
Until recently, as the opening Chapter identified, the issue of managing crowds,
as opposed to managing hooligans has received a low priority. Indeed Inglis (1987)
commented:
A century ago clubs did virtually nothing to protect spectators. Thousands were
packed onto badly constructed slopes with hardly a wooden barrier in sight. About
the best that can be said of the early grounds is that with only ropes around the
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pitches there was little to stop a build up of pressure sending hundreds pouring
onto the pitch." (p28)
Indeed this happened during the first FA Cup Final to be held at Wembley in 1923
which led the Government of the day to commission Lord Shortt to inquire into the
events of that day.
The first recorded sports stadium death in the UK had occurred in 1888 at
Bradford's Valley Parade ground during a Rugby League match. In April 1902, at
Ibrox Park Glasgow, a 'temporary' wooden and iron structure collapsed killing 26 and
injuring a further 500 spectators. As Chapter 1 reported there have been forty-five
separate incidents and some nine public inquiries since 1900. Taylor (1990)
commented:
"There is no point in holding inquiries or publishing guidance unless the
recommendations are followed diligently. That must be the first lesson."(p4).
At the time of Taylor's Inquiry in 1989/1990 it seemed that both the scale and
frequency of such disasters was increasing.
A remarkable degree of similarity may be seen in terms of the response of
regulators to the various stadia disasters. In the initial post crisis phase, legislative
controls were developed to deal with the demands of a particular incident; reflecting
the tendency for learning to be constrained to incident specific lessons (Toft &
Reynolds 1992); and a focus upon technical solutions (Turner 1976, 1978, Canter et al
1989, Elliott & Smith 1993a) leading to the development of a piecemeal framework
of control. De Quidt (1997b), Chief Executive of the FLA, reported that:
"All football legislation might be described as tombstone legislation, driven by
emotion, hurried, things overlooked, the end result is that we finished with
legislation that is flawed"(private communication, 1997)
More fundamental problems associated with managing crowds in 'complex space'
were not addressed in any holistic way (Sime 1985). For example, the Moelwyn-
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Hughes Report (1946) recommended that the maximum capacities for grounds be
determined and enforced. 'The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds' (or Green Guide)
was published as a response to the Ibrox disaster as an attempt to provide guidelines
to clubs on ground safety, paying particular attention to the problems of crowd egress
from grounds which had triggered the tragedy. The Popplewell Report (1985) sought
to control the sale and consumption of alcohol in and around football grounds. In the
wake of the Bradford fire, specific recommendations concerning the maintenance and
construction of grounds were put forward. The Fire Prevention Association (FPA)
Journal (1969) had published recommendations following a series of 'near misses' in
which fires had broken out in football stadia. These recommendations were not acted
upon until Popplewell's inquiiy some seventeen years later, an example used by Toft
& Reynolds (1992) as an example of 'the failure of hindsight'. That is, the
knowledge had been collected and disseminated through 'appropriate' channels, but it
was not acted upon.
	 Finally the Taylor Report (1989) made specific
recommendations about the control of crowds and the use of wire cages to prevent
pitch invasions. This fragmented approach brings particular problems as Canter et al
(1989) argued:
"As a consequence there is never any possibility of examining the system of
legislation as a whole, of seeing the directions in which it is accumulating or of
developing radical solutions that will deal with fundamental problems. A further
problem is that rules and principles get built into the legislation in the early years
and provided it cannot be demonstrated that somebody has been injured because of
these rules, there is a powerful inertia in the system of controls operating against
changing the rules." (p92).
Canter et al's argument, that once the problem of crowd safety and control is seen as
a technical question (for example, determined by barrier strengths, the width of
passageways etc.) the mind set becomes one that seeks only technical solutions. In
essence a technical paradigm is created which then becomes impossible to shift. This
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culture of technocracy (Fischer, 1989) is important in luring organisations into a false
sense of security. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, a technical approach ignores the
social components of a system. Solutions based upon a technical paradigm will
therefore, be incomplete.
The evidence presented above is supportive of the view that no full cultural
readjustment occurred in this period as was hypothesised in Chapter 1. The ongoing
emphasis upon technical issues indicates a reliance upon explicit knowledge and
single rather than double loop learning.
5.3 Regulation versus Self Regulation
Safety through compulsion is unlikely to be achieved unless it is accompanied
by an organisational desire to change. The current regime in Scotland is of self-
regulation. In England and Wales the FLA seeks to avoid conflict, preferring
instead a policy of promoting good practice. The reasoning behind this approach is
that it is better to educate than coerce, and de Quidt (1997b) expressed pride that the
FLA had yet to use its powers of sanction, although it was reported that these had
nearly been applied in four cases. However, the role of the FLA to date has largely
been concerned with the implementation of Taylor's (1990) all seater stadia and
safe standing for the lower divisions. Technical guidance is available but as safety
management develops there is a danger that the less tangible safety management
systems and culture that are so necessary, will remain underdeveloped. In such
intangible areas it can be argued that regulation is likely to be less effective. de
Quidt's (1997a, 1997b) view is consistent with Mintzberg's (1983) conclusions
concerning the best means of controlling corporate behaviour. Mintzberg (1983)
suggested that effective control is extremely difficult and that in the first instance,
corporate executives must be trusted. Echoing this view, Kharbanda & Staliworthy
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(1991) concluded, from their study of the chemical industry, that self regulation is
an effective means of control:
"We have demonstrated that in industry management inevitably know more than
anyone else about the type of risk involved in the operations within their plants,
and the implications for the community at large. This means that it is in their
own interest for management to self regulate...........it is in the larger interest of
management to regulate their own affairs and to do their best to ensure that such
disasters never occur" (p88)
Mintzberg's (1983) formula for effective control is based upon a similar pragmatic
observation. Trust, however, is insufficient on its own. Mintzberg argues that
executives should be relentlessly pressured and work within a framework of
regulation. Additionally, efforts should be made to democratise the process and
integrate the full range of stakeholders into decision-making processes. Braithwaite
& Fisse (1987), supporting the view that self regulation is effective, identified five
characteristics of companies that effectively self regulate:
"1.	 A great deal of informal clout and top management backing is given to
their compliance personnel.
2. Accountability for compliance performance is clearly defmed and
placed on line managers.
3. That performance is monitored carefully and managers told when it is
not up to standard.
4. Compliance problems are effectively communicated to those capable
of acting upon them
5. Training and supervision (especially for front-line supervisors) for
compliance are not neglected." (pp 97-8)
In a critique of Kharbanda & Stallworthy (1991), Smith & Tombs (1995)
provide some examples of self-regulation and suggest that attempts to permit firms
with a good safety record to 'self regulate' have not been successful. These authors
concluded that a more appropriate regulatory strategy would include:
1. "A shift from a compliance-oriented to a more punitive-oriented regulatory
approach"
2. "A greater empowerment of regulators"
3. "An empowerment of.....trades unions, the third set of actors in the
existing tripartite regulatory system"
179
4. "A move towards more participative form of decision making concerning
hazard management.... including local publics".
(Smith & Tombs 1995, pp 632-3)
Smith & Tombs (1995) observations are particularly concerned with the Chemical
Industry. They identified the limitations of self regulation recognising that whilst
managers may understand more about the risks associated with particular
technologies, decisions are made on economic and political grounds as well as upon
safety considerations. Implicit within Smith & Tombs' (1995) model are the push
and pull strategies discussed at the end of Chapter 4. Push comes from the
regulatory bodies whilst Smith & Tombs (1995) refer to the empowerment of trades
unions who can work to 'pull' higher safety standards. In the case of the Football
Industry it will be demonstrated how the current regulatory framework has
developed. The evidence collected lends support to Smith & Tombs' (1995)
hypothesis that self regulation on its own is unlikely to be an effective means of
ensuring safety management practices.
5.4 Regulation within the football industry
The legal framework for regulating football stadia has changed significantly
since the Ibrox tragedy in 1971. This section examines the development of
regulation through four key stages. First, in the period prior to the Safety at Sports
Ground Act (1975); second, from 1975 to the Bradford Fire (1985) and the
subsequent Popplewell Report; third, from 1985 to the Hilisborough tragedy and
the Taylor report (1989); and fourth from Taylor until 1994. Central to this analysis
is the problem identified by Gouldner (1954) of how rule makers establish the
legitimacy of their authority given the frequent refusal to consent on the part of
those being governed. Gouldner's (1955) analysis illustrated the limitations of
regulation when a conflict exists between the beliefs and assumptions of regulated
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and regulator. It reported the fmdings of a longitudinal study of a gypsum mine
and described the effects of the introduction of increased regulation over work
Indulgency	 Rules applied leniently or ignored.
Pattern:	 Infrequent checks
Second chances
_______________	 Relaxed attitudes
Bureaucratic
Patterns:
Mock	 Rules imposed on group by outside agency.
Bureaucracy	 Neither supervisors or staff identify themselves with rules, nor do they consider
them legitimate.
Rules are not enforced, and all gain status by violating them.
Comply only when visited by rule makers.
False returns indicate compliance.
"People spend a lot of time going through the motions'
'Participants are bolstered by the joint violation of rules in order to get on with the
________________	 real job"
Punishment	 Rules arise in response to pressures from either management or staff. (e.g. introduce
centred	 clocking in or a work to rule)
Bureaucracy	 The attempt is made to force compliance.
________________	 Deviations are interpreted as wilful disobedience
Representative	 Rules are devised by experts whose authority is acceptable to all the members of the
Bureaucracy	 organisation.
Support for those rules which fit with their values and confer status on those who
conform.
Gouldner uses the example of a safety programme and suggests that rules are
enforced by managers and obeyed by staff with little conflict.
Deviations are either carelessness or ignorance since the values underpinning the
______________	 rules are not disputed.
Table 5.1 Patterns of Organisational Behaviour	 Source: Gouldner (1955)
activities, onto what Gouldner describes as the 'indulgency pattern' of the previous
management system. The study highlighted the need to bridge the dissonance
between regulator and regulated, if behaviour is to be changed. Three types of
'bureaucracy' were identified. The key characteristics of these types are
summarised in table 5.1. Within any organisation Gouldner suggested, the three
patterns of behaviour may co-exist in different degrees.	 These patterns of
behaviour refer to the 'cultural climate' in which regulations are devised and
enforced. The patterns may be thought of as lying on a continuum from an extreme
indulgency pattern with few rules, to a representative pattern in which rules are
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accepted, understood, obeyed and enforced. From the data collected during this
study elements of these patterns emerged.
5.5 Pre 1975 : Indulgent Pattern
The Shortt (1924) Report provided the first example of an inquiry into crowds
and disasters. Commissioned in response to the 1923 Wembley Cup Final incident,
the Report's brief was to look at all sports stadia. Notably the FA refused to furnish
the information requested by the enquiring committee, displaying an early example
of the Industry's inner orientation. Shorn concluded with a statement in support of
self-regulation:
"Where then, a measure of self government has been developed, it would seem a
pity that, without real need, it should be destroyed for the sake of concentrating
in the present system of national and local government the immediate
administration of regulations affecting sports grounds" (p27)
Shorn continued:
"We are assured that these governing bodies are only too anxious to secure that
their sport is carried on under conditions which will promote public safety, and
we feel at this stage that it is safe to leave the matter to them" (p27)
This observation appears optimistic, given the failure of the FA to co-operate with
the committee by its refusal to provide evidence (Shorn, 1924). It was to be another
twenty years before the question of crowds and sports stadia was to be addressed
again.
In 1946 thirty three people died at the Bumden Park stadium. The subsequent
Moelwyn-Hughes Report (1946) concluded, in contrast to Shorn:
"The preceding safety measures cannot be secured without legislation.....
Compliance with the recommendations of this report will cost money. They will
involve grounds in a loss of gate money on popular days. Human beings will not
station themselves scientifically on a terraced enclosure; among the crowd there
will be thin patches and gaps to grieve the sight of club directors and secretaries.
The insurance for greater safety for the public demands a premium." (p11-12)
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Moelwyn Hughes concluded with the ominous warning:
"The helpful representative of the Football Association ... feared that the disaster
at Bolton might easily be repeated at 20 or 30 other grounds and would welcome
such measures as I have suggested for securing a safety capacity." (p12)
Despite Moelwyn-Hughes' recommendation for legislation, a voluntary system of
licensing for grounds with a capacity of 10,000 or more, was introduced by the FA.
This system did not however, establish specific standards or guidelines and Inglis
(1987) reported that the FA accepted each licensing report without question,
reflecting an extreme 'indulgency pattern of behaviour' and indicating a refusal to
acknowledge a threatening reality, an example of the defence mechanism denial.
It can be argued that, despite the deaths of many spectators, the disaster did not
have a significant psychological effect upon the football industry and certainly did
not challenge the basic assumptions of those with responsibility for crowd safety
inside stadia. The failure to introduce legislation reinforced the view that the Bolton
disaster, though unfortunate, was an aberration. As table 1.1 illustrated, another
fatal accident was not recorded until 1957. The lack of data concerning 'near
misses' prevents any analysis of less critical incidents in this period. As shown in
Chapter 4, the period 1946 - 57 was one of rising attendances for the football
industry. These peaked in the 1950s and began to decline steeply throughout the
late 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
The late 1960s saw an increase in Government interest in football and its
problems. This interest may have been triggered by a number of factors including
the success of the World Cup held in England in 1966, declining attendances and
the growing media interest in soccer hooliganism. The Chester (1968) Report was
requested to examine the organisation, management, administration and finances of
the football industry. Its main observation concerning crowds was to note an
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increase in spectator disorder; an early example of 'hooliganism' deflecting
attention from issues of crowd safety. Indeed spectator disorder was an issue
deemed sufficiently serious to require its own investigation in 1968, commissioned
by the Minister for Sport. Harrington's (1968) investigation into crowd behaviour,
a euphemism for hooliganism, called for legislation:
"The absence of national legislation outlining minimum standards of safety and
amenity at football grounds means that some club managements do not feel
obliged to put their grounds into a state considered by the police to be necessary
for crowd control... .Clubs often seem keener to spend money on the purchase of
players than to undertake any major spending on ground improvement which
would increase safety and make hooligan control easier......Letters from
members of the public suggest that already some are staying away because of
their dislike of poor facilities.., so that the neglect of ground improvement may
ultimately be self defeating. (pp33-4).
Harrington's (1968) observations indicated the continued existence of an
'indulgency pattern' of behaviour in which guidelines were frequently ignored and
club executives demonstrated relaxed attitudes to safety. Following publication of
the Harrington Report (1968) the then Minister for Sport commissioned a further
study, chaired by Lang (1969), to investigate crowd behaviour. Lang (1969)
reconmiended a voluntary system of licensing through the sports' governing bodies,
echoing Shortt (1924) some forty years earlier and ignoring Moelwyn Hughes'
(1946) earlier call for legislation. The Lang Report (1969) can thus be considered
as further endorsement of the indulgency pattern of behaviour that was well
established within the football industry. It was to take another disaster to lead to
legislation. As Popplewell (1986) reported:
"Almost all the matters into which I have been asked to inquire and almost all
the solutions I have proposed have been previously considered in detail by many
distinguished Inquiries over a period of 60 years"
Gouldner's analysis suggested that a key factor in explaining the persistence of
the indulgency pattern is that neither side, regulator or regulated, can see a real need
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for rules. That is, no cultural readjustment had occurred. In the case of the football
industry, the lack of data collected regarding smaller incidents combined with the
occasional major incident never challenged the core assumptions of Government
nor football agencies. As the data collected from the clubs illustrates, these
accidents were seen as freak or acts of God. Thus, there was little to be done to
prevent them. The data regarding accidents inside football stadia, shown in table
1.1, was collected over a period of five years in the 1990s. This pattern was not
discernible to policy makers or football authorities prior to 1989. The problem was
to a large extent hidden. Although aware of the potential dangers the lack of
information may have prevented remedial action. There may have been some
convenience in this ignorance. Although the scale of the problem was hidden, that
a problem did exist cannot be denied. As Taylor noted (1989)
"Despite all the accumulated wisdom of so many previous reports and guidelines
{That Hillsborough was allowed to happen] must indicate that the lessons of past
disasters and the recommendations following them had not been taken
sufficiently to heart" (p4)
Even Moelwyn Hughes described the Bolton disaster as unique, and despite the
FA's concerns that those events could have happened at any first or second division
ground, the view that Taylor (1989) identified as "It couldn't happen here" appears
to have pervaded decision making. Table 5.2 summarises key developments in this
pre-1971 period. Most striking is the continuity of an indulgency pattern of
behaviour with the half hearted development of a mock bureaucracy in which the
FA merely registered the licensing reports of member clubs.
There is little evidence to support the view that a cultural readjustment
occurred following the 1946 Bolton Disaster. Lax practices, denial that a problem
existed and the FA's policy of accepting each Safety Report without question all
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indicate that little learning took place in this time. The influence of culture,
specifically regarding the lack of critical questioning by those within the industry
and the employment of a range of defence mechanisms appears clear. In 1971 a
further 66 people died at the Ibrox Stadium.
_____________	 Patterns of Behaviour in the UK Football Industry 1946- 1975
Indulgency	 Despite calls for legislation in 1946 a voluntary licensing scheme
Pattern	 developed despite fears that thirty stadia were dangerous.
No specific guidelines produced concerning what the voluntary scheme
might enforce.
_____________	 No procedure for inspection of stadia.
Mock	 Taylor (1989) cites evidence of clubs regularly exceeding capacities.
Bureaucracy	 FA do not reject any Stadium report in this period.
Punishment	 Little evidence.
centred
Bureaucracy
Representative	 No evidence.
Bureaucracy
Table 5.2: Development of Regulation and Response 1946 - 71
5.6 The Ibrox Stadium Disaster
The Ibrox Stadium was, and still is, the home ground of Rangers FC, one
of the richest clubs in the UK. It is ironic perhaps, that such a club should play host to
a major accident. The disaster took place on the Stadium's Stairway 13. This
particular stairway had already been the scene of three major incidents ( see table
1.1). Incidents in 1961, 1967 and 1969 had led to the deaths of two and injuries to
eight and twenty four respectively. Stairway 13 was long and steep, similar to some of
the entrances to the London Underground system. Some modifications were made to
the stairway in response to each incident although no major restructuring took place
(Jnglis 1987).
At the end of the derby match against old firm rivals Celtic, spectators leaving
by the stairway fell. Canter (1989) reports the incident happening:
"When spectators who had started to leave early from a new year local derby match
turned back at the sound of cheering from the stands. In the crush which resulted
between those leaving and those returning, 66 people died and 140 were injured.
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Steel barriers were bent in the crush, which suggests that a force of at least 4,450
newtons was exerted at that point." (p89)
Inglis (1996) suggested a more straightforward description of the disaster in which the
crowd had stayed on until the end of the match and were all moving in the same
direction. The added detail of the late goal and the return of leaving fans suggested to
the Times (6/01/71) parallels with the incident with the Bethnal Green Underground
Station disaster', and provided a further example of the potential value of isomorphic
learning:
"That the disaster was caused by a number of people losing their self control at a
particularly important time and that no forethought in the matter of structural
design or practicable police supervision could be any real safeguard against the
effects of loss of self control by a crowd."(pl 1)
If this were the case then blame, if it were to be apportioned, could be deflected from
those with responsibility for providing the facilities and for controlling the crowd, to
the spectators themselves. The warnings of the previous incidents, that is, were
largely ignored. This view was repeated in a series of newspaper articles following
the Bradford Fire (see for example Guardian 13/05/85). The subsequent inquiry,
whilst not apportioning blame, found the Ranger's management complacent in their
attitude to previous problems and their ignoring of warnings from the Scottish FA.
The response of the club was to make a few modifications to Stairway 13.
"For a few years after the tragedy, Ibrox was merely patched up as the old, now
tainted regime resolutely hung on.....compared with developments at other major
clubs at this time, the work was a cheap mish mash, hardly commensurate with
Rangers' stature." (Inglis 1996, p46'7).
Inglis (1996) linked the 1977 complete redesign and redevelopment of the ground
with the death of the old chairman and the designation of the stadium under the 1975
Act. With a new leadership:
People crowding down a stairway into the Underground station during the war were crushed to death.
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"Rangers rejected piecemeal development such as had plagued other grounds.
They refused to compromise in size or materials"(Jnglis 1986, 294)
The reluctance of the club to act, illustrated by the six year break between the disaster
and redevelopment of the ground, highlighted the inadequacy of the regulatory regime
and the ongoing failure of the club itself to take responsibility for crowd safety.
Although no detailed observations can be made given the lack of reliable data, the
refusal to listen to warnings, the piecemeal development of the stadium in response to
specific incidents and the lack of a safety culture formed a pattern to be reflected in
later disasters. These factors reflect the cultural and structural barriers to learning
identified in Chapter 2. There was awareness however, that such a disaster could
happen elsewhere. For example, within Parliament there developed growing pressure
for a scheme of formal licensing for sports grounds that went beyond learning from
the specifics of the Ibrox disaster.
"This is the sort of thing that could happen with a smaller number of people. The
clubs should make civilised accommodation available for their supporters - give
them seats under cover -instead of herding them into areas where they are pushed
and jammed like animals." (Maurice Miller MIP, The Times, 5/01/71)
Despite the number of deaths, there was limited coverage of the disaster in the
national (British) press reflecting a low degree of public interest and indicating that,
like the Bolton Disaster which was also investigated via the public inquiiy process,
the Ibrox tragedy did not have a major symbolic impact. The wider problems facing
the football industry received some attention. For example, a leading article in the
Economist (9/1/71) referred to the bleak year for football with only a dozen clubs
paying their way. Regarding safety and the announcement that Lord Wheatley had
been commissioned to inquire into "Safety at Sports Grounds" the Economist (1971)
commented:
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"It is sure that after half a century of neglect by successive governments, the safety
of crowds at football matches will be taken seriously at last."
The Wheatley Report led to the passing of the 1975 Safety at Sports Ground Act,
although, it is argued, this was implemented in a halfhearted way that encouraged the
continuation of a lax regulatory regime.
The Ibrox stadium disaster highlighted the inadequacies of the voluntary
licensing scheme. That four serious incidents could happen upon the same stairway
within a ten year period indicated that a problem had been clearly identified but that
no effective learning had taken place. The ongoing reluctance of the Club to act
following the 1971 tragedy is difficult to explain. Turner (1976) and Toft &
Reynolds (1992) suggest that in the aftermath of a disaster the organisation that
experiences it is at least expected to undergo a major cultural adjustment. The
behaviour of the Ranger's board, delaying a fundamental redevelopment of the Ibrox
Stadium for six years, demonstrates that this does not necessarily occur.
Table 5.3 identifies some of the key factors associated with the Ibrox disaster. It
utilises Smith's (1990) three stage model of crisis and the 7 C's checklist introduced
in Chapter 1. It highlights the combination of social-organisational and technical
system components and particularly the key role of culture in the pre and post crisis
incident stages. The technical elements of the system are identified as resulting from
the original structure and a series of minor modifications following each incident that
preceded the 1971 disaster. The continuance of the pre-crisis complacent culture is
demonstrated by the length of time that it took the Club to redevelop the stadium.
Table 5.3 emphases the combination of factors that contributed to the disaster, from
the club's failure to respond to previous incidents and redevelop the clearly
dangerous stairway. This indicates the persistence of the indulgency pattern of
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Crisis Phase	 Ibrox Stadium Disaster: A Socio-Technical Systems Failure
Crisis of Management
Culture	 Indulgency Pattern of regulation
Ignored previous incidents (failure of hindsight)
Ignored official warnings
No complete redesign of stairway 13
Complacency
Configuration	 No individual with responsibility for safety.
Operational Crisis
Control	 66 people crushed on stairway, asphyxiated
No means of stopping flow or gaining rapid access to those fallen
Coupling
& Complexity	 Design of stairway and terraces, conlijsion on day, inability of stadium staff to
assess severity of problem
Contingency	 No contingency Plans
Planning_______________________________________________________________________
Crisis of Legitimation
Culture/Cost	 Focused upon piecemeal changes
Culture (no challenge to	 Myth of late goal and returning spectators, apportions blame to fans or Act of God
assumptions	 (scapegoat)
Culture, blocks learning	 Licensing scheme introduced in 1975 Act but not rigorously enforced
Tainted board refuse to learn lessons, not until 1977, when new board appointed
that comprehensive redevelopment occurs.
fable 5.3 The Ibrox Stadium Disaster: Three Stages of Crisis
behaviour that continued from before until many years after the tragedy. Although
a number of contemporary explanations placed blame, if that is the appropriate
word, upon the crowd itself, it is clear that the context in which the incident
occurred was created through the actions and inactions of the club and regulatory
agencies.
5.7 1975-85: The Safety at Sports Ground Act (1975)
The Safety at Sports Ground Act (1975) and the first edition of 'The Guide to
Safety at Sports Grounds' (popularly known as the Green Guide) were published as
a result of Wheatley's (1972) report. The Act introduced a formal licensing system.
Wheatley (1972) reported that he was lobbied by representatives of football clubs
and administrators who were concerned that the costs of compliance could
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threaten the existence of some clubs. His response echoed that of Moelwyn-Hughes
in 1946, Wheatley (1972) replied:
"My answer to that is this. My task was to consider the problem of crowd safety
at grounds. Clubs which charge the public for admission have a duty to see that
their grounds are reasonably safe for spectators.....some standards should be
imposed and observed.....There is nothing new in this proposal. it has been
mooted for almost fifty years. It can come as no surprise to the football world,
and in light of happenings over the years the demand for an independent
appraisal and determination of the safety of grounds becomes almost irresistible.
I certainly cannot resist it."(p17)
Not withstanding this statement Wheatley recommended that the licensing system
be spaced out, with clubs in lower echelons given a longer period before the new
system be applied to them. When it was first introduced, the Act applied only to
First and Premier Division clubs in England and Scotland respectively. Tn 1979 it
was extended to include Second Division clubs. Designation therefore, was not on
the basis of a ground's size, or related to the potential hazard, but based upon a
club's league position.
Wheatley envisaged a flexible licensing system based upon the Green Guide, a
system that would take account of individual grounds. Views of the effectiveness
of the measures introduced in 1975 were mixed. Inglis (1987) reported that:
"In general, however, clubs have done everything demanded of them in a spirit
of co-operation with their local authorities" (p34)
This contrasts sharply with the view of Fl in response to the question 'why hadn't
the club spent more on ground improvement'?:
"Basically because there was no one kicking them up the backside and as we've
said before just look at the odds, to put our terrace into the state where it would
totally comply with the green guide would probably have cost us a couple of
million, virtually the same as the all seater, as the fmance dried up we had to
look at the odds and see whether it was worth spending or whether it was worth
spending on the team, draw in more crowds, so that you can afford to do the
work."
F2 stated that:
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"It was only as a result of Bradford and Hilisborough that clubs came to realise
that what they were doing was not sufficient."
prior to Hilisborough and Bradford F2 reported:
"There was a feeling that the clubs were positively doing what they thought was
necessary."
In support of this Popplewell (1986) asserted that:
"My enquiries into the working of the Act have shown that in designated stadia it
has proved effective in securing improvements in safety." (J)l8).
The incidents listed in table 1.1 question Popplewell's assertion. The fact that the
Bradford Fire occurred in a non-designated stadium meant that there was no
perceived need to question the efficacy of the standards of regulation pertaining at
the time.
In Scotland the 1975 Act appears to have had a more significant impact. SC1
reported that their stadium had been all seater since 1978 following the Safety at
Sports Ground Act:
"We have seen continuous improvements at a number of Scottish grounds,
we've balanced our needs better than in England where there is a greater
emphasis on getting a team capable of winning the league, in Scotland pressures
are less so we don't spend the huge amounts on transfers and we've toddled
along keeping our stadia in good order"
SC3 commented that they had had to comply since 1976
"And we've been aware of safety ever since.... we had nothing specific after
Bradford or Hilisborough because of our safety certificate".
A possible explanation for this reportedly greater impact of the 1975 Act is that
having been initiated by an incident in Scotland that greater notice of it was taken in
that country. The role of local government may also have been key given that the
Strathclyde regional council was the largest in the UK and may have had the
resources necessary to enforce the Act properly. SC2 complained:
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"Strathclyde are talking about a new blue guide as an upgrade on the green guide
- I think that its just an overkill, why should we have to go above the green
guide, either it's safe or it's not"
The latter part of the sentence is revealing of the assumptions made about risk,
safety and legislation. It suggests that the respondent conceived of safety in
absolute terms. The comment also suggests a confidence in technical guidelines
from an approved source.
In summary, a number of observations can be made about this period (see table
5.4). First the persistence of the 'indulgency pattern'. There is little evidence to
support the view that a major cultural adjustment had taken place, even within the
club experiencing the disaster. That the triggering disaster occurred in Scotland
may explain why the Scottish response appeared to have been more effective than
in England and Wales. Second, the emphasis upon technical issues was marked.
Appended to Wheatley (1972) is a technical report, almost as long as the fmdings of
the main report. Its inclusion reinforces the view that the causes of stadia disasters
are largely technical. Inter organisational co-ordination is dealt with in one
sentence when Wheatley recommended that:
"Consultations between the club and the police (and the first aid and ambulance
services as well) to see what is required for the efficient discharge of their duties
should be held at least at the beginning of each football season."Q18)
There was no recommendation for ongoing communication between the various
agencies or for the formalisation of arrangements for co-ordinating their activities.
Third, there was an official view that clubs were in general complying with
regulations. However, as the examination of the next period illustrates, there is
evidence that in many cases a 'mock bureaucracy' existed in which rules, for
example on capacities, were regularly flouted (Taylor 1989). Inglis (1987) reported
that some 27 grounds in England and Wales had stands and terraces either closed or
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their capacities dramatically reduced at the start of the 1985-6 season as local
councils implemented regulations more vigorously, fearing that they too could
suffer as the West Yorkshire Authority did as a result of the Bradford Fire. This
evidence indicated the continuation of the 'indulgency pattern' in England and
Wales in which rules were rarely enforced. It suggests that clubs may have been
doing all that they felt necessary, but that the regulatory agencies were ineffective in
drawing their attention to their responsibilities, as indicated by the post Bradford
closure of twenty seven stands and terraces.
There is little evidence to support the view that either a 'representative' or
'punishment centred bureaucracy' developed in this period, although Inglis (1996)
____________	 Patterns of Behaviour in the UK Football Industry 1975 - 1985
Indulgency	 More rigorous enforcement leads to closure of terraces & stands in some
Pattern	 27 grounds following the Bradford Fire, indicating previous leniency.
Lower division clubs exempt from 1975 Act - little attempt for such clubs
_____________	 to abide by recommended guidelines.
Mock	 Taylor (1989) cites evidence of clubs regularly exceeding capacities.
Bureaucracy
Punishment	 Limited evidence of fines levied on three clubs in this period.
centred	 Scottish clubs report active local authority enforcement.
Bureaucracy
Representati 	 P2 reports good relations with Local Authority discussing issues, although
ye	 suggests that LA were harsh and part of the ground was closed after the
Bureaucracy	 Bradford Fire.
Table 5.4: Development of Regulation and Response 1971 - 85
reported that in three cases, clubs were fmed between £200 and £1,750 for minor
infringements. The evidence suggests that investment on the part of clubs was
limited and half hearted and that generally, the regulatory authorities failed to
ensure compliance.
In summary, the post Ibrox period may be summed up as 'business as usual'.
The focus of the licensing system was upon technical considerations. The role of
the local authority licenser was in many instances to check crush barrier strengths
and the structural condition of the stadium. In many cases this task was delegated
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to Building Control officers, whose main duties include providing advice on
building regulations, plans for new build and inspecting work in progress in new
developments or house extensions. This is significant because the skills required
for dealing with members of the public are not necessarily the same as those
required for dealing with businesses. It also indicates that enforcement of the Green
Guide was seen as a technical task to be undertaken by building technologists.
There was no suggestion that the police and club should meet regularly to discuss
crowd control, nor was there a suggestion that football clubs should appoint
specialist staff to deal with crowd welfare. It is clear from the data collected, that
administrative tasks, including crowd safety, were usually the responsibility of an
administrator who also had responsibility for all the other day to day functions
conèerned with running a club. That is, the structure of clubs, with its
overburdened secretary, acted as one powerful block upon learning. For example,
Popplewell (1985) reported that a visit from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
to the Bradford stadium in 1980 produced the following opinion:
"There was very little compliance with the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, and
Mr. Newman (club secretary) said that although he knew of the existence of the
Guide it was not really his responsibility to see whether or not particular
recommendations of the Guide were met."
This 'begs the question'; If it was not the Club Secretary's (equivalent to the Chief
Executive) responsibility to enforce the particular recommendations then whose
was it? At the very least, the lack of awareness regarding the Green Guide points to
a weakness on the part of the Local Authority to comnuinicate with the Bradford
Club. Poor inter organisational communication (through lack of forum, time and
information) acted as a second powerful block. Culture, in the form of Club
objectives, beliefs about disasters and the importance of crowd safety acted as a
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third powerful force blocking learning. The technical emphasis of the Wheatley
Report (1972) simply reinforced the view that Ibrox and other disasters were
technical failures; from which it can be inferred that inspection of a stadium's
structure and fixtures and fittings would be sufficient to ensure crowd safety.
A final issue that held a high priority in this period concerned hooliganism. In
October 1970 the FA advised all Football League clubs that they should introduce
more stringent methods of confinement. Bale (1993) reported that the erection of
barriers to segregate fans at Old Trafford cost in excess of100,000, a considerable
sum in 1974. In Chapter 4, Guilianotti's (1994) description of the period between
the Ibrox and Bradford disasters divided into two periods (see table 4.3). In the
first (1970-8) the rise of hooliganism as a national problem was identified. The
response of the authorities was to employ technical fixes. In 1979, with the election
of a new Government, Guilianotti (1994) identified the greater sensitisation of the
executive to hooliganism, and notes a switch to punitive judicial policies. Whether
hooliganism was a more serious problem during this period or whether, as has been
suggested (Williams et al 1993), it was a problem amplified by the media, many of
the executives with responsibility for administering within the football industry
believed this to be so. The introduction of close circuit TV and the erection of
segregating barriers were investments reflecting the belief that hooliganism was
problem number one. It may be argued that the hooliganism debate created a
smokescreen, behind which further stadium incidents (see table 1.1) went unnoticed
or were interpreted as being caused by hooligans.
A difficulty for this thesis concerns the question of balance. The problems of
hooliganism were, it has been argued, exaggerated, and in seeking to counter this
imbalance, there is a danger that the actual role played by hooliganism is
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understated. Directly, hooliganism played an immediate role in the Birmingham2
and Heysel disasters. Indirectly, the response to hooliganism had an important
influence upon the redevelopment of football grounds prior to 1989. However, as
the analysis in this Chapter identifies, hooliganism is only one amongst a number of
issues. There has been no suggestion that hooliganism played a part in either the
Ibrox or Bradford Disasters. In the case of Hilisborough there is less clarity with
some commentators (Ingham 1997 for example) placing blame firmly upon the
spectators. Conversely, it has been difficult for others to criticise the behaviour of
some spectators without being accused of adopting an anti-spectator stance.
5.8 The Bradford Stadium Disaster
Bradford City FC was founded in 1903 and by 1908 the club had successfully
achieved promotion to the first division and its main stand, eventually to be burnt
down, had been built. By the 1 950s , despite its successes in the earlier half of this
century, Bradford City had slipped into the lower divisions. The ground was never
designated under the 1975 Act and the club was not required to bring standards up
to those specified in the Green Guide. Its lack of success was reflected in a
worsening fmancial situation. The club was threatened by closure in both 1965 and
1983 (Shaw, 1985). Regarding safety, two stands at Valley Parade were demolished
during the 1950's because of concerns about their safety (Inglis, 1987). During the
early 1980's the HSE expressed similar concerns about the main stand as reported
above.
Only designated grounds were obliged to meet the guidelines expressed in the
Green Guide. Although Bradford, because of its low league position, was not
2 The Birmingham disaster occurred on the same day as the Bradford Fire. One person died when a
wall collapsed as he, with many others, sought to escape from thrown missiles.
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amongst these it was expected to use the Green Guide for guidance. Herein lies one
key weakness of the way in which the 1975 Act introduced regulation. Responding to
pressure from clubs and the Football Authorities it was targeted at those clubs
believed to be at greatest risk and in possession of resources to comply with it. As
Inglis (1985) writing in the Guardian reflected:
"No club wants to have an unsafe ground, but the third and fourth division clubs
have always resisted moves to include them in the Act because they argue that the
costs involved would bankrupt them or be inappropriate in view of their rapidly
declining attendance figures."(p2)
Correspondence between Bradford AFC and the HSE included a letter from the latter
the following September (1980) indicating further hazards, including:
"In the main stand the void area between the concrete supporting structure and the
wood floor should, after the removal of rubbish, be completely blanked off."
Further inspections in 1981 included questions regarding evacuation from the main
stand:
"I would also ask you to consider the evacuation procedure for the main stand, this
is largely constructed of wood and from paragraph 8 of the code you will see that it
should be capable of evacuation in 2.5 mirmtes. Please consider the above points
and write to me detailing your proposals." (p23)
There was no response to this letter.
The HSE were not the only Statutoiy Authority aware of the potential risks. The
poor state of the ground had led the club to seek financial support from the Football
Trust. A letter (18/7/84) from West Yorkshire County Council was written, at the
request of the club, in support of this application:
"As the West Yorkshire County Council is the Licensing Authority under the
Safety at Sports Ground Act 1975, it may assist you to know what some of the
Council's other considerations would be, should at some time in the future the
provisions of the Act apply to Bradford City AFC ground:
These are:
1. Main Grandstand
(a) The unusual construction of this stand makes an appraisal of structural
adequacy desirable.
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(b) The timber construction is a fire hazard, and in particular, there is a build up of
combustible materials in the voids beneath the seats. A carelessly discarded
cigarette could give rise to a fire risk.
(c) Egress from the stands should be achievable in 2.5 minutes"
(Quoted in Popplewell, 1985, p20)
The letter was despatched in July 1984. A copy was also sent to the Fire Service.
Popplewell (1985a) reported that:
"They took the view that it was a matter of good housekeeping for the occupiers of
the football ground to deal with and saw no reason to take the matter any
further."Q 19)
The earlier discussion of regulation suggested that whilst managers frequently
understand more about their organisation's processes than regulators and thus must
take a lead in safety management, the role of regulators is to push and ensure that
essential work is undertaken. The HSE stance demonstrates the persistence of an
indulgency pattern, perhaps due in part to a lack of resources,.
With regard to the 'crisis of management stage' (Smith 1990) a number of
observations can be made. It is clear that in the five year period prior to the incident,
the club's attention was drawn to the potential for the disaster. That these warnings
were ignored parallels the pattern of behaviour at Ibrox pre 1971.
	 The simple
organisational structure of the Bradford club did not lend itself to providing sufficient
resources to deal with all matters, leading arguably, to the failure to respond to letters
and to the admission that it was not the secretary's responsibility to oversee
compliance with safety guidelines.
The main stand was about 90 metres long and set on the side of a bill. There was
a void between the weathered floor of the stand and the ground below. Over a period
of at least twenty years, papers, sweet wrappers and litter had collected in this void,
creating a fire hazard. The stand was divided into two length way sections separated
by a solid wooden barrier of about 4-5 feet high. Two gaps in this barrier allowed
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access between the front and rear parts of the stand. These were located
approximately one third of the way in from either end. To the front of the stand there
was a small terrace. Access to the stand was from the rear, through a dark passageway
which ran its length. The exit gates and entry turnstiles were located off this
passageway. To prevent the admission of non-paying customers many of these gates
and turnstiles were locked shut during the game, thereby preventing exit during any
match. Toilets and refreshment bars were also located here, meaning that it became
crowded at halftime. The stand was covered by a wooden roof covered with felt.
A crowd of some 11,000 attended the ground on May 11th to celebrate the
team's success for the fmal match of the season. Shortly before halftime a fire broke
out in the main stand. Witnesses report seeing a small fire in the void beneath the
floor of main stand. The fire caused little concern, at first, as is evident by
photographic evidence. Popplewell (1985a) reported:
"Those in the immediate area of the fire seemed not unreasonably to think that it
was simply some paper which had caught fire, that it was of no particular
significance, and that within a short period of time steps would be taken to deal
with it." (p7)
One spectator left his nephew to get a fire extinguisher from the rear of the stand. Fire
fighting equipment, however, had been removed due to fears of its misuse by unruly
spectators. PC Lyles, called to investigate the fire, requested colleagues on the
touchline to get a fire extinguisher:
"Owing to the background noise they thought he had asked for the fire brigade and
they therefore radioed to the fire brigade."(Popplewell, 1985, p7)
This request was made at about 15.42, by 15.44 flames were clearly visible and within
two further minutes the whole stand was on fire. Spectators proved reluctant to move
as PC Lyles reported:
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"We did not get much reaction from people in the stand, obviously they were
watching the match and in fairness the fire did not look much from where they
were sitting. A few of them moved out into the aisles towards the top of the
steps. "Q7)
An absence of loud hailers and an inability for the police to access the public address
system hindered police attempts to direct spectators. Eyewitness accounts indicated
that no attempt was made via the p.a. system to direct spectators to leave [Siggins,
18/05/85]. The police radio sets, which were designed for only one officer to speak
at a time, also caused communication problems. Two people speaking at the same
time meant that neither was properly understood; a problem exacerbated at Bradford,
by the background noise. Further, the problems of communicating in a crisis for a
machine bureaucracy type organisation was highlighted in Chapter 4, with reference
to the fire service. Similar problems face the police when they work in large numbers.
At times of a crisis incident it is likely that radio channels will be overloaded with
requests for orders or permission to deviate from contingency plans.
Eventually, when the seriousness of the fire became clear, spectators began to
move, some escaped onto the pitch, many sought to leave by the usual exits, many of
which were locked shut. Sime (1985) reported that this behaviour is normal and
rational. People may avoid taking the shortest route to safety, preferring instead to
exit the way they came in, following a route that is familiar and one that they have
confidence will permit their escape. The existence of the wooden barrier may have
influenced many, particularly the less mobile, to move towards the rear of the stand.
Whilst some exits were forced open and other non-signposted exits were used as
escape routes many spectators were caught in a trap, caught between the fire and the
barred exits. Popplewell (1985) surnmarises the causes of the tragedy:
"The answers to the question therefore, why the fire started and caused casualties
are that, firstly the stand was a wooden structure, with a void under the seats, in
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which debris could and did collect; and secondly that the available exits were
insufficient to enable spectators to escape the devastating effects of the rapidly
spreading fire."Q9)
In the aftermath of the tragedy Justice Popplewell was commissioned to undertake an
Jnquiry into the disaster. Less than three weeks later, thirty nine spectators were killed
at the Heysel Stadium in the European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus and
Popplewell's terms of reference were extended to include this disaster. Before the
Heysel Stadium disaster is examined, a number of observations can be made. First,
the linking of the two incidents refocused attention onto the problem of hooliganism.
Second, that hooliganism played no part in the Bradford tragedy (evidence that
contradicts the first of the three explanations of the stadia disasters in Chapter 1).
Third, the behaviour of spectators at Bradford did not conform to assumptions. For
example, people proved reluctant to move when the first signs of the fire were
noticed. Evacuation times were based on identification of a problem rather than upon
human behaviour. That is, a period of time will elapse between identification of a
problem and a human response. (Sime 1985).
Although no previous incidents had been reported within Bradford's main stand
the correspondence from the Fire Authority and County Council illustrates that a
problem had been identified some years prior to the disaster. As was the case at Ibrox
no remedial action was taken. The availability of data regarding the Bradford disaster
enables us to make a number of observations. From the analytical framework (figure
2.2) and summary of the crisis incident in table 5.5, it can be seen that the dire financial
straits of the football club acted as one barrier to the taking of remedial action.
However, the comments of the Secretary, that it was not his role to ensure the Club's
compliance with the Green Guide is revealing. Observations such as these lead to the
identification of a further type of 'defence mechanism' in the course of this study, which
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Culture/Finance
Culture/Finance
Conliguration
OperationalCrisis
Communications
Coupling & Complexity
Culture
Crisis of Legitimation
Culture:
The Bradford Stadium Fire: A Socio-Technical S ystems Failure
Crisis of Management
Cultural Context
	
Focus on hooliganism.
Ignore warnings from Fire Service & HSE.
Culture: Assumptions	 Lower division club and therefore not a designated ground.
Reluctance of spectators to move on first signs of Smoke (response time not
included in evacuation calculations)
Locked exit gates to prevent admission without payment.
No exit gate stewards.
Low priority of backroom activities.
Confusion re. responsibility between HSE arid Fire Service.
Previous financial problems, at time on brink of insolvency.
Inadequate cleaning and maintenance.
Secretary an administrator, chairman and board distant from housekeeping
matters.
Too few radio channels and communication overload
Design of stand, poor housekeeping, lack of fire exits, poor communication
between regulatory agencies.
Exit and entry 2ates locked for security reasons, no stewards or keys available.
Connnission Popplewell Report.
Link to Heysel (Hooliganism).
Local Authorities close 27 stands.
Focus on fire.
Incident specific learning 	 Safety measures focused upon fire hazards rather than on meeting requirements
blocks learning	 of Popplewell Report.
Technical recommendations.
Focus upon hooliganism, Bradford an unfortunate aberration.
Table 5.5: The Bradford Stadium Disaster: Three Stages of Crisis
has been termed 'displacement'; that is, the tendency to ascribe responsibility for a
task or role to another agency, and thereby avoiding having to deal with a threatening
situation. Responsibility for safety had been added as one of a long list of duties for
the club secretary. In view of the reluctance of the authorities to do more than identify
a problem, that is to hold back from pressuring the club to act, such behaviour
remained largely unchallenged. As with the Ibrox tragedy it was a collection of
factors, cultural, structural and economic that combined to create the conditions in
which the fire occurred
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With the benefit of hindsight, the Bradford disaster can be seen as one of a series
of high profile crisis incidents. In May 1985 of course, it was merely the first major
incident since 1971. It was easy to consider it as another aberration or freak accident.
Indeed as table 5.6 illustrates, this is a view that has persisted to the current day for
some football administrators. Respondents were asked to identif' the primary causes
of the Bradford disaster. The identification of wooden stands and locked gates as key
factors rather than ineffective evacuation, communications etc. highlights that
technical causes of crises are easier to identif' and act upon. Despite this, a number
of instances during my observations of safety management practices, suggested that
lessons had not been learned by 1994-5. In many clubs, locked gates were left
unattended. In another case, an attempt by a deputy chief steward to investigate a fire
alarm in a crowded stand was delayed for 10 minutes because a steward had left a fire
door locked and had moved off to watch the match - no disciplinary action was taken
because the deputy chief steward knew that the individual would lose his job if the
stadium manager were informed, providing further evidence of the continuation of an
indulgency pattern of behaviour. For other administrators the Bradford Club was at
fault, and a number were quick to assert that such sloppy management would not be
tolerated in their clubs.
Table 5.6 summarises the views of respondents regarding the causes of the
Bradford Fire. The criteria used to determine the appropriate * result was as follows.
Where	 are shown the respondent indicated that this particular factor was either
the only one or the most significant. Where two factors were identified, ** were
allocated. Finally, where a respondent indicated a combination of factors, * was used.
The virtual absence of * indicates that few respondents attributed the causes of the fire
to any complex combination of factors.
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Primary Cause
Club	 Wooden	 Locked Fire!
stands!	 gates!
construction exits
Primai3'
Poor	 Lack of Freak	 Smoker Club
maintenance finances accident
&
cleanliness
P1 I- 	 	 -	 -	
-	 I-	 I-	 -
P2 -	 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
3	 **	 **	 -	 -	 -
4	 **	 **	 -	 -	 -
Fl	 **	 **	 -	 -	 -
F2
P3	 **	 **
F4
Si
S2
S3 -	 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
S4	 *
Ti -	 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
T2 -	 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
T3	 **	 *	 **
14	 **	 **	 ***
Table 5.6: Summary of views of respondents on causes and responsibility for Bradford tragedy
'" Sole or primary cause	 ***	 One group with prime responsibility
** Secondary or one of a no. of key factors 	 **	 Balance of responsibility
*	 Contributory	 *	 Contributory (fleeting mention)
5.9 The Heysel Stadium Disaster
The Bradford disaster emphasised that peaceful, law abiding spectators could be
victim to tragedy in a football stadium. The disaster did much to focus public
attention on the plight of the football industiy and upon the poor state of many
grounds. The Heysel disaster, just over two weeks later, returned the focus towards
hooliganism once again. The Heysel Stadium, Brussels, was chosen as the venue for
the final of the European Cup between Juventus of Italy and Liverpool of England.
Although this disaster did not occur in the UK and the stadium was not subject to UK
legislation it is included in this analysis because of its profound affect upon Justice
Popplewell's recommendations.
The Heysel stadium, built by the City of Brussels municipal authority, was
opened in 1930 and was a regular venue for football matches and other sporting
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events. The condition of the ground was questioned at the investigation into the
tragedy. Popplewell (1986), reported:
"Having regard to the state of the crush barriers and fences, and the general
condition of the terraces it seems unlikely, had it been located in this country, that
a certificate would have been issued under the Safety of Sports Ground Act 1975
for this part of the ground."
He continues:
"However, the poor state of the terraces played no part in the tragedy."(p4)
Popplewell's (1986) comment may reflect a desire to avoid openly criticising the
Belgian Authorities given the role of British supporters in triggering the tragedy. It
thus reflects the political nature of such inquiries, a weakness identified by Toft &
Reynolds (1992). The suitability of the stadium as a venue for such an important
match must be questioned. A more balanced view was put forward by Miller (1985)
who wrote:
"Nobody of whatever nationality could attempt to defend England's wretched
record of crowd behaviour, but it must be said that the Heysel Stadium.....was ill
equipped both in its structure and in its segregation of rival supporters to cope with
a match in which there were bound to be such tensions." (pp 1-2)
Jnglis (1990) reports allegations that the UEFA inspectors spent less than 30 minutes
checking the suitability of the ground for the Cup Final.
The Belgian authorities determined that Juventus and Liverpool fans would be
segregated. In addition areas for "neutral" spectators would be located in block "M"
beside Juventus supporters in blocks "N" and "0" and in block "Z" beside Liverpool
supporters in blocks "X" and "Y" (Appendix 5.1). Additional barriers around the
neutral areas were also erected.
"This composite construction, whilst fomiing a physical barrier, was not of
sufficient strength to resist the detennined efforts to breach it." (Popplewell, 1 9S6,
p4)
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t'Hart and Pijnenburg (1989) report that these barriers:
"Were neither designed properly, nor constructed adequately, to stop a determined
and angry crowd"(p203)
To the flank of block" Z", the site of the disaster, was a wall rising from 2 metres high
at one end to 3 metres at the other. It was a brick wall which was not fixed in anyway
to the concrete wall it sat upon.
Responsibility for policing was split between the Brussels Police and the
National Gendarmerie. Problems of communication were evident as the two forces
maintained separate communication and co-ordination networks (t'Hart & Pijnenburg
1989). The Gendarmerie officer in charge (OIC) at the stadium failed to attend any of
a number of meetings to discuss arrangements for the match with his counterpart in
the Brussels police and other official bodies. (Popplewell, 1986). The lack of apparent
planning by the police was commented upon by a number of observers. (See Times,
Guardian and Financial Times of 30 & 31st May 1985). Peter Robinson of Liverpool
claimed in an interview that:
"When we arrived at the stadium on Wednesday, I immediately said that police
were needed in the empty security zone, because it was clear that the neutral zone
was predominantly filled by Italians with predominantly black and white colours
and that the barriers, which they say the police had approved the day before would
not be adequate."(The Times, 3 1/5/85, p3)
The attempts to segregate the opposing fans had broken down. Many Italian fans
were able, one way or another, to acquire tickets for block "Z". The security
arrangements had assumed that opposing fans would not be located in such close
proximity to one another. Police reports indicated a series of incidents throughout
the afternoon before the game. At 17.15 a police report indicated a mass invasion of
block "M" (neutral) from blocks (Juventus)"O" and "N" which were overcrowded
(Popplewell 1986, p6). At the other end of the ground:
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"Somewhere between 18.15 and 18.30, the English fans fired flares and rockets
and threw stones into Block "Z", which was beginning to be occupied by what
were clearly Italian supporters. There was also a number of English supporters in
Block "Z" who sought to escape into Block "Y"....It appears there were about
15,000 spectators in Blocks "X" & "Y" and about 5,000 in Block "Z"."
(Popplewell 1986, p7)
Precise figures for the numbers of spectators, were unavailable owing to the lack of
specific turnstiles for each block, and gaps in the boundary wall sufficiently wide to
enable admission without a ticket or payment.
Between 19.15 and 19.30, according to a Times report of3l/5/85 and supported
by further evidence to the Popplewell Inquiry, three charges by English spectators
from Blocks "X" and "Y" on block "Z" took place. The first two were repulsed, the
third successfully broke through the security barriers. The Times suggests that the
Belgian police had withdrawn at this stage to await reinforcements. The Popplewell
report is deliberately vague (it appears) on this point. As the Juventus supporters
sought to escape from the onslaught of English supporters they were forced along the
boundary walls furthest from block Y. As the crush built up more pressure was
exerted on the perimeter wall. A section of about 6 metres length collapsed. People
tumbled down among the rubble, others followed close behind, unable to stop
themselves owing to the pressure of people behind them, seeking to escape from the
English supporters. Most of the victims suffered death from suffocation or crushing.
Thirty eight people died in the disaster, some four hundred were injured.
Table 5.7 highlights that despite the identification of hooliganism as the main
cause of the tragedy by some commentators, a range of social and technical factors
came together to create the potential for the deaths to occur. These factors, as shown
in table 5.7, influenced the preparations for the match as well as the immediate
response.
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__________________________	 Heysel_Stadium_Disaster:_A_Socio-Technical_Systems_Failure
Crisis of Management
Cultural Context	 Assumption that ground is safe leads to a quick check by UEFA official
Culture: Claim that ground would not be certificated in UK, sub-standard grounds
perceived to be OK in countries that had not suffered a major stadium
accident.
Configuration/Communication
Different police forces responsible for different parts of the ground causes
problems in communication and irnplementatioxt. One police force does not
attend pre-match briefing making co-ordination very difficult.
Finance
_________________________ Poor condition of ground
Operational Crisis
Communications	 Too few radio channels and communication overload
Coupling & Complexity	 Design of stand, poor quality infrastructure, close proximity of British and
Italian spectators, poor policing, hooligan behaviour all combine.
Configuration	 Presence of different crowd control agencies makes co-ordination difficult
Crisis of Legitimation
Incident specific learning	 Identified as a problem of hooliganism rather than mismanagement.
blocks learning	 Political Concerns, Government embarrassment and desire to avoid being seen
as blaming the Belgian authorities.
Subsequent Popplewell Report focuses upon problems of hooliganism and
violence, diverting attention away from problems of poor quality stadia
Immediate closure of grounds in UK soon relaxed.
__________________________	 Government act before Popplewell Reports.
Table 5.7: The Heysel Stadium Disaster: Three Stages of Crisis
The political context in which Popplewell prepared his reports is further
demonstrated by the announcement of specific measures to deal with hooliganism
some four days after the Heysel tragedy, and some months before Popplewell's
interim report was written and published. The comment that the Heysel Stadium
would probably not have been awarded a safety certificate under the provisions of the
1975 Act demonstrates the difficulty in transferring lessons between countries, even
where obvious and close similarities exist.
5.10	 1985-9: Response to the Bradford Fire
Following the two disasters, the interview data, collected from club
executives, suggests an immediate tightening up on the part of the regulatory
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agencies, indicatiiig a switch to a 'punishment centred bureaucracy' - a view
supported by Inglis (1987) who identified the closure of some twenty seven stands
across England and Wales. P1 complained that after Bradford, the Local Authority
compelled the club to spend some £450,000 on an old stand despite the fact that it
was to be rebuilt the following year. The nature of the complaint, that such a
requirement was absurd, suggests that there was still a gap between the values of
many regulators and clubs. It also raises the question why the improvements had
not been required at an earlier date if they were so pressing. A similar gap was
identified by Fl:
"Even prior to Taylor, unless the fire brigade on one of their annual inspections
or us, in the police force as a result of something that happened during a game,
my impression is that they wouldn't have done anything unless it was brought to
their attention somewhat forcibly because other things keep coming up and
dropping on your desk."
P2 suggested that after the 1975 Act the Local Authority had maintained very high
standards which "we used to think that they were being a little bit harsh', but that
this had stood them in good stead. Later on in the interview it emerged that
immediately following the Bradford Fire, a wooden terrace below a wooden stand
had been closed. The wooden stand above it however, remained in use for another
nine years. Such a view reflects the use of 'denial' as a defence mechanism, a
refusal to acknowledge the potential for danger. Only F2 identified the Bradford
Fire as a catalyst to greater co-operation between the club and the regulatory
authorities, in this case the police. Where respondents identified the Bradford Fire
as a stimulus to action, it concerned the regulatory authorities compelling clubs to
act as in the cases of P1 and F 1 cited above. For a number of clubs this involved
the closure of specific stands (P2, S4, Ti).
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Despite this immediate response to the Bradford Fire there does not appear to
have been a significant shift in values. The analysis of the views of interviewees
concerning the causes of the Bradford Fire sheds light on one aspect of this
(reported in table 5.6). For many within the industry Bradford was a freak. The
focus upon hooliganism, discussed earlier, switched the focus of attention away
from clubs and their regulators and onto means for crowd control and spectator
behaviour. Five clubs identified the Bradford Club as having primary responsibility
but believed that this was an extreme case of poor housekeeping that would never
have been permitted within their own organisations. Note, one of these clubs was
subsequently reprimanded for permitting the build up of combustible materials
beneath a wooden stand. As Fl put it:
"Popplewell tended to get forgotten; a couple of things that he recommended
continued but he certainly didn't have the influence that Taylor did."
In summary, the evidence suggests a flurry of activity following the Bradford
Fire and a shift towards a 'punishment centred bureaucracy', a shift that subsided
after the initial shock.. Although an additional fifty grounds were designated to
come under the provisions of the 1975 Act there is little evidence for the
development from the indulgency patterns and 'mock bureaucracy' of the
preceding period. Indeed Inglis (1987) in a review of safety in sports stadia appears
to mock cases where the fine detail was applied. In one example, a match was
almost called off because a senior police officer found that the bulbs in an exit
corridor were broken. Fortunately, 'staff were sent to the corner shop for
replacements and the game was saved'[p38J. An alternative interpretation of this
stoly is that the exit corridor was an important emergency exit and that lack of
lighting could have severely hindered the escape of spectators. Given the quantity
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of lighting inside any building, the lack of spare bulbs indicates either the poverty
of the club or an example of the type of poor housekeeping that contributed to the
Bradford Disaster. Ground improvement was not a high priority for football clubs
in the 1985-9 period (Arnold & Benveniste 1988).
The problems of hooliganism received extensive attention from the media as
well as from academics. The period 1985-1989 saw the rapid growth in the
treatment of the football industry from a sociological perspective. There was a lack
of any research however, from either a risk management or organisational
perspective. Near misses continued, frequently unreported (as was the case at the
1981 and 1988 FA Cup semi fmal fixtures at the Hilisborough stadium).
____________	 Patterns of Behaviour: 1985 - 1989
Iridulgency
Pattern
Mock	 T3 "There wasn't the safety concerns before Hillsborough even though
Bureaucracy	 Bradford had happened.... you wouldn't have a safety officer before
______________	 Hilisborough or fluorescent jackets or insufficient [sic] first aid cover"
Punishment	 Closure of 27 stands and terraces on instructions of Local Authority
centred	 License bodies following Bradford Fire.
Bureaucracy	 Legislative focus upon hooliganism including sale of alcohol ban
Representative	 F2 cites example of better relationships with local authority regulator
Bureaucracy
Table 5.8: Development of Regulation and Response 1985 - 89
Although this period witnessed a knee jerk reaction immediately following the
Bradford Fire, there was little evidence for the development of a punishment
centred bureaucracy and no evidence of a representative bureaucracy (see table 5.8).
The emphasis of the licensing scheme may have been extended to incorporate fire
safety, but there was little evidence of a safety culture developing.
5.11 The Hilisborough Stadium Tragedy
Hilisborough, the home ground of Sheffield Wednesday, was widely considered
to be one of the better quality grounds in the UK, described by Inglis (1987) as the
212
Wembley of the north. The West Stand, built in 1965 in readiness for use as a venue
the 1966 World Cup. It was described in 1987 as:
"Hillsborough is a stadium, with all the grand connotations the term implies......To
the left is the West Stand, with 4465 seats in an upper tier, and open terraces in
front. Next to the other two stands it looks rather ordinary, but the view it provides
is excellent, as are its facilities, and it does close off the ground effectively without
cramping the style of either of its neighbours." (Inglis, p9'7)
The terraces to the front of the West or Leppings Lane stand, had a capacity of about
10,100. The terracing was split into a number of separate pens, each surrounded by
fencing on three sides. The division into pens was the result of an overcrowding
incident during the 1981 FA Cup semi-fmal. Capacity for each pen was determined by
a process of fans fmding their own level, despite the fact that approximate capacities
for each pen had been calculated. Access between the pens was possible by gates
located to the rear of each pen. When these gates were open the back row of terracing
had access between pens.
"In practice, when substantial numbers are present, those gateways are not readily
visible or accessible. The present layout of the pens, fences, crush barriers and
gates has resulted from a series of piecemeal changes." (Taylor 1989, p5)
Crush barriers were also located parallel to the goal line. To the front of the terraces
lay a 2.5 metre high fence, turned inwards at the top, preventing access to the pitch.
Gates were located at intervals, along this fence, and none was wider than 1 metre.
Entiy to the West Stand and terraces was from the Leppings Lane. Owing to the
close proximity of housing and the River Don, there was not as much room for
turnstiles as there was for access to other parts of the ground. Lack of room also
meant that the area immediately outside the ground could become quickly congested.
Thus access for 29,800 spectators on the south and east sides of the ground was
through 60 turnstiles (500:1) compared to 23 turnstiles serving the 23,250 capacity
(1,000:1) on the north and west sides.
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From Leppings Lane, spectators made their way through a set of perimeter
gates to the turnstiles. Seven turnstiles were available for the potential 10,100
standing spectators (1450:1). A rate of 600 admissions per hour was considered quick,
given good conditions.
The layout of the turnstiles was confusing; the use of letters and numbers out of
sequence to denote groups of turnstiles as well as individual ones made the individual
spectator take time to make sense of. This confusion was exacerbated by the presence
of a dividing fence running from the perimeter fence to the ground itself. Any
spectator who found himself on the wrong side of this would be forced to fight against
the tide of people onto the other side. Entrances A and C were located on one side of
this fence, Entrance B on the other. Turnstiles for the former two entrances were
denoted by numbers, for the latter by letters.
Having successfully made sense of the external layout, spectators, on entering
the ground were drawn by a combination of signposting and layout towards a tunnel
which led to terracing in pens 3 and 4, directly behind the goal. Where the tunnel
emerged onto the terraces, the way ahead was bisected by the radial fence separating
pens 3 and 4. A short spur of wall projected forward on either side of the tunnel
opening, guiding those emerging forward into pens 3 and 4, rather than into other
adjacent pens. Overcrowding of pens 3 and 4 had been so severe in 1988, at the
identical semi-final fixture also between Nottingham Forest and Liverpool, that this
tunnel had been blocked off by police officers. However, no record of this was made
in the post match de-brief and it was not included in the operational order for 1989. It
should be noted that there was virtually no control of the numbers of spectators going
into each of the pens.
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In summaly, the layout of the Leppings Lane end had developed, both internally
and externally, in a piecemeal manner. Despite these changes the safety certificate
was not amended. Crowd density was monitored manually. This layout was to have a
key impact on the disaster of 15 April.
Liverpool FC and Nottingham Forest FC were to meet one another in the semi-
fmals of the FA cup in an exact duplication of the previous year's match. Despite
having the larger average attendance Liverpool supporters were given the smaller side
of the ground, accessed from Leppings Lane, to assist in ensuring strict segregation.
By 2 p.m. , although pens 3 and 4 were filling quickly a surprisingly small
number of Liverpool fans had taken their places upon the terraces, in pens 1,2 and 5.
By 2.15 p.m. the numbers in pens 3 and 4 were large enough to warrant a request, via
the public address system, for fans to move forward to make room. Outside the
Leppings Lane entrance large crowds of fans were beginning to collect. By 2.50 p.m.
pens 3 and 4 were reportedly:
"Already full to a degree which caused serious discomfort to many well used to
enduring pressure on the terraces. The numbers at that time were clearly in excess
of the maximum density stated by the Home Office Guide to Safety at Sports
Grounds." (Taylor, 1989, p1 1)
Outside the ground, as kick off approached, the crowd became more anxious to
ensure quick access. Given the numbers of turnstiles, progress was likely to be slow.
Progress was further slowed by the rising pressure, pushing and shoving. It was clear
that the crowd would be unable to enter the ground by 3.00 p.m. A request, from a
police officer, for kick-off to be postponed was rejected by the South Yorkshire
Constabulary Match Commander. Technical problems affecting communication
between officers outside the ground and the control room were also reported at this
time. Superintendent Marshall, officer in charge outside the Leppings Lane, fearful of
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fatalities occurring outside the ground requested permission (at 2.47 p.m.) to open the
exit gates, adjacent to the turnstiles, to relieve the crowd pressure outside the ground.
At 2.52 p.m. authorisation to open an exit gate was given. The largest entry was
through gate C which opened into the area directly behind the terraces. The most
obvious route to the terraces, as described, was through the tunnel to pens 3 and 4
which were already overcrowded.
Intense pressure built up in the tunnel, pressure which took advantage of any
movement forward in the pens ahead, thereby increasing the pressure on the fans
trapped inside the pens. Against a background of noise within the stadium the police
officers in front of the pens did not immediately notice what was wrong. The narrow
exit gates to the front of pens 3 and 4 sprang open due to the pressure. Police officers
sought to close them and either to push back fans spilling out of them or to redirect
them to the wing pens. As awareness of the problem grew further problems of
communication were evident:
"At gate 3, a constable, now alive to the crisis, followed strictly his written orders
and radioed for permission to open that gate. Receiving no reply, he took it upon
himself to open it."(Taylor, 1989, p13)
Prior to the incident, at the pre match briefing police officers had been instructed not
to open the gate under any circumstances, and had been given clear instructions that
they were to accept 'no trouble from the scouse hooligans' [Private Communication,
various anonymous members of the South Yorkshire Constabulary]. One officer is
identified by Taylor (1989) as actually pushing the gate to pen 3 shut after it had
sprung open under the pressure of the crowd crush. The officer could see the distress
of spectators but remembered his instructions not to allow fans onto the pitch. A few
minutes later, thinldng to himself that "I'll get a real bollocking for this" he opened
the gate and assisted in the rescue of the injured and dying.
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Whilst some fans sought to escape through the gates, others tried to climb the
perimeter fence. These were pushed back at first by police who suspected a pitch
invasion. The overcrowding remained un-noticed by the control rooms, they assumed
that the fans spilling onto the pitch were involved in an attempted pitch invasion.
Photographic evidence also shows that before 3.00 p.m., spectators were being pulled
out of the terrace by spectators sitting in the stand above. At some stage one of the
crush barriers in pen 3 broke, providing an unbroken thrust of pressure from rear of
the tunnel to front of the terrace.
"The crushing force was transmitted and dispersed so that all along the front of pen
3 fans were pressed hard up against the low wall and the wire of the fence above
it... .The pressure stayed and for those crushed breathless by it, standing or prone,
life was ebbing away. If no relief came in four minutes there would be irreversible
brain damage; if longer death. "Q 13)
The most noticeable thing about video evidence of the incident was the slowness
with which the police appeared to comprehend what was going on. Even after officers
closest to pens 3 and 4 "come alive to the situation" many other officers clearly
believed it to be an case of crowd trouble. By 3.06 p.m. the police control room were
aware of the seriousness of the problem and requested that the match be stopped. It
was not until 3.12 p.m. however, that any attempt to seal off the entrance to the tunnel
was made. Chief Superintendent Nesbit of the traffic police arrived on the pitch at
about this time and set about organising the extraction of casualties from pen 3. At
3.13 p.m. a request from the police to the fire brigade for cutting equipment was
made. The flow of communication from police at the ground to a central police
control and subsequently, to the fire service indicate a lack of planning.
Moelwyn-Hughes' (1946) analysis of the causes of the Bolton tragedy might have
been written for Hillsborough: a larger than expected crowd, too many admitted,
defective method to count spectators into enclosures, slow remedial action and
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unorganised, and unauthorised entry. Taylor (1989) as reported earlier stated that all
the problems into which he was requested to inquire had been envisaged before.
Indeed a similar accident had only been narrowly averted the preceding year. It is
clear that as was the case with Ibrox and Bradford, warnings went unheeded, lessons
from previous incidents had not been learnt. From the preceding analysis it seems
clear that major cultural adjustment did not take place prior to the Hilisborough
tragedy. The limited resources of football clubs, the wide span of responsibility of
________________________ 	 Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: A Socio-Technical Systems Failure
Crisis of Management
Cultural Context 	 Focus on hooliganism.
Technical measures, no holistic redevelopment of Stadium
Police 'stirred up to take no nonsense from scouse troublemakers'[anon 1995]
Crowd control not crowd safety.
Focus upon playing success to detriment of safety management.
Configuration/Communication 	 Failure to debrief from previous year means opportunity for learning lost.
Rigid response, ignored evidence of o eyes.
Finance	 Piecemeal re-development of Stadium.
Few poorly paid and trained stewards.
__________________________	 Poor condition of ground.
Operational Crisis
Communications	 Too few radio channels and communication overload.
Coupling & Complexity Design of stand, signposting inside and outside, failure to monitor packing in
pens, perception that problem one of hooligans, layout of pens, warm weather
and roadworks lead to late arrivals of supporters.
Configuration	 Central co-ordinator freezes, leaves the police response without leadership for
critical period
Machine bureaucracy structure of police prevents quick and effective response
Crisis of Legitimation	 Attempt to scapegoat fans in first instance.
Switch to blame police for operational mistakes on the day.
It couldn't happen here response of other clubs
Ultimately the Scapegoatirig of the police diverted attention away from
football clubs, reduces pressures for cultural re-adjustment and removes key
pressure for internal change
Incident specific learning	 Focus on FLA immediately upon introducing all seater stadia - a technical fix.
blocks learning	 Failure to learn from previous incidents or only in a specific way (erection of
new fences with no thought of further problems)
Table 5.9: The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster: Three Stages of Crisis
key executives, a weak and largely ineffective regulatory regime combined to prevent
the translation of acquired knowledge into active learning. Drawing upon Gouldner's
(1954) framework, it is clear that an indulgency pattern of behaviour persisted
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throughout this period with an occasional flurry of punitive enforcement following
high profile incidents. Given the lack of evidence of any major cultural readjustment
in this period and the absence of extensive, active learning, a key question concerns
the transfer of knowledge into action since 1989
5.12	 Summary
This Chapter focused upon the UK Football Industry 1946-89. The evidence
indicates the persistence of an indulgency pattern of behaviour with periodic switches
to a punishment centred bureaucracy following disaster incidents. On the basis of this
evidence it can be conjectured that such switches are brief and a reversion to
indulgency soon follows. No major or long term changes to culture are indicated,
thus lending support to the principal hypothesis that no full cultural readjustment
occurred in this period. The reluctance of government to introduce an effective
regulatory framework mirrors the reluctance of many football clubs to develop safe
crowd management systems through technical improvements or through stewarding
and the education of spectators. The influence of the hooligan issue is also clear,
most evident in the concluding remarks of Justice Popplewell's final Report (1986)
cited above. However, the evidence does not support the explanation that hooligans
acted as the primary instigators of the disasters examined. The hooliganism issue,
however, did play an important role in creating a particular mindset that influenced
stadia modifications and practice. There has been nothing eclectic in the selection of
these focal incidents. They represented the worst disasters of their kind in the UK and
register very highly on a world scale. The evidence supports the view that these were
socio-technical failures that were caused in large part, by the actions and inactions of
actors within the various agencies with responsibility for crowd safety inside stadia.
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It had been hypothesised that following a disaster a full cultural re-adjustment
would take place. (see Hypothesis 1, Turner 1976, 1978; Tofi & Reynolds 1992). In
the period 1946-89 there was little evidence in support of this contention. The
reluctance of the Rangers' Board to redevelop the Ibrox stadium is one example of
this. The focus upon hooliganism following the Bradford and Heysel disasters are
further examples. As has been argued, the view that these tragedies were caused by
hooligans or were acts of God remained pervasive, a fact reflected in the persistence
of the indulgency pattern.
The evidence indicates that organisational learning was deficient in this period.
It was argued in preceding chapters that factors such as organisational structure,
culture and communications may act as the filters through which active learning can
occur or be blocked. In the next Chapter, the post 1989 response of the Industry is
considered. Particular attention is placed on the elements of culture, structure and
communications discussed in Chapter 2. The purpose of Chapter 6 is not only to
consider the evidence concerning the degree of cultural readjustment since Taylor's
(1989, 1990) public inquiry into the Hillsborough tragedy, but also to detennine the
key factors that influenced the industry's learning in this period.
220
Chapter 6
Organisational Learning from Crisis:
An Examination of the Football Industry in the Post 1989
Period
6.1 Introduction
Since the 1989 Hilisborough Tragedy there have not been any major tragedies
inside UK football stadia. However, as table 1.1 indicated, there have been some
minor incidents. This Chapter examines the football industry in the post 1989
period. It begins with a description and brief assessment of the regulatory response
to the Hillsborough tragedy. The analysis draws extensively upon the data collected
from semi-structured interviews with Club executives and 'Local Authority safety
advisory group' chairmen. The discussion then examines the results of the survey
of football Club safety officers. Five key factors emerged from the statistical
analysis and these were used as the basis for assessing the levels of crisis proneness
within the football industry. It has been argued that following the Bolton, Ibrox and
Bradford (& Heysel) disasters no full cultural re-adjustment took place, reflected in
the persistence of the mock bureaucracy in safety management. This Chapter
examines the degree of cultural change in the post 1989 period and considers its
effect upon organisational learning from crisis.
6.2 1989-97: The Regulatory Response to the Hilisborough Tragedy
Included within Taylor's Report (1990) were recommendations to establish a
national Football Licensing Authority (FLA) to promote and ensure the consistent
application of legislation. The 1989 Football Spectators Act may be seen as an
extension to the 1975 Safety in Sports Ground Act and conformed in large part to
many of the recommendations made by Moelwyn-Hughes in 1946 (Taylor 1990).
Within the regulatory framework each football stadium would be overseen by a
Safety Advisory Group (SAG) which included representatives from each Club,
Football Licensing Authority (FLA) , Local Authority, St. John's Ambulance , the
various emergency services, Fire, Police, Ambulance and other groups co-opted
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onto it. For example, P4 indicated that a supporters' representative also attended
meetings, although this proved to be exceptional. The function of the FLA was
defined as being to:
"Keep under review the discharge by Local Authorities (certifying authorities) of
their functions under the Safety at Sports Grounds Act (1975) in relation to
sports grounds at which designated football matches are played. Specifically, the
FLA may, after due consultation, require a certifying authority to include in any
safety certificate such terms and conditions as the FLA may specify in writing.
The FLA, however, wishes to use this power only in the last resort. It intends
wherever possible to proceed by advice, persuasion and agreement. the FLA is
aware of considerable variations between safety certificates issued by certifying
authorities. Its aim is to bring about greater consistency and to promote best
practice." (FLA 1992, p3)
The FLA's stated approach fits within Gouldner's representative bureaucracy
and the title 'Safety Advisory Council' (renamed committee or group) symbolises
this approach. de Quidt (1997a, 1997b) reported that the FLA has never had to use
its regulatory powers to coerce behaviour, although it has used the threat on a small
number of occasions. However, the response of Clubs reflected different views
and values.
Only two Club chairman, from our sample of twenty, were reported to attend
Safety Advisory Group meetings. In the majority of cases this task was delegated to
an official with some budgetary control. The precise level of budgetary control was
more difficult to discern, but, for the majority of Clubs the person with ultimate
control was not present at meetings. The difficulties that this could cause were
demonstrated during a visit to P3 where a number of stewards were ordered to
'keep out of the way of the chairman' who had been questioning whether so many
were needed. A number of Clubs reported very positive relationships with the
regulatory authorities. P3 described it as the "Safety Team.....and we work as a
unit".
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For P4 the main use of the Safety Committee was:
'That they make you follow it to the letter... now whether the Club would do that
I don't know'.
This emphasis was found in a number of other Clubs, F3 stated that the "FLA man
sticks rigidly to his terms of reference', P1 and F4 identified that the Local
Authority used the Green Guide as a 'bible or gospel'. T2 suggested that the FLA
prevented the Local Authority from being flexible because the its officers were very
conscious of being criticised by the FLA. Others were less positive; P2 for
example:
"It's surprising how the advisory committee, they don't do anything really, but
they want to come along and sit in the directors box and watch the match.....but
if they weren't there they wouldn't be missed really."
In the two lower Divisions more negative views were expressed; S2 spoke of the
'daft documents emanating from everyone' and the false wisdom of the Local
Authority. S4 told of a recent 'set to' with the FLA man:
"I think to be honest, that they nit-pick, to justify their existence, its jobs for the
boys."
Ti was required by the FLA to prepare a report on a three year strategy for ground
improvement:
"We didn't do it because it would either have been a blank piece of paper or all
fiction so what was the point. Last year I didn't know where I'd be next week let
alone next year or three years time."
It is important to note that the SAG is comprised of members from very
different types of organisation. Local Authorities, Police, Fire and Ambulance are
all public bureaucracies and are characterised by a clear defmition of roles and
responsibilities. The regular procedures that characterise these organisations
contrast sharply with the entrepreneurial football Club with its centralised control
and general lack, as argued in Chapter 4, of regular routines and procedures. The
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FLA is a relatively new organisation with eleven inspectors nationally. Each has
responsibility for a number of Clubs within a particular region. The majority of
FLA inspectors have been recruited from retired police and fire officers from which
it may be inferred they have a greater sympathy and understanding of public service
operating norms and procedures. The clash of cultures identified above is not
surprising given the very different configurations of the agencies involved in the
SAG.
A further observation from these statements concerned the use of the Green
Guide as 'gospel' or 'bible,' indicated that guidelines had been enforced and
implemented rigidly; despite de Quidt's (1997) expressed view that they be used to
promote consistency rather than uniformity. The reliance upon the Green Guide is
indicative of a technical response rather than a cultural response. Indeed the
conmients are also indicative of the use of a punishment-centred bureaucracy. This
lends support to our hypothesis that no significant cultural changes have occurred
within the industry and that the problems of crowd safety are still being approached
from a technical perspective. As identified previously, a large proportion of
'technical' improvements were subsidised through a Pools levy administered by the
Football Trust.
Although the discussion above suggests that the 'representative pattern of
behaviour' has not developed as fully as de Quidt (1997) had hoped, there was
some evidence of a cultural change. The Taylor Report and the Hilisborough
Tragedy were identified by many respondents as a key turning point, a point made
in a number of contexts. P4 suggested that before Hilisborough:
"Stewards were for stopping people from getting in illegally."
for T3:
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"Pre Hillsborough, there wasn't the emphasis on making sure that the stewards
were there. If one didn't turn up then you'd saved yourself a few bob, there
wasn't the safety concerns before Hilisborough even though Bradford had
happened."
P3, F3 and S4 all identified that the high profile of the Taylor Report had made the
task of justifying ground improvement expenditure easier to justify to their
Directors.
As table 6.1 indicates, the post Hillsborough period has seen the development
of a representative bureaucracy in some cases. However, the persistence of the
mock and punishment-centred bureaucracies is an indicator of the absence of
Indulgency
Pattern
Mock	 P2 "the advisory conunittee don't do anything really, they want to come
Bureaucracy	 along and sit in the director's box and watch the match."
S2 "there are some daft documents that come out of the health and safety
and FLA."
S4 "I think, I feel at times they nit-pick to be honest"(the FLA)
Ti "we didn't prepare a plan for the FLA, it would have been either a
_____________	 blank piece of paper or fiction."
Punishment-	 P4 "We do feel that at times we're being dictated to, but it has been
centred	 necessary."
Bureaucracy F3 - "the FLA sticks rigidly to his guidelines and if you don't comply they
can reduce your capacity... so we have always done exactly what was
required, before the Taylor Report there was leeway with all Local
Authorities but the Green Guide was re written and you then had hardly
any leeway, so Local Authorities went in with a big stick and said that
they would not relicense you."
Tl "the Green Guide, this is the problem, is the bible or gospel."
T2 "safety team meeting, everyone is so nervous that they're just trying to
ensure that if the shit hits the fan they are not brought to account."
Representative	 P3 "I'm a member of the safety team, if something goes wrong we are all
Bureaucracy	 losers."
F3"asfarasoursafetycommitteeisconcernedthereislotsof dialogue."
Table 6.1:
	
Patterns of Behaviour 1989 - 97
significant cultural changes within the industry. Whilst the logic of the FLA's
strategy or persuasion rather than coercion, makes some sense, given the
demonstrated reluctance of football Clubs to change, such an approach must be
questioned. It should be noted that the FLA has no jurisdiction in Scotland
226
although Local Authorities play a key role in licensing sports stadia. This explains
the absence of comments from Scotland in table 6.1.
Although two Scottish respondents referred to their Local Authorities, the data
suggested that stadia safety was left to the Club and the police to organise. Sd
reported that during an event:
"A police officer will be match commander. The police want to have the fmal
say."
SC2 described the match control room as the 'police control room' suggesting that
whilst the Club and police work together the latter agency takes the lead. As table
6.2 illustrates, the police are still responsible for the control of public events at
football stadia in Scotland, in marked contrast to developments within England and
Wales. Indeed for England and Wales the transfer of responsibility for matchday
control has passed towards the Club's own safety officers, whether individually or
in partnership with the police. The high proportion of safety officers given
matchday control in the Premiership, indicates the ability of these Clubs to employ
full time
Police	 Safety	 Joint
_______ _______ Officer	 Effort
Premier	 2	 10	 5
First	 7	 1	 10
Second	 2	 3	 7
Third2	 9	 __________
Scottish	 14	 0	 0
Total	 27	 23	 23
%	 ________ ________ ________
Table 6.2: Who is in Charge of Matchday Operations?
officials who enjoy the confidence of the police. The high figure for the Third
Division may be indicative of the perception that there is a lower risk of problems
with a smaller crowd; a dangerous assumption as this thesis has demonstrated.
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In summary, the post Hillsborough period has elements of the various patterns
identified by Gouldner (1954). There is evidence to suggest that there has been a
switch from the indulgency pattern, although our own observations of operational
practices and those included in a recent documentary (Laybrun 1994) indicated that
this pattern has not been eradicated. There is real evidence that a punishment-
centred approach is forcing changes, although there have been concerns expressed
that fear has led to a literal interpretation of the rules and regulations. 	 P4's
comments suggested conflict with the regulators but an acceptance that their actions
had been necessary. There is less evidence in support of the development of a
representative bureaucracy whereby all parties see the benefits of the rules. The
link between these two approaches may provide a key influence on organisational
behaviour. For example, punishment-centred bureaucracies appeared exclusively
where the task for liaison with the safety committee was delegated to an individual
without board status. In these instances, the role of the Club representative might
be seen as to ensure minimum expenditure and to comply with the minimum
standards required. Even P3 reported that the chairman quibbled over the requests
or decision of the safety committee. Where the chairman or other board member
was involved with the safety committee there appeared to be a greater chance of
dialogue.
6.2.1	 Relations Between Football Clubs And Regulatory Bodies
The development of relations between football Clubs and regulatory
authorities has passed through a number of distinct phases. Most significant has
been the persistence of the 'indulgency pattern' in which there appears to have been
little effective regulation and little action on the part of Clubs. The 1975 Act
provided a framework for regulation and appears to have had some limited
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influence on those designated Clubs, but the fact that some twenty seven Clubs
were subjected to closures following the Bradford Fire suggests that neither
regulators nor regulated had worked as required. The Hilisborough Disaster and
subsequent Taylor report appear to have acted as catalysts to a more structured
response on the part of regulators and regulated, and the development from an
indulgency pattern and mock bureaucratic approach to a punishment-centred modus
operandi. The development of a representative bureaucracy suggested by some
respondents, indicates that cultural change is partially underway.
The analysis of regulation in the football industry since 1945 indicates the
failure of legislators to change attitudes and behaviour. The persistence of the
indulgency pattern reflects the lack of resources and 'clout' of regulators. Smith &
Tombs' (1995) observations of the chemical industry suggest that this problem is
not confmed to the football industry alone. Since 1989 there has been some
evidence of a developing representative bureaucracy. The negative attitude of many
Clubs towards their supporters, however, indicates that they are unlikely to be
invited to participate in decision making concerning hazards which Smith & Tombs
(1995) identified as the fourth strand of a strategy to improve regulatory
compliance.
There is an important link between the response of the industry to regulation
and the nature of regulation. Many Clubs identified compliance as an end in itself.
Describing the Green Guide as 'bible or gospel' indicates that those Clubs are
focused upon incident specific learning rather than seeking for isomorphic lessons
(Toft & Reynolds 1992). Legislation has been criticised (see for example
Mintzberg 1983) for setting a lowest common denominator standard of behaviour
rather than promoting excellent standards. Within such a context regulation may
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actually stifle organisational learning and legitimise efforts that fall well below that
which is required, a case of always shutting 'the stable door after the horse has
bolted.'
In all four cases there was evidence of crisis incubation with failures of
hindsight, and a failure to consider the possibility of crisis amplification by those who
were responsible for managing the stadia (see table 6.3).. There were a number of
common features if the incidents and the period preceding them are examined at an
appropriate systems level. Table 6.3 highlights the failures of hindsight pertaining to
each incident.
Table 6.3: Football Stadium Disasters and Failures of Hindsight
Are warning signs being missed now? The evidence of the continuation of smaller
incidents suggests that this may be the case. However, are these incidents merely the
tailing off of a phenomenon that is now largely under control? Are the cultures of
individual Clubs within the industry now crisis prepared? The thesis now moves onto
an analysis of the culture of the industry, beginning with the nature of Local Authority
regulation in the post Hilisborough period.
6.3 Local Authority Regulatory Patterns 1989-97
From the data collected concerning Local Authorities with responsibility for
regulating safety management inside designated stadia, two basic patterns of
behaviour emerged. First, one group of Local Authorities described a
confrontational, punishment-centred approach with the Club officials with whom
they dealt. The second pattern indicated a more consensual or representative
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approach between the various agencies on the Safety Advisory Group (SAG) and
Club officials.
6.3.1	 Punishment-centred Local Authorities
This pattern was characterised by the use of punitive measures in the form of
enforcement or prohibition notices to ensure conformity with the Green Guide. For
example, LA 3, an Environmental Health Department, stated that they avoided
consensus on the Safety Advisory Group (SAG) because: "We didn't want the
group to think that it was a voting group" (LA 3). LA 3 also reported that the
approach adopted, was based upon the system used for Environmental Health's
inspection processes for health and safety and food hygiene. Other Local
Authorities that had delegated responsibility for stadium safety to an enforcement
department (LA 5, LA 10, LA 13) also identified the use of coercive methods as a
key means of achieving conformity with the Green Guide. In the cases of LA's 3, 5
and 10 a number of examples were given where enforcement notices had actually
been served or a written fmal warning issued, demonstrating the representativeness
of these anecdotes to the full interviews. Additionally, the tone of these interviews
indicated an adversarial character in the relationship between Clubs and Local
Authorities. Of these four respondents only one (LA 13), suggested that they
attempted to reach consensus in the first instance. The response of the Clubs in two
cases appears to have been very negative, with LA's 3 and 10 reporting that the
Club's did not attend SAG meetings. For LA 5 there were only two SAG meetings
per year. This first pattern of behaviour appears to fit closely with the routine
enforcement work of the host departments. An explanation supported by LA 3 who
observed:
231
"We've had to resort to prohibition notices on three occasions, a style that we've
adopted from our Environmental Health work." (LA 3)
and LA 10
"We try to persuade but with our background in prosecution we will take them to
court if necessary." (LA 10)
Whilst enforcement is likely to achieve conformity with written standards it is less
likely to achieve cultural change. The lack of participation of the Clubs in
discussing safety matters will also provide a block on the transfer of relevant
knowledge, making cultural change and organisational learning less likely.
6.3.2	 Consensual Approach: Local Authorities
The second pattern that emerged was more consensual in approach. This does
not necessarily mean that coercion was not used, as the following comment by LA
1 suggests (the only respondent from an 'enforcement department in this group):
"I aim to use goodwill and I try to avoid laying the law down but the Club has to
know that if necessary these rules will be imposed" (LA 1)
LA 6 referred to the SAG as the team stating that
"The team works well. From time to time it raises the hackles of some people
but it is a very useful way of bringing safety issues to the Club's attention - the
Club are very responsible and genuinely want to get it right" (LA 6)
Other respondents in this group also used the word team to describe the SAG, (LA
2, LA 6, LA 8, LA 9, LA 12, LA 13) indicating a positive working relationship
between the various agencies and Clubs that belong to it. Five of the respondents
were keen to emphasise that despite the team relationship there were no cosy
arrangements and there had been heated debates and disagreements as LA 6's
'raising the hackles' suggests. The favoured means of compelling action was
through manipulation of the so called '5' or Safety factor. Briefly the S factor is
produced by the regulatory agency as an assessment of safety management practice.
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It is used to weight the technically derived stand or terrace capacity, from 100% to
zero. Thus the Local Authority can determine the safe, maximum capacity of any
part of a stadium, taking into consideration the quality of safety management
practices 1 . It is less confrontational than enforcement notices because it is derived
from a recommendation of the Local Authority that is discussed at SAG where it
can be explained in detail to the relevant Club. LA 2 identified that they aimed to
develop the safety management side through the application of the S multiplier, to
draw to the attention of Club directors the importance of a safety culture.
The consensual approach is founded on the operation of the SAG as a team.
However, bearing in mind the reluctance of Clubs to invest in physical
infrastructure and safety management, it is not without teeth. It differs from the
punishment-centred approach in its emphasis upon discussion and persuasion. The
regular attendance of all Clubs to these SAG meetings provides an indication of its
greater success in maintaining the awareness of Club executives with regard to
safety management.
In summary, it is difficult to be certain whether the intransigence of the Club
or punishment-centred approach comes first. However, the correlation between the
types of department (Environmental Health, Legal Services and Trading Standards)
and their routine practices and procedures suggests that an adversarial approach is
not as successful as a consensual approach in achieving change. Analysis of the
Clubs did not provide any evidence that the four punishment-centred Local
Authorities had to deal with particularly poor safety practice.
Safety Management practices refer to elements including the quality of stewards recruited, their
training, the attitudes of the Club towards equipping them, etc.
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The obvious commitment of the Local Authorities to the promotion of higher
standards, despite their different methods, does represent a significant change from
the pre 1989 period in which regulatory action appears to have been the exception
rather than the norm. The reference to manipulation of the S factor, (to encourage
higher standards in areas such as the quality of stewarding), is evidence of a shift
from a purely technically focused approach to improving stadium safety and is thus
indicative of a significant cultural change. However, one weakness identified by
seven respondents concerned their lack of expertise in all the areas relevant to
stadium safety management. A lack of relevant training or other support facility
was identified as the major cause of this weakness. This raises questions about the
'pigeon holing' of responsibility for stadium safety with one group of 'experts'
ignoring the necessity for input from a variety of disciplines.
In conclusion, the activities of Local Authorities appear to provide a powerful
push on football Clubs to raise standards. This thesis now turns to an analysis of a
survey of football Club safety officers.
6.3 Statistical Data Analysis Methodology
The purpose of the survey of football safety officers was twofold. First, it
sought to elicit specific information regarding safety management systems before
and after the Taylor Report. Second, it aimed to identify the levels of crisis
preparedness within the football industry by examining the attitudes of respondents
to a number of statements. The primary source for the second part of the Football
Safety Officers' questionnaire was Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) interview survey
of 410 companies in the United States, Canada and France. The results of this
analysis were used to formulate a diagnostic questionnaire to be used to help assess
the proneness of organisations to crisis. That is, the questions included within the
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diagnostic tool were derived directly from the responses of interviewees. Pauchant
& Mitroff (1988, 1992a) reported that the diagnostic questionnaire was developed
to provide indicators of the seven defence mechanisms and groups of
rationalisations in a format relevant to crisis management. This diagnostic tool was,
therefore, well grounded empirically. Fifteen statements (see table 6.4) were
selected and reworded for a UK, football industry audience. These fifteen
statements were selected to provide coverage of the seven defence mechanisms and
the four groups of faulty rationalisations identified in the source questionnaire. Four
additional variables were added as indicators of the eighth defence mechanism
identified in this study (i.e. displacement).
The selection of individual variables was constrained by the need to cover the
'dimensions' identified by Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992a) and the ratio of five
cases to each variable recommended by Gorsuch 1983 and Hair et al 1984. Bryrnan
(1997) observed that as a minimum there should be more cases than variables but
that the lower the ratio between the two, the lower the confidence in the results.
With a total target population of 113 (112 soon after dissemination of the survey)
even a very high response rate would only just meet this particular criteria.
However, this sample represents 65.5% of the total population of professional
football Clubs, providing greater confidence in replicating the study and results than
if it represented a smaller proportion of the total population as so many samples do.
Hair et al (1984) suggest a stricter interpretation of results when smaller samples are
employed, illustrating that despite the usual advice, that factor analysis can be used
on smaller samples. Given these observations and potential weaknesses of this
study, more stringent criteria were used for the selection of factors to be further
examined.
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There have been some criticisms of the 'simplistic' use of factor analysis.
Gould (1988) argued that even positive correlations and a strong first principal
component can not be reified as a 'thing' without convincing, independent
information beyond the fact of the correlations themselves. Bearing this criticism in
mind, the context for the use of factor analysis in this study was to triangulate the
data within an essentially qualitative methodology. Although superficially the use
of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis techniques differ,
grounded theory and factor analysis have much in common. Both are a means of
data reduction. In both instances the design of the instruments to collect the data
plays an important role in determining the fmal factors or categories identified. The
design of this whole research project played a vital role here in counteracting the
potential for the final results to be simply fitted around the analytical framework.
Grounded theory, as explained in Chapter 3, was deliberately used in a creative way
to avoid reaching conclusions prematurely. Additionally, the combination of
elements of Pauchant & Mitrofi's (1992a) questionnaire with elements emerging
from the semi structured interview data was used to ensure that this study drew not
only upon the available literature but from material collected within the industry.
A pilot of the questionnaire with five Club executives indicated that a full
version of the questionnaire (100 questions) would be unacceptable and unlikely to
be returned by safety officers. A further difference from Pauchant & Mitroff
(1988,1992a) was that their questionnaire dealt with all types of crises whereas the
context for this study was 'safety management,' and inevitably respondents focused
upon their efforts to prevent crowd disasters. The evidence of this survey questions
Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) implicit hypothesis regarding the structure of
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Football Safety Officers	 Pauchant & Mitroff(l992a)	 Onion Model
Questionnaire
Q45	 We can handle any crowd	 We can handle any crisis 	 Level
_____________	 incident	 ______________________________ (grandiosity)
Q46	 A major tragedy cannot	 This will not happen to us	 Level 1
____________	 happen in our ground 	 ___________________________ (denial)
Q47	 We now do enough in safety	 We do enough already 	 Level 1
_____________	 management	 ____________________________ (disavowal)
Q48	 Disasters just happen we	 Crises happen by fatality; we Level 1 (Fate)
_____________ cannot prepare for them	 cannot prepare for them
Q49	 Only badly managed Clubs	 Only bad companies have Level
______________	 have crises	 crises	 (intellectualisation)
Q50	 Crises are usually caused by 	 Crises happen by the Level 1
the mistakes of a few people 	 wrongdoing of a few rotten (splitting)
____________ _____________________________ apples
	 __________________
Q51	 A crisis has one or two main	 A crisis always has one or Level 1
causes	 two major causes	 (splitting)
Q52	 We do not have time to fully	 We do not have the time	 Level 2,Group 3.
_____________	 prepare_for crises	 ______________________________ ___________________
Q53	 Well managed Clubs do not	 Excellent, well managed Level 2, Group 1
have crises	 companies do not have crises
Q54	 Extensive Crisis Management	 Crisis management or crisis Level 2, Group 1
_____________	 is a luxury	 prevention is a luxury	 __________________
Q55	 If a major crisis happens	 If a crisis happens, someone Level 2, Group 2
someone else will rescue us	 else will rescue us.
Q56	 Every disaster is so different 	 Each crisis is so unique that it Level 2,Group 3.
that it is impossible to	 is impossible to prepare for
_____________	 prepare_for_it	 ______________________________ ___________________
Q57	 In a crisis our contingency	 In a crisis situation we just Level 2,Group 4.
plans will see us through	 need to refer to the
emergency procedures we've
____________ ____________________________ 	 laid_down	 __________________
Q58	 We will be able to react to a 	 We are tough enough to be Level 2,Group 4.
crisis in a calm and positive	 able to react in an objective
manner	 and rational manner
Q59	 Our communications systems	 We are a team that will Level 2, Group 4
are sufficient to deal with a
	
function well in a crisis
_____________	 major incident
Q60	 The police are responsible for 	 Level 1
_____________	 public safety.	 ______________________________ (displacement)
Q61	 The police should, normally, 	 Level 1
have no role within a football 	 (non-displacement)
____________	 ground.	 ____________________________ __________________
Q62	 Hillsborough was terrible but	 Displacement	 Level 1
current regulations are too	 (displacement)
muchof a burden.	 ____________________________ __________________
Q66	 The enforcement bodies	 Displacement	 Level 1
expect too much from	 (displacement)
_____________ football_Clubs 	 ______________________________ ___________________
Key: Table 6.4 Football Safety Officers' Attitudinal Questions
Level 2, Group 1 Properties of the Organisation
	 Level 2, Group 2 Properties of the Environment
Level 2, Group 3 Properties of Crises themselves
	 Level 2, Group 4 Properties of prior crisis
management efforts themselves
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organisational culture and the variables which underpin it. Table 6.4 identifies the
questions that were included in our survey and includes the Pauchant & Mitroff
statement upon which each was modelled.
When responses were received they were coded and entered onto the statistical
package SPSS for Windows 95. Initially 1 was entered for strongly agree, 2 for
Level 1
	 Level 2	 Eigenvalue	 %	 Variance
___________ _________________ _________________ ______________ explained
Pre-	 Q48,	 Q49,	 Q53,	 Q54,	 3.43	 18%
Factor1	 Q52,	 Q55, Q56	 ______________ ____________________
Pre-	 Q45, Q46,	 Q57,	 Q58,	 2.93	 15.4%
Factor2 __________________ Q59,
	 ______________ _____________________
Pre-	 Q50,	 Q51,	 1.93	 10.2%
Factor3	 (Q66)	 ___________________ _______________ ______________________
Pre-	 Q61, Q62,	 1.46	 7.7%
Factor_4 __________________ __________________ ______________ _____________________
Pre-	 Q60	 1.32	 7.0%
Factor_5 ___________________ ___________________ _______________ ______________________
Pre-	 Q58	 1.08	 5.7%
Factor_6 __________________ __________________ ______________ _____________________
Pre-	 Q47	 1.01	 5.3%
Factor_7 __________________ __________________ ______________ _____________________
Table 6.5 Preliminary Factors (variables in brackets indicate negative loadings)
agree, 3 for don't know, 4 for strongly disagree and 5 for strongly disagree. This
was reversed for q48 which was set up differently from the other variables. R factor
analysis was used to identify the latent factors within the data set. Seven factors had
eigen values> 1.0., indicating that each explained more of the variance in the data
than an individual variable (see table 6.5). Three factors explained more than 10
percent, each, of the variance. The other four explained more than 5 percent of the
variance. These pre-factors are shown in table 6.5.
As a second stage, and in order to increase their 'interpretability', the factors
were rotated orthogonally. The purpose of orthogonal rotation is to maximise the
heterogeneity of factors whilst maximising homogeneity of variables within each
factor (Hair et a! 1984, Bryman 1997), rather like the process of market
segmentation. The particular method adopted was a varimax rotation.
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Given the ratio of 73 responses to 19 variables it was decided to exclude from
the rotation those factors which had an eigen value below 1.25, given the earlier
comments regarding the sample size and ratio of cases to variables. Within the
factor analysis dialogue boxes of SPSS these parameters were set and varimax
rotation undertaken. The factor-variable loadings are shown in table 6.6.
Given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of this research the
guidelines for significant factor loadings at a 0.05 significance level, based upon
sample sizes were used as guidance. With a sample size of 74 a factor loading of
65 is deemed to be significant (Hair et al 1984). Koutsoyiannis (1983) using the
Burt-Banks test reported that loadings in excess of .302 (1% level, two tailed)
should be deemed significant, taking into account the sample size and the number
of variables. Accordingly, variables above and approaching 0.5 were included in
the identification of factors suggesting a more rigorous standard than that suggested
by Koutsoyiannis (1983) and approaching that recommended by Hair et al (1984).
Variable	 Factor 1
	
Factor 2	 Factor 3	 Factor 4	 Factor 5
Q45	 .01783	 .78545	 .11535	 .09184	 .08579
Q46	 .40399	 .53879	 -.01511	 .26286	 -.13240
Q47	 -.11232	 -.40660	 .27547	 -.32699	 -.00274
Q48	 .54830	 .17444	 .27053	 .01453	 -.08639
Q49	 .11537	 .13840	 .75596	 .15787	 -.15976
Q50	 -.00446	 .07204	 .20760	 .70871	 .11250
Q51	 -.08521	 .25039	 .20089	 .68423	 .30873
Q52	 .54322	 -.40356	 .25091	 .01861	 .11986
Q53	 .10910	 .04074	 .78640	 .07218	 -.05179
Q54	 .31337	 -.30056	 .51612	 .27060	 .07492
Q55	 .56223	 -.34208	 .46220	 .09522	 -.13205
Q56	 .75506	 -.03229	 .23645	 -.01899	 .24172
Q57	 -.04756	 .75719	 .07283	 -.07250	 .16917
Q58	 -.23100	 .37838	 -.21136	 .00337	 .45811
Q59	 .10655	 .40147	 -.32474	 .08002	 .59923
Q60	 .13110	 -.07933	 .00528	 .07698	 .78563
Q61	 .11290	 -.15113	 .00685	 .66587	 -.43826
Q62	 .72316	 -.06752	 -.22901	 .25928	 -.19947
Q66	 .71053	 .24497	 .01022	 -.18363	 .13066
Table 6.6
	 Rotated Factors (Varimax)
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Given the concerns of some authors (see Hair et a! 1984, Rendall 1997)
regarding the use of factor analysis with ordinal (as opposed to interval) data two
procedures were used to check that the results shared some of the properties of
interval data. First, the original scores of 1,2,3,4, and 5 were replaced with
+2,+1,O,-1,-2 to check that an alternative, consistent, numbering system did not
alter the factors identified. Although specific loadings altered slightly the same
seven factors were identified with the same contributory variables. Second, the
scores were reversed (1 to 5, 2 to 4 and vice versa). Although the resulting matrix
and loadings differed in the specific detail, the same factors emerged providing
greater confidence in the suitability of this approach for this study. It should be
noted that the use of factor analysis was pioneered in the social sciences,
particularly by psychologists in the early Twentieth Century (Gould 1988). There is
therefore, a long tradition of the use of the technique with ordinal data.
Additionally, the use of factor analysis in this study has complemented the
extensive qualitative data collection. Factor analysis offers an opportunity for
triangulation. This thesis now turns to a discussion of each of the five factors
drawing upon data collected from the interviews, participant observation and
documentary sources, to ensure that they are interpreted within a context of rich
data.
6.4 The Five Factors
The discussion of organisational culture in Chapter 2 highlighted the
consensus amongst many researchers that it is a complex, multi-level phenomenon.
The crisis management and high reliability organisation literatures emphasise
culture's key role in binding together the other elements of organisation. In the
analytical framework (figure 2.1) it stands alongside communications, structure and
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technical system elements. Pauchant & Mitroff's (1988, 1992a) Onion Model
shares many features with the most influential models of organisational culture and
behaviour (see Schein 1985, Hofstede 1990, Trompenaars 1993 and Hampden-
Turner 1990 for example).
The five factors identified from this study suggest that the distinction between
the levels of culture (or factors as Pauchant & Mitroff describe them) are not as they
hypothesised. Pauchant and Mitroff (1988) and Mitroff et al (1989) have emphasised
the importance of culture in determining the proneness of organisations to crisis
illustrated by their Onion Model of Crisis Management (see Chapter 2), which shows
the relationships between organisational culture, managerial beliefs and structure and
behaviour (realised strategy):
"In actuality, there is an extreme overlap and interpenetration between the various
factors that compose the levels such that it is extremely difficult to say precisely
which circles ... are true subsets of which. (p273)
At the innermost, core level, are the fundamental beliefs that influence the way
in which organisation or individuals process information collected for the decision
making process. Four of the five factors from this study incorporated variable
statements from both levels 1 and 2. Only factor 5 consists solely of level 1
variable statements. A model depicting concentric circles does not appear to reflect
the complexity of the phenomenon observed. A net may better depict the
relationships between these two levels. This is an area for further research and
beyond the scope of this thesis which now turns to a consideration of the three main
factors identified.
6.4.1	 Factor 1: Fatalism: Nothing We Do Will Matter!
It should be emphasised that this was the most important factor to emerge
from the analysis. The highest loading for this factor was the variable-statement,
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"Every disaster is so different that it is impossible to prepare for". The other
statements that loaded on this factor concerned the attitudes concerning the nature
of crises and the value of making preparations for them. The uniqueness of each
crisis incident, their randomness or fate were key variable-statements. Additionally,
two variable statements linked to displacement and concerning specifically the
extent of regulation were linked, reflecting the view that fate cannot be legislated
away. If it is going to happen then there is nothing we can do to prevent it. As P3
stated:
"That's what disasters are, that's what accidents are, the unknown happening
without warning."
Suffering a disaster may be a lottery no Club wants to win but is entered for
automatically. The basic defence mechanism is fate leading to the faulty
rationalisations that given the uniqueness of crises, we cannot prepare for them.
In the earlier discussion concerning the nature of the stadia disasters it was
argued that they resulted from socio-technical failures. If this is the case then there
Level	 Rotated
	
_________________________ _______________ Loading	 _______________
Q48	 Disasters just happen we	 Level 1 Fate	 .54830
- cannot prepare for them	 ________________ ________________ ________________
Q52	 We do not have time to fully	 Level 1 Time	 .54322
prepare_for crises	 _________________ _________________ __________________
Q55	 If a major crisis happens	 Level 2 Group	 .56223
someoneelse will rescue us 	 2.	 _________________ __________________
Q56	 Every disaster is so different 	 Level 2 Group	 .75506
that it is impossible to	 3.
- prepare for it	 _________________ _________________ __________________
Q62	 Hillsborough was terrible but 	 Level	 1	 .72316
current regulations are too 	 displacement
much ofaburden
Q66	 The enforcement bodies	 Level	 1	 .7 1503
expect too much from Clubs
	
displacement	 ________________ ________________
Table 6.7	 Factor 1: Variable Loadings
is a real opportunity for learning from them, at an appropriate level. Real learning
requires individuals to rise above the specific detail and identif r
 lessons at an
242
appropriate level of generality, as Toft & Reynold's (1992) isomorphic learning
suggests. This factor is a vital indicator of the culture in which organisational
learning takes place. First, a fatalistic view of the world undermines the practice of
safety management. 'If it is going to happen, it is going to happen, there is nothing
we can do. Second, the belief that each crisis is unique questions the value of
analysing such failures, as it suggests that nothing of value can be learnt. A high
score on this factor reflects the presence of powerful restraints upon organisational
learning from crisis. An example of this 'fatalistic view' and a concern regarding
regulation emerged from the interview data.
The capacities of football stadia has been significantly reduced during the last
twenty years, well within the memory of many spectators and administrators.
Memories of large, well behaved crowds were identified by a number of interview-
respondents. These examples were used to indicate that current arrangements were
too strict. S3 for example observed
"We would all love to see the days when you look back, say at Wembley when
they used to have those vast crowds, when there were no restrictions and
everyone was good and sat quietly at the edge of the pitch and crossed legs, and
kids at the front and no cages, no barriers, no anything."
Implicit in this statement is that 'if everyone were good;' then there would be no
need for barriers and fences. F2 looked back to when the Kop held some 22,000
'safely' compared to only 6,000 in 1994, implying that current restrictions were too
severe. S2 spoke of pressure from the directors who could remember a crowd of
50,000 without any problems and questioned the need to reduce the stadium
capacity to below 20,000. P4 remembered a crowd of 51,000 (with 30,000 the
current capacity of the whole ground) on one terrace, but of course 'They were
better behaved then', repeating the perceived link between behaviour and current
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'safety measures'. These rosy reminiscences highlighted an overriding view that
much of the blame for stadium incidents could be placed on poor crowd behaviour.
It is worth repeating that there was no suggestion of poor behaviour as contributory
causes of either the Ibrox of Bradford disasters and its role in the Hilisborough
disaster has been considered at length in Chapter 5.
If thousands of spectators could crowd onto a terrace, with minimal
supervision and protection quite safely for many years then it follows that many
incidents were random happenings. A concentration of incidents in the 1 980s lead
to a search for a scapegoat, the poorly behaved spectator. The illusion of large
crowds spectating safely in the first three quarters of this century is however, a
fallacy. The evidence in support of this statement comes from the catalogue of
incidents identified in table 1.1 and from a variety of anecdotal sources. The failure
to routinely collect accident statistics from football matches means that a full
picture can never be portrayed. Bale (1993) reported on the regular injuries to
Liverpool spectators in the swaying and pushing on the Kop.
As table 6.8 illustrates, safety officer responses were predominantly in the
safety and question mark zones, with 2 in the danger zone. These scores were
computed by adding up respondents' scores on a 1 to 5 scale from strongly disagree
to strongly agree. The safety zone includes those respondents with a total score for
the six variable-statements of between 6 and 12. That is, they indicated
disagreement with the statements. The question mark zone consisted of scores that
indicated some element of uncertainty or agreement with the six statements. The
danger zone indicated agreement and strong agreement with the statements. This
method was used in our analysis of each of the five factors.
244
Safety Zone	 Question Mark	 Danger Zone
____________________	 (6 - 12)	 (13 - 20)	 (21 - 30)
Premier Division	 14	 3	 0
First Division	 11	 7	 1
Second Division	 7	 5	 0
Third Division	 5	 7	 0
Scottish Premier &	 7	 5	 2
FirstDivision	 ______________________ _____________________ _____________________
Total	 44 (59.5%)	 27 (36.5%)	 3 (4.1%)
Table 6.8:	 Factor 1: Nature of Cnses and Crisis Preparations
The results of the questionnaire data provided a contrast with the interview
data. A seemingly interesting anomaly was 'thrown up' by the triangulated data.
Table 6.8 indicates a less crisis prone profile than had been expected from the
interview data. A plausible explanation for this is that the questionnaire data reports
the attitudes of safety officers, a large percentage of whom were former police and
fire officers. The interviews were conducted with Club executives, who combined
a general responsibility for safety with many other administrative tasks.
This contrast suggests that there may be conflict within football Clubs
regarding safety management. It indicates that those charged with the task of safety
management are faced with some resistance to the introduction of new measures.
Our earlier report of comments regarding the numbers of stewards and payment of
travel costs lend support to this argument. Given this conflict within Clubs the
presence of forty percent of respondents with scores placed in the question mark or
danger zones demonstrates that a full cultural readjustment has not yet taken place
amongst those charged with the task of championing safety management. It
suggests that little cultural readjustment with regard to factor 1; if the Club as an
organisation is the level of analysis (as opposed to the safety officer) then the figure
of 60% represents an optimistic assessment.
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This view is supported by the interview data in which a marked inability to
consider alternative forms of crises was noted. One exception stood out. P3
commented:
"I'd hate to think that there is any Club in the country who will now say, well
we've done everything Justice Taylor has recommended and we're OK now,
because I don't think you can ever be in that situation... I mean I don't know at
three o'clock or quarter past three on a Saturday afternoon whether a tanker is
suddenly going to come along **** Road and suddenly go through the boundary
wall and explode, there are so many outside influences ."
continuing:
"all I can do is to try and train everybody, including myself that the majority of
things we can do in a major incident scenario would be instinctive"
A prevailing view within the industry, expressed in the interview data, was that
crises were unique incidents, thereby denying the underlying importance of
systemic factors which have been identified as key within the crisis management
literature (See for example, Perrow 1984, Shrivastava 1987, Pauchant & Mitroff
1989, Smith 1 990a). Instead there has been a focus upon incident specific learning,
based in part as we have seen upon the official regulatory response to issues. Thus,
despite citing personal experiences of previous stadium fires F4 and Si described
the Bradford Fire as a freak accident. Explanations offered for the Bradford arid
Hillsborough disasters frequently revolved around simple cause and effect with a
particular focus on the problems on the day, rather than a consideration of how the
potential for crisis had developed over a long period before the incidents (See table
5.6, 6.9).
Table 6.9 summarises interview-respondents' views concerning the main
causes of the Hillsborough tragedy and of those groups held to have primary
responsibility. The decision rules used to categorise the responses were based on the
assessment offered by respondents. Clearly, much of the richness of the data is lost
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in such a table. The problem is to balance the need for summary with the need to
reflect the views of respondents. There are clear dangers of including only
'selective' statements that reflect the researcher's bias rather than the respondents'
perceptions. To reduce such bias once the table had been first drafted interview
data were re-examined to identify evidence contrary to that included within the
table. Few revisions were necessary given the firm, and apparently fixed views of
respondents.
A number of key themes from the data emerged. First respondents differed in
their view of the causes of the Hilisborough tragedy with regard to whether they
were complex or simple (see factor 5). For example P4 and S4 were unequivocal in
their identification of supporter behaviour as the primary cause. Hooliganism was
identified as one of the three basic explanations for the stadia disasters despite the
evidence to the contrary. Similarly F3 accused the police of breaking the 'cardinal
rule' and thus identified a simple explanation for the tragedy. Other respondents
cited more complex causes, P3, F4, and T 4 for example. Typically, where
complex causes were identified less equivocal responses were made. P3 uses
'perhaps' , F4 and T3 begin their statements with 'I think'. Linked to their
identification of causes were the allocation of responsibility. For P4 and S4
supporters were to blame, for F3 the police were held to be responsible. P1 placed
responsibility with the Local Authority for not identifying the problem, providing
further evidence of 'displacement'. Contrastingly, where respondents identified
complex causes, responsibility was deemed to be shared between the various
agencies and stakeholder groups involved. However, there was one notable
omission from all responses. No one indicated that the owners of the ground,
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Primaxy Cause	 Primaiy Responsibility
Club	 Ground Hooligans Operational 	 Ill luck	 Local	 Police All	 Supporters
Layout	 failures	 Authority	 agencies
______ ________ _________ ___________ ________ _________ ______ involved __________
P1
P2_________ __________ _____________ _________ __________ _______ _________ ___________
3	 **	 **
p4
Fl	 *
F2	 ***	 *	 *
F3	 ***
F4	 **	 **	 **	 **	 **
Si	 **	 **	 **	 **	 **	 **
S2	 ***	 ***
S3 -	 	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
S4	 ***
11	 **	 **	 **	 **
12	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
T3	 *	 **	 **	 **
14	 **	 **	 **	 **
Table 6.9: Summary 01 views or responoents on causes and responsrninty br 1-llllsDorougn tragedy
" Sole or primary cause	 ***	 One group with prime responsibility
** Secondary or one of a no. of key factors 	 **	 Balance of responsibility
*	 Contributory	 *	 Contributory (fleeting mention)
Sheffield Wednesday, contributed to the causes of the disaster or that they had any
responsibility for the incident. In June 1996 the Sheffield Wednesday Football
Club, its structural engineers and the South Yorkshire Police settled out of court
claims made by police officers who had been at the Hilisborough Tragedy
(Guardian 5/6/96). Even where complex causes were identified, responsibility was
placed with a combination of police, government, Local Authority and supporters.
Only T3 's general statement about the failures of everybody concerned with the
match organisation might be interpreted as placing some of the responsibility with
the stadium owners.
This evidence supports the view that many key executives within the industry
persist in the view that crises are simply 'acts of God' or that they have simple
causes. Within the literature it has been suggested that such views will lead to a
focus on technical solutions to problems (Canter et a! 1989, Smith 1990a, Pauchant
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& Mitroff 1 992a, Toft & Reynolds 1992) rather than a system wide review. This
view may be reinforced by the Local Authorities which have responsibility for
ensuring conformity with the Green Guide. Data collected from thirteen Local
Authority respondents indicated an ongoing emphasis upon technical issues. Only
one Local Authority questioned the status of the Green Guide stating:
"Its just a guide. It recommends that an 1100mm barrier be erected around
vomitories. We had one that was in the middle of a seating area and if we'd
gone by the guide we'd have obscured the view of spectators. So we reclassified
it as a stairway and had it at 900mm so that sitting spectators can see over it.(LA
2)
Although many identified the importance of developing a safety culture there was
an acknowledgement that this would be difficult to achieve. Therefore, the first
objective for many Local Authorities was to ensure that football stadia met the
standards identified in the Green Guide.
6.4.2	 Factor 2: Complacency: Self Inflated Organisations
Where factor 1 indicated the helplessness of Clubs in the face of disasters,
factor 2 indicates a more optimistic assessment of a Club's ability to deal with crisis
incidents. This 'optimism' has been labelled 'complacency' because it reflects a
high degree of self satisfaction, even smugness (q45, q46, q47).	 Variable-
statement 57 suggests a high confidence in the value of contingency plans at times
of crisis.
The variables that load upon this factor concern an assessment of how well
respondents believed their efforts have either reduced the risk of crisis incidents
occurring or enhanced their ability to deal with them. At level 1 the beliefs that any
crowd incident can be dealt with (q45) and a major tragedy cannot happen here
(q46) reflect the grandiosity and denial defence mechanisms respectively.
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____________________________	
Level	 _________________ _________________
Q45	 We can handle any crowd	 1 grandiosity	 .78545
incident____________________ ____________________ ____________________
Q46	 A major tragedy cannot 	 1 denial	 .53879
happenin our ground	 ________________ ________________ ________________
Q47	 We now do enough in safety	 1 disavowal	 -.40660
management________________ ________________ ________________
Q57	 In a crisis our contingency	 2 properties of	 .757 19
planswill see us through	 cm efforts	 ________________ ________________
Table 6.10	 Factor 2: Variable Loadings
AsF1 stated:
"I suppose that when you assess the odds then it won't happen, you know the
number of disasters when you consider the number of football matches, its one
of the safest past times isn't it, it really is low low odds"
These beliefs are closely correlated with the rationalisation that the organisations
have made adequate preparations (through contingency plans) to deal with any
incident.
Each variable-statement provided an indicator of a mindset of complacency,
which Taylor (1990) described as the 'enemy of safety'. This "mindset" will
determine the range of policy options considered. For example, Taylor (1990)
reported:
"Amazingly, complacency was still to be found after Hilisborough. It was chilling
to hear the same refrain from directors at several Clubs I visited:-
"Hillsborough was horrible - but, of course, it couldn't have happened here."
Couldn't it? The Hilisborough ground was regarded by many as one of the best
in the country." (p4)
This complacent assumption indicates a mindset that will not place importance
on Clubs financing improvements to the layout of their stadia. At times of financial
hardship, available moneys are more likely to be spent on team improvements, given
this key assumption and the finding by Arnold and Benveniste (1988) that playing
success is the most important objective for Clubs. The continued use of stairway 13 at
Ibrox despite three serious incidents, the poor housekeeping at Bradford despite
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warnings over a period of at least five years are both indicators of the low priority
given to ground improvements and accordingly to crowd safety. Both suggest
'denial' argued to lie at the core of the Onion Model (Pauchant & Mitroff 1992a).
That ground safety is viewed by Clubs as simply a question of fulfilling legislative
requirements is demonstrated by Popplewell (1985):
"There seems to be a general view that the Green Guide has no application unless
the ground is designated. Nothing could be more misconceived. I recommend that
the next edition of the Green Guide should make it clear that it applies to all sports
grounds, not simply those designated." (p30)
The football industry, based upon the evidence from the official inquiries, has
a tendency towards complacency, which has acted as a constraint upon active
learning. With regard to organisational learning a high scoring on this factor
indicates that the organisation has already reached an endpoint. It has the skills and
resources to deal with anything and this may act as a justification for looking no
further at possible improvements. Examples of elements of this factor can be found
throughout our analysis in Chapter 5. Disavowal (q47), the downplaying of the
importance of a recognised threat, can be seen in the persistent reluctance of
football Clubs to invest in new stadia and safety stewards. The outright denial
(q46) that a tragedy might occur, as expressed in the comment 'it couldn't happen
here' and feelings of grandiosity (q45), 'we can deal with anything' was noted
during observations of stewards at P2, Fl, F3 and S3.
A high score in this factor indicates assumptions about the value of crisis
preparations that is at odds with the evidence presented in Chapter 5.
Communication systems, technical and social, were inappropriate in each crisis
incident. Confidence in contingency plans is also misplaced as is the assumption
that they will be able to respond in a calm and confident manner. Questions, 45, 46
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and 47 all correspond to complacency, a high score on these variables indicates a
high degree of complacency and a misplaced confidence in the value of pre-crisis
preparations. Table 6.11 indicates that all respondents, with one exception, lie in
either the question mark or danger zone.
As table 6.11 shows only one respondent scored within the safety zone. The
remaining seventy two Clubs were split between the question mark and danger
zones by a ratio of 2:1. This indicates that the football safety officers, champions
for safety management practice, have not undergone a major cultural readjustment.
Safety Zone	 Question Mark
	 Danger Zone
_______________	 (4-8)	 (9-13)	 (14-20)
Premier Division	 1	 12	 4
FirstDivision	 _______________________	 11	 8
SecondDivision	 ______________________	 12	 0
ThirdDivision	 ______________________ 7 	 5
Scottish Premier &	 7	 7
FirstDivision	_______________________ ______________________ _______________________
Total	 1(1.4%)	 J	 49 (66.2%)	 24 (32.4%)
Table 6.11: Factor 2 Assessment of Crisis Preparedness
Given the recent history of high profile disasters it begs the question, what will
cause a full cultural adjustment.
An incident that occurred in the course of this study reveals the fallacy of this
attitude. The scenario concerned direct observations of crowd management during
an FA Cup tie between a Premier and a Second Division Club. As a relatively
unattractive tie parts of the ground were empty. With two minutes of the match
remaining the home (premier) team were losing 0 - 2. Many spectators left early.
Two late goals however, took the tie into extra time. The cheers that greeted the
two late goals attracted many spectators to attempt to get back into the ground. The
gates were locked and a crush ensued. The chief steward, who despite wearing a
radio head set, was unable to hear clearly the Safety Officer who was trying to
alleviate the problem. He ran from one side of the ground to the other and managed
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to get outside where the crush was developing. He kept having to move so that the
he could use his head set, which because of a combination of poor signal and
background noise was hardly audible. He was also threatened by some of the
supporters who recognised the insignia on his stewards jacket. He was unable to
deal with the problem. Only quick thinking by a small group of private security
guards, acting on their own authority, who opened access to an empty part of the
ground, avoided the real threat of serious injuries. If the ground had been full that
night this action would not have been possible. The communication systems were
not adequate that night and they were amongst the most reliable observed in the
course of this study. The contingency planning process had not considered the
possibility of thousands of spectators trying to get back into a ground to watch the
end of a match for which they had paid. The external Tannoy system was not loud
or clear enough to communicate with the returning fans. As a low risk fixture there
were few police officers present. This incident was a near miss. Occurring as it did
outside the ground none of the media were aware of the incident, nor were the
relevant safety advisory group.
The high levels of complacency identified in table 6.11 support our hypothesis
that no major cultural readjustment has taken place. The high percentage in the
questionmark zone may reflect improvement since the pre-1989 period. However,
the uncertainty that it indicates and the usually part time role of the football safety
officer is indicative of higher levels of complacency within the administrative and
board structures of football Clubs.
6.4.3	 Factor 3: Who suffers crises
The variable-statements which load highly upon this factor relate to the link
between the properties of organisations and their propensity to crisis. A high score
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indicated an attitude that only badly managed Clubs had crises. Well managed
Clubs, this factor suggests, do not need to invest in crisis management efforts.
Within the football industiy many Clubs indicated that they had exceeded their
licensed capacity on terracing, due to particular problems.
Table 6.12 : Factor 3 : Variable Loadings
Three quarters of respondents scored within the safety zone, with a further
22% scoring in the question mark zone. This indicates that the majority accept that
crises can happen to anyone and that therefore crisis management is not a luxury.
This is an important fmding because as the various tragedies have shown it is not
the Clubs alone that create the potential for crises. Many agencies and bodies may
be involved.
Safety Zone	 Question Mark
	 Danger Zone
________________	 (3-6)	 (7-10)	 (11-15)
Premier Division	 13	 4	 0
First Division	 15	 4	 0
Second Division	 10	 1	 1
Third Division	 8	 3	 1
Scottish Premier &
	 8	 4	 2
First_Division	 _______________________ _______________________ ______________________
Total	 54 (73%)	 16 (21.6%)	 4 (5.4%)
Table 6.13: Factor 3 : Assessment of Crisis Preparedness
Much of the focus so far has been on the stadia and the Clubs themselves that
hosted the disasters. The involvement of other parties, however, must not be
overlooked. The failure of the various inspection bodies to follow up expressed
concern prior to the Bradford fire or the allegedly lax inspection of Heysel by UEFA
officials are examples of a 'crisis of management' that goes beyond stadia managers
themselves. Problems of communication may be relevant here, for example the failure
of the USE to communicate their worries about the Bradford Stadium to the fire
brigade. The different configurations or structures of these organisations may also
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impede communication between them and their ability to act. Thus because the Green
Guide stated that a fire hazard was a matter for the fire brigade, officials from the
HSE did not feel it necessary for them to take responsibility for a problem which they
had identified. This might be viewed as the actions of a bureaucracy which does not
encourage its officers to use their initiative but rather encourages them to follow the
prescribed procedures. This problem may be further exacerbated by the existence of
dual responsibility for ground safety:
"It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Laird (HSE) was doing no more than
following the directive from his department. It does however, highlight the
problem of dual responsibility. There is a serious risk of duplication of work,
resulting in a waste of resources. There is also a risk that information available
to one Authority responsible for safety will not reach another Authority"
(Popplewell 1985, p24)
Sheffield Wednesday was considered to be an example of good management practice
prior to the Hillsborough stadium (Inglis 1996).
6.4.4	 Factor 4: Confidence regarding our Crisis response
The variable-statements that loaded highly upon this factor reflect the
confidence a respondent has regarding the ability of their Club to cope with crisis
incidents. The evidence presented in Chapter 5 regarding the aetiology of each of
the crisis incidents highlights that it is unlikely that any response will be cool, calm
and confident. Nor does it appear likely that communication systems will be
adequate to meet the needs of a major incident. The inclusion of q60
(displacement) with a high loading on this factor suggests that at times of crises it is
expected that the police will assume control. Note that the George (ACPO, 1993)
report has emphasised an advisory role only for the police inside football stadia
with the ultimate decisions to be made by a Club representative in England and
Wales.
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Q58	 We will be able to react to a crisis in a calm 	 .45811
and positive manner
Q59	 Our communications systems are sufficient to 	 .59923
__________	 deal_with_a_major_incident 	 _____________________
Q60	 The police are responsible for public safety.	 .78563
Table 6.14
	
Factor 4: Variable Loadings
A high score on this factor indicates a misplaced confidence in the ability of
many organisations to deal with crises, an argument reinforced by the analysis of
Chapter 5. Table 6.15 illustrates that only two respondents fell within the safety
zone with the remainder in the question mark and danger zones. The scores for
Scottish respondents were the highest, an observation in part explained by the
leading role of the police force in Scottish stadia.
Safety Zone	 Question Mark
	
Danger Zone
(3-6)	 (7-10)	 (11-15)
Premier Division	 1	 13	 3
First Division	 0	 15	 4
Second Division	 0	 11	 1
Third Division	 1	 10	 1
Scottish Premier &	 1	 3	 10
FirstDivision	 _______________________ _______________________
Total	 I	 (4.1%)	 52 (70.3%)	 19 (25.6%)
Table 6.15: Factor 4 Assessment of Crisis Preparedness
Some 97% of respondents scored within the question mark and danger zones
reflecting a high degree of 'crisis proneness'. As for factor 2 these scores are all the
more alarming because they suggest a high degree of optimism in the ability of
Clubs to deal with crisis incidents. An optimism which is refuted by the evidence
collected regarding the four main stadia tragedies. Additionally the response of
Local Authorities indicated that whilst there have been many technical
improvements to stadia there is still much room for improvement to safety
management practices such as stewarding. Eight Local Authority respondents
reported examples of malpractice during matches ranging from too few or untrained
stewards [LA 2, LA 3, LA 5, LA 7, LA 10, LA 11,1, no emergency lighting [LA 1,]
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and lack of emergency exits [LA 6, LA 7]. Most notable are the concerns regarding
the quality of stewards. This contrasts sharply with the views of Safety Officers
whom indicated a high level of satisfaction with their stewarding arrangements.
Table 6.1 indicates that the Premier and First Divisions are more satisfied
with the quality of stewarding, although there is virtual consensus that all
stewarding is at least adequate. A survey of police match commanders
(Middleham 1993) reported that almost a quarter of Clubs had stewarding that was
less than satisfactory (see table 6.17). A different perception can be identified with
_____________ Very Poor	 Poor	 Just Adequate Adequate	 Excellent
Premier_______________ ______________ 0 	 8	 9
First______________ ______________ 1 	 13	 5
Second_______________ ______________ 0 	 8	 3
Third_____________ _____________ 2	 7	 3
Scottish______________ ______________ 2	 10	 2
Total_____________ _____________ 5	 46	 22
Table 6.16: How would you defme the quality of your stewards now: Perceptions of Safety Officers
on Stewarding Quality
Safety Officers expressing greater confidence in the ability of stewards than police
observers, suggesting some complacency.
____________________________ Police Commanders
	 Safety Officers
Veiy Good
	 7.8%	 29.7%
Good	 31.1%	 62.2%
Satisfactory	 37.8%	 6.8%
Not Good	 20.0%	 0.0%
Poor	 3.3%	 0.0%
Table 6.17 : Perceptions of the Quality of Stewarding in the post 1-lillsborough Period
Source Middleham (1993), Survey Data (1994-6)
Notwithstanding this criticism it is apparent that there was wide agreement that the
quality of stewarding had improved since 1989, with 95% of Police Commanders
indicating significant changes. Also 67% of Safety Officers reported that pre
Hilisborough stewarding was poor.
Complacency is however, one of a number of factors (Turner 1976, 1978; Smith
1 992a), although it is argued that it plays an influential role in determining a range of
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behaviours. Bradford City AFC was faced with bankruptcy twice in the twenty years
prior to the tragedy. The cost of improvements, given the limited financial resources
and priorities of the Club, meant limited maintenance of and improvement to the
ground. The dilapidation of the Heysel stadium reflected many years neglect. At
Ibrox, replacement of stairway 13 required significant investment. The deaths of sixty
six spectators must have helped increase the priority of such investment, although not
for some six years. Piecemeal improvements to the Leppings Lane end of the
Hilisborough stadium must also be in part attributable to the shortage of financial
resources. The cost of redesigning the entrances to allow turnstiles to service specific
pens was no doubt considered to be prohibitive before the tragedy. The effects of
tragedy may be to challenge some of the key assumptions which, subconsciously
perhaps, underpin all management decisions. Finances for new stands and layout
improvements may suddenly be available as their priority becomes only too evident.
From the evidence included, it is clear that the potential for crisis existed for a
number of years prior to each incident. In particular the incidents on stairway 13
between 1961-9, the warnings to Bradford AFC 1980-5 and the 1981 near miss at
1-Jilisborough provide evidence of warnings up to ten years before the major accidents.
Problems of communication tend to come to the forefront during disasters. The
configuration or structure, determining how work is co-ordinated is critical here.
Where organisations co-ordinate by contingency plan, communication needs are
determined by two key factors. First, the relevance of the original plan to the crisis
circumstances and second, the familiarity of individual operatives with the plan.
Assuming a close correlation, communication between individuals and central control
may be minimised leaving the central co-ordinator time to devote to management of
the whole incident, liaising with other agencies rather than management of the small
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parts. Contingency plans may be seen as the product of organisations used to a fairly
simple and stable environment trying to make sense of the unknown. Individuals are
expected to carry out duties in accordance with the plan. As the lives of others may
depend on each person undertaking his assignment in a prescribed way, as is the case
with the Fire Service, little scope for the use of initiative is allowed. Organisational
structure and culture will reinforce this creating environments which do not reward
such behaviour. Clearly such organisations are likely to face serious difficulties at
times of crisis which do not correlate closely to the contingency plan. This contrasts
sharply with a training scheme organised by the Scottish Police Service which has
created a simulation scheme which enables officers to develop a wide range of skills
which may be applied in a range of situations rather than confine them to strict
contingency plans.
At Hilisborough, permission to open gates to the pitch was required from the
central control. It is difficult to determine how long a PC waited for authorisation
before opening the gate to pen 3 on his own initiative. A reliance on control and co-
ordination through a central point of authority, requires excellent communications
which often are not available for the duration of a crisis incident. Otherwise there is a
danger of information overload meaning that the central control fails. This problem
will often be exacerbated by communications failures:
"Mr. Greenwood's request for the match to be stopped and various messages from
Constables reporting the distress in the pens did not register. Likewise,
communication from Leppings Lane to control was unreliable. Undoubtedly these
breakdowns made it more difficult for those in command to make proper
assessments and exercise effective command." Taylor, 1989, p54)
The failure of Mr. Duckenfield to take control of the co-ordination of the rescue
from the pens suggests the serious problems within the control room.
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The limitations of police radios, the level of background noise and finally an
attempt to use hand signals indicate the difficulties of communicating in
circumstances such as these. The need, however, for central co-ordination is
displayed, by the request of the Officer outside the ground to open the gates. Someone
with a knowledge of circumstances inside and outside was needed to make an
effective decision.
The issue of communication may also refer to the crowds themselves in
situations such as these. All four disasters occurred with crowds in what might be
described as complex spaces. Canter (1989) argues that it is not simply the weight of
these crowds that causes crushes but:
The communicative and behavioural inertia, which means that once a crowd
starts on one course of action it is slow to react to circumstances, partly because of
difficulty in passing information all the way from ,the site of the danger to the
fringes. Typically, those at the back of such a crowd never realise how dangerous
conditions have become at the front." (p88)
The need for excellent monitoring of such crowds and the need to ensure
effective communication to them is clear. The need for good quality public address
systems which can be accessed by those co-ordinating either the control or the rescue
function is imperative. At Ibrox and Hillsborough the predicament of those caught up
in the middle of the crush is clearly not comprehended by those on the edge of it.
Quick communication might have played a part in reducing the number of casualties.
At Bradford effective use of a PA system might have marshalled people more quickly
and encouraged them to find proper exits. However, the effectiveness of the
communication lies in part, in the ability for spectators to hear the message and the
ability of the co-ordinator to give meaningful direction.
Correlational analysis indicated a positive correlation between country and
factor 4 (.577, significant at the 0.000 level, 2-tailed test). This fmding was
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supported by the interview data. Sd suggested that Scottish Clubs had
traditionally managed their resources better than their English counterparts, largely
owing to the perceived dominance of the two Glasgow Clubs and the futility of
attempting to match them. SC2 and SC3 both reported that they did not have to
undertake any work following Hillsborough because they already conformed to
their safety certificate. SC3 however, reported that the executive with responsibility
for safety had had to threaten resignation in order to get adequate support from the
Club.
6.4.5 Factor 5: Causes of crisis
This factor can be interpreted as relating to 'the causes of crisis,' with the
statement "crises are usually caused by one or two people' and 'a crisis has one or
two main causes' loading highly (see table 6.18). This factor corresponded closely
with Pauchant & Mitroffs (1992a) 'Splitting Defence Mechanism'.
It is has been argued that the disasters represented socio-technical failures, a
focus upon either simple causes or upon scapegoats is likely to reduce the scope for
active learning from disasters. The evidence collected from respondents regarding
the causes of the Bradford and Hillsborough tragedies suggests that football Club
executives frequently focus upon simple causes.
_____________________________ Level	 _________________ _________________
Q50	 crises are usually caused by	 I splitting	 .70871
- the mistakes of a few people __________________ __________________ __________________
Q51	 a crisis has one or two main	 1 splitting	 .68423
causes
Q61	 The police should normally 	 .66587
have no role inside a football
- ground	 ________________ ________________ ________________
Table 6.18
	
Factor 5: Variable Loadings
The negative loading of q66 on this factor indicates that the more a respondent
focuses upon simple causes, the less agreement there is that current regulation and
261
enforcement are adequate. A plausible explanation of this is that a belief in simple
causes is linked to a belief that crises can be regulated away.	 Rotating this
argument, where the causes of crises are perceived to be complex there is a
perception that too much is expected of football Clubs who are only in control of
one group of causal factors. Alternative explanations including the age and previous
employment of respondents were also examined but no significant relationships
could be identified.
Safety Zone
	 Question Mark	 Danger Zone
________________	 (3-6)	 (7-10)	 (11-15)
Premier Division	 4	 11	 2
First Division	 7	 11	 1
Second Division	 3	 9	 0
Third Division	 1	 9	 2
Scottish Premier &	 5	 9	 0
FirstDivision	 ______________________ ______________________ ______________________
Total	 20 (27.0%)	 49 (66.2%)	 5 (6.8%)
Table 6.19: Factor 5: Assessment of Crisis Preparedness
Table 6.19 reveals the persistence of simplistic views of the causes of crises.
Nearly 73% of respondents scored within the question mark and danger zones for
this factor. This indicates that many respondents believe that crises have simple
causes. With regard to our discussion of organisational learning this suggests that
the football industry is not a fertile ground for isomorphic learning. In Chapter 1
the basis for an explanation of the stadia tragedies within a socio-teclmical
framework was established. Smith & Sipika (1993) for example, argued that
In a related process, culture and configuration combine to affect the decision
and communication functions of an organisation and these factors interact with an
organisation's history to provide a climate within which a trigger event can
precipitate a major incident.0 (Smith & Sipika 1991, p8)
The crisis incident is child to the preceding crisis of management. Just as children are
shaped by their parents, the crisis of management will influence the ability of the
organisations involved to cope with the demands of the crisis event. The absence of
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the Officer In Charge of the Gendarmarie at Heysel from pre-match briefings limited
the effectiveness of his response during the crisis. Greater concern for security at the
expense of safety, led to the locking of exits and removal of fire fighting equipment
from the Bradford Stadium. The assumptions of management, a denial of risk (It can't
happen here assumption) underpin these decisions.
While examples of the various 7C's may be found having effect during the crisis,
certain of them are regularly more critical. The coupling of events is often visible in
crises: at Hillsborough, the poor layout at the Leppings Lane, the signs focused on the
tunnel to pens 3 and 4, overcrowding aggravated by a further influx of fans through
the open gate. Failure, at the time, to appreciate the links between the gate, tunnel and
overcrowded pens was in one sense the cause of the tragedy. Poor co-ordination from
the control room by failing to communicate the effects of opening the gate was also
evident. Crises have complex, systemic causes. An attitude that they have few and
simple causes will determine that a simplistic approach to prevention (if any) will be
undertaken.
6.5 Crisis Prone or Crisis Prepared
A profile for the football industry as a whole on these five factors is shown in
table 6.20. The table highlights that respondents scored lowest in the two factors
that related to 'complacency' (factors 2 and 4). Analysis indicated the failure of
Safety Zone	 Question	 mark	 Danger zone
_____________________ zone 	 ____________________
Factor 1	 44 (56.5%)	 27 (36.5%)	 3 ( 4.1%)
Factor2	 1 (1.4%)	 49 (66.2%)	 24 (32.4%)
Factor3	 54 (73.0%)	 16 (21.6%)	 4 (5.4%)
Factor 4	 3 (4.1%)	 52 (70.3%)	 19 (25.6%)
Factor S
	
20 (27%)	 49 (66.2%)	 5 (6.8%)
Table 6.20: All Factors : Assessment of Crisis Preparedness
regulation to promote high standards of safety in football stadia. Despite increased
regulation, the industry appears to have remained prone to crisis. The factors
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derived from our analysis have provided substantial evidence to support the
hypothesis that no major cultural readjustment has occurred since 1989. There may
have been some shift, but in the wake of four high profile disasters the industry can
not be placed in the crisis prepared category.
Chapter 5 indicated a long tradition of self-centredness within the football
industry that included: a refusal to contribute to earlier reports; a reluctance to
consult with their spectators; the negative views expressed by respondents
regarding outside agencies. This Chapter has provided evidence of a fatalistic view
of the world as well as the ongoing use of a variety of defence mechanisms. The
evidence presented above indicates that levels 1 and 2 of Pauchant & Mitroffs
Onion Model are closely linked, with our factors reflecting elements of both. The
high levels of complacency are perhaps the most worrying. Although much has
been done with regard to investment in new stadia build it is clear that the
promotion of crowd safety still requires much attention.
6.6 Levels 3 and 4: Organisafional Structure and Strategies
Although Pauchant & Mitroff (1 992a) relate the outer skin of their onion
model to plans, mechanisms and procedures for crisis management, the routine
administration and management of the Clubs shall be considered here alongside the
results of the direct observation of the management of a number of events. The
context in which safety management decisions are taken cannot be separated from
the day to day management of the Clubs. As Chapter 4 argued, Clubs do not
squander resources on administration and support services. As many safety officers
are part time or combine this role with duties, a part of the safety management task
will often fall to the senior administrator. The analysis and discussion of factors
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suggests that there is some conflict between safety officers and their Club
executives.
6.6.1	 Scope of Responsibility of Club Secretaries and Planning
Two key themes emerged in the course of the interviews concerning business
practices The first concerned the range of tasks with which the Club secretary had
to deal with. The second concerned planning. These two themes proved to be
closely related as respondents indicated that a heavy workload with wide ranging
responsibilities prevented them from considering the future adequately. This view
was supported by the fmdings of the 1966 PEP Report which identified that the key
performance indicators used to assess managerial performance in football were
short term focusing on immediate playing success:
"The manager's position is thus perilous as long term policies, in particular team
building and ground improvement may be sacrificed in favour of the team's
current performance"[p 123]
Such a view was supported by our respondents, P1 for example, commented that
the Club was:
"Better managed now, but before, I didn't have enough time to concentrate on
the issues that really mattered because you're bogged down with the day to day
issues',
The other Premier League Clubs also indicated significant changes including the
appointment of more administrative and support staff and a redistribution of
responsibilities allowing the secretary (or chief executive) to devote more time to
planning issues. One result of this was that now budgets were prepared on a variety
of scenarios from good to bad. For example, P4 reported:
"We have three lots of cashflow each year, and you've got to base scenarios on
the worst."
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P3 indicated that increasingly those who had the title 'Club Secretary' were legal
officers and that many of the duties associated with that post had been re-allocated
to 'Chief Executives'.
The picture that emerged from the lowest two divisions, as described in
Chapter 4, was very different. Responsibility for safety management lay with the
Club Secretary or Chief Executive for whom it was one amongst a number of
responsibilities. Comments, already reported, depict these individuals as continually
striving to balance competing, and sometimes conflicting, demands upon them. At
one Club, LA3 reported that the Safety Officer was also the Club's odd job man and
was usually to be found in his overalls. LA3 concluded that his dual role did little
to enhance the status of the Safety Officer in the eyes of the Board of Directors. For
T3, planning was limited to the re-signing of their best player to ensure that he
could be sold for more at the end of the season. T4's prioritisation consisted of:
"Whoever shouts the loudest you do that next, there is no other more methodical
way of doing it, you learn as you go on and if you're lucky you don't learn too
often by your mistakes."
The reluctance of Directors to invest more resources in administration and
support was noted by two interviewees. S2 indicated a desire to appoint staff in
preparation for promotion, directors wanted to wait until they achieved it before
committing any resources. Five interviewees used the term 'jack of all trades' to
describe their current role.
The explanation of the reluctance of football Clubs to respond to regulation
and the problems posed to safety have hitherto focused on a 'crisis prone safety
culture'. The study's fmdings indicate another factor, namely the time pressures
upon administrators. Given the lack of resources and the immediacy of problems
ranging from preparing for forthcoming events, contractual problems, lotteries,
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responding to requests for information, dealing with fmancial matters, the Inland
Revenue, ticket sales etc., it can be seen that unless rigidly enforced, regulations
may be overlooked. Club Secretaries reported a lack of a proper job definition, (in
practice even if they existed on paper), which mean that 'non-urgent' tasks,
however important, were frequently 'forgotten'. In Popplewell's (1985) analysis of
the causes of the Bradford fire the dire fmancial circumstances of that Club are
posited as key. However, his analysis also shows how the Club had received a
number of warnings concerning the build up of combustible waste beneath the main
stand. Lack of finances certainly played a part but ironically the replacement of that
stand would have begun the following Monday in preparation for the Club's newly
acquired designated status. The greater division of labour, facilitated by investment
in administrative and commercial staff, was identified as an important development
by all Premier and First Division respondents. In the lower divisions, it was clear
from responses, as well as from personal observations in the course of the
interviews, that this greater task specialisation was not possible. For example,
although interviews lasted for in excess of two hours, no interview with a Premier
or First Division Club was interrupted by a telephone call. In contrast, with the
exception of S 1, interviews were interrupted an average of seven times and a
number of other personal callers were either put off or the interview was halted for
a few minutes.
Routine business planning also differed between the divisions. Seven of the
eight senior Clubs identified that they planned between three and five years ahead
with projections based on at least three separate scenarios. Only one of the lower
division Clubs (Si) identified any such planning practice. S3's experience provides
a clear example of the perceived problems of the lower division Clubs:
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"No plans for next season because we might get relegated, so do we do
something or don't we and we can't afford to redevelop the main stand because
we don't get the crowds, we don't have the money. But obviously when we are
forced to make a decision we will do."
Despite the uncertainty of either relegation or promotion there can be few
industries faced with the certainty of a minimum number of key income generating
events. Fixed income from the league could form a part of any projection and the
estimation of likely attendances following promotion or relegation could be
estimated relatively easily, given the vast quantities of data concerning attendance.
6.6.2 Direct Observation Findings
A key element of the research methodology was the use of mixed methods.
As discussed in Chapter 3 a deliberate choice was made to focus upon a wide
sample of football clubs rather than to produce a very detailed analysis of a smaller
number of case studies. This trade off, inevitable in this research given constraints
of time, was calculated in order to maximise an understanding of the industry as a
whole. A case study approach may have allowed for greater understanding of a
small number of cases but would have had limited generalisability. Direct
observation provided a real opportunity to build upon the lengthy interviews and
create a real picture of organisational behaviour. Where the use of interviews and
questionnaires provided an opportunity to study individual perceptions of safety
management and its practice, direct observation presented an opportunity to witness
safety management in practice. As Denzin (1979) and Jick (1979) have argued,
multiple methods, if reaching the same conclusions should offer greater validity.
Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) suggest a more limited role for triangulation, that it
may strengthen qualitative research fmdings by combining observation,
interviewing and documentary analysis.
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In all but two cases the observations took place between two and four
weeks of the respective semi structured interview. In one case the observation
occurred the evening before the interview (Ti) without the invitation of the club;
and in another case the observation occurred the evening following the interview
(P3). With the exception of Ti (where I was not invited to the briefmgs) the
observation followed a similar format. I arrived at the ground three hours before a
match and met with the club secretary or chief executive. I was then introduced to
the club safety officer or chief steward and to the Silver Command Police Officer. I
attended the pre match briefings for both stewards and police and was provided
with access to all parts of the ground including all spectator areas, match control
room and back room areas. A typical visit provided an opportunity to listen to
safety officer, chief steward and individual stewards describe their work, training
and perceptions of their role. I was able to listen to police officers, from the most
senior present to the constable stood on the edge of the pitch, describe their work
and how things had changed post 1989. In a number of cases the local authority
SAG chairman was present and I was able to listen to their description of their role
and history of relations between themselves and the relevant club. When a match
started I was typically assigned to a senior steward although I had freedom to
wander around the ground observing practice. I made a point of walking around
each ground checking upon the location of stewards, noting locked gates left
unattended. In addition to these formal visits to clubs I made a number of informal
visits as a member of the public and worked as a steward for two matches. These
latter 'visits' might be described as full participant observation as I was to all
intents and purposes a paid employee carrying out a covert investigation. For the
other visits as a researcher I was on the periphery of interaction, a 'complete
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observer' to use Junker's (1960) taxonomy (cited in Gill & Johnson 1992). For
comparative purposes I also visited other sports stadia as a guest of the relevant
body, the format for which were similar to those described above.
As discussed in Chapter 3 direct observation played a key role in examining
the extent of cultural readjustment within the football industry. This presented an
opportunity to witness actual behaviour and thereby complement the data collected
in other ways.
A number of key findings emerged from the observations which supported the
fmdings using other methods, thus enhancing confidence in the findings of this
study. Attempts were made to look for evidence of cultural change in the behaviour
of those with responsibility for safety management, behaviour identified as the
outer layer of Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992) Onion Model. It should be noted that an
attempt was made to get an overall sense of behaviour and the assumptions that
underpinned it. However, in any organisation employing many people there will be
a range of behaviours reflecting different values and beliefs. Individuals bring these
to their work and organisations only in part shape the attitudes and behaviour of
employees. This posed a particular problem illustrated by the inclusion of examples
of bad practice below. A key question concerns the extent to which these examples
accurately reflect the standard of management at the various clubs. The examples
shown in this analysis, it is argued, are reflective of the general state of affairs.
However, as already stated, organisations provide the focus for a wide range of
individual and collective behaviours, the examples listed here are intended to
illustrate some of the key characteristics, not to provide a comprehensive picture of
each organisation which would be beyond the scope of a thesis such as this.
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6.6.2.1	 Covert Observation
Reflecting the opportunism that is vital to organisational research (Buchanan
et a! 1988) a chance remark from a student, who was casually employed as a
private security steward at a football club, led to my applying to work as a steward
for ''' club. I arrived at the assembly point for this private security finn at
l2.3Opm one Saturday. I informed the relevant member of staff that I was at De
Montfort University and wished to work as a steward. "No problem" was the reply
and I was assigned to a unit of five staff which I later found to be responsible for
monitoring and checking incoming spectators. I was issued with a high visibility
jacket, received no pre match briefmg apart from a few informal words from my
supervisor and was told to stand in front of three turnstiles and to check that
spectators had valid tickets. Ten minutes after the match kicked off I was sent
inside the ground where I stood with ten other stewards between the home and away
supporters. Of the eleven stewards I found through conversation that three had
received some basic training (fire extinguishers and a video of Bradford) and that
only one had been to the three two hour training sessions required by the Club.
Many of these had worked for the security firm at this and other football grounds
since the previous August (my observations occurred in March and April). My
second visit, two weeks later, followed a similar format except that I spent most of
the match alongside two other stewards where we had responsibility for monitoring
a gangway and stairway amongst away supporters. From conversation it became
evident that whilst training was available there was little encouragement for
'stewards' to take part; a situation they believed unlikely to change given the casual
nature of employment and the shortage of individuals willing to work as stewards.
From previous investigations I was aware that the club claimed to monitor steward
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training closely. The stewards that I spoke to, who had worked at other grounds,
suggested that this was not the case and that this laxity was not confmed to this
particular club but to others where they had worked. Apart from the observations
regarding training it was obvious that there was no strict dress code. A number of
the female stewards wore high platform shoes or boots, sufficient to impede their
quick movement. Those inappropriately dressed formed a small minority of
stewards, however, it became apparent that the decision regarding what a steward
should wear was left to the individual, despite the comment from the steward who
had attended the three training sessions that guidelines for dress had been given.
Random visits since the covert observation indicate that a minority continue to
dress inappropriately (Observation April 1998).
These observations indicated that steward training was not considered a high
priority. The requirement, in each venue's licence, that a specified minimum
number of stewards be present at any event encourages this laxity for those clubs
that fmd difficulty in recruiting a reliable and regular group of stewards. For
private security firms too, supplying the requisite number of persons is the first
priority. The lack of monitoring of steward dress provided an opportunity for staff
to wear inappropriate clothing. A contrary example was noted at Rangers FC where
a private security firm was employed. The Club Operations Executive followed a
fixed route of inspection, around Ibrox, for each game. First, to ensure that
sufficient stewards were in attendance; second to check on the appropriateness of
their dress (a formal dress code applied); third to talk to spectators. No examples of
inappropriate dress were observed at Rangers. Stewards who were not dressed
appropriately were informed of this and warned that a recurrence would result in a
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termination of their contract. This warning was communicated, where appropriate,
to a representative of the private security company.
6.6.2.2	 Overt Observation
As Gill & Johnson (1992) report a potential weakness of overt observation is
that people may behave quite differently when aware that they are under
observation. Further, perceptions of reality reported by respondents will no doubt
be influenced by a desire to create a favourable image. In this case stewards and
police officers were used to being observed by various agencies, be it each other,
FLA, local authority, or an FA representative. The presence of another observer did
not appear to arouse any interest.
6.6.2.2.1	 General Observations
The noise at pitchside level at all clubs was surprising despite my regular
attendance at football matches. This posed real communciations difficulties as
stewards, those issued with radios (often a ratio of 1 radio to 6 stewards) sought a
sheltered spot from which to communicate. P2 and P3 alone had issued headsets
for staff to help overcome the problem of background noise and thus facilitate
communication. The limitations of these systems were indicated by the need for the
chief steward at P3 to walk from one side of the ground to the other to speak face to
face with the Club Safety officer 'to hear it from the horses mouth', because of the
difficulties he had in hearing instructions over the radio. As events at Hilisborough,
Bradford and Ibrox have illustrated failures may spread very quickly reinforcing the
need for quick and effective communications. The poverty of communications
hardware, justified in part by their relatively infrequent use, observed at many
grounds is a serious potential weakness.
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6.6.2.2.2	 Attitude of Clubs to Safety
Following feedback from the Chairman of P3, stewards were requested to
remain out of sight of the directors box because the Club's Chairman was
concerned about the expense of so many stewards and their equipment. The safety
officer was compelled to employ a certain number of stewards because they were
specified in the ground's safety certificate.
'Strict' no smoking policies were clearly flouted in eleven venues, including
senior staff, for example the Deputy Safety Officer at P3 and the senior steward at
S3, who appeared to chain smoke during the match. At these eleven venues many
spectators were observed smoking in wooden stands. I did not witness one
occasion when a spectator was requested to stop smoking. The clear flouting of the
no smoking policy is an example of Gouldner's (1954) mock bureaucracy
illustrating the persistence of this form of behaviour in the post 1989 period.
6.6.2.2.3	 Police- Club Relations
Despite the idiosyncrasies in the relations between each club and police
service patterns did emerge. At one extreme the match control room was called the
police control room (P1, F3, S3, Ti, SC1, SC2, SC3, SC4) and admission was only
permitted if accompanied by a police officer. In each case, apart from the Scottish
clubs, this reflected an obvious dislike and distrust between the agencies. In
Scotland it was assumed that the police would oversee the management of crowds.
The police expressed a concern that P1 was keen for the hasty removal of police
officers from match duties with their replacement, by stewards, as a means of
reducing crowd management costs by 75%. In 1994-5 each police officer attending
a match might cost the host club up to £130, depending upon the pricing structure
of the local police service. Stewards pay at this time was a maximum of15 and an
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average of £8.42 across all venues, P1 tended to the higher figure.. 	 It was
rumoured that the club safety officer's pay package included a large performance
related element and that this was the primary motive in the removal of police, rather
than concern for crowd safety. The police officer in charge described P1 as
'possessing a spiv mentality, a really unethical business practice which its seems all
football clubs accept'. In other cases P2 and Si the police and club retained their
own control rooms relying upon technical means of communication in order to co-
ordinate their activities. In the case of Rangers FC the police and club control room
were located beside each other, facilitating informal, face to face communication
and the Police officer in charge worked alongside the club's safety officer. In all
other cases one control room existed for both club and police with one agency
taking the lead role in managing the event. T3's chief executive reported that the
police played no role and attended no matches, despite my own observation that
two police officers appeared to control matchday operations (no club representative
was present in the match control room). T3 refused to accept that police officers
had been present. T3 reported that the police had expressed serious concerns about
the quality of stewarding at the club.
The P3 safety officer reported difficulties in recruiting a regular 350
stewards and was thus forced, to some extent, to employ those who turned up to
meet the requirements of the safety certificate. A number of the stewards
commented that for two years it had been a job, not like before which I interpreted
as meaning that stewards just used to turn up to watch the match.. P3 police
expressed concerns about the clubs use of private security firm stewards. Although
training was not explicitly identified as a key issue a major concern was the
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presence of new faces each week and that the perceived high turnover of staff
prevented the development of expertise amongst the stewarding force.
It should be noted that the time when these observations took place were
during a period of transition, albeit change that was more developed in some clubs
than in others. The George Report (1993), prepared for the Association of Chief
Police Officer's by the Deputy Chief Constable of Manchester, supported the
withdrawal of the police service from ensuring crowd safety inside football
grounds. George (1993) argued that this should rest with the clubs themselves. It
was clear that there was some resistance to this from some police forces who were
concerned about the quality of stewards replacing fully trained police officers and
the concern (P1) that fmancial considerations would take precedence over crowd
safety.
6.6.2.2.4	 Steward Training
Many of the stewards with whom I spoke had received some training. The
content of the training appeared to consist of watching videos of the Bradford and
Hilisborough disasters, listening to police and fire officers, being given a tour of the
ground and being informed of the location and idiosyncrasies of fire extinguishers.
Stewards at every ground complained however, that the variety of fire extinguishers
used made it difficult for them to be certain that they would know how to operate
them should the need arise. Where stewards expressed greater confidence in their
familiarity with equipment such as fire extinguishers it emerged that they had a
regular area of the ground for which they were responsible. A number of clubs
monitored the training of stewards including primary and refresher (i.e. annual
retraining). Failure to attend training would mean termination of their contract (P3,
P4, Fl). However, the Chief Steward (P3) reported that despite the appearance of
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rigorous checks he had not had to weed out any steward, perhaps reflecting the
difficulties the club reported in recruiting the numbers of stewards required by the
safety certificate (note the steward who was missing from the locked fire exit
identified earlier). P3 had also devised a detailed questionnaire to test how
stewards would respond to a number of scenarios. The questionnaire details
scenarios that include issues related to both crowd safety and control. P3, in
addition to its own stewards, employed the private security firm that I had worked
for. A number of the faces I recognised suggesting that untrained staff were also
present at P3. F2 had introduced a written exam following the identification that a
number of stewards could not read. F2 expressed that a key motivation to weed out
these stewards was the fear that an inquiry, should a failure occur, would highlight
any such weakness immediately.
6.6.2.2.5	 Stewards
Underlying many of the discussions was the view that the emphasis of police
and stewards upon control was because of spectator misbehaviour which had
created an environment in which control was paramount. This was reflected at P1,
Fl, F3 and S2 with the employment of a 'hit squad' of stewards whose job it was to
'sort out troublemakers. In both cases the team included a number of 'ex-military
who could handle themselves,' according to their fellow stewards.
At S3, with the exception of one senior steward, the senior stewarding staff
were clear that their role was to ensure crowd safety. A number of these stewards
were employed by the local authority building control service which had the task of
inspecting the football ground on behalf of the local authority. At all other grounds
the perceptions of senior stewards were mixed.
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Although many stewards fitted the recommendations included in Taylor's
Report concerning age, fitness etc. a small proportion, up to 25% in some instances
(for example, S4, 13,) were clearly outside the remit or inappropriately attired. For
example, at P1 a number of the female stewards wore high platform shoes; S4 and
T3 employed a large number of frail and elderly gentlemen. F3 had discovered that
a number of stewards could not read the briefing cards with which they were issued.
At each ground apart from P3, F4, S2, Ti, 12, 13 unattended locked gates were
observed in the course of the match. At P3 a fire alarm went off in the main stand.
I walked with the Chief steward and found our entry to that area blocked by a
locked door, also a fire exit. We waited for four minutes until the return of the
steward who had been assigned to that particular exit. The steward had 'nipped off
to get a coffee'. The steward let us through and we found that it was a false alarm.
This message was then communicated to the Control Room who were waiting for
information before contacting the fire service. No record of the incident was made
and no further action taken apart from a light reprimand that I felt occurred only
because of my presence. This was the only incident that I believed to happen
because of my presence.
At S3 a case of ticket forgeries came to light and an extra 450 spectators were
allowed into a standing area because no decision was made to close entry gates
when the designated maximum number of spectators had entered the ground. The
problems of overcrowding in that area (licensed for 3,300 spectators) were made
worse by the presence of a blocked drain that flooded part of the terracing. At many
clubs the rate of admission to a given area is slowed (usually through the closure of
some turnstiles) as the maximum capacity for a given area is reached. The case of
S3, where no problem were expected, illustrates that clubs may become
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complacent. The absence of the safety officer, who had authority to close all
entrances, at a critical time meant that there was no one to take that decision,
reflecting again the role of club structure.
A final observation that involved all clubs concerned the primacy given to
protecting the pitch. I checked every fifteen minutes to see whether stewards were
watching an event or the crowd. At these check points, in every case (with the
exception of Rangers) 75% or more, of stewards observable at any time, were
watching the event. This changed at the end of each half when stewards would
(except S4, TI, T3, T4) move to pitchside. At this point the majority of stewards
would be observing the crowd and protecting the pitch. There were as a
consequence very few stewards allocated to the exit ways. The case at P3 illustrates
the dangers of too great a focus upon the pitch. The demeanour of P3 stewards at
the end of that game also highlights a weakness of employing fans as stewards.
At Rangers, stewards would walk down the gangway for which they were
responsible every ten minutes. This provided an opportunity for the safety officer
to monitor their state of alertness. Rangers indicated that it helped focus the minds
of stewards and reminded spectators of the presence of their stewards. Although F3
and Si had similar systems, observations indicated that these did not work well and
that many stewards ignored the instruction that they walk down a gangway every
ten minutes.
6.6.2.2.6	 Mechanisms for ongoing learning
There is no central agency tasked with identifying common problems. For
example Ranger's reported the abandoning of a match some fifteen minutes before
kick off. This caused problems because many spectators, unaware of the
postponement sought to enter the ground whilst those already present sought to
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leave, posing an unusual problem. A similar case emerged at P3 when an unlikely
two goals in the last two minutes of a cup tie led to extra time. Supporters who had
been leaving for some 25 minutes heard the cheer and sought to regain entry to the
ground by the nearest entry, there being no system to allow for their readmission to
their paid for seats. Additionally concerns regarding a possible pitch invasion
meant that stewards were concentrated near the pitch side and away from exit gates
where no difficulties had been anticipated. Additionally, stewards were visibly
elated at the comeback from their team and appeared to be more intent on
celebrating than upon watching the crowd or listening to instructions. Both
scenarios, although unusual, were not unique and illustrate the unexpected
problems that can beset those with responsibility of ensuring crowd safety. A
system that collated and investigated such issues might provide feedback that
enables managers to anticipate and prepare for similar eventualities. The case at P3
illustrates again the primacy given to crowd control over safety as exit gates had
been left unattended to ensure sufficient numbers of stewards in case of a pitch
invasion.
Mechanisms for ongoing learning however, are not restricted to formal
forums. For example, a useful mechanism was observed at F3. At the end of the
match the directors retired to their board room. Similarly the supervisory level of
staff including ticket office manager, safety officer, stadium manager, groundsman,
chief and deputy chief steward retired to the 'boot room' with a bottle of blended
whiskey. The group sat down and gossiped about the board and then discussed the
match, not what happened on the pitch, of which they had seen little, but what had
happened to each of them. Events were pieced together from the perspectives of
those present. Real learning appeared to be taking place. Unfortunately I was
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unable to record the conversation and I was, after some twenty minutes invited to
join the directors in the board room where the conversation concerned the match
and various business interests.
Neither formal or informal debriefmgs appear to be used. Exceptions
include F3 (which was not identified by the club as it was an informal gathering),
P3, Fl, and S3 and Rangers. At other clubs, even though debriefings of stewards
was identified as an element of the safety management process observed behaviour
was that within ten to fifteen minutes of the end of a match stewards would hand in
their high visibility jackets and leave. The safety officer was often not present at
this time preventing him from debriefmg staff. Police forces however, were
observed to conduct a debrief, in reverse cascade from police constable to sergeant
to inspector who attended the formal debrief.
6.6.2.2.7	 Summary
Whilst there were extreme examples of bad practice (for example P1 and F3)
most clubs did some things well and some things badly. There were few clubs (P3,
the example of the locked fire exit as an exception and Rangers) who appeared
consistently professional. This reinforced the view that complacency was rife and
that there remained an over emphasis upon crowd control which weakened the
importance of crowd safety. There was a reported emphasis of Club executives
upon the physical improvement of stadia, an emphasis that appeared to play down
the vital role played by stewards and safety management. The previous sections and
chapters have argued that what cultural readjustment has occurred has been limited.
The results of the direct observation tend to support this. There were some
examples of good practice but the fmdings reported above highlight the difficulties
that clubs have experienced in translating the knowledge acquired through the
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public inquiry process into new operating norms and procedures. Culture, in the
form of aftitudes to cost and safety, the importance of control versus safety can be
seen as one impediment to change. The structure of clubs, the marginalisation of
the safety officer for example and the effect of this upon internal communciations
acts as a further impediment. In conclusion comments recorded at the end of one
match may summarise they key fmdings:
"Mix of good and bad, there certainly seemed to be some sloppiness and
overemphasis upon the pitch and lack of readiness to man the exits. The fire
exit that was not manned and very poor communication with supporters during
the end of normal time break.. I got a sense of panic amongst staff at the end of
the game. "(Author: Tape transcript P3)
However, before concluding the chapter we turn to a brief consideration of other
sporting venues.
6.6.2.2.8	 Other Sporting Venues
Five other sporting venues (Vi, V2 etc) were visited representing four
different spectator sports. These have not been identified to maintain the anonymity
of participants. Four of the venues were similar to football in terms of their focus
upon a 'pitch based sport', the fifth was a type of racing track. All but one of the
venues was used (three regularly) as an international venue. At Vi and V2
stewards were recruited on a volunteer basis. Staff were recruited from a very wide
area with some travelling two hundred miles to assist. This posed problems for
steward management as it was difficult to insist upon volunteers travelling four
hundred miles for an evening training session. The standards of stewarding were
very poor. At least 25% of those present had been drinking and an estimated 10%
were happily inebriated. At V3 a number of stewards were observed sitting with
their families eating a picnic during the event. A majority of stewards participated
in the event in a manner little different to other spectators. At V4 many of the
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stewards appeared to be old (over 70) and frail. Fire exits were locked shut with no
steward present to unlock them should a fire break out. Many stewards appeared to
be enjoying a day out, sitting at the front, eating and drinking. At VS there was a
large police and private security presence. Stewards were allocated to their
positions and appeared to take note of the crowd and of the event.
This very short summary of experiences elsewhere may illustrate that the
football industry, is in many ways far in advance of many other sports. The poverty
of stewarding at most other venues was frightening. An emotive word for a thesis
but one that indicates how little knowledge has been transferred to other venues.
Toll & Reynolds (1992) notion of isomorphic learning is that organisations can
learn from other system types. There is clearly much potential to transfer
knowledge to other sports. However, evidence suggests that culture and structure in
these other industries will impede such learning. Lord Justice Taylor himself was
reported by a respondent to have said that his report was not intended for grounds
such as Twickenham, suggesting that a different type of spectator did not need the
same measures. Such statements reflect deeply held assumptions. However, a
study of other industries is beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.7 Chapter Conclusions
This Chapter has identified significant differences between the pre and post
1989 periods with regard to cultural change within the football industry. However,
as the analysis of the survey of football safety officers indicates this cannot yet be
considered a full cultural change; a view supported by the findings of the direct
observation. The nature of the regulatory regime has also been examined and the
more systematic enforcement of regulations identified. This Chapter also marks the
end of the empirical detail presented in this thesis. Having presented the analytical
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framework, presented an analysis and discussion of the data and identified
preliminary conclusions, the fmal Chapter attempts to draw the findings together. It
deals with an assessment of Turner's (1976, 1978) model of cultural readjustment
and identifies key findings with regard to organisational learning.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions, Recommendations and Suggestions for Further
Research
7.1 Introduction
The principal objective of this thesis was to investigate organisational learning in the
UK football industry following a series of major disasters. Turner (1976, 1978) and Toft
& Reynolds (1992) had implicitly hypothesised that following a major man-made disaster
a full cultural readjustment would occur; manifest in changes to operating norms and
procedures. The analysis of the response of the Football Industry to the Bolton, Ibrox and
Bradford Stadium tragedies does not lend support to this hypothesis, yet each had been
investigated through the public inquiry process, the proxy measure by which the
magnitude of disasters has been determined in previous studies (see Turner 1976, 1978;
Toll & Reynolds, 1992). This raises questions concerning the ability of organisations to
learn from crisis events. The aftermath of the Hilisborough Tragedy provided a focus for
the examination of organisational learning, an incident recent enough to be still the
subject of debate but historic enough for the initial emotional back-lash to have subsided.
This Chapter considers the evidence with regard to our principal hypothesis and resulting
research questions. It progresses to a consideration of the weaknesses and limitations of
the study. Finally recommendations for further research are made.
7.2 Cultural Readjustment
In our opening Chapter it was hypothesised that "A full cultural readjustment did
not occur following each of the disasters". The evidence from the data collected and
examined for the periods 1946-71, 1971-85 and 1985-9 provides little support for the
view that a 'full cultural readjustment' occurred. The evidence is indicative of a
persistently indulgent pattern, with a periodic switch to a punishment centred model in
the immediate aftermath of disaster incidents (Gouldner,1955). The focus upon
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hooliganism, in the latter two periods (i.e. 1971-89), is a further indicator of the
ongoing failure of the industry to consider the social and technical aspects of the
disasters.
Since 1989 there has been evidence of a partial cultural readjustment, although
safety officer respondents scored highly in the two factors indicating complacency. In
Chapter 3, figure 7.1 was introduced as a framework for assessing the extent of cultural
readjustment. Drawing upon the analysis in earlier Chapters, this thesis considers the
Cultural Readjustment7
Yes
.1
Double loop learning
Tacit Knowledge
Internal motivation
Outer Orientation
Mechanisms for ongoing learning
Modified norms and operating procedures
Single loop learning
Explicit knowledge
External Motivation
Inner Orientation
Coercive enforcement measures
No fundamental change
Figure 7.1: Cultural Readjustment Assessment Model
extent of cultural readjustment prior to and following 1989.
Chapter 5 indicated that organisational learning within the football industry was
deficient in the pre-1989 period. The basis for this view rests upon the analysis of the
various crisis incidents and an appraisal of the industry and its regulators in this period.
Prior to 1989 there was little evidence of double loop learning within the UK Football
Jndustry. The literal interpretation and application of the 'Green Guide' illustrated both
the reliance upon explicit knowledge and an unwillingness to question the norms and
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assumptions that underpinned it. Indeed, in the pre 1989 period, the persistence of a
mock bureaucracy in the relations between Clubs and regulators, provided further
evidence of the lack of double loop learning. The term 'business as usual' was used in
Chapter 5 to describe the behaviour of football Clubs and regulators following the
Bradford Fire. With regard to figure 7.1, this indicates no fundamental change to either
Clubs or regulators. Motivation, for example, was neither internal or external. It was in
many cases non-existent. Safety management was not a high priority for Football Clubs
in this period, as indicated by Arnold & Benveniste's (1988) survey and the data
presented in this thesis concerning the behaviour of Clubs. Despite the series of
incidents, portrayed in table 1.1, the majority of Football Clubs in England and Wales
failed to identify their own potential for crisis. As was shown in Chapter 5, Scotland was
in a number of cases different. By 1980 a number of Scottish Clubs had redeveloped
their stadia, reflecting the influence of the Ibrox Disaster and suggesting some internal
motivation. In summary, in the pre 1989 period there has been little evidence of any
cultural readjustment, with the exception of a limited number of Scottish Clubs.
Since 1989, despite the extensive redevelopment of many stadia and the clear
improvements in the quality of stewarding (a view expressed by the Safety Officers
themselves and more independently by the Police Forces Middleham 1993), there is little
evidence of a significant change in culture. Although the FLA has stated its commitment
to promoting good safety practice, a view reinforced by some Local Authorities, it may be
that the impetus provided by the Taylor Report (1989, 1990) has already waned, making a
full change unlikely. This is however, speculation about the future. From the data
collected there were few examples of double loop learning. The inner orientation of
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many Clubs, identified in this study, may provide a barrier to ongoing learning (Smith,
1995 argued that external verification was a key driver of the learning process). The
SAG may provide a means of challenging this inner orientation, although evidence
presented in this thesis indicates that this has only occurred in some instances. In some
cases the SAG appeared to be a positive forum for the free and frank discussion of safety
matters, suggesting a useful mechanism for learning and cultural readjustment. However,
even the 'better practice' SAGs were not without their problems. The usual exclusion of
supporters and the absence of senior Club executives do not suggest a fundamental
change to the inner orientation of football Clubs, identified as a key defence mechanism
in Chapter 2. In 'worst practice' examples, the non-participation of the Clubs themselves
in the SAGs provided further evidence of their inner orientation.
For cultural readjustment to occur, there is a need for mechanisms to assist and
support ongoing learning. The SAGs and the Football Safety Officer's Association have
the potential to fill this role but only if there is a commitment to learn on the part of the
Clubs themselves. The evidence of the failure to learn from the disasters of 1946, 1971
and 1985, in addition to the mixed response to the Hillsborough Tragedy, does not
encourage high expectations.
The analysis of the four principal crisis events and the intervening periods included
in Chapter 5, provided limited evidence of fundamental change within the industry. The
Hillsborough Tragedy appears to have had a symbolic importance that the other stadium
disasters did not; a view expressed by respondents from Football Clubs, Local
Authorities and other agencies. It is difficult to ascertain however, just what the
Hillsborough Tragedy meant to these organisations. As this thesis has shown there are
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still very different perceptions regarding the underlying causes of the Hilisborough
tragedy and different assessments of the lessons to be learnt. The cultural response does
not appear to have challenged the technical mindset identified in Chapter 1. For
example, there is still a general tendency for Clubs and Local Authorities to accept
guidelines without question. There was evidence in one case only of their use in a
flexible rather than a rigid way. The weaknesses of the current SAG system and the
persistence of a 'punishment centred' approach are also indicative of limited cultural
change. Clearly this is a complex phenomena given the evidence of the desire by all
Clubs to improve their safety practice. The expression of such desires may be criticised
as 'empty words', yet they were sincerely expressed. This indicates the complexity of the
phenomena and highlights the role played by a number of factors of which culture,
structure, communications and economic context have been identified as key. In short,
while the mechanisms to support ongoing learning may exist, barriers to cultural
readjustment continue to exert a powerful restraining influence. Thus, it has been argued
that cultural readjustment concerns the translation of challenged assumptions into new
norms and operating procedures. There is little evidence, however, of changed
procedures prior to 1989. Since then all 113 Clubs have appointed Safety Officers and
have 'improved' their training of stewards. The evidence suggests that despite the
obvious improvements, old beliefs and assumptions regarding the nature of football
crowds and the importance of technical modifications have impeded real cultural change.
In summary, there is little evidence to refute our hypothesis from the pre-1989
period. Since 1989, although it is difficult to argue that a full cultural readjustment has
occurred, there is some evidence of change and the existence of 'vehicles' that can drive
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this process (e.g. Football Safety Officers' Association, Football Licensing Authority).
Given the apparent significance of the Hilisborough tragedy, described by Taylor (1990)
as an 'endpoint,' why has only limited cultural change occurred?
7.3 Organisational Learning from crisis
The second focus of this thesis concerned organisational learning from crisis and
represented an attempt to understand why knowledge acquired through the public inquhy
process was not translated into changed behaviour. This section summarises the findings
with regard to organisational learning and seeks to address those issues raised in Chapters
I and 2. Particular attention is drawn to the role played by organisational filters including
culture, structure and communication. The key research questions identified in the
conclusions to Chapter 1 concerned the role played by these factors in influencing or
restricting learning in the aftermath of the stadium disasters. In Chapter 2 a number of
frameworks were introduced to assist in the examination of these factors. These
frameworks provided the basis for the analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the results of
which are now summarised with regard to the question: "Why did the football industiy
fail to learn following the disasters?"
7.3.1	 Culture: Views of the Underlying Causes of the Stadium Disasters
In Chapter 1 it was argued that the views of decision makers regarding the causes of
crises would act as a powerful mindset, and thus influence both their interpretation of
public inquiry fmdings and their behaviour in forming and implementing stadium
management policies.
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7.3.1.1	 Culture: Crises have Simple Causes
There is still a persistent view that crises have simple causes with a particular
emphasis given to technical failures. This view is closely connected to the perception
that each disaster is unique, which constrains learning to incident specific lessons. The
reported views of Club Secretaries regarding the causes of the Bradford and Hilisborough
disasters indicates that this perception is still prevalent within the UK Football industry.
A majority of respondents failed to grasp that the underlying causes of crises, as shown in
Chapter 5, combine many factors in a complex relationship. Chapter 6 indicated that
some 73% of safety officer respondents were outside the safety zone on this particular
factor (factor 5). Concentration upon one or two causes is unlikely to be sufficient to
prevent future disasters, as the failure of the technical solutions 'implemented' prior to
1989 illustrates. This persistent view, indicated by the current rigid interpretation of
guidelines, has been identified as one barrier to the effective learning process and
provides examples of the defence mechanisms fixation, and splitting.
An underlying premise of this thesis is that crises were the result of a combination
of social and technical elements, and that systems failures result from the complex
interaction between these component parts. The analysis of the stadium disasters
supports this view, yet, as has been shown, many of the measures implemented to 'deal'
with the problem of safety management within the industry have concentrated upon
technical failures rather than social-organisational ones. The prevalence of the view
amongst football industry officers indicates an emphasis towards single ioop learning,
and thus it acts as a barrier to effective learning.
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7.3.1.2	 Culture: The Hooliganism Mindset
The popularity of this view was outlined in Chapters 1 and 4. The coincidence of
the Bradford Fire and the Heysel Disaster led to Popplewell's (1986) focus upon the
'problems of violence' and his effectively downplaying the importance of his own
findings that hooliganism played no part in the Bradford Disaster. For many authors (see
for example, Redhead (1991), Dunning et a! (1986, 1991), Guilianotti et al (1994)
hooliganism has been the defining characteristic of football in the UK. The high
prominence given to 'soccer violence' has contributed to a mindset in which the issues of
crowd safety and control have become inseparable in the minds of official agencies and
the Football Clubs themselves. This influence was most pronounced in the summarising
comments of the Popplewell (1986) Report, but was also noticeable in the number of
official reports dealing with 'soccer hooliganism' in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The
causes of the Hillsborough Tragedy, as perceived by Club secretaries, illustrate the
strength of this view within the football industry to the current day. Indeed, the Guardian
(22/1 1/97) reported the calls of Jack Straw (Home Secretary) for an intergovernmental
convention to raise the issue of hooliganism prior to the Football World Cup (to be held
in France, 1998). The issue of crowd safety appears to be no longer on the agenda.
The persistence of this view acts as a barrier to learning because it encourages those
organisations with responsibility for crowd safety to apportion blame to a disparate,
dispersed and ill defmed group of individuals. In short, it permits these organisations to
avoid reflecting upon their own deficiencies and thus limits the likelihood of their
changing their own behaviour.
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The Hooliganism mindset also influences the preparations that Clubs make for
dealing with issues of crowd control and safety (the controversy surrounding the policing
of the Italy-England football match, held in Rome on 11th October 1997 is one example).
In three Clubs, stewards reported that their primary duty was to 'kick out
troublemakers'. Two other Clubs employed a 'mobile team' of large male stewards to
deal with 'any trouble'. Alternatively, the stewards at two other Clubs placed a high
priority upon crowd safety with the expectation that Police would deal with illegal
behaviour. Hooliganism still exerts a powerful influence upon the perceptions,
organisation, training and behaviour of Club stewards and their employers.
In summary, as this thesis has argued, the hooliganism issue may still be regarded as
the defming characteristic of British Football. The Home Secretary's call for a 'soccer
violence summit' indicates the continued strength of this view of football and the
spectator. The Hooliganism issue is still a major concern to the Football Industry and can
be seen to exert influence from board room to steward. It has been shown to have
influenced Popplewell's Report (1985, 1986) and Lord Chief Justice Taylor's comment at
Twickenham indicates that while he may not have emphasised it in his Reports, it was an
overriding consideration.
7.3.2	 Culture: The Five Factors and Defence Mechanisms
Chapter 2 identified the range of defence mechanisms that crisis prone organisations
may employ to avoid taking action. Chapter 6 identified five factors that highlight the
role played by defence mechanisms within the UK football industry in the Post 1989
period.
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7.3.2.1	 Fatalism: Nothing We do Will Matter
This defence mechanism is closely related to the belief in the simple causes of crises
and the belief that disasters, by their very nature, are impossible to prepare for. A number
of respondents reminisced about the 'good old days' when ground capacities were twice
as large and 'there were no problems'. From the data collected (Chapter 6, factors 1 and
5) there was a significant difference between the responses of Club secretaries and Safety
Officers; the latter group indicated a less 'idyllic' perception of the past. This suggests
conflict within Clubs regarding safety management. However, the marginalisation of
many Safety Officers, discussed earlier, indicates that this defence mechanism is
frequently employed by those officials with budgetary authority within Clubs. Given the
earlier argument that learning involves the translation of knowledge into behaviour, the
marginalisation of Safety Officers acts as an important barrier to learning. The fatalistic
view is most influential, however, as a means of justiQ, ring doing nothing. As Fl
commented' its low, low odds'.
7.3.2.2	 Complacency
This defence mechanism, linked closely to denial and disavowal, indicates
assumptions concerning the value of preparing for crises and the ability of Clubs to deal
with them effectively. As was shown in Chapter 6 (factors 2 and 4), a high level of
complacency was indicated by both Club Secretaries and Safety Officers. Evidence of
incidents and near misses since 1989 has been provided in this thesis, indicating that such
complacency is misplaced. Further, the assumption that what is being done is sufficient,
or that current procedures are adequate will stifle the critical questioning that is vital to
the double loop learning process that is, in turn, vital to cultural readjustment.
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Our survey of football Safety Officers indicated dangerously high levels of
complacency with regard to their ability to deal with crises. This complacency contrasts
with the difficulties reported in the immediate aftermath of each of the disasters analysed.
Further, in the course of direct observations, there were instances at every ground visited,
except one, of poor practice. These included stewards leaving locked gates and fire doors
unattended; stewards attired in inappropriate clothing (e.g. platform shoes) and;
inaudible public address speakers. Moreover despite claims by many Clubs to monitor
stewards' training, these reports appeared to represent an ideal rather than the actual state
of affairs. The training of stewards at a number of Clubs included no more than a tour of
the ground, instruction in the use of fire extinguishers and a video of either the Bradford
Fire or the Hillsborough tragedy. In many grounds the fire extinguishers are of various
sorts and as a number of stewards indicated, although they had been trained in the use of
one, there were many other types with which they were unfamiliar.
Complacency influences learning because it may suggest that 'we already do
enough' or 'it cannot happen to us'. In particular, a belief that compliance with the
'Green Guide' is sufficient may lull Clubs into a false sense of security concerning their
vuinerability and ability to deal with crisis incident. The concerns of the police that at
least 25% of Clubs have stewarding that is less than satisfactory (Middleham, 1993)
indicates that improvements to stewarding remain imperfect.
7.3.2.3	 Displacement
Displacement of responsibility can be seen to act as a barrier to Clubs, and other
agencies, from taking responsibility for ensuring the safety of their spectators; creating
the illusion that safety management is beyond their control. In the period 1946-89, given
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the confusion between crowd safety and control, both were perceived to be the
responsibility of the police. This perception was shared, from the evidence collected, by
Clubs, Local Authorities and police alike. George (1993) in a report for ACPO
recommended that the role of police and Club be clearly defined to avoid any
misunderstandings. The George (1993) Report may be seen as a part of the movement
reducing police presence inside football grounds. This has been physically recognised by
the renaming of what were formerly 'police control rooms' as 'matchday control rooms'
emphasising either the Club's primary responsibility for crowd matters, or that at the least
that it be a multi-agency effort. It should be noted that in Scotland the police still perform
a major role inside football grounds.
Although displacement largely refers to statutory agencies, displacement also refers
to the smoke screen of the badly behaved spectator. The idealised view of the past does
not stand up to rigorous examination as Williams et a! (1987) have argued and our Table
1.1 illustrates. The ongoing confusion of crowd control with crowd safety, evident in
this study, has acted to block effective learning. The evidence presented in Chapter 4
indicated that this focus upon hooliganism was general to all agencies within the football
industry. The views of respondents concerning the causes of the Hilisborough Disaster
suggests that this is still a widely held view within the industry. It has been argued
throughout this thesis that the focus upon the issue of hooliganism has been to the
detriment of crowd safety. On one level it prejudices the responses of those tasked with
ensuring crowd safety, encouraging individuals to misinterpret warning signals as crowd
trouble rather than crowd distress. The most striking example being the Hilisborough
tragedy. At another level it creates the mindset in which new stadia are designed and
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modified. Finally, the focus upon hooliganism has dominated any discussion of crowd
related issues, as illustrated by Popplewell's (1986) concluding remarks concerning 'no
panacea for crowd violence.' This has created the smokescreen, convenient to some, that
has prevented a proper examination of crowd safety management and has hindered the
application of relevant legislation to other sports.
7.3.2.4	 Blame Avoidance
'Blame avoidance' concerns the openness of the various agencies involved to learn.
Taylor (1990) reported a sharp criticism of the South Yorkshire Police following the
Hilisborough disaster:
"In all some 65 police officers gave oral evidence at the Inquiry. Sadly I must report
that for the most part the quality of their evidence was in inverse proportion to their
rank. There were many young constables who as witnesses were alert, intelligent and
open.....By contrast, with some notable exceptions, the senior officers in command
were defensive and evasive witnesses.0 (p49)
and
"It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South
Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in
what occurred. Mr. Duckenfield, under pressure of cross-examination, apologised for
blaming the Liverpool fans for causing the deaths. But, that apart, the police case was
to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor
the pens. It was argued that the fatal crush was not caused by the influx through gate C
but was due to barrier 124a being defective. Such an unrealistic approach gives cause
for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly
and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced." (Taylor, 1989, p50)
The search for scapegoats has impeded the search for full explanations of what happened.
Some respondents reported that safety advisory groups could be characterised by the aim
of each agency to ensure that it could not be blamed if an incident occurred. Such a
culture is likely to encourage a rigid application of any code rather than facilitate a
flexible approach to meet the needs of each stadium as envisaged by the FLA. This
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reflects an inner orientation identified in Chapter 2 as a potential barrier to learning. As
the examples illustrate, evidence of blame avoidance was identified with regard to all
agencies involved in the football industry. This may reflect a weakness of the public
inquiry system that seeks to apportion blame.
7.2.3.5	 Inner Orientation
Smith (1995) identified 'self generated turbulence' as a mechanism for assisting
double loop learning, (which underpins cultural readjustment as it suggests the
questioning of underlying assumptions). External verification was identified as one
potential element of such turbulence. The purpose of this process is to challenge
organisational assumptions by looking at processes, noims, etc., from alternative
perspectives. The inner orientation of football Clubs and authorities, identified in
Chapters, 4, 5 and 6, counters such a process. The reluctance of many Clubs to canvas
supporter views, to attend SAGs or to support in some instances the Safety Officers'
Association is indicative of this inner orientation which blocks double loop learning by
seeking to avoid contrary views.
An inner orientation closes down opportunities to learn, by encouraging a 'virtual'
siege mentality. The comments of secretaries regarding supporters' comments were
indicative of this mentality. This orientation also affects relations between the various
agencies involved in the SAGS and arguably, makes them less effective as a result.
7.3.2	 Structure
The analysis of structure within this thesis was based largely upon Mintzberg's
(1983) configurational approach. As argued previously, such an approach emphasises the
importance of a consistency between structure, culture, strategy pattern, co-ordination and
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other features appropriate to a particular environment. It should be noted that although
the three key factors are treated separately, they are inextricably linked.
7.3.2.2	 The Structure of Football Clubs
The organisational structures of football Clubs do not lend themselves to rigorous
safety management. The 'jack of all trades' role of many chief executives and secretaries,
combined with the part time employment of many Safety Officers, may lead to safety
issues falling betwixt the two. The Bradford tragedy provided a stern warning of the
dangers of this. Lack of time and resources may increase the pressures to focus upon
explicit knowledge and thus to treat the Green Guide as 'gospel'. This is because it is
easier to deal with the well structured, technical issues, than with the ill structured
problems associated with developing a safety culture. Our analysis suggests that for
many Clubs, particularly those in Scotland and the Football League, this structure still
persists and that safety management is, as a result, neither properly resourced nor properly
attended to. This indicates a structural impediment to effective learning as it creates a
context in which explicit knowledge is not necessarily translated into the tacit form which
would lead to changed operating norms and procedures. A further impediment concerns
the status of Safety Officers.
7.2.4	 The Status of Football Safety Officers
A related point concerns the status of Safety Officers within their organisations.
While many are isolated from day to day decision making by their part time contracts,
many are marginalised by lowly status and a perception that their task is that of chief
steward, to ensure that stewards turn up on time. Evidence in support of this conclusion
was provided in Chapters 4 and 5. There are cultural, structural and communication
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issues here. Perceptions of the relative unimportance of the task result in a part time
appointment, with a reporting line to an executive, at best, who has limited time owing to
the wide range of responsibilities held. Lack of time and structural isolation combine to
limit communications. Additionally, as shown in Chapter 4, the safety officer may be so
poorly regarded that funding for vital training and education is not forthcoming from the
employing Club. The role and status of the safety officer plays a vital part in
determining the effectiveness of the translation of explicit knowledge from inquiries into
the behaviour of the Club with regard to safety. It is argued that frequently the safety
officer is unable to influence adequately Club behaviour thereby restricting the
effectiveness of real learning.
7.2.5	 Communications
Closely linked to structure is the issue of communication. The frequently observed
structural isolation and lowly status of the Club Safety Officer acted as an impediment to
the communication of relevant information, either concerning what was required or
reports based on the monitoring of previous events. As Braithwaite & Fisse (1987)
argued, effective self regulation requires a good deal of informal communication between
top management and those responsible for compliance. The perception of safety officer
as chief steward, evident in many non-Premiership Clubs indicates that such informal
communications are unlikely.
7.2.6	 Legislation: A Technical Response
Without exception, all legislation relevant to safety in sports grounds has been
enacted as a response to disaster (de Quidt's 1997b 'tombstone legislation'). There has
been an apparent willingness for government, football authorities and Clubs to seek
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technical solutions and formulas to help ensure that such tragedies never happen again.
However, as we have seen, purely technical solutions rarely take full account of the
complexity of crowd related disaster, as Canter et al (1989) argued:
"There is one other very simple flaw in the engineering considerations. The calculation of
the use of a set of exits is made by identifying all the exit widths available to people in
particular spectating positions and dividing the total number of unit widths by the total
number of people. This is an elementary averaging exercise. But anybody who has looked
around in a theatre, or at any other public place of entertainment at the end of the
performance, will have noticed that unlike engineers' numbers people do not divide
themselves evenly between the exits available. People will tend to go to the exits they
know or to the ones that lead in directions they wish to take." (J)96)
Technical "solutions" only serve to create a climate of incubation unless the core
behavioural aspects of organisations are also addressed. Promoting good standards is a
less well structured problem than identifying and dealing with extreme examples of bad
practice. This poses particular problems for the type of regulatory regime.
Gouldner's (1955) analysis identified the weaknesses of both the 'mock' and
'punishment-centred' approaches. Yet those tasked with overseeing the stadium
licensing process are those with either technical or enforcement expertise. The
concentration upon compliance, within a context in which each agency is keen to avoid
blame if a disaster occurs, limits the potential for the exchange of ideas suggested in
Gouldner's representative pattern. Braithwaite & Fisses' (1987) 5 characteristics of the
effective self regulating organisation do not apply well to many football Clubs. Power is
highly centralised and remote from the safety officer, there is little monitoring of safety
compliance and training is minimal. The adversarial relationship noted between some
Clubs and Local Authorities acts as a further barrier to real organisational learning,
although it may achieve the objective of ensuring a minimum standard of compliance.
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This tendency to over emphasise the technical elements only of socio-teclmical
failure reflects the prevailing beliefs and assumptions of key decision makers. Pauchant
& Mitroff (1992) criticise the tendency of some professionals to fragment complex
questions into microscopic parts that distort the real issue. Of course this does mean that
'we dispose of the baby and the bathwater' but that it is argued that a stronger balance
must be created between the complexity of the 'technology concerned' and the
complexity of human behaviour which manages it. Turner (1994) suggests, from a study
of public inquiry recommendations, that approximately seventy per cent deal with social
issues. This study has indicated that those recommendations of a technical nature are
most likely to be implemented. This requires further investigation to determine whether
the fmdings from the football industiy can be translated to others. The real problem may
be to encourage organisations to go beyond implementing recommendations concerning
tangible changes (for example, introducing all seater stadia, painted gangways etc.) to
implementing the spirit of the legislation. Technical 'improvements' may be introduced
with little understanding of why they should be introduced or as a key element of socio-
technical development. The evidence that has been collected indicates that for many
clubs technical changes have been introduced because of regulation and external
pressures. For these clubs the introduction of change has been an end in itself and some
key decision makers have not sought to understand the underlying rationale for such
changes. For example, the apparent conflict between club chairmen and their safety
officers reflect the differing views within football clubs themselves. This also indicates
that the particular pattern of interplay and integration between social and technical issues
will vary significantly between clubs and reflect not only cultural assumptions, but
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organisational politics, structure and financial considerations. Any understanding of what
we have described as a largely 'technical response' to the stadia disasters or socio-
technical failures of the past must be firmly rooted in an understanding of the vaiying
influence of culture, structure, finance and organisational politics. The development of
Turner's (1976, 1978) model of cultural readjustment aims to highlight the interplay of
these factors and show that the process of knowledge transfer is a complex one and that
the forces (identified throughout this thesis) that shape its interpretation and
implementation are as important, if not more important, than the knowledge itself.
The reliance upon 'technical solutions', identified in this study reflects the strength
of a confidence in a technocratic approach. That is, such beliefs and assumptions are
firmly embedded in the social framework.
7.2.9	 Organisational Learning in the Football Industry 1946-97
In Chapter 1 a modified version of Turner's (1976, 1978) model of organisational
learning from crisis was shown. It was argued in Chapter 1 that a weakness in this
approach concerned the limited emphasis upon the post crisis incident phase. This
weakness arises from the failure of this study to examine how the findings and
recommendations from public inquiries are translated into behaviour. Figure 7.2
represents, more completely, the organisational learning and cultural readjustment
process. There are two key additions to the frameworks utilised in earlier studies.
First, the organisational filters, through which explicit knowledge is interpreted, are
identified. These, it has been argued throughout this thesis, represent a key stage in the
translation of organisational learning into behaviour. The roles played by culture,
structure and communications have been examined at length in this thesis. This
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Chapter has thus far, highlighted how these factors have acted as barriers to learning
within the football industry. The evidence presented in this thesis strongly supports
the view that prior to 1989 there was little change to the operating norms and
procedures within football stadia. In the post 1989 period the points identified in the
preceding section indicate that despite significant changes in the regulatory climate
these impediments to organisational learning remain. Culture plays an important role
through defence mechanisms that deny or minimise the potential threat or simply
displace blame or responsibility to other agencies or groups. High levels of
complacency may reflect confidence in the technical changes to many football stadia
but ignore the slower development of safety management through the effective
management of crowds. The status and structural isolation of the safety officer may, in
some cases, enable the continuation of the convenient ignorance of football chairmen
and directors with regard to safety. This ignorance is further encouraged by the
frequent absence of these groups from SAG. Further, the 'jack of all trades' role of the
secretary or chief executive ensures that only high priority tasks receive proper
attention. With reference to figure 7.1 the degree and type of organisational learning
appears, from the data examined, to be primarily single rather than double loop and
concern the transfer of explicit rather than tacit knowledge.
The model resulting from this study identifies three further stages to those
suggested by Turner (1976) and loft & Reynolds (1992), namely knowledge
transfer(6.1), the learning process (6.2) and active learning (6.3). These are shown in
table 7.1 alongside Turner's (1976) six stage model.
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Initial Beliefs And Norms
71
Precipitating Incident
No Cultural
Readjustment
Immediate Rescue & Recovery
Perception Of Symbolic Importance Of Incident
Low	 High
I
Examine Technical &
	
Public Inquiry
Procedural Issues	 Challenge To Existing Norms
(incident specific learning)
Dissemination Of Inquiry Findings
Regulators	 (iconic learning)
Through Organisalional Filters
Learning Filters
Culture - Defence Mechanisms, inner/outer orientation, fatalism
Structure & Communications
4	 No Cultural Change
	 Cultural Readjustment
New Norms and Belief
(isomorphic learning)
Figure 7.2 Organisational Learning and Cultural Readjustment Process
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A deficiency of the model utilised by Turner (1976) and Toft & Reynolds (1992)
is that it places too liftle emphasis on the post recovery stage. Table 7.1 highlighted
that in the case of the football disasters the public inquiry process did identif' many of
the problems and solutions some forty years prior to Taylor's (1989, 1990) Reports.
That is, the relevant knowledge had been acquired. What was missing from the process
of cultural readjustment was the means by which that knowledge could be transferred
to relevant organisations. This was a particular problem in the football industry given
the convenient ignorance of administrators and directors of Clubs. From our analysis
the various regulatory agencies play an important role in transferring that knowledge to
football Clubs. However, the learning process is integral to the Clubs themselves. The
regulatory agencies cannot learn for them. The punitive approaches identified in this
analysis, it appears, may provide a useful means of ensuring technical compliance but
are less effective in promoting good practice. Punitive approaches try to alter
behaviour without changing the 'personality' or makeup of individual Clubs.
Conversely the seemingly weaker consensual approach seeks to encourage more basic
changes to the culture and structures of football Clubs. In so doing, an unstated aim,
must be to change a resistant culture into a proactive one. The acid test for cultural
readjustment, must be in our opinion, un-coerced changes to operating norms and
procedures. As has been shown, this is a lengthy process and one that is not simply
dependent upon the symbolic importance of a crisis incident. The 'status' of an
incident will be one factor, but as we illustrate in figure 7.3 there are many system
components, including the various regulatory agencies, that contribute to the learning
process.
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Stage of Development 	 Feature	 Comments
• Stage I: Initial Beliefs &
	
Failure to comply with	 Violation of existing
Norms	 existing regulations	 precautions
Stage 2: Incubation Period 	 Rigidities of beliefs and 	 A. Events unnoticed or
perceptions.	 misunderstood because of
Decoy Phenomena	 erroneous assumptions
Disregard complaints from	 B. Events unnoticed or
outsiders.	 misunderstood because of
Information difficulties and
	 difficulties of handling
noise.	 information in complex
The involvement of strangers.	 situations
Failure to comply with	 C. Effective violation of
discredited or out of date	 precautions passing
regulations.	 unnoticed because of cultural
Minimising of emergent	 lag in formal precautions
danger	 D. Events unnoticed or
misunderstood because of a
reluctance to fear the worst
_____________________________ ______________________________ 	 outcome
Stage_3:_Precipitating_Event ______________________________ ______________________________
Stage_4:_Onset	 ________________________________ ________________________________
Stage 5: Rescue & Salvage
Stage 6: Full Cultural 	 Defmition of new well	 The establishment of a new
Readjustment	 structured problems and
	
level of precautions and
appropriate precautions in	 expectations.
inquiries following the
______________________________ 	
disaster.	 ________________________________
Stage 6.1: Knowledge	 Dissemination of knowledge	 Communication of new
Transfer	 acquiredfrom inquiry	 expectations to target
___________________________ ____________________________ 	 organisations
Stage 6.2: Learning Process	 Consideration of knowledge	 Cultural readjustment
from inquiries, 	 process triggered by
Knowledge filtered through	 perceptions re. the symbolic
culture, communications and 	 importance ofprecipitating
structures of organ isational 	 event.
personnel.	 Propensity of an
Questioning of
	 organisation to learn
organisational norms and
	 determines effectiveness of
operating procedures. 	 learning process.
Organisational cultural
___________________________	 readjustment occurs
Stage 6.3: Active Learning	 New norms and operating	 Establishment of mechanisms
procedures reflect new state	 to facilitate ongoing learning
______________________	 of knowledge	 (ideally).
Table: 7.1 : Cultural Readjustment and Learning from Crisis Model
(italics represent additions to Turner's model of cultural readjustment
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7.2.10	 Regulation
The failure of self regulation in the pre 1989 period lies at the heart of the current
regulatory system. Drawing from Gouldner's (1955) framework, it can be argued that
one reason for the ineffectiveness of self regulation was the failure of Clubs to
recognise the value of safety management. The use of the various defence
mechanisms, iimer orientation and fatalistic beliefs of executives combined to create an
environment in which crowd safety was not taken sufficiently serious. This failure
was compounded by the apparent failure of regulatory bodies in the 1975 - 89 period
which saw the emergence of a mock bureaucracy. Other factors influencing the failure
of self regulation included, the lack of resources given to routine administrative,
including safety, tasks and the lack of adequate training. It is apparent since 1989 that
more resources have been provided, in the form of the safety officer. However, it is
clear that the cultural climate in many Clubs is not conducive to effective self
regulation given the lowly status of the safety officer.
7.10.2	 The Style of Regulation
A key fmding which emerged from the data concerned the different styles adopted
by the various Local Authorities. Although two pure styles (punishment centred and
consensual) were identified, the responses suggested a continuum. The approach
adopted by the regulatory authority may influence organisational learning, as
represented in Figure 7.2 and Table 7.1. The punishment centred approach may
encourage the application of technical solutions because these are well defined and
lend themselves to a legalistic approach. Promoting good practice is less well defmed
and may be better suited to a representative approach, such as that advocated by the
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FLA. As argued previously, this latter style was complemented, where appropriate, by
'coercive' measures, indicating that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
It should be noted that the current regulatory system emerged from a system of
self regulation that evidently was ineffective. However, there is an apparent danger
that by focusing upon the punitive aspects of regulation valuable learning opportunities
may be lost. A sound punitive base is required but it forms only one element of the
process of ensuring effective safety management. As Smith & Tombs (1995) argued,
other elements include the involvement of third parties and a move towards
participative form of decision making. The consensual style reflected in the relations
between a number of Local Authorities and Clubs represents an example of this type of
system. However, a notable weakness evident in the majority of cases was the
exclusion of supporters from most SAG's.
In Scotland where the FLA have no role the picture of regulation is more
complex. First the police play a more hands on role in safety management, still taking
charge of matchday operations in most cases. This may reinforce the view that the
primary concern is crowd control rather than safety. Second, although Authorities such
as Strathclyde Regional Council (before local government reorganisation) play an
important role, it was evident from the data that they were further removed than their
English and Welsh counterparts.
7.4 Pauchant & Mitroff's (1988, 1992a) Onion Model
Pauchant & Mitroff (1988, 1992a) depict a four level model of organisational
culture. The factor analysis, reported in Chapter 6, indicated that there is little
justification for distinguishing between levels 1 and 2. Each of the five factors drew
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upon elements from both levels 1 and 2 indicating that the two are closely related if not
inseparable. A more accurate depiction, as suggested earlier, of the model might be of
a network of elements linked together. It should be noted that the distinction between
individual beliefs and core organisational assumptions is not unique to Pauchant &
Mitroff (1988, 1992a) but is shared, as table 2.1 indicated, with a number of other
theorists. This suggests that culture is a phenomenon, or phenomena, that is not yet
properly understood.
7.5 Review of the Study
The analysis presented suggests strongly that it is often social or organisational
failures which lead, ultimately to technical failures. It is people who design, construct,
operate and maintain both the physical and social elements of the systems that fail.
Despite the major contribution of social factors to the stadium disasters it is evident
from the analysis presented that technical changes are the most likely to be
implemented. This may reflect the often well structured nature of technical problems
particularly when contrasted with the ill structure of many organisational problems.
The study has however, identified a range of different beliefs and practices within
the industry providing evidence of a partial cultural readjustment. The Football
Licensing Authority recognise the importance of changing values and state their
intention of modif'ing their emphasis from technical conformity to the promotion of
good safety practice. However, the data collected from Local Authorities illustrates
that this may be problematic given the ongoing emphasis upon punitive measures
aimed at ensuring 'technical' compliance with the Green Guide.
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There was mixed evidence concerning the extent of cultural readjustment. The
evidence from Local Authorities suggested that whilst the Safety Advisory Groups
frequently provided a valuable forum for discussing safety and for pointing Clubs in
the right direction, there was still the need in many cases to use the threat of prohibition
notices or to reduce capacities via the safety certificate to coerce behaviour. In some
cases members of the Board were regular attendees at SAG's indicating the importance
of safety issues in those Clubs and ensuring that issues discussed could be fed back to a
Club's executive team.
7.6 Practical Recommendations
This thesis has examined the response of the football industry and associated
agencies to the various disasters 1946 - 97, in an attempt to assess the extent of cultural
readjustment following each incident and to explore the process of organisational
learning within it. From this analysis a number of practical recommendations have
emerged which are aimed at the various agencies involved in the setting, enforcement
and implementation of regulations. This section details these areas before moving on
to recommend areas for further research. Figure 7.3 identifies the key agencies and
groups operating within and around the UK football industry. The model highlights
how different agencies may exert different forms of influence or pressure to assist in
the change process.
7.6.1	 Football Club Executives and Chairmen
The most basic, yet fundamental, recommendation that can be made is that
football Club directors and executives become more involved in the safety management
process either through attendance at SAG meetings or by liaising with supporters. One
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feasible suggestion is that they occasionally make use of the stadia facilities as if they
were ordinary members of the public. There can be no replacement for the experience
of queuing to enter a groimd through a turnstile, of being pushed and shoved as one
moves through the various passageways, of using the catering facilities, toilets and
sitting in the cramped seats. There was a sense from many respondents from all
agencies that Club directors are cushioned from the reality of attending the match.
Braithwaite & Fisse's (1987) recommendations for effective self regulation emphasise
the importance of informal measures.
Additional measures should include clear performance guidelines that emphasise
the development of 'safety management' practices in addition to technical
improvements. As Mintzberg (1983) argued, organisations have to be trusted in the
first place because it is managers who have day to day responsibility for, and day to day
contact with, these issues.
With regard to safety management, it is the responsibility of directors to ensure
that safety management is properly recognised, resourced and monitored. This has
implications for smaller Clubs but a related recommendation is made in the next
section.
7.6.2	 Football Safety Officers
Despite the obvious fmancial implications for smaller Clubs there is a need for
ample resources to be provided for the role of Safety Officers. The many examples of
Club Secretaries and Chief Executives having responsibility for safety amongst many
other duties prevents safety issues from always being effectively managed. Where part
time Safety Officers are employed it is vital that they have suflicient status and
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adequate recognition by the directors of Clubs to ensure that safety management issues
are considered at board level. A possible solution for smaller Clubs would separate the
safety management responsibilities from those of Chief Steward. A professional Safety
Manager could be employed by a number of Clubs. Safety management would include
responsibility for planning and developing steward training, a board level profile and a
brief to liaise with other agencies in designing and modifying stadia and in plaiming for
future events. The chief steward would have responsibility for administering stewards,
ensuring that they attend matches and training events. A full time safety officer, with
responsibility for a number of Clubs would ensure a professional approach while not
placing too heavy a financial burden upon individual Clubs.
7.6.4.	 Safety Advisory Groups
The SAG clearly plays an essential role in ensuring that safety issues are fully
discussed. There is a danger, expressed by some respondents, that as new stadia
development and modemisation cease the SAG's will become talking shops. This
concern indicates a misunderstanding of the role of the SAG, which should develop
more fully the promotion of the good safety practice part of its responsibility. The role
of the Football Safety Officers Association should receive formal recognition from the
various Clubs and leagues, and consideration should be given to providing a bursary
scheme to ensure that all Safety Officers can participate in its activities and meetings.
The influence of the different types of regulatory style have been discussed
already. The role of the SAG is to lead the football Club towards a participatory model
of regulation which previous studies have indicated to be the most effective. Support
needs to be provided to the various Local Authorities, to aid in the exchange of
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information between them and to promote a consistent , but not uniform, approach.
The FLA may be the body to achieve this, although it does not appear to have yet done
this.
The FLA's emphasis upon consistency rather than uniformity appears positive in
that it recognises the differences between Clubs. To support this Clubs and Local
Authorities need to be encouraged to interpret the 'Green Guide' flexibly rather than
literally. Such encouragement could be achieved via a regulatory system that seeks to
promote a representative rather than punishment centred pattern. This is not to suggest
that coercion should be ignored as a tactic, but that it should be combined with
persuasive and educational methods.
7.6.5	 Football Agencies
A role for the various football authorities should be to co-ordinate and support
member Clubs in developing safety management practices; the guidance on stewards
training, published by the Football League, for example. The Football Authorities
could set the tone for safety management practice, by raising its profile and by ensuring
that hooliganism does not dominate any agenda.
7.6.2	 Private Security Firms
The use of private security companies has grown as Clubs and police have striven
to reduce the numbers of police officers at football grounds. Private security
companies are supposed to provide training to their staff. It was reported in a number
of cases however, that Local Authorities did not check this training as rigorously as that
of Club stewards. Further, a number of examples were cited, including one
experienced by the author, where someone could turn up on a match day, put on a
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stewards jacket and work as a steward. As there is a switch in emphasis from ensuring
sound structures to promoting safety management practices there is a need for greater
scrutiny to ensure that high standards of stewarding are maintained and developed.
7.7 Push and Pull
From the discussion above it follows that ensuring high standards of safety
management concerns a number of different agencies and groups. As figure 7.3
indicates those with a formal relationship with football Clubs are in a position to 'push'
Government
FIFA
UEFA
LocalFootball
Licensing
Autho	 allMsociatio
Football Leagues
PUSH
PUSH
Football
Club
PULL
Active	 PULL
Learning]
____________	 provernent 
I
StadiumI	 SafetyCulture
Figure 7.3: A Model for Controlling the Football IndustrY
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for better practice through formal regulations and ongoing interaction with football
Clubs. Although Government is shown one step removed from the football Club it
plays a key role through legislation and by keeping stadium safety high on the political
agenda. Given the systemic nature of the industry, Government is seen linked to media
and supporter interest groups who may play a vital role in pushing Government interest
whilst 'pulling' for better standards through complaints, and exposing examples of
poor practice. Following our earlier discussion of regulation, it is apparent that self
regulation rarely works effectively, certainly not in the case of the football industry in
the 1946-89 period.
7.8 Recommendations for Further research
This thesis has concerned the study of one industry over a long time period. The
role of culture, configuration and communications have been considered with regard to
organisational learning from crisis in the football industry. There is a need to extend
this investigation to other industries in order to test the generalisability of these
findings. Two important questions need to be addressed. First, what influence does
the style of regulation (punitive or consensual) have on the ability of organisations to
learn? Second, what means of knowledge transfer are most effective at promoting
changed behaviour?
Of particular importance is the notion of symbolically important events. Implicit
within the theory of cultural readjustment is the importance of the trigger event. To
utilise Pauchant & Mitroff's (1992a) typology of crisis: "How can managers be
encouraged to see accidents as crises and thereby trigger a full or partial cultural
readjustment?" More fundamentally, how can the learning organisation be created so
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that organisations may benefit from foresight as well as hindsight and avoid the costly
implications of experiencing crisis events? Inevitably, given this study's focus upon
learning from crisis, and its emphasis upon response to crisis events, the subject of
'learning organisations' per se has not been addressed in detail.
Given the limitations of the public inquiry process as a means of achieving
cultural change in this context, what other mechanisms might be used to achieve
effective organisational learning from crises?
7.8 Conclusions
This Chapter has attempted to summarise the key fmdings, make practical
recommendations and provide a justification for amendments to theory. The purpose
of these conclusions is to assess these findings with a view to determining the
contribution of this thesis to knowledge.
7.8.1	 Cultural Readjustment
Turner's (1976, 1978) influential work is well respected and highly cited. This
critique provides evidence of limitations, rather than deficiencies, in Turner's model of
cultural readjustment. As stated earlier, Turner's (1976, 1978) primary concern was
with 'readjustment' following public inquiries into a variety of man-made disasters.
This focus encouraged Turner (1976, 1978) to concentrate upon the pre crisis incident
phases. The focus of this study upon a series of crisis incidents within the same
industry has permitted consideration of the post crisis stages and the learning that may
take place. Since Turner's (1976, 1978) analysis there has been a dramatic growth in
organisational studies and interest in the phenomenon of the learning organisation. The
combination of these two factors has provided the platform for this study and the
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identification of additional stages to Turner's model of cultural readjustment. This
adjusted model (see figure 7.2, table 7.1), grounded empirically, suggests that there are
a number of forces that may influence organisational learning. Figure 7.2 also
identifies the role played by other agencies in the cultural readjustment process, a role
not made explicit in Turner's (1976, 1978) analysis.
7.8.2Organisational Learning from Crisis in the UK Football Industry 1946-97
The major area of contribution made by this thesis concerns our understanding of
the football industry. Previous studies of the industry have included historical (see for
example, Walvin, Mason), 	 sociological (see for example, Dunning et a! 1981,
Guilianotti 1994) or economic (see for example Sloane, Arnold & Benveniste )
analyses. The peculiar administrative and cultural characteristics of the industry have
received scant attention outside popular studies or official reports (see for example
Chester ). With regard to the crises that have provided a focus to this study, this
represents the first attempt to deal with the industry from an organisational theory
perspective. Additionally, the inclusion of Local Authorities and the FLA is unusual
for studies of this kind, despite the vital role these agencies play in setting much of the
context in which current stadium safety issues are considered. The different styles of
regulation, identified within this thesis, may provide the basis for further study and
greater understanding of the regulatory process.
It is argued in this thesis that previous studies of the football industry have been
deficient for two main reasons. First, many of these studies have examined the
industry from a single perspective. Although the studies of hooliganism have made a
major contribution to our understanding of that particular phenomenon, they have, as
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has been argued, supported the mindset that perceives soccer violence as the industry's
defining characteristic. Second, and related to this first point, is that many previous
studies have focused upon football Clubs and authorities rather than upon the wider
system of which it is a part. The inclusion of Local Authorities and the FLA was vital
to understanding the context of football Clubs.
More specifically, the contribution of this thesis to our understanding of the
football industry concerns the specific research objectives outlined in Chapter 1. There
is little evidence in support of a full cultural readjustment occurring in the 1946-89
period. The 1989 Hillsborough tragedy did have a symbolic importance greater than
preceding disasters, but it is unclear whether or not a full cultural change has occurred
since then. The evidence within this study supports the view that the failure to learn
from previous disasters has been strongly influenced by cultural forces including not
only the persistence of strongly held beliefs but the ongoing employment of defence
mechanisms. Changes to core assumptions require the analysis and understanding of
these mechanisms so that active learning can take place. However, in addition to
culture the means of communication and structures of organisations may also act to
distort information, impede its flow or prevent the translation of knowledge into new
operating norms and procedures. Given the systemic relationship between these factors
any attempt to encourage a cultural readjustment requires that attention be focused
upon each of these elements, if such an attempt is to succeed. For cultural readjustment
to occur there is a need for mechanisms to assist and support ongoing learning. The
SAGs and the Football Safety Officer's Association have the potential to fill this role but
only if there is a commitment to learn on the part of the Clubs themselves. The evidence
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of the failure to learn from the disasters of 1946, 1971 and 1985 in addition to the mixed
response to the Hilisborough Tragedy does not encourage high expectations.
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Statistics from Selected World-wide Stadia
- Country : City	 Capacity	 Previous Capacity	 Present site
Italy____________________ ___________________ ____________________
Milan: San Siro
	 83,107	 ____________________	 1926
Turin(new)	 _________________ _________________ 1990
Turin (old)	 49941	 70000	 1933
Genoa	 44000	 51000	 1928
Verona	 25000	 42500	 1963
Udine	 42133	 47616	 1976
_______________________	 (38685 FIFA_limit) ______________________ _______________________
Bologna	 40782	 50100	 1927
______________________	 (38000 FIFA_limit) _____________________ ______________________
Florence	 49033	 66344	 1932
_____________________	 (44781 FIFA_limit) ____________________ _____________________
Cagliari	 42855	 60000	 1970
____________________ 	 (41000 FIFA_limit) ___________________ ____________________
Palermo	 40500	 44860	 1932
Ban	 34000	 43000	 1934
Naples	 86000	 86000	 1960
______________________	
(74090 FIFA_limit) _____________________ ______________________
Rome: Stadio	 31630	 65000	 1959
Flaminio_____________________ ____________________ _____________________
Rome: Stadio	 80000	 80000 (90000)	 1953
Olimpico_______________________ ______________________ _______________________
Germany_____________________ ____________________ _____________________
Munich	 74000	 77895	 1972
Nuremberg	 55670	 60000	 1929
Frankfurt: Neckar
	 67963	 74000 (103000)	 1933
Frankfurt:Wald	 61992	 87000	 1925
Cologne	 60584	 63000	 1923
Dusseldorf	 68360	 68360	 1926/1972
Monchengladbach	 36800	 36800	 1978
Gelsenkirchen	 70298	 70298	 1973
Dortmund	 53970	 53970	 1974
Bochum	 49417	 49417	 1979
Hanover	 60355	 86500	 1954
Bremen	 40000	 40000	 1921
Hamburg	 61351	 75000	 1953
Berlin	 76006	 86000 (100000)	 1936
Holland_________________ ________________ _________________
Amsterdam:	 41433	 41433	 1928
Olympisch_____________________ ____________________ _____________________
Amsterdam: De	 27000	 27000	 1934
Meer_________________________ _________________________ __________________________
The Hague	 23500	 23500	 1927-85
Utrecht	 20000	 20000	 1982
Rotterdam: Feynoord	 58000	 61500	 1937
Rotterdam: Het	 26000	 26000	 1916
Kassel_________________________ _________________________ __________________________
Eindhoven	 28000	 28000	 1977
Arnhem	 26000	 26000	 1991
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France_____________________ ____________________ _____________________
Nantes	 52467	 52467	 1984
Bordeaux	 51460	 51460	 1938
Toulouse	 29900	 39540	 1938-1950
Nimes	 26180	 26180	 1938
Marseille	 45000	 54848	 1938
Monaco	 20000	 20000	 1939
St. Etienne	 48274	 48274	 1931
Lyon	 51680	 51680	 1920
Strasbourg	 42756	 49982	 1914
Lens	 51000	 51000	 -	 1934
Colombes	 Closed after Heysel 	 60000 (61772)	 1922
Paris:StadedeParis	 21000	 21000	 1922
Paris: des Princes	 49700	 49700	 1897
Spain_________________ ________________
Barcelona:Nou	 115000	 120000	 1957
Barcelona: de Sarria	 41000	 44000	 1923
Valencia	 49373	 49373 (50000)	 1923
Elche	 38750	 53000	 1976
Alicante	 38700	 38700	 1974
Malaga	 -	 42000	 42000	 1941
Seville	 47500	 47500	 1928
Seville: Pizjuan	 70000	 70000 (110000)	 1958-75
Madrid: Bernabeu	 90200	 90200 (120000)	 - 1947
Madrid: Calderon	 62000	 62000	 1966
Valladolid	 37500	 37500	 1982
Vigo	 33000	 33000	 1922
La Coruna	 28956	 40000	 1945
Gijon	 45000	 45000	 1917
Oviedo	 22284	 22284	 1932
Bilbao	 46223	 46223	 1913
San Sebastian	 27400	 27400	 1913
Zaragoza	 46290	 43349	 1923
GreatBritain	 ___________________ ___________________ ____________________
Wembley	 76000	 100000	 1922
Ibrox	 45000	 68000	 -	 1899
Old Trafford	 47985	 76982	 -	 1910
Anfield	 39858	 61905	 1892
St James Park	 30348	 68386	 1892
Goodison Park	 38500	 78299	 1892
Hillsborough	 40247	 72841	 _1899
Villa Park
	
40277	 76588	 - 1897
Ellarid Road	 33235	 57892	 1919
Ayresome Park
	
26500	 53596	 - 1899
RokerPark	 31887	 75518	 1906
Highbury	 47000	 73295	 1913
City Ground	 31920	 44946	 1898
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Selected Statistics from UK Rugby League Stadia
Club	 Current	 Highest	 Year	 Highest 1995-
_____________________	 Capacity	 Gate	 _______________	 6
Barrow Braves	 ____________	 21,651	 1938	 948
Batley	 _____________	 23,989	 1925	 3018
Bradford	 _____________	 69,429	 1953	 5546
Bramley	 12,600 (old)
	 1947
760	 1996	 760
______________ _________ (new)
	 _________ __________
Carlisle	 _____________	 2042	 1994	 850
Castleford	 ______________	 25,449	 1935	 5695
Chorley	 _____________	 2851	 1994	 1236
Dewsbury	 _____________	 26584	 1920	 2221
Doncaster	 10000 (old)	 1952	 1240
_________________ ____________ 1240 (new)	 1995	 _____________
Featherstone	 17531	 1959	 2422
Rovers_______________ _______________ _______________ ________________
Halifax	 _____________	 29153	 1959	 7776
Highfield	 18000 (old)	 1922	 468
1071	 1994
	
___________________ _____________	
(new)	 _____________ ______________
Huddersfield	 32912 (old)
	
1950	 6026
_________________ ____________ 9348 (new)
	 1950	 _____________
Hull	 _____________	 28798	 1936	 4180
Hull KR	 27670 (old)	 1953	 2073
	
____________________ ______________	 8557 (new)	 1991	 _______________
Hunslet	 24700 (old)	 1924	 2350
_________________ ____________ 2350 (new)
	 1995	 _____________
Keighley	 _____________	 14500	 1951	 4812
Leeds	 _____________	 40175	 1947	 18000
Leigh	 _____________	 31324	 1953	 1543
London Broncos	 ____________	 15013	 1981	 1465
Oldham	 _____________ 28000
	 1912	 4316
Rochdale	 26664 (old)	 1922	 3038
_________________ ____________ 8150 (new) 	 1989	 _____________
St Helens	 ____________	 35695	 1949	 17590
Salford	 _____________ 26470	 1937	 5194
Sheffield	 ______________ 7984	 1990	 4639
Swinton	 26891 (old)	 1964	 1221
	
____________________ ______________	
3501 (new)	 1992	 _______________
Wakefield Trinity ____________	 30676	 1921	 2463
Warrington	 _____________	 34304	 1949	 7714
Whitehaven	 _____________	 18500	 1960	 1819
Widnes	 ______________ 24205 	 1961	 5495
Wigan	 _____________	 47747	 1959	 13700
Workington	 _____________	 17741	 1965	 5960
York	 ______________ 4977
	
1990	 1077
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Statistics from UK Football Stadia
Premier Division
1995-6	 1988-9	 Record	 Post	 Planned
Capacity	 Capacity	 Gate	 Taylor	 Expenditure
________________ ________________ 	 (seated)	 _______________	 Costs £ ___________________
Arsenal	 38,500	 57,000	 73,295	 30m
_______________ _______________	 (17,200)	 (1932)	 ___________ __________________
Aston Villa	 39,341	 48,000	 76,588	 18.5m
______________ _____________	 (19,900)	 (1946)	 __________ ________________
Bolton	 22,616	 29,000	 69,912	 Im	 25,000 seat
______________	 (8,759)	 (7962)	 (1933)	 __________	 stadium 1997
Blackburn	 31,149	 21,956	 61,783	 25m	 Replace Stand
_______________ _______________	 (2,656)	 ______________ ___________ __________________
Chelsea	 31,760	 43,900	 82,905	 15.3m	 Buildnew
920,624)	 stand to
capacity of
_______________ _______________ ______________ ______________ ___________ 	 40,000
Coventry	 24,003	 29,800	 51,455	 7m	 Seat corner
______________ _____________	 (18,496)	 (1967)	 __________	 areas
Everton	 40,103	 50,271	 78,299	 5.6m	 redevelop
______________ ______________ 	 (26,471)	 (1948)	 ___________	 stands
Leeds	 39,775	 39,133	 59,892	 10.3m	 rebuild west
_____________ _____________ _____________ 	 (1967)	 __________	 stand
Liverpool	 41,210	 46,628	 61,905	 18.7m	 Extend stand to
(22,528)	 (1952)	 capacity of
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ___________ 44,500
Manchester	 32,344	 51,993	 84,569	 19m	 Capacity to
City_____________	 (25,883)	 (1934)	 __________	 45,000 by 2000
Manchester	 55,800	 56,385	 76,962	 43.5m	 Enhance
United	 ______________	 (25,686)	 (1939)	 ___________	 exterior
Middlesboro' 	 29,977*	 53,802	 1 8m	 Extend to
(1949)	 34,000
________________ ________________ _______________ _______________ ____________	
capacity
Newcastle	 36,610	 37,703	 68,386	 23.5m	 Increase
(11,413)	 (1930)	 capacityto
_____________ _____________ _____________ ____________ __________ 41,000
Nottingham	 30,602	 35,367	 49,946	 10.lm	 long term to
Forest	 (15,009)	 (1967)	 replace main
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ___________ stand
QPR	 19,017	 27,330	 35,353	 5.4m	 Extendroof
______________ ______________ 	 (15,330)	 (1974)	 ___________ _________________
Sheffield	 39,800	 54,324	 72,841	 lOm	 Upgrade stands
Wednesday_____________	 (23,324)	 (1934)	 __________ ________________
Southampton	 15,352	 25,175	 31,044	 2m	 relocate
______________ ______________ 	 (9,175)	 (1969)	 ___________ _________________
Tottenham	 33,157	 48,200	 75,038	 12.25m	 Upper tier
______________ ______________ 	 (17,681)	 (1938)	 __________ _________________
WestHam	 25,982	 35,556	 42,322	 ll.5m#	 Rebuildmain
______________ ______________ 	 (8,740)	 (1970)	 __________	 stand
Wimbledon	 Ground
share_____________ __________ ________________
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First Division
1995-6	 1988-9	 Record	 Post	 Planned
Capacity	 Capacity	 Gate	 Taylor	 Expenditure
_______________ ________________	 (seated)	 _______________	 Costs £ ___________________
Barnsley	 19,073	 36,987	 40,255	 5m	 Rebuild main
(2,287)	 (1936)	 stand &
disused spion
_____________ _____________ _____________ _____________ __________ kop
Birmingham	 25,936	 38,408	 67,341	 6.5m	 Increase
(9,368)	 (1939)	 capacity by
_____________ _____________ _____________ _____________ __________	 10,000
Charlton	 15,222	 20,000	 75,031	 8.6m#	 rebuild stand to
(10,000)	 capacity of
_______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ___________ 	 20,000
Crystal Palace	 26,309	 38,366	 51,482	 10.2m	 Reseat to
(11,508)	 (1979)	 42,000
________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ _____________ 	 capacity
Derby	 17,451	 26,500	 41,826	 700,000	 relocate by
_____________ _____________ 	 (10,222)	 _____________ __________	 1997
Grimsby	 8,807	 20,685	 31,651	 1.3m	 Relocate?
_____________ _____________ 	 (5,021)	 (1937)	 __________ ________________
Huddersfield	 19,663	 17,010	 67,037*	 15m	 Newstand
________________ ________________ 	
(5,300)*	 ________________ ____________ ___________________
Ipswich	 22,465	 37,345	 38,010	 1.2m	 long term to
______________ ______________ 	 (14,168)	 ______________ ___________ redevelop stand
Leicester	 22,517	 31,057	 47,298	 7m	 long term,
(15,123)	 (1928)	 redevelop east
_____________ _____________ _____________ _____________ __________	
stand
Luton	 9,975	 14,470	 30,069	 1.lm	 relocate
_______________ _______________ 	 (6,810)	 ______________ ___________ __________________
Millwall	 20,146*	 25,850	 48,672	 15.7m
______________ ______________ 	 (3,200)	 (1937)	 __________ _________________
Norwich	 21,272	 26,812	 43,984	 5.lm#	 build 9,500
_____________ _____________ 	 (11,225)	 (1963)	 __________	 stand
Oldham	 13,679	 21,949	 47,671	 4.22m	 Unknown
_____________ _____________ 	 (3,200)	 (1930)	 __________ ________________
Portsmouth	 26,452	 29,664	 51,385	 2m	 Redevelop two
(6,757)	 (6,676)	 (1949)	 (include	 sides of ground
s .75m
on
relocati
on
___________________ ___________________ ___________________ ____________________ 	 costs)	 ________________________
Port Vale	 22,356	 20,962	 50,000	 2.8m	 Build new
(17,046)	 (4,768)	 (1960)	 10,000 seat
______________ ______________ ______________ ______________ ___________ stand
Reading	 14,058	 13,500	 33,042	 300,000	 relocate
______________	 (2,242)	 (1,953)	 (1927)	 __________ ________________
Sheffield	 23,530	 44,010	 68,287	 3.5m	 Build new
United______________	 (13,597)	 ______________ __________ 	 stand
Southend	 12,549	 12,753	 31,090	 3.5m	 Buildnew
(12,651)	 (1979)	 stand while
looking for
____________	 new site
Stoke	 24,071	 35,812	 51,380	 200,000	 relocate in
_____________	 (8,996)	 (11,312)	 (1937)	 __________	 1997-8
Sunderland	 22,657	 37,775	 75,118	 1.3m+	 relocate in
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I	 (7,799)	 (9,025)	 (1933)	 850,000	 1997 (14.5m)
on
relocati
on___________________
Tranmere	 16,789	 18,500	 24,424	 3.lm	 Extend main
_____________ _____________ 	
(3,500)	 (1972)	 __________	 stand roof
Watford	 22,0 1 1
	 26,956	 34,099	 4m	 New East
______________ _____________	
(6,906)	 (1969)	 __________	 Stand
West	 25,329	 35,091	 64,815	 5.2m	 Rebuild stand
Bromwich_____________	 (10,675)	 (1937)	 __________ ________________
Wolves	 28,464	 25,000	 61,315	 16.5m	 Extend
_______________ _______________	 (9,320)	 (1939)	 -	 capacity
includes land purchase costs
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1988-9
Capacity
(seated)
16,696
(3,196)
12,038
(4,038)
15,519
(4,58)
12,100
(2,917)
29,026
(4,754)
30,868
(7,416)
8,844 (658)
20,961
(6,761)
18,506
(2,162)
12,838
(2,638)
5,900
(1,100)
19,797
(6,040)
24,077
(3,877)
14,374
(2,785)
17,440
(3,440)
17,913
(3,407)
15,983
(4,153)
7,250
0)
18,165
(3,165)
19,652
(5,062)
16,018
(1,358)*
22,426
14,109
Record
Gate
38,098
(1955)
28,799
39,146
39,626
36,747
43,335
38,742
54,775
27,603
30,968
(1939)
20,000
(1960)
55,019
(1949)
47,310
(1955)
22,750
(1964)
30,096
(1965)
25,170
(1952)
18,917
(1961)
27,833
950)
32,796
(1968)
32,000
(1972)
25,453
(1961)
34,445
(1957)
9,007
(1195)
28,123
(1938)
Post
Taylor
Costs £
400,000
180,000
600,000
300,000
235,000
3m
*
250,000
3m
265,000
I .5m
200,000
8m
500,000
2.25m
125,000
500,000
2m
500,000
265m
4.5m
150,000
1 .9m
500,000
Planned
Expenditure
40,000 all
seater stadium
5.5m, 12,000
seat stadia
Rebuild stand
& seat Kop
Seat terraces
(relocate
eventually)
Relocate -
uncertain
Seat stand and
build boxes
*
build 2 all
seater stands
3 new stands
for all seater
2004
Relocate
Rebuild main
stand to 15,000
seater
redevelop
terraces
Upgrade
facilities
relocate
Long term to
convert
terraces
Redevelop
ground
All seater by
2,000
Reseat main
stand
Relocate or
redevelop
Recover stand
Develop
redevelop
new stand
rebuild terrace
Second Division
1995-6
Capacity
Blackpool	 10,337
______________	 (2,987)
Boumemouth	 10,700
______________	 (3,080)
Bradford	 14,359
______________	 (6,320)
Brentford	 13,870
(3,905)
Brighton	 17,100
______________	 (5,1 88)_
Bristol City	 20,540
Bristol Rovers	 8,943
____________	 (1,026)
Burnley	 22,966
_______________	 (7,3 85)
Carlisle	 13,288
(2,161)
Chesterfield	 8,870
______________	 (2,200)
Crewe	 5,914
(4,814)
Hull	 14,996
______________	 (5,495)
Notts County	 20,300
Oxford	 9,572
______________	 (2,803)
Peterborough	 13,350
(9,650)
Rotherham	 11,533
_____________	 (4,486)
Shrewsbury	 8,000
______________	 (3,000)
Stockport	 11,761
____________	 (9,110)
Swansea	 15,638
____________	 (3,635)
Swindon	 15,341
Walsall	 8,985
______________	 (6,685)
Wrexham	 9,350
______________	 (5,046)
Wycombe	 9,649
______________	 (1,267)
York	 9,459
( ficI
378
Third Division
1995-6	 1988-9	 Record	 Post	 Planned
Capacity	 Capacity	 Gate	 Taylor	 Expenditure
________________ ________________ 	 (seated)	 ________________ - Costs £ ___________________
Barnet	 3,994	 11,120	 11,026	 750,000	 relocateground
______________	 (1,779)	 (880)	 (1952)	 ___________ _________________
Bury	 11,000	 8,337	 35,000	 2.9m	 Seatmainstand
_______________ _______________ 	 (2,700)	 _______________ ___________ __________________
Cambridge	 9,667	 12,500	 14,000	 280,000	 Relocate or
________________	 (3,242)	 (3,396)	 ________________ ____________ 	 redevelop
Cardiff	 17,759	 39,545	 61,566	 l.5m	 Seat terraces
______________	 (12,807)	 (5,545)	 ______________ ___________ _________________
Chester	 6,000	 8,784	 5,638
_____________ _____________ 	
(2,834)**	 (1994)	 __________ ________________
Colchester	 7,618	 6,500	 19,072	 450,000	 Seek new site?
______________	
(1,1440	 (1,084)	 ______________ ___________ _________________
Darlington	 7,046	 16,511	 21,023	 110,000	 rebuild.
______________ (1,212)	 (973)	 (1960)	 ___________ ________________
Doncaster	 8,254 (905)	 8,529	 37,149	 250,000	 redevelop or
_______________ _______________	 m(1,259)	 ______________ ____________	 relocate
Exeter	 10,570	 9,230	 20,984	 500,000	 To survive,
(1,690)	 (1,608)	 (1931	 relocate or
_______________ _______________ ______________ ______________ ___________ 	 redevelop
Fulham	 14,350	 19,400	 49,335	 750,000	 redevelop
______________	 (5,742)	 (7,540)	 (1938)	 ___________	 ground
Gillingham	 6,123	 19,589	 23,002	 150,000	 Redevelop
_______________	 (1,111)	 (1,225)	 (1948)	 ___________	 stand
Hartlepool	 7,229	 6,620	 17,426	 l.lm	 Build
(3,966)	 (1,582)	 (1957)	 conference
centre
Hereford	 8,856	 16,119	 18,114	 150,000	 relocateor
______________	 (2,754)	 92,304)	 (1958)	 ___________	 redevelop
Leyton Orient	 17,050	 26,500	 34,345	 375,000	 9.75m rebuild
______________	
(7,130)	 (7,172)	 (1964)	 ___________	 + facilities
Lincoln	 10,918	 11,248	 23,196	 3.5m
______________	 (9,251)	 (2,029)	 (1967)	 ___________ _________________
Mansfield	 7,033	 12,298	 24,467	 750,000	 Build new
______________	 (2,863)	 (3,448)	 (1953)	 ___________	 stadium
Northampton	 7,653*	 8,432 (357)	 24,523	 5.2m	 New stand
_____________ _____________ _____________ 	 (1966)	 __________ ________________
Plymouth	 19,960	 28,000	 44,526	 500,000	 Relocate
_______________	
(6,859)	 (3,259)	 (1934)	 ___________ __________________
Preston	 18,907	 18,500	 42,684	 Sm	 rebuild 3
_______________	 (9,168)	 (3,928)	 (1938)	 ___________	 stands
Rochdale	 4,895	 12,001	 24,231	 2.3m	 New stand
______________	 (2,054)	 (730)	 (1949)	 ___________ _________________
Scarborough	 4,980	 11,000	 11,130	 1.lm	 refurbish
______________	 (3,500)	 (833)	 (1938)	 ___________	 ground
Scunthorpe	 9,183	 11,226	 8,775	 150,000	 Training
______________	 (6,410)	 (4,800)	 (1989)	 ___________	 facilities
Torquay	 5,987	 4,999	 21,908	 2.2m	 Rebuild stand
______________	 (2,362)	 (1,450)	 (1954)	 ___________ __________________
Wigan	 7,201	 12,500	 30,611	 170,000	 relocate
____________	 (1,299)	 (1,100)	 (1929)	 __________ _______________
** Switched stadium in period
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Summary of Expenditure on Stadium Development Costs for
England and Wales
Division	 Premier	 First	 Second	 Third
Mean	 14.33M	 5.2M	 1.4M	 1.42M
Expenditure
1989-95	 __________________ _________________ _________________ _________________
SD	 10.7	 4.8	 1.86	 1.58
Mm	 0	 .2	 0	 .11
Max	 43.5	 16.5	 8	 5.2
N	 20	 24	 24	 24
Expenditure on Ground IniprovementlKedevelopment 199-9 in kooWaH eagueirerniereague
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/	 Contingency Planning
Cold	 Control
Square
Coupling & Complexitj'
* ,'
r0
Warm Triangle
Communicati	 Configuration
Self-Generated Turb	 ernal Verification
Source: Smith 1995
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Have you read either the Taylor or Popplewell Reports?
What do you think were the causes of the Hilisborough Tragedy?
What do you think were the causes of the Bradford Tragedy?
How was the club affected by the Hilisborough Tragedy?
Was Bradford any different
Have there been any near misses here?
What significant problems has the club had?
What is the club's attitude to safety now?
What has the club done to ensure that a similar tragedy does not occur here
Could the club do more?
How did the club respond to the Taylor Report
What physical changes were made
Were other changes to the management of crowds made too?
How would you summarise the club's fmancial position?
Club Structure:
No. of playing staff
No. of non-playing staff
How are these organised?
Who reports to the chairman
What are the roles of board and chairman
What is the role of the safety officer
How was he appointed
What was his previous job
What links are there with external agencies, spectators etc.
Do you have a crisis plan
What does it cover
Do you keep accident stats - ask to Se them
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Appendix 3.2
Football Safety Officers of England, Scotland and Wales
Questionnaire
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SCOTTISH FOOTBALL SAFETY OFFICERS QUESTIONNAIRE:
SOME QUESTIONS ANSWERED
Why has the questionnaire been sent to you?
This questionnaire has been designed as part of a research project looking at the issue
of safety and crisis management in the football industiy. A copy of this questionnaire
has been sent to every professional football club in Scotland, Wales and England.
Interviews with thirty six clubs across Great Britain have been undertaken.
Who should complete the questionnaire?
Either the Club Match Day Safety Officer or the Club Official (e.g. Secretary ?)
responsible for day to day safety issues.
How long will it take?
Probably between fifleen and twenty minutes. Most answers involve ticking boxes or
circling numbers. A limited number may require a little more information.
What happens to the replies?
All responses will be treated in confidence. The aggregate findings will be written up
for final publication, but individual club responses will remain anonymous. These
aggregated findings will be presented to the Football Safety Officer's Association
(England & Wales) and individual clubs (Scotland) and to the various football
authorities.
How can you benefit from this project?
We will be happy to provide you with the results of our research findings. These will
be provided in a short, easy to read form. Findings will also be sent to the various
Football Leagues and Football Associations. The findings from earlier parts of this
project have already shaped guidelines on stewarding and football safety
management.
What if some questions appear inappropriate?
Please write in your response to the question, even if it differs from the choices you
are presented with.
Where do I return the questionnaire?
Please return in the enclosed stamped, addressed envelope to:
Dominic Elliott
Principal Lecturer in Corporate Strategy
Leicester Business School
De Montfort University
The Gateway
LEICESTER LE1 9BH
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION
WOULD YOU LIKE TO RECEWE A COPY OF OUR RESEARCH
FINDINGS?
1.	 Yes	 No
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PART A YOU AND YOUR CLUB
2. Club..........................
3. Division............
4. Are you :(pk tick)
Full Time Club Safety Officer 	 ()
Part Time Club Safety Officer	 ()
Club Secretary	 ()
Other(please specify).......................	 ()
5. Previous Employment
Police	 ()
Building Surveyor	 ()
Safety Management
	 ()
Other Club
	 ()
Club Administration	 ()
Other .pcci)...................	 ()
6. Length of time in current post
Less than I : ear	 ()
1-3 y ears
	 ()
4 -5 years	 ()
More than 5 years	 ()
7. How old are you?
18-30	 ( )
31-40	 ( )
41-50	 ( )
50-60	 ( )
61+	 ()
Which of the following do you believe will result from the introduction of all seater stadia?
8. Improved public safety
9. Faster evacuation
10. Improved spectator behaviour
11. Easier crowd control
12. Fewer police
13. Fewer stewards
14. Improved spectator comfort
15. Reduced hooliganism
1	 2	 is	 -,
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
PART B: STEWARDINC AND MATCH CONTROL
16. Does your stadium have a match control room
phuetick)	 Yes	 ( )
No	 ( )
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17. If yes, which of the following are usually located within the Control Room during matches
a) Police	 ( )
b) Club Safety Officer/Steward/Security Co	 ( )
d) Ambulance Service
	 ( )
e) Fire Service	 ( )
1)	 Other (please specif,') 	 ( )
19. Who is usually in charge of match operations tick one only
a) Police Match Commander	 ( )
b) Club Safety Officer/Steward/Security Co
	 ( )
c) Joint effort	 ( )
d) Other (please specily 	 ( )
20. \Vhat is the primary role of your stewards at a football match? (tick one only)
a) Ensuring Crowd Safety 	 ()
b) Ensuring Public Order 	 ( )
c) Other (please speciQj)	 ( )
21. What is the primary role of the police at a football match? (tick one only)
a) Ensuring Crowd Safety 	 ()
b) Ensuring Public Order	 ( )
c) Other (please specif') 	 ( )
22. Do you consider a match supervised by stewards only, i.e. with no police presence, to be a
genuine possibility at your club in the foreseeable future?
Yes	 ()
No	 ()
If no, then could you explain briefly your reasons?
23. How would you rate the overall quality of stewarding at your club now ? ( when I is vesy poor aod 5 is
cxceIIet)
Veiy	 Just	 Escdllent
Poor	 Adequite
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
24. How would you rate the overall quality of policing at your club now? (
	
i poor and 5 is cxceUeat)
Vety	 lust	 Excdlent
Poor	 Adequate
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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25. Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality of stewards you are able to recruit?
Vety	 Jug	 Eiccdllcnt
Poor	 Adequate
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
26. Do you consider that stewards and police officers should perform the same duties inside the
stadium?
(plesoc tick)	 Yes	 ( )
No	 ()
27. If no, briefly, how do these duties differ?
28. Which of the following training do new stewards (and private security) receive? : (Iik ii	 apply)
Introduction to venue and ground regulations 	 ( )
Introduction to safety legislation 	 ( )
Crowd dynamics (stress/overcrowding) 	 ( )
Crowd conirol(frisking/ejection etc.) 	 ( )
Customer service	 ( )
Major incident and emergency procedures	 ( )
Fire prevention/control 	 ( )
Firstaid	 ()
1-listory of stadia disasters	 ( )
Incident reporting	 ( )
Radioskills	 ()
29. How would you rate the overall quality of stewarding at your club prior to the Hilisborough
tragedy?
Vety	 Ju	 Excellent
Poor	 Adequate
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
30. How would you rate the overall quality of policing at your club prior to the Hilisborough Tragedy
? (betc I iu vety poor and 513 excellent)
Venj	 Ju	 Excellent
Poor	 Adequate
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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PART C GROUND iMPROVEMENTS
31. Have you undergone any major ground re-development since publication of the Taylor Report?
(pcioc titk)
Yes	 go q000tion 33)	 C )
No	 ()
32. If no, is this because: (Uk o&y)
a) not required to do so	 ( )
b) Lack of finance	 ( )
c) Uncertainty over future divisional status	 ( )
d) Ground already meets all safety standards	 ()
(pk&se go to qucotioc 3?)
How important were the following in your club's decision to redevelop your ground? (w	 ti vital
aod 5 is uithnportant)
Vital
1
I
1
I
I
1
33. Availability of finance
34. Need to respond to Stadia Tragedies
35. Taylor Report Recommendations
36. Local Council Safety Committee
37. Commitment to improve stadium
38. New Chairman/Board
IaqQrtaot	 )4egiblc
2	 3	 4	 5
2	 3	 4	 5
2	 3	 4	 5
2	 3	 4
	
S
2	 3	 4
	
5
2	 3	 4
	
5
39. Please indicate which of the following best describes how you are able to introduce all forms of
safety measures ? uck ne ot ctsly)
a) We sometimes are unable to comply with regulations	 C )
b) We always comply and sometimes do more than we are required to ( )
c) We always fully comply with legislation	 ( )
d) We always do more than required 	 ( )
e) We have been unable to comply with new regulations	 ( )
40. Do you believe that crowds using your stadium are safer now than they were before the
publication of the Taylor Report? li tick)
Safer	 ( )
About the Same	 ( )
Less Safe	 ( )
Don't Know	 ( )
41. 111 yes, wiich of the following do you consider to have been the single most important factor in
increased safety. (tick one box osly)
a) improvements to the Stadium	 ( )
b) Improved Stewarding	 ( )
c) Other (please specify) 	 ( )
42. Do you believe that you could have done more
(please tick)	 Yes	 ( )
No	 ()
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43. If yes, what has prevented you from doing more?
44. Using your knowledge of the Club for which you work, please place in order of priority, the three
most important objectives from the following list
a) Playing Success	 ( )
b) Financial Success	 C )
c) Financial Stability
	 ( )
d) Entertainment	 ( )
e) Crowd Safety	 ( )
f) Ground Improvement	 ( )
g) Local Area Success
	 ( )
h) Other (please specif,') 	 ( )
PART D AlTITUDES
Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 your view of the following where 1 is to strongly agree and 5 is to
strongly disagree. (plca circle)
45. We can handle any crowd incident.
46. A major tragedy can not happen
in our ground.
47. We now do enough in safety
management.
48. Disasters just happen, we
cannot prepare for them.
49. Only badly managed clubs
have crises.
50. Crises are usually caused.
by the mistakes of a few people.
51. Acrisishasoneortwo
causes.
52. We do not have time to fully
prepare for crises.
53. Well managed clubs do not
have crises.
54. Extensive safety management is
a luxury.
55. If a major crisis happens someone
else will rescue us.
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
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strongly	 strongly
agree	 unsure	 disagree
56. Every disaster is so different that
it is impossible to prepare for it.
	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
57. In a crisis our contingency plans
will see us through.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
58. We will be able to react to a
crisis in an objective and
rational manner.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
59. Our communication systems are
suflicient to deal with a major
incident.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
60. The police are responsible for
public safety.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
61. The police should, normally, have
no role within a football ground.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
62. Hillsborough was terrible but
current regulations are too much
ofaburden.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
63. My board of directors would never
compromise safety.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
64. The board never questions my advice
on safety expenditure.	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
65. Our local safety committee have little
understanding of the way football
clubs are managed. 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
66. The enforcement bodies expect too
much from clubs. 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.
SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR QUERIES, PLEASE CONTACT DOMINIC
ELLIOTT ON 0116-257 7245.
PLEASE RETURN TO:
D. ELLIOTT
PRiNCIPAL LECTURER IN CORPORATE STRATEGY
LEICESTER BUSiNESS SCHOOL
DE MONTFORT UNWERSITY
LEICESTER LE1 9BH
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Appendix 3.3
Club Executive Interview Respondent Characteristics
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Appendix 3.3
Club Executive Interview Respondent Characteristics
Club	 P1	 P2	 P3	 P4	 Fl	 F2	 F3	 - F4
Title of	 Sec.	 Sec.	 Gen. Mgi	 Sec	 Sec	 Stadium	 Sec.	 Chief Exec
interviewee___________ _________ __________ ___________ __________ Mgr
	 ___________
At Club	 23 years	 23 years	 28 yrs	 17 years	 3 years	 3 years	 23 years - 18 months
Background	 Soccer	 Soccer	 Various	 Soccer	 Police	 Police	 Accountan AccoUfltafl
________________ admin.
	 admin.	 __________ admin.	 _________ __________ t	 t
Estimated	 45	 60	 50	 40	 50	 50	 60	 35
Age(rounded to
nearest 5 years)	 _____________ ___________ ____________ _____________ ___________ _____________ _____________
Av. attendance	 16,834	 23,148	 29,459	 17,618	 12,400	 14,703	 18,390	 6,786
91/2	 ___________ _________ __________ ___________ __________ ___________ ___________ __________
Board Member	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No -
Full time safety	 Private	 Yes	 Yes	 Consultant	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Part time
officer/stadium	 security/
mgiPart time	 ________ _________ _________ ________ _________ _________ _________
Safety officer	 Police	 Police	 Soccer	 Police	 Police	 Police	 Soccer	 Police
background__________ _________ admin.
	 __________ _________ __________ admin. 	 _________
______________ SI
	 S2	 S3	 S4	 TI	 T2	 T3	 T4
Title	 Chief Exec Sec.	 Sec	 Sec	 Sec	 Chief Exec Sec.	 Sec
At Club	 40 years	 2 years	 1 year	 17 years	 5 years	 1 year	 2 years	 18 month
Background	 Soccer	 4 years in Commerce Soccer 	 Soccer	 Accountan Soccer	 N/A
admin.	 soccer	 admin.	 admin.	 t	 admin
___________ _______ adrnm. ______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
Estimated	 65	 30	 35	 55	 55	 40	 50	 25
Age(rounded to
nearest 5 years)	 ____________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
Av. attendance	 8,511	 10,521	 6,279	 2,608	 2,904	 4,492	 1,857	 1,677
91/2	 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ _________
Board Member	 Yes	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 No
Full time safety	 Yes	 Consultant Part time	 Matchday Matchday Consultant Matchday Matchday
officer__________ __________ __________ only 	 only	 __________ only	 __________
Safety officer	 Police	 Private	 Police	 Surveyor	 Police	 Police	 Unkno	 Local
background__________ secunty	 __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ authoriy_
_______________ Sd
	 Sc2	 Sc3	 Sc4
Title	 Safety	 Safety	 Club	 Club
__________ Officer
	 Officer	 Secretaiy Secretary
At Club	 5 years	 3 years	 18 years	 12 years
Background	 Police	 Police	 Club	 Club
__________ ______ ______ adrnin
	 admin
Estimated	 60	 60	 45	 45
Age(rounded to
nearest 5 years)	 ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
Av.attendance	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A
91/2	 confidenti	 confidenti	 confidenti	 confidenti
___________ _______ ality	 ality	 ality
Board Member	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes
Full time safety	 Yes	 No	 No	 No
officer__________ __________
Safety officer	 Police	 Police
background__________ ___________ __________ __________
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Premier Division
P1 had some thirty years of experience in the football industry and had been at the club for over
fifleen years. The Club had recently been purchased by a prominent businessman and had
experienced a major turnaround in its fortunes. The interview took place in F2's office with minimal
interruption.
P2 had had over thirty years experience within the football industry and had spent some twenty five
years at the present club. The interview took place in P2's office and lasted for one hour and twenty
minutes. P2 was a member of the board.
Although P3 had been in post for some five years, F4 had had twenty eight years working for the
club, originally as a part time turnstile operator. The interview took places in F4's office with
minimal interruption.
P4 combined the club secretary and safety officer. Both had been with the club for over twenty years
and were clearly good friends.
First Division
Fl was a former police officer who had been in the post with the club for less than five years. The
Club had recently emerged from severe financial difficulties and had been recently purchased by a
prominent businessman. The interview took place at the Club in an open plan office with other
administrative staff present. Fl was a member of the board.
F2 consisted of two members of staff, one the safety officer the other the stadium manager. One had
been with the club for some 10 years following a successful commercial career. The other had been
with the club for three years following a police career. A high level of trust appeared to exist
between the two and the interview lasted for two and a half hours.
F3 had been the Club secretary for over twenty years, following a career as an accountant, and was a
member of the board. The interview lasted for some three hours and the safety offlcerjoined the
interview for the last hour.
F4 had been a keen semi-professional footballer and Chartered accountant and had been in post for
eighteen months.
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Second Division
Si had been a professional footballer and had had experience as a football administrator in a number
of clubs. Si had been at the club for over twenty years. the interview lasted for two hours.
S2 was an ex lower league football player and after two years experience at another club had been in
post for eighteen months.
S3 had worked for the club over a twelve year period, interrupted by an eight year stint in commerce.
S2 had been in current post for twelve months. The meeting lasted for some three hours and the
interview was used by the interviewee to avoid another meeting with a 'difficult player'.
S4 had been in post, as Chief Executive, for some eighteen years. S4 was a board member and used
the interview to avoid listening to the chairman talk 'a lot of waffle'.
Third Division
Ti had worked in a senior capacity for a number of clubs in the preceding twenty five years and had
been in post for some two years.
T2 had been in post for twelve months and had been brought in to 'turnaround the club'. T2's
background was as a management accountant and had little experience of football.
T3 had worked for a number of clubs over a period of twenty years, with a four year break, and had
held the current position for some two years.
T4 had been in post for less than twelve months and had had little work experience before joining the
club.
Scottish Clubs
SC 1 had been in post for more than 10 years and the club had complied with Taylor's
recommendations for some time
SC2 was a retired police officer who had been in post for five years.
SC3 had been in post, as part time safety officer, for some 18 months. Prior to this he had been a
retired police officer.
SC4 had held the post of club secretary/chief executive for 7 years. Prior to this he had held another
administrative post at another club.
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Appendix 3.4
Letter to Local Authorities Safety Advisory Group Chairpersons
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April21, 1997
Dear Sir/Madam,
I am currently completing a five year study of crowd safety and the UK Football
Industry. The study, which has been undertaken with the support of the football
authorities, has two main objectives.
(i) Examination of the underlying causes of the UK football stadia disasters
1946-89
(ii) Analysis of the responses of clubs and the various agencies associated with the
football industry to the tragedies.
In addition to extensive interviews with football club executives, I have interviewed
and surveyed members of those agencies with an interest in crowd safety (including
FA, Police, FLA, Home Office, Politicians, Local Authorities, and members of the
Football Safety Officers' Association) The result, to date, has been one of the most
comprehensive analyses of this subject.
As a final stage in this study I intend to examine the role of the Safety Advisory
Group. To enable me to do this I would be grateful if you would grant me a 10-15
minute telephone interview to discuss the role of your Safety Advisory Group. I
shall treat all discussions sensitively and in the strictest confidence - an assurance
given to all participants in this study.
The areas of interest to me currently concern the following broad areas:
a) The responsiveness of the Club to S.A.G. recommendations.
b) The nature of the contribution of members of the S.A.G.
c) Strengths and Weaknesses of the S.A.G. system.
Your local authority is one of a small, carefully selected sample (reflecting the
geographical dispersion, league status and size of the football clubs for which you
have responsibility). I would be very grateful, therefore, if you could confirm your
willingness to participate in this study by either writing to me or by fax indicating
your support to Dominic Elliott 0116251 7548 or of course by phone 0116 257
7245 (work) 0116 2858292 (home).
I will however, endeavour to make contact with you weeks commencing April 28th
and May 5th. Should you require further information or background please do not
hesitate to contact me. You will of course be sent copies of the final research
report.
Yours faithfully
Dominic Elliott
Principal Lecturer in Corporate Strategy
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Appendix 5.1
Plan of Heysel Stadium Layout
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Appendix 6.1
Pre rotation Factor variable Loadings
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Appendix 6.1
Pre Rotation Factor variable Loadings
1997	 Pre-	 Pre-	 Pre-	 Pre-	 Pre-	 Pre-	 Pre-
Factor	 Factor	 Factor	 Factor	 Factor	 Factor	 Factor
____ 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
Q45	 .14410	 .68260	 .20530	 .04316	 -.32917	 .01156	 -.02852
Q46	 .35062	 .50216	 .04475	 -.31895	 -.23272	 .07119	 -.25571
Q47	 .01908	 .47635	 .06440	 -.34560	 .02967	 .14230	 -.61400
Q48	 .59419	 .07191	 -.11591	 -.06069	 -.28117	 -.42063	 -.06575
Q49	 .51569	 -.01381	 .47197	 .29480	 -.24486	 .05441	 -.08978
Q50	 .30269	 .23824	 .48253	 -.14788	 .39654	 -.32370	 .23129
Q51	 .26320	 .44096	 .47916	 -.00797	 .41630	 -.06347	 -.01853
Q52	 .59013	 -.30689	 -.28893	 .09811	 .17340	 .35655	 -.15883
Q53	 .48357	 -.05085	 .39807	 .45133	 -.16444	 .16829	 .15163
Q54	 .63470	 -.25754	 .14707	 .15471	 .19123	 .00137	 -.32377
Q55	 .71012	 -.35314	 -.07407	 .06027	 .00851	 .24581	 .09237
Q56	 .66869	 .13191	 -.43083	 .12512	 .04872	 -.02956	 .01952
Q57	 -.01429	 .68445	 .09205	 .16375	 -.30942	 .05416	 .28306
Q58	 -.17829	 .53430	 -.06007	 .20338	 .19448	 .57102	 .22318
Q59	 -.02012	 .67101	 -.29558	 .06261	 .28441	 .11014	 -.05164
Q60	 .11504	 .29814	 -.27586	 .36494	 .55181	 -.31972	 -.02860
Q61	 .32563	 -.18334	 .42178	 -.58399	 .15263	 .09738	 .27790
Q62	 .46398	 .05970	 -.34453	 -.56971	 .05916	 .18011	 .27984
Q66	 .44792	 .30759	 -.51038	 -.01436	 -.21503	 -.26126	 .21773
%oftotal	 18.0	 15.4	 10.2	 7.7	 7.0	 5.7	 5.3
variance
explained__________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________
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